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The period 1911-14 has, until late, been largely ignored 
by historians, and, like so many other periods, even when it 
has been covered, there has been little attempt to investi­
gate the attitudes of the people of the time to the events. 
This thesis endeavours to compensate for this, at least to a 
small degree. It examines the class structure of the period, 
and then looks at the working class unrest of the time from 
the eyes of the community. It was an especially strike-prone 
age and for the first time, there were national stoppages 
and smpathetlc_walk-out s .^wlth^he _threat_of _S3Tidicall sm 
lurking in the background. Some believed that revolution 
was imminent. Unfortunately, the sources have been limited 
by the availability of material, but, nevertheless, the 
thesis represents the nearest approximation possible to 
publi c opinion. It reveals that the nation did not have 
a single view on any of the major disputes, and that the j
split was not entirely along •political lines. Some Tories 
were quite sympathetic to the working class, whilst certain
Liberals were extremely traditional and authoritarian.
, <•
Moreover, attitudes did not remain constant, but changed 
with events. Finally, the results of this study are looked 
at in relation to several theories on public opinion, and, 
as such, virtually represent a case study for sociological
John Douglas Pratten ‘The Reaction to Working Class Unrest,
1911-1914'
theorists.
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Preface
This thesis began as a private study of the militant ■
-.<« *
unionism in the pre-war period, and developed into its 
present form simply because the information was not 
avallahle. The reaction of the Irish and Scots ha£» not 
been included simply because they are different in attitude, 
and each would require a separate thesis, ill money is in 
£ s. d., and has not been converted into decimal currency. 
The standard conversion table is printed below.
£ s. d. to Decimal
TABLE H TABLE 2
shillings new pence shillings new pence old pence new pence
1 5 11 55 1 &
2 10 12 60 2 1
3 15 13 65 3 1
A 20 1A 70 A ' «JL»2
5 25 15 75 5 2
6 30 16 80 6 2-I-
7 35 17 85 7 3
8 AO 18 90 8 3i
9 A5 19 95 9 A
10 50 20 100 10
11
A
Air
For sums in shillings and pence read the shillings equivalent 
Table 1 and the pence from Table 2.
Add the two figures Example 15s 8d = (75 + 3i)p
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Chapter I
Public Opinion in Edwardian England
Politicians regularly claim that their actions have 
resulted from the force of public opinion, yet it is very 
doubtful that the whole of a community has over felt the same 
way on any issue. A war is usually taken as an excellent 
example of a united nation, but the Second World War, for 
all that it demonstrated a remarkably determined body of 
people, nevertheless, produced a small group of Britishers 
whose political sympathies lay with the Nazis, and, as such, 
hoped for a German victory. In addition, there were those 
who disapproved of all wars on principle, and merely wanted 
to see an end to bloodshed, rather than the defeat of the 
enemy. Despite this, most people would maintain that every­
body supported the war efforts: public opinion was with the 
Allies.
Any attempt to analyse public opinion will be hampered by 
a shortage of sources, for the whole population will not have 
recorded its views on any particular Issue, even presuming 
that everybody would-have adopted an attitude, which must be
IhI regarded as doubtful in itself. Hence, it is only possible
o-« L i V '
to look at the material which does exist, and to,hope that
this gives the differing opinions on the events. The most
obvious disseminator of information, normally with comments 
*
'S'* the mass media. In Edwardian England, this, meant the 
press. The politicians themselves'are crucial, for their 
actions can help to determine the course of events, and are 
the result of the demands of the nation - or, perhaps, merely
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make that claim. The economic and social background of the 
politicians has to be considered, as these factors could* ■ 
influence a man's behaviour. ,To determine their attitudes, 
the speeches of politicians have been studied and also their 
private papers, so as to eliminate the difference, if any, 
between their private and public utterances. Contemporary 
articles and books, including novels, biographies and auto­
biographies have also been .used. Despite the dangers of 
relying on such material, there is little alternative.
Within any group, some will always dominate, through wisdom, 
ability, sheer loudness, or other means. Because they are 
able to influence others, their opinions are of importance, • 
and it is such people who are most likely to have left a 
permanent record of their views.
The Press -
In a society that lacked radio and television, the 
press provided the information on world and domestic affairs 
that the public required. In Edwardian England, there was a 
variety of daily newspapers, weekly papers and the more 
serious journals, which appeared weekly, monthly, or even 
quarterly. Of course, there can be notproof that the press 
could shape the attitudes of its readers. Dibblee, writing 
in 1913) expressed his own doubts on this topic, arguing 
that, so far as the poular papers were concerned, ’in all 
matters of opinion what they say is a matter of indifference. 
Their function is to supply to those who already agree with 
them a brief and effective setting for obvious facts and
,3f- 1 *
sometimes just, so much misrepresentation as to make more , 
unpalatable facts a little more tolerable’. ,Dibblee, then, 
was observing that people with a political persuasion-read 
a newspaper with similar views. Some journals, Dibblee 
' continued, were read for their stories rather than their 
political affiliations, and would have but little impact 
in formulating the attitude of its readers. He noted that 
’in London, it is conspicuous how insignificant their 
political efforts may be. In the last three elections the 
the most populous parts of London have on the whole voted 
in the sense contrary to the two or three sensational 
journals which have the largest circulations in those 
localities*.^ Thus, Dibblee was insisting that most 
people chose a paper which concurred with their own 
political stand point, but the more trivial papers were 
taken for their entertainment value rather than editorial 
content, so that they probably did not reflect the ideas 
of many of their readers. However, most other papers did, 
and if Dibblee was correct, then an Investigation 
of the politics of the non-sensational newspapers, coupled 
with an analysis of their circulations, would provide an 
approximate range of national opinions on any particular 
issue.
(T) In Edwardian England, there was a wide variety of news* 
papers, catering for a whole host of tastes, but their circula- 
• tions are not easy to obtain. A.P. Wadsworth, who was the 
editor of the Manchester Guardian after the Second World
(1) G.B. Dibblee, The Newspaper (1913) p. 109,
War, believes that ’we can only guess at the circulation of 
most of them during the period of secrecy between the 1850» s 
and the 1930’s.*2)
Even when a newspaper did issue its sales' figures, it 
was necessary to distinguish between audited net circulation 
figures and publishers’ assertions, which could easily have 
been the result of wishful thinking, or a reversion to the 
number of sales when the paper was in its prime. One source 
is useful in this respect. T.B. Browne's Advertisers' ABC 
of Official Scales and Charges was an annual directory whioh 
explained the position and status of every part of the press, 
so that intending advertisers would be able to decide where 
their needs could best be satisfied. According to this book, 
the guaranteed average daily sales of the leading papers in 
1910 were*«
Daily Express over 400,000
Daily Mail over 900,000
Daily Mirror 450,000
Daily News over 200,000
Labour Leader 17,000
Empire 454,765
Weekly Dispatch over 400,000
The following year, the Morning Leader was claiming 250,000, 
and by 1914 the Daily Citizen gave on uncertified circulation 
of 200,000. Wadsworth has made estimates which embrace
(2) A.P. Wadsworth, 'Newspaper Circulations 1800-1954', 
Manchester Statistical Society (1955) p. 1.
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several other paper
1911 19U
Daily Telegraph 250,000 200,000
Observer
Sunday Times
50,000 14.0,000
25,000 27,500^
A.K. Russell has issued circulation figures for some 
journals for the year 1906, but he has provided no source, 
not has he stated whether or not they are the official 
figures: -
Daily Chronicle 200,000
Daily Express 300,000
Daily Graphic 100,000
Daily Mail 750,000
Daily Mirror 350,000
Daily News 200,000
Daily Telegraph 285,000
Morning Leader 150,000
Morning Post 60,000
Standard 80,000
Times ' 30,0003 (4)
Even if all of these figures were accurate, they do not 
indicate how many readers there were to each copy, and whether 
or not the number varied between different papers, so that the 
total readership is virtually impossible to ascertain. More- 
over, there would be no way of discovering how many people
(3) Ibid p. 35.
(4-) A.K. Russell, Liberal Landslide (Newton Abbot, 1973) p. 138
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actually read the political comment. Thus, the true political. *.:• m
import of a newspaper cannot be discovered with absolute .accuracy 
but at least it has been possible to arrive at the political 
persuasion of each, major paper, and to examine the content, 
emphasis and status in the community of (very journal. Some of 
the most informed sources on these questions are the annual 
trade guides dealing with the newspaper industry. T.B. Browned 
Advertisers' ABC has already been mentioned in connection with 
circulation figures. Other useful manuals include the 
National Press Directory (N.P.D.), Willing's Press Guide, and 
Sell's Dictionary of the World's Press. Useful as these are, 
it must be borne in mind that they are trade papers, and as 
such tend to be uncritical of the periodicals that they 
discuss. This does not detract greatly from their general 
comments on the status of each paper, us long as it is 
remembered that the glowing terms might have to be played down 
a little. A few books written at the time, or published later 
by contemporaries, supplement« our knowledge of the character­
istics of each paper.
(o) The majority of the press supported the Conservative Party,
and in particular, the high prestige section was almost solidly 
behind the Unionists. Perhaps the most famous British news­
paper was the Times, which had been founded in 1785. The N.P.D. 
claimed that 'no journal has enjoyed such world wide fame',^  
The paper itself was well aware'of its position, and announced 
that it was 'the only newspaper published in Great Britain 
which reaches ALL the wealthy and leisured classes of the 5
(5) N.P.D. (1912) p. 62
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(6Vcommunity1. ' ' This was probably true, and moreover,' it was
beginning to reach more and more people. In 1908, when the
price was 3d, it had a circulation of 38,000. A reduction
to 2d on 5 May 1913» and then to 1d on 16 March 1914- ensured
a rise to 150,000. The full in price coincided with a change
in owner. Lord Northcliffe, who was already the proprietor
of several papers, including the Daily Mail, took over the
Times in 1908. The editors also altered at this time.
C.F. Buckle, who had been in charge since 1884, retired in
August 1912, to be succeeded by G. Dawson, at that time colled
Robinson (he assumed the name of Dawson in 1917). His social
o^nce
background reflected that of the paper,^ha^isa^been educated 
at Eton and Magdalen* College, Oxford, and then working in
the Colonial Office before taking up journalism. Thus, the
Times, with its exclusive readership, had an editor whose .
class position reflected its tone.
Another paper supporting the Conservatives, and almost
matching the Times in prestige, was the Standard. The editor
of the Daily Express at the time, R.D. Blumenfeld, described
(7)it as ’one of the most influential papers of its kind’,
■ and the N.P.D. pointed out that, ’while maintaining conservative 
principles, the Standard reserves the right to apply those 
principles to the question of the day, without regard to party 
politics or special devotion to the views of party leaders 67*
(6) T.B. Browne (1910) p. 354,
(7) R.D. Blumenfeld, The Press in my Time (1933) p. 72
(S) N.F.D. (1912) p. 62
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No doubt this was accurate, for the paper was extremely
orthodox in its politics, and would be critical of anyone who
deviated from the lines of traditional Tory policy. The
readership was from the same class as the Times, and it saw
itself in the same light; 'where goods of a high class and
artistic nature are to be disposed of, or where buyers more
than usually wealthy are to be appealed to, the Advertising
Columns of the Standard is always requisitioned - with
(9)gratifying results'.
A third highly respectable Conservative paper was the 
Morning Post. The N.P.D. observed that, ’as a medium for 
announcements which is desired to bring before the notice'.of 
the high and wealthy classes, the Morning Post cannot be 
s u r p a s s e d ' I t  was particularly celebrated for its Social 
and Court pages, and it was regarded as 'the best advertising 
medium for domestic staff, housemaids, ladies' maids,-valets, 
butlers, and those like appendages of the wealthy home'.^"^ 
Thus, under the editorship of H.A. Gwynne, who had controlled 9*1
(9) T.B. Browne (1910) P. 354
(1°) N.P.D. (1912) p. 62
(11) ¥. MacQueen-Pone. Twenty Shillings in the Pound (1948)
Sir Charles Petrie has told the story of the 
employer who asked her butler if he would like to 
see a paper, handing him the Morning Post and 
received the reply, ^"No thank you my lady: I
am perfectly happy with my present post'".
C. Petrie, Scenes from Edwardian Life (1965) 
p» 54
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the Standard for the seven years up to 1911, it maintained‘a
■■■*, *
high class audience, and was in the words of Blumenfeld, a
(12)'comparative exclusive class organ'.
The other great Tory news sheet was the Daily Telegraph.
which possessed a larger circulation than the other three
quality papers of similar persuasion, and it was 'very widely
(13)read among business men'.-" It was owned by an active 
proprietor, Henry Lawson, and edited by John Le Sage, who had 
been on the staff since 1863, and was celebrated for his 
autocratic views. Together, they ensured that the Daily 
Telegraph retained its Unionist allegiance. .
All of these papers .cost 1d by 1914-, but support for the 
Conservatives was not confined to these relatively expensive 
journals. ^ The foundation of the Daily Mail in 1896 had begun 
the era of mass journalism, with copies selling at ^d..
R.A. Scott-James noted that, in 1913, there were 'many circles 
in which the "half-penny Press” is still alluded to as some­
thing wholly vulgar and contemptible, whilst the "Penny Press" 
is still supposed to stand for the respectable,-decent, 
orderly, responsible, and dignified, if dull'.^"*^ Never­
theless, the cheaper papers had achieved an extremely wide 
circulation. The most popular was the original, the Daily 
Mail, which was selling one million copies a day by 1914-.
Its owner claimed that bad journalism occurred when the 
'leading articles are like gramaphone records', and, to 123*5
(12) R.D. Blumenfeld op. cit. p. 55
(13) N.P.D. (1912) p. 61
(U) R.A. Scott-James, The Influence of the Press (1913) p.'llO
(15) R. Pound and G, Harms^orth, Northcliffe (1959) p. 4.O4.
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prevent this, the aim of the editor, T, Marlowe, was to avoid
monotony. Despite its immense soles, estimates of its ability
to manipulate opinion varied. The N.P.D. believed that 'its
influence on matters of public interest is considerable',
and MacQueen-Pope, looking back, maintained that it was 'the
(17^daily paper wielding the widest influence'. However,
Raymond Postgate has disagreed completely, asserting that 
'its influence in no way corresponded to its circulation, and 
it was despised by its own party, whose leaders had described 
it as written by office boys for office b o y s ' . N e v e r t h e ­
less, the Dally Mall did have a massive readership, which 
could not enjoy as wide a coverage of the news as in the 
quality papers, but who could learn about events both interest* 
ing and serious - and always from a Conservative stand point.
The Daily Mail's most serious ■rlval-Was_the_DallvLExpress. 
whose 'editorial policy is that of an honest Cabinet Minister -
jnsPlred-hy^L-sincere desire to.do.and.say what „may best serve
our country, a resolute determination to combat influences 
making for .the national . d e t r i m e n t A g a i n ,  its concept 
of the national interest coincided with that of the Conservative 
Party. Its editor, Blumenfeld was the son of a Canadian news­
paper owner. His political affiliations are revealed in his 
private papers. In 1907, he invited Hugh Oakeley-Forster to 
join an association, almost certainly the Anti-Socialist Union. 1678920
(16) N.P.D. (1912) p. 61
(17) W. MacQueen-Pope op.clt. p, 350
(18) R. Postgate, The Life of George Lansburv (1951) p. 135
(19) N.P.D. (1911) p. 61
(20) Blumenfeld Papars AEN1. Letter from Amold-Forster to
Blumenfeld, 4 December 1907.
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In fact, Blumenfeld helped to found this society, and used the
columns of his paper to advance its cause. With such a m m  Gt
its head, the tone of the Dally Express was predictable.
T*16 Dally Graphic was another id paper, but one which
attempted to appear more sophisticated than the others. It
claimed to be read by 'the intelligent and well-to-do classes
Certainly, it devoted a great deal of space to activities in
the social world, possibly in the hope of attracting those
middle class readers who were interested in such affairs.
Thus, the Conservatives were well served by the quality
and popular national morning press. The Liberal Party also
had journals upon which it could rely for support. The
most prestlgeous of these was on evening paper, the Westminster
Gazette; The N.P.D. commented on its 'reputation for fairness
and Impartiality which has given it a position of its own
among London newspapers, and a remarkable influence over
- ( 22)thinking men of all political persuasions’. / If it failed
to alter the views of those who supported the Conservatives, 
it was, nevertheless, 'probably the only paper in the capital 
on the Liberal side in politics which is habitually read by 
an influencial section of its opponents' The Westminster
Gazette itself believed that it appealed to 'a large and well- 
to-do public '»^) and it would certainly be read by anyone 
who wanted to know how the Liberals felt on any particular 
issue. Lord Curzon insisted that it was 'in the lead of 2134
(21) T.B. Browne (1910) p. 970'
(22) N.P.D. (1911) p. 62
(23) G.B. Dibblee op.cit. p, 185
(24) T.B. Browne (1910) p. 361
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(25)thoughtful Liberal opinion', "  and Scott-James went so far
*
as to state that 'it is scarcely an exaggeration to call its 
editor a member of the Liberal C a b i n e t T h e  man in 
question was J.A. Spender, an Oxford graduate who had worked 
at Toynbee Hall before entering journalism, thus combining 
social position with an understanding of the plight of the 
poor.'
This was not the only London based Liberal paper that 
could match the quality Unionist ones on appearance and 
seriousness of content. The Daily Chronicle, edited from 1902 
by Robert Donald, became popular after its price had been
reduced to -gd in 1905. The N.P.D. was probably correct to
assert that it was' 'one of the leading organs of the daily 
(071press', ' for, as the paper itself claimed, its contents
(281would 1 appeal to the multitude or to,the select *.' 'On 
occasions, it was extremely radical, but it was not as close 
to the Liberal hierarchy as the Westminster Gazette. This is 
well illustrated in a letter that its editor wrote to Murray, 
the Master of Elibank, in 1912. Murray was the-Parliamentary 
Secretary to the Treasury, and Donald wanted some guidance.
He and his paper had been critical of the Government's handling 
of the coal strike, and Donald: did not want this-:to recur, so 
he urged closer coordination to avoid Liberal newspapers 
attacking the Liberal Party in Parliament: 'X think it is a : 25678
(25) Spender Papers- B.M. Add. Ms. 46391 f.7. Letter from
Curson to Spender, 28 December 1905.
(26) R.A. Scott-Jernes op.cit. p. 211
(27) NjJPjD. (1912) P. 61
(28) Browne (1910) p. 344
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very great pity that the Cabinet Committee do not give the,
newspapers, more especially the Liberal newspapers, hints
(29)privately to guide theta on the lines to follow’.
A similar paper was the Morning Leader, whose quality 
was higher than the popular -gd press, but not as prestigeous 
as the more expensive organs. It had ’a large and unique 
circulation by reason of the reliability of its news and its 
ably written editorials’. In 1912, the Morning Leader was 
incorporated into the Daily News as the Daily News and Leader, 
whose joint circulation reached 4-50,000 by 191 -4* It was 
owned by the Cadbury family, and contained neither racing news 
nor. liquor advertisements after the Quaker confectionary 
manufacturers bought it in 1901, and helped to create 'one 
of the leading organs of the Liberal daily press. It devotes
special consideration to religious matters and the welfare of
(30) (31)the working classes' and to 'social reform'. Dibblee
regarded it as a radical journal, representing 'wifeh much
ability the views of the left-wing of the Liberal Party, not
(32)at all Socialist and quite distinct from the Labour Press'. 1 
OtV\SL"
One^major national paper existed, the Daily Mirror, and 
this managed to retain its political allegiance.. It had been 
founded as a women's paper, but this idea had been abandoned, 
and under the editorship of Alexander Kenealy, had reached a 
circulation of over one million by 1914. It was in no way *3012
•(29) Eli bank Papers NLS Ms. 8803 f25. Letter from Donald to 
Elibank, 12 March 1912.
(30) N.P.D. (1912) p. 61
(31) Ibid (1913) p. 61
(32) G.B. Dibblee op.cit. p. 178 ,
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serious, and provided light reading for those who wanted it.
* ■
The natters of the moment were discussed, but seldom in depth.
The Labour Party had its own.press. The Labour Leader, 
a weekly, had been in existence since 1891. It was serious, 
without being too weighty, and represented the views of the 
Independent Labour Party. A more militant journal was the 
Daily Herald, which had begun life as a strike sheet for 
printing workers in 1911, and appeared in 1912 as a regular 
daily. It did not have a set political stance, but it did 
support all strikes, and it tended to look on Parliament as 
a waste of time - it devoted a section to ’The House of , 
Pretence', in which scorn was poured on this institution - 
but it supported anyone who tried to help the working class 
in the Commons. Its more moderate rival was the Daily 
Citizen, which commenced printing in 1912, shortly after the 
Herald. . It was the official paper of the Labour Party, and 
consequently supported the Parliamentary process, while 
expressing concern about the Daily Herald's advocacy of 
extreme policies.
Thus, there was a wide variety of newspapers* though those 
with allegiance to the Unionists werd in the majority. In 
addition, there was a strong weekly press. Ofte group was 
similar - they were serious, good quality, and sided with the 
Tories. These included the Sunday Times. Spectator. Observer, 
and Economist. There were two other periodicals with the same 
characteristics, but different politics. The Nation aimed to 
represent the thinking radical section of the Liberal Party, 
and the Lew St at e sman had been founded in 1913 to present the' 
case for the some group and other intelligent people who.were
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on the fringes of the Labour Party - the Fabians in particular.
.. V *
Less serious weeklies existed - the equivalent of the -§d
daily press. The News of the World. People. Umpire, Referee.
and Weekly Dispatch come into this category as supporters of
the Tories. Another paper, which regarded itself as ’the best
(33)medium for reaching the millions of industrial workers','
was Reynold’s Newspaper, which tended towards radicalism.
This was hardly surprising, as it was owned by a Liberal M.P.,
Sir Henry Dalziel, who was well-known for his ‘advanced views
on all political and social questions',K 1 and whose paper
contained 'much strong writing,, and is outspoken in its
articles on political and social questions affecting the
(35)welfare cf the people’.
Thus, the Conservatives tended to dominate the popular 
weekly press. There was another series of periodical publica­
tions. This was the era of.the reviews, which' appeared monthly 
or quarterly, giving lengthy, intelligent, and serious analyses 
of events, in the light of their political persuasions. They 
included a large number of articles from experts who were not 
on their staffs, and, because of their intellectual presenta­
tion, had a small circulation, made up of those sufficiently 
interested in the subjects involved, with enough leisure time 
to digest the details, and an adequate education to comprehend 
the arguments. The readership was small, confined to the 
more affluent classes, and in particular, those who felt 
particularly needful of the maximum amount of knowledge - 345
(33) Willing’s Press Guide (19111 p, 437
(34) Pod’s Parliamentary Companion (1911) p. 260
(35) N.P.D. (1912) p. 74
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they could veil have been the opinion leaders vithin their , 
social groupings.
Both these periodicals and the political veeklies enjoyed 
low circulations, and some might have been subsidised by 
wealthy patrons, who supported their political idea.s, and 
wished to permit the papers to continue to supply information 
and concepts to the most thoughtful and discriminating sec­
tions of the community in the hope that these people might 
be able to propogate the notions which they read.
Of course, not everyone read national newspapers. There 
was a very strong local press. Probably the most famous paper 
was-the Manchester Guardian, which was read by the 'wealthy and 
important c l a s s ' , n o t  just in Manchester, but throughout 
the country. Dibblee confirmed that it was 'not only the
leading paper in its district, but also a newspaper of
(37)universal range and importance'. \ This paper,had a great 
tradition of Liberalism, and was especially prominent in this 
period, under its powerful editor and owner, C.P. Scott, but 
most of the other notable local papers inclined towards the 
Unionists.
Hence, there was an extensive press, most of which was 
Conservative in political belief, and each had its own ideas 
of orthodox Conservatism, so that the whole spectrum of Tory 
politics was covered. Similarly, the Liberal Party's news­
papers were not -united in their opinions, ranging from radical­
ism to orthodoxy. Given such a wide-ranging spread of views, 
a reader could easily select the paper which best represented 36
(36) T.B. Browne (1910) p, 982
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his interests, if he so wished. There is no evidence to show 
that this was done, but it is reasonable to assume that only 
a limited number of people would regularly read a journal 
whose attitudes they detested. Although it would be danger­
ous to rely on the press as an indicator of public opinion, 
it would be a fair presumption that a large section of the 
community concurred with the ideas printed in the newspapers 
it read.
Political Parties
The attitudes of certain members of the public can be 
discovered by studying the remaining material of the various 
political parties, which can reveal the attitudes of not 
only the prominent figures, but also of the constituency 
activists. Of course, such people con hardly be taken as 
representative of the nation as a whole, but, because they 
were directly concerned with public affairs, their opinions 
can be regarded as typical of the most active elements in the 
society. Their very involvement meant that they must have 
discussed the issues of the day with friends and business 
colleagues, and, thus, their ideas would have found a wider 
audience than their co-workers within the parties they 
supported. •
The reports of the annual conferences of the various
political parties have almost all survived. Unfortunately, 
these have not always been published fully, so that not 
every word spoken has been recorded. In addition, the 
conferences often attempted to deal with a very wide variety 
of topics, leaving little time for debate on the subjects of
- 18 -
social conditions and industrial unrest. Consequently, this 
has not proved to be as valuable a source as had seemed 
possible, but there have been several useful insights into 
the views of some of the most politically involved groups in 
the country.
Speeches
Some of those speaking at the annual conferences were 
members of the House of Commons or the House of Lords. The 
Parliamentary Debates are reported in full, and contain a . 
wealth of information about the reaction of the various 
groups in Parliament to the unrest. Moreover, such people 
were likely to be better informed than the rest of the 
community, so that their opinions could be regarded as 
especially valuable. Needless to say, the speeches that were 
made would be reported in the press, though the amount of 
coverage depended on the seriousness of the paper. Politicians 
did not confine their words to Parliament, and the press often 
reported speeches made around the country by major figures. 
These, too, help to provide on up-to-date account of the way 
in which politicians and political parties were thinking on 
certain events. - ‘
It would be impossible to state that the supporter of a 
party would automatically concur with the views of leading 
politicians within that party, so that a definite correlation 
between speeches and public opinion cannot be made. However, 
there are always some people who support their political party, 
no matter what, and other who believe that ,a certain public 
figure con say no wrong, and they, at least, are likely to 
be influenced by such speeches.
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Unpublished Papers
Of course, it is necessary to look even closer at these 
<politicians, because the public utterances do not always 
coincide with their private beliefs. It could be argued that 
the role of a politician is to reflect public opinion, and act 
in the way in which the community has already indicated that 
policy should follow. However, at least part of' the objec­
tive of a statesman is to mould the nation's views, so that 
it will concur with the aims which the politician thinks 
ought to be pursued. In order to discover whether or not
there was any dichotomy between public statements and secret 
feelings, it is necessary to investigate their private, 
unpublished papers, together with those of the relevant 
Government departments, and the Cabinet documents.
The Home Office collection shows how -the relevant 
minister responded to events, and the files show letters from 
other senior politicians, and from business men and ordinary 
citizens who were concerned by events. It is difficult to 
know whether or not these letters and telegrams con be relied 
upon as wholly accurate. However, very few people would take 
the trouble to communicate with the Home Secretary unless the 
issue was especially dear to them, and their very tone carries 
a ring of sincerity which indicates their authenticity. The 
records of the Board of Trade and the War Office failed to 
reveal much information, but the Cabinet Papers and the Letters
from the Prime Minister to the King contain the opinions of 
those members of the Government who felt strongly on any 
particular issue, even when they disagreed with the concensus 
view of the Cabinet. The attitude of the Monarch himself is
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sometimes recorded. There con be little reason to doubt the 
genuineness of these papers. , .
Farther relevant unpublished collections take the form of 
private papers of individuals, most of which have been deposited 
in libraries. The Royal Commission on Historical Documents can 
provide the locations of these manuscripts, and some work has 
been done to provide summaries of the main holdings, but this 
has been inadequate for a specialised piece of work, such as 
one on labour unrest within a narrow time period. Consequently, 
some collections, and in particular those which have not been 
catalogued> have had to be subjected to detailed scrutiny 
without necessarily producing much useful material.
Regarding Liberals of prominenoe, the most complete sets 
of papers, as far as this piece of research is concerned, were 
those of David Lloyd George and John Burns. At this time,
Lloyd George was the Chancellor of the Exchequer. He came 
from a poor Welsh background, and became a solicitor, before 
entering Parliament in 1890. He made a national reputation
by opposing the Boer War. His papers contain a large quantity 
of valuable information, and help to show his very great 
sympathy for the working classes. Another member of the 
Cabinet from a needy family was John Burns, an engineer who 
joined the Socialist Democratic Federation, and helped to 
organise the Great Dock Strike of 1889. He formed the 
Battersea Labour League, and sat on the London County Council 
from 1889 to 1907, entering Parliament in 1892. He refused to 
join the Independent Labour Party, and drifted into the 
Liberals. From 1906, he was the President of the Local 
Government Board. His collection is especially important
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■because he kept a diary, which contains his reactions to -
«
various labour disputes. His sympathies with the working 
class appear to have greatly diminished, judging from the 
tenor of many of his remarks. - .
Most of the other leading Liberal politicians came from 
very different backgrounds. Public school and Oxford or 
Cambridge University was a far more common breeding ground 
for a Liberal or Conservative politician, and most conformed 
to this pattern. The Prime Minister, H.H. Asquith, fits 
into this category admirably, and provides a good example of 
the traditional statesman. He gained a double first at 
Bnlliol, and became a barrister,. before entering Parliament 
in 1886. He married well, and was a typical member of the 
upper middle class. His papers, as might be expected in a 
man of his position, are extensive, and contain a largo 
quantity of documents relevant.to this period. The Home 
Secretary from 1911 to.1915 was another barrister, Reginald 
McKenna, who had been educated at Cambridge. His papers are 
disappointing, revealing little on industrial unrest during 
his period of office. Sidney Buxton enjoyed a similar 
upbringing, attending public school and Trinity College, 
Cambridge, but he then began to interest himself. in working 
class life. He sat on the London School Board, became an
M.P. in 1883, and acted on the Conciliation Committee to end 
the 1889 Dock Strike. He sat on the Royal Commission on 
Education from 1886 to 1889. His concern for the deprived 
sections of the community was genuine, and is to some extent 
reflected in his papers, which are comprehensive on the major 
issues. Viscount Haldane’s early life had been similarly
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elitist. He went to Gdttingen and Edinburgh Universities ■
*
before going to the bar, where he made a reputation as a 
theorist. His political and legal careers continued side- 
by-side. He become an M.P. in 1885 and a Q.C. in 1890, and 
after a Cabinet post as Secretary for War from 1906 to 1912, 
was appointed Lord Chancellor. His papers are wide ranging 
and are made even more valuable by his daily letter to his 
mother, which was, in effect, a diary of the major political 
events, and his opinions them so that the major industrial 
disputes all receive his comments. Another consistent family 
chronicler was Herbert Samuel. He he.d gained a first at 
Balliol, was elected to the Commons in 1902, and then was 
appointed Postmaster General in 1910. He wrote to his wife, 
keeping her informed about the day's events, and, again, this 
is effectively, a diary. The contents of these letters, and 
others that he wrote elsewhere, reveal that he possessed a 
genuine sympathy for the conditions of the working classes.
.One of the other major figures-at this time was Winston 
Churchill, a former soldier and journalist, before entering 
Parliament as a Tory in 1900. After joining the Liberals, he 
quickly rose to Home Secretary in the years 1910-11, before
4.
transferring to the Admiralty. His early reputation was as a 
radical, but, even though his archives are closed, there is 
sufficient evidence to indicate that his views were tempering, 
and becoming increasingly orthodox.
The records of other politicians are available, but they 
are not always particularly helpful. Sir Edward Grey was the 
Foreign Secretary. He had attended Winchester and Balliol, 
but was sent down from the latter for incorrigible idleness.
His chief passion was country life, aa his hooks on nature 
demonstrate, hut a sense of duty drove him to the public life. 
He entered Parliament in 1885, and achieved Cabinet rank in 
1906. His papers are mainly Foreign Office documents, but 
what little there is of relevance suggests-that he had some 
sympathy with the poorer elements of the society. Another 
prominent Liberal was Murray of Elibank, a former Lieutenant 
in the Lothian and Berwickshire Yeomanry Cavalry, before his 
election to the Commons in 1900. By 1910, he was the 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Treasury. His papers are 
incomplete, but do contain several useful letters, Another 
disappointing collection is that of the Marquess of Crewe, 
who became the Leader of the House of Lords in 1908, and 
Secretary of State for India in 1910, His papers give no 
insight into his own feelings, but there are several letters 
to him relating to the industrial unrest.
Even more disappointing are the collections which, after
careful examination, have provided nothing of interest to the 
topic, Lewis Harcourt worked as private secretary to his 
father before election to Parliament in 1904., From 1910, he 
was Secretary to the Colonies. His documents - uncatalogued, 
and unsorted - appear to be devoid of relevant material. Sir 
Ellis Jones Ellis-Griffith might have been expected to provide 
a view, as he was Under-Secretary at the Home Office from 1912 
but his collection is equally disappointing. So is Lord 
Rosebery’s. He had been Prime Minister in the years 1894-95, 
but had severed himself from the Liberals in 1905, and 
denounced the 1909 Budget. He might have been expected to 
comment on, and receive letters about, the strikes, but if
this was the case, then the letters have not been preserved. 
Similarly, Viscount Bryce, a Liberal M.P. from 1880.to 1906, 
and a Minister in the 1890's, seems to have ignored such 
events. Mrs. Masterman would not allow access to her 
husband's letters. C.F.G. Masterman gained a double first at
Cambridge and worked among the poor of London before enter­
ing Parliament in 1906. He became Under-Secretary at the 
Home Office in 1909, and Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
in 1912. He was closely involved with the National Insurance 
Act, so his papers could have been informative. However, Mrs,. 
Masterman did give on interview in which she recalled the . 
period, the events and some famous figures. Several of her 
comments have been quoted.
Thus, the main Liberal politicians have been studied in 
depth, and all worthwhile comments to and from them have been 
recorded, so as to arrive at a picture of the Liberal hierarchy. 
This has been revealed as many-sided, for there was no single 
attitude, even within the powerful ruling group. Other 
politicians of lesser importance have been investigated, but 
this has produced little worthwhile material*.
The Conservatives have been analysed in the same way.
The most complete records are those of Austen Chamberlain, 
who had been Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1903 until 
1905. His diaries and letters to his father, which have been 
published, contain a wealth of materiel, especially on the 
1912 coal strike. His family letters are far longer than 
those of Haldane and Samuel, and, therefore, go into far 
greater detail. The leader of the Tories at the beginnning - 
of the period was A.J. Balfour, the Prime Minister of the last
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Conservative Government. He was an academic, deeply 
interested in philosophy. His papers record nothing about 
industrial unrest, perhaps because of his involvement with 
other matters, including the Bill to reform the House of 
Lords, and the question of the leadership of the Party.
Balfour was, in fact, ousted in October 1911, and replaced 
by Andrew Bonar-Law, who had been bom in Canada, and 
educated in Glasgow from the age of ten. He was an 
industrialist - Chairman of the Glasgow Iron Trade Association - 
and become em'M.?. in 1900. His papers are valuable, and, in 
particular, reveal much about the 1912 cool strike. Other 
collections have offered but little of value. A young 
Tory of the time, Lord Robert Cecil, an M.P. from 1906, 
received several interesting letters on the attitude of 
Unionists to events. Lord Curzon, who had been in the 
Commons from 1886 to 1898, and had held office as Under 
Secretary for India, Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
Viceroy and Governor-General of India, has a large collec­
tion of documents, but few of them'refer to industrial 
unrest in Britain. A back-bench M.P., Colonel Sir Robert 
Sanders, a barrister, kept a diary, which produced several 
useful and stimulating entries on the subject,
, Access to the collections of some of the other leading 
politicians was refused. Lord Birkenhead would not give 
permission to inspect the papers of his father, F.E. Smith, 
the successful barrister, and, as an M.P., a member of the 
influential Unionist Social Reform Committee. The manuscripts 
of L.S. Amery, the scholar, barrister, and writer of Times1
editorials, and of Lord Lansdowno, a former Foreign Secretary,
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were being catalogued, and were' unavailable.
The records of minor Tory politicians have beqn studied, 
so that as complete an account as possible of the Conservative 
reactions to the labour unrest will be provided. Just like 
the Liberals, there was no single Tory attitude, but 
Conservatives tended to be less understanding.
Biographies and Autobiographies
Another way of discovering the opinions of individuals 
is through biographies and autobiographies, but there are 
serious drawbacks in placing too much emphasis upon such 
souroes. Biographers can select evidence to support what— ’ 
ever case they care to espouse, and writers of memoirs can 
ignore events, or look back in such a way as to present their 
activities in the best possible light.. This does not mean 
that these works should be ignored - on the contrary, they 
can often be employed as extremely valuable supporting 
material, as long as they are treated with caution. It is 
especially unfortunate that so many chroniclers have ignored 
the industrial and social disturbances of the period 1911^
1A, but this could be significant in itself. Perhaps, on 
reflection, events did not appear to be as serious as had 
appeared at the time. Even when nothing was mentioned, there 
is often a sound insight into the atmosphere of class relation­
ships prevalent at that time, which is almost as important.
Contemporary Publications
More accurate accounts of feelings at the time con be ■ • ' 
obtained from contemporary publications, as they tend to 
express the author1s true opinions of events as soon as they
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have occurred. They might change later, but the article, 
pamphlet, or book remains, and for someone to write at 
^length immediately suggests a genuine depth of feeling 
which ought not to be ignored. Such works could well 
influence, or even consolidate the readers’ views, and could 
provide a focus for conversation. Of course, many more 
written from a quite deliberate political viewpoint, and a 
large number, particularly pamphlets, came directly from 
the political parties, but this does not deter from their 
value: they reflected the opinions of at least some people.
Novels
One special type of contemporary publication was the 
novel, which did not deal with particular issues, but is 
extremely important in indicating class structure and class 
feeling. A section will be devoted to literature in the 
chapter dealing with social stratification.
Public Opinion
Thus, the sources for this work are very diverse, and 
concentrate as far as possible on opinions expressed at the 
time that the events occurred. Clearly, no single attitude 
can emerge: in any community so socially diverse as Edwardian 
England, there will be many. It is quite possible that 
differences of opinion could centre around the various
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political parties, so that supporters of one group would 
almost inevitably feel differently to those who advocated a 
different liner; however, it is equally possible that the 
split could be on class lines. It is conceivable that the 
shades of opinion were created on class and political lines 
This study attempts to analyse these groupings. x
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Chapter II . „
Social Stratification in Edvardian England
(i) Class; a general analysis
According to popular belief, there are three classes in 
a society, the upper, middle, and vorking. It is not always 
easy to allocate an individual to a particular class, as the 
boundaries are not fixed, and from tine to time, the social 
position of r. group of people can change, as the ideas of 
the society progress. Thus, popular usage does not provide 
an adequate definition of social class. However, many tighter . . 
analyses have been produced. Most of these differ, so that 
there is not generally agreed criterion of class. Thus, any 
discussion on social stratification ought to be preceded by an 
examination of several versions that have been used in the 
past.
The Marxists evolved their own definition which was based 
upon.their analysis of the dynamics of capitalism. When this 
stage in social evolution had been reached two classes faced 
each other - the capitalists, who owned the means of production, 
and the propertyless proletariat, who were obliged to offer 
their labour for sale to the former. This model was an over­
simplification of the complexities of class structure in 
Edwardian Britain, and, in particular it omitted to take into 
account the increasing numbers who-fitted into neither class, 
but occupied the area between them. Such people included 
white collar workers and small proprietors. In addition, it 
ignored the divorce of ownership fron control rjid the proportion 
of co.pita.list enterprises* Perhaps it wqs this unexpected
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development which prevented the class confrontation and 
vio lent revolution that the Marxists had anticipated, but for 
the purposes o f th is study, the Marxist scheme o ffers a useful 
starting point, but i t  is  not equipped to meet the actual 
problems encountered.
There have been various attempts to use occupational 
status as the basis for class stratification. In the Census 
Report of 1911, the Registrar General had devised a system in 
which there were five occupational divisions, which were 
supposed to correspond to social class:-
I  High status professional, business management
and administrative ,
II Some professions, including teaching and farming 
III Skilled manual, including clerical 
IV Semi-skilled manual 
V Unskilled manual
This was often regarded as too narrow a definition, with 
barriers between the divisions that were too vague. Thus, 
other structures were created, but the problem of fringe 
groups prevented the establishment'of any definitive frame­
work based on occupation. For example, on the boundaries of 
the upper working class and the lower middle class are such 
occupations as typist, nurse, shop assistant, and the lower 
supervisory grades.in industry. There can be little doubt 
that these jobs are popularly accorded higher prestige than 
those which are unquestionably working class. They are 
probably rated higher than the skilled manual trades, though, 
of course, skill and social class are not perfectly correlated. 
Moreover, such a classification is not permanent. Changes in
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the society will create movements in the order. For instance,
*
the relionce on mechanisation during the First World War 
elevated the position of engineers. Thus, while the type of 
work undertaken by an individual is important, this can only 
be considered in conjunction with other factors in determin­
ing social class.
Income is often equated with social class: the upper class 
is supposed to be rich, and the working class poor, with the 
middle class coning somewher in-between. However, if money 
is to be used as the basis for classification* there is the 
difficulty that the lower section of the middle class and the 
upper group of working class would have roughly similar in­
comes. In addition, wealth could have been acquired by neons 
which were not considered acceptable, so that a rich man 
could be rejected by his contemporaries because he had been 
involved in an unsuitable way of life.
This implies that people place themselves and others into 
a particular social class. This has not always proved to be 
an accurate method of arriving at class positions. There is 
often a distinct lack of uniformity. People at the some level 
in the same job might describe themselves differently, while 
a nan whose income and occupation are working class, and who 
is accepted as working class by his colleagues, may prefer to 
think of himself as middle class, and would describe himself 
as such if asked, perhaps through a belief that middle class 
life and values are superior. Middle class life inples a 
less physical, more comfortable, more luxurious level of 
existence, to which many of the working class night aspire.
By the same token, a professional man with a large income may
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wish to refer to himself as working class, but most would like
to safeguard their position, and fear attempts at equalisation,
. . . .  *
believing that this would worsen their economic and social 
place in society.
Thus, none of these basic definitions of class really 
tackle the question fully. In addition, there are various 
symbols of class, such as accent, dress, and abode, which 
help to identify people into approximate social groupings, 
but, once again, they are not entirely accurate. A working 
man might wear overalls, because his job is a dirty, manual • 
one. Perhaps the middle class man has a more extensive wardrobe 
a reflection of his larger income, but this does not mean that 
a member of a social class can be identified at a glance.
Accent is often the result of education, and education a 
reflection of wealth. However, education and accent can 
provide no more than an indication of class. A working man 
can study after work, so as to receive what might be regarded 
as a middle class education. Regional tones are generally 
thought of as working class, but this is not necessarily the 
case. There are two types of middle class. One is national, 
metropolitan in interest, and mobile, while the other is local, 
rooted in the district, and unlikely to leave. Such people, 
especially in the past, were likely to have accents as regional 
as those of the working class. Abode is another symbol of 
class. The working class tend to inhabit certain parts of a 
town, in small, often terraced houses, or in flats, while the 
middle dass live in different areas, in more expensive 
accommodation - often owning their own detached or semi­
detached houses, with gardens, and the upper class live in
large detached residences in their own grounds. This does not 
necessarily follow, and anyway, the housing you have is 
usually a reflection of your income, end so does not make any 
real contribution to a definition of social class.
Thus, it is extremely difficult to place a person within 
a social class. Although it is commonly accepted that there 
are three classes, there are no agreed borders, so that the 
dividing lines are vague. A popular story in Edwardian England 
concerned the Duke of Devonshire’s amazement when he learnt the 
use of napkin holders. He was accustomed to a fresh serviette 
for every mealj the working class never used one, so the use 
of a napkin could be the criterion for entry into the middle 
class, but that presumes the existence of three neat compart­
ments into which everyone can be placed. This is not the case. 
There are innumerable divisions. The Austrian, Charles 
Morawitz, writing in 1911, observed that ’the social division 
of class is more intricate in England than anywhere else’. He
(l N
described the various sub-sections as a ’Gesellschaftepyromide’. '
Given tliis, any definition of class would be vague. The middle-, 
class are not manual workers, but they lack independent wealth; 
they are not poor, but'neither are they rich. Perhaps they 
could be described as white-collar workers, but this creates 
its own problem of meaning. For the purposes of this study, 
occupation and income will be the main determining factors in 
social class, but the various factors involved will each be 
considered, using as much contemporary material as possible. 1
(1) C. Moravitz, ’Sidelights on the National Economy and
People of Britain’ Nineteenth Century and After. V 
June 1911, p. 1011
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( i i )  Class in Edwardian England
*
Before the First World War, incomes varied very widely, 
.according to the sk ills  and qualifications o f the individual, 
and the differences were not ameliorated by high taxation, for 
income tax was only 1s 3d in the pound fo r those earning more 
£160 a year. Of course, i t  was not always possible to equate 
occupation to income, and both to class, but there was gener­
a lly  a connection, and no-one doubted that c lasses did exist. 
A Punch cartoon o f 1911 illu strates th is. The caption read, 
'In  order to avoid "social bias", judges in future w ill be 
selected from a l l  classes*. S itting at the bench was a judge 
in wig and robes, with the blackened hands raid face o f a 
c o llie r , pipe in mouth, and a foaming mug o f ale in front o f 
h im .^  Clearly, working class 'advancement to the bench was 
not expected in Edwardian England.
Occupation
Occupation is one of the easiest factors employed in 
determining class. In the 1911 Census, the Registrar General 
decided to divide the nation into occupational groups, and 
thus provided a starting point for an investigation of class . 
structure at that time:-
% of the
working Number
population
I Professional
a) Higher 1.00 184,000
b) Lower 3.05 560,000
(2) Punch. 21 June 1911, p. 471
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II Employers, administrators, 
Managers m
a) Employers 6.71 1,232,000
b) Managers and administrators 3.43 629,000
III Clerical workers 4.84 887,000
IV Foremen, supervisors, inspectors 1.29 236,000
V Skilled manual 30.56 5,608,000
VI Semi-skilled manual 39.48 7,244,000
VII Unskilled manual 9.63 1,767,000
Incone
Incone is very often related to the prestige of the job, 
but this is not always the case. However, the two factors 
are crucial in any analysis of class. Several writers examined 
the distribution of money at the beginning of the twentieth 
century. One of the most famous studies was made by Chiozza 
Money, a Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, who became 
a Liberal Member of Parliament in 1906. His book Riches and 
Poverty, published in 1905, was widely referred to by radicals. 
Money investigated the financial year 1903-4, and discovered 
that the national income was £1,710m. Of this sum, £830ra was 
taken by five million people, with family incomes of more than 
£160 a year, while the rest of the nation, thirty eight million 
persons, lived on a total of £880m. Money then analysed in 
detail the distribution of these incomes»-
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Those with less than £160 a year and
their families 38*000,000.
Those of incomes of between
£160 and £400 3,035,000
£400 and £500 265,000
£500 and £600 145,000
£600 and £700 65,000
Unplaced 240,000
3,750,000
Persons with incomes of £700 and over 1,250,000
43, 000,000
In other words, 250,000 men, supporting a further million
people, made over £700 a year. Money regarded them as rich.
In addition to these, 750,000 earners of income, supporting
another three million people, took between £160 and £700.
They were described as comfortably off, while the rest of
(3)
the population, according to Money, lived in poverty.
Other investigations went even further. Supertax was paid on
incomes in excess of £5,000 a year, and in 1911-12, it was
paid by 11,554 persons,^ yet at that time the average wage
in Britain, for men over the age of twenty in ‘ordinary
(51industry' was £1 9s.
Thus, Britain was a country with a large number of manual 
workers, and a country with very wide disparities in wealth.
(3) L.G.C. Money. Riches and Poverty (1905) pp. 39, 35, 42
(4) J.C. Stamp, British Incomes and Prosperity (1916) p. 331
(5) A.L. Bowley, The Division of the Product of Industry
(Oxford, 1919) p. 28
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Many people earned very little, but it does not necessarily 
follow that manual workers were the worst paid members of 
the community. However, in this period, there were several 
surveys which related occupation to income and to social 
status, so the question can be resolved. The most extensive 
investigation was by Charles Booth, a Liverpool business 
man, President of the Royal Statistical Society 1892-94-» ond 
a social investigator. He studied London in the iSSO’s. The 
fact that this was over a decade before the Edwardian era 
does not seriously detract from its value, for, if anything, 
monetary distinctions widened rather than narrowed in the 
intervening years. Booth divided the population into 
socio-economic groups:-
«A - The lowest class - occasional labourers, loafers, 
and semi-criminals.
*B — The very poor — casual labourers, hand to mouth 
existence, chronic wont.
•C and D - The poor - including alike those whose 
earnings are small because of irregularity of employment, and 
those whose work, though regular, is ill-paid.
'E and F - The regularly employed and fairly paid 
working class of all grades.
1G and H - Lower and upper middle class and all above 
this level.1
Booth then revealed the number of Londoners in each 
category:-
38
Class Number % of the population
A (lowest) 37,610 0.9
30.7$ in
B (very poor) 316,834. 7.5
poverty
C and D (poor)
E and F (working class
938,293 22.3
comfortable) 
G and H (middle class
2,166,503 51.5 69.3/& in
comfortand above) 74.9,930 17.8
Booth explained exactly vhat he meant by poverty: ’By the 
vord "poor" I mean to describe those vho have a sufficiently 
bare income, such as 18s to 2 1s per week for a moderate 
family’. ^  Low wages had been equated with unskilled labour. 
A sociological analysis by F.G. D'Aeth in 1910 linked income 
end occupation more carefully: -
A. The loafer, earning 18s a week as on irregular 
labourer.
B. The low-skilled labourer, who earned £1 5s a week.
C. The artisan, bringing home £2 5s a week by skilled 
labour, or by acting as a foreman, clerk, or minor official.
D. The small shopkeeper and clerk, on £3 a week.
E. The small business man, expecting £300 a year.
F. The professional and administrative class,.earning 
£600 a year.
(71G. The rich, with £2,000 and above a year.v v  
Thus it is clear that the degree of skill possessed
(6) C. Booth. Life and Labour of the People of London Streets
and Population of East London (1902 ed.) pp, 20-21; 
East and Central London, p, 20
(7) F.G. D’Aeth ’Present Tendencies of Class Differentiation’
Sociological Review, Ootober 1910, pp. 270-1
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by a worker would make a considerable difference to his
earnings, though for manual workers, this gap was narrowing.
G.D.H. Cole has estimated that in about 1864-, a labourer
anticipated 15s to 16s a week, and a skilled nan £1 10s; by
1914-, the figures were £1 4s to £1 5s and £1 17s. ^
Raymond Postgate, in his study of building workers, revealed
a similar trend. Between 1853 and 1861, a bricklayer
averaged 5s a day, and his labourer 3s, or 60% of the craft-
smante rate. By 1872, the bricklayer made 7s 1d a day, and
the labourer took 62£ of this - 4s 4d. In 1914> the
respective figures were 8s 7d and 6s, so that the labourer
was earning 70% of the smilled man's rate.
Sidney Pollard's extensive study cf wages in Sheffield
establishes that large differences in pay for the various
grades of work existed in the city's cutlery and engineering
trades. Some forgers and smiths working with silver could
(q)
earn £3 15s a week in 1910' ' - considerably more than those
in the lower ranks of non-manual labour could expect.
Frederick Rogers, the contemporary vellum binder, trade
unionist, and journalist, confirmed that 'the workmen who has
*
a good trade and is in constant work,..is as well off as... 
many among the lower ranks of professional men'.^^ Such 
on opinion has received statistical confirmation by Lockwood's 
analysis of the wages of clerks. He investigated the average
(8) G.D.H. Cole, Studies In Class Structure (1955) pp. 57-58
(9) R. Postgate, The Builders' History (1923) p. 455
(10) S. Pollard, A History of Labour in Sheffield (Liverpool, 
1959) pp. 209 et. seq.
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annuel earnings of clerks over the age of twenty-five in the 
year 1905-6, with, th following results;- 
Bank clerks £170
Civil Servant assistant clerk £100
Local Government officer £90
Railway clerk £30
This information was supported by an examination of the 
earnings of all clerks in 1909:-
% of all male clerks earning more than 
£160 a year by industrial groups
Insurance 4-6
Banking AA
Civil Service 37
Local Government 28
Industry and Commerce 23
Railways 10
Such workers might have the occupational status of middle 
class, even though some skilled manual workers, who, in terms 
of employment would be regarded as working class, had larger 
earnings. Nevertheless, they would describe themselves as 
middle class, and quite distinct from even the more affluent 
manual wrker. Shan Bullock has written what he calls a 
biography of Robert Thorne, although the book is probably an 
autobiographical novel. Thorne was a London clerk, earning 
about £100 a year. He was convinced of his middle class 
position, asking, i"Had I not still to uphold the dignity of 
my class by conforming to its traditions in the manner of 1
(11) F. Rogers, Labour. Life and Literature (1973 ed.) p. 293
Average earnings 
of others
£85
£90
£95
£91
£ 3 0
£80
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appearance?" ’ ^  ^
Living Standards
Thus, there were a relatively snail number of extremely
wealthy people, a fairly large group of median incone families,
and another section of the community with relatively low
wages. Rowntree looked at the relationship between wages
and standards of living, and discovered that 7,230 people in
York - a tenth of the population - were ’families whose total
earnings are insufficient to obtain the necessaries for the
maintenance of merely physical efficiency. Poverty falling
under this head nay be described as "primary" poverty’. For
a family of two adults and three children, Rowntree calculated
that the minimum to maintain life, but allowing no money for
fares, papers, letters, sick clubs, trade ■unions, beer and
tobacco, no toys for the children, and providing that there
was no absence from work, either through illness, or through
the mployer requiring less than a full week’s work, the wages
should be £1 1s 8d a week. As well as those people whose
average earnings were below this level, Rowntree discovered
*
that there were 13,072 persons, or 18.515a of the citizens, 
living in "secondary" poverty. Although they earned more ' 
than £1 1s 8d, a part of their wages was absorbed in other 
expenditure, useful or otherwise, such as drinking, gambling, 
or poor housekeeping, so as to , »reduce the amount available 
to support the family to less than that sum.^^-
(12) D. Lockwood, The Blackcoqted Worker (1958) pp. 217, A2
(13) B.S. Rowntree, Poverty. A Study in Town Life (1910 ed.)
PP. 86, 133-4, 117, U 2
-  42 -
Booth's study had revealed that alnost one third of 
Londoners lived in poverty. Further surveys were conducted 
by the statisticians Bowley and Burnett-Hurst. Their work 
was net as comprehensive as that of Booth or Rowntree, but 
confirmed their conclusions. Bowley and Burnett-Hurst 
-examined the towns of Northampton, Warrington, Stanley, and 
Reading, and discovered that a large section of the men were 
earning less than a pound a week: 13$ in Northampton; 3*5$ in 
Warrington; 4.0$ in Stanley; and 15.0$ in Reading. Moreover, 
the figures for those with between £1 and £1 5s were 14-$;
28.5$; 5.0$; and 35.5$ respectively.^^
Hubert Llewellyn Smith, the Permanent Secretary at the 
Board of Trade, prepared a paper for Lloyd George, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, giving the total numbers of 
adult workers on less than £1 a week. The analysis was based 
on work done during the preparation of the National Insurance 
Bill in 1911, for which Smith had planned the section on 
unemployment insurance. 1,320,000 men and 1,635,000 women 
over the age of twenty were in this category, excluding 
seamen, fishermen, domestic servants, agricultural labourers 
who hoarded with their employers, shop assistants, clerks, and 
those serving in the army and navy. Qaith warned that by 1914-, 
when he provided this information, 'it is probable that the 
number has been somewhat reduced, especially as in view of the 
rise in the cost of living there has been a tendency for 
employers to look into the question of men earning low rates,
(14) A.L. Bowley and A.R. Burnett-Hurst, Livelihood and 
Poverty (1915) p. 33
(15^e.g. the railway companies’. ' '
Thus, a substantial part of the nation was living in what
Booth and Rowntree regarded as poverty, and if urban wages
had been'revealed as inadequate, contemporary studies revealed
that conditions were worse in the countryside. The Government's
Report on agricultural wages showed that in 1907 the average
weekly earnings of ordinary labourers (including those in
charge of animals, who were usually paid more than the others)
in England was 17s 7d.^^ F.E* Green, who had worked in the
city before rejecting regimentation, commercialism, and
suburbanism for country life, and who hod made a reputation
as a critic of successive governments for their agricultural
(17)policies, insisted that this figure was exaggerated.'
Rowntree and Kendall looked at rural costs, and declared that,
for a family of two adults and three children, providing that
they ate no butcher’s meat, no butter, no eggs and drank very
( 18)little tea, a weekly income of £1 Os 6d was required. 1 Thus 
the majority of farm workers must have been living in poverty.
M.F. Davies investigated the village of Corsely in Wiltshire, 
and discovered that twenty-eight households were in primary 
poverty, and thirty-seven in secondary, out of a total of two
(15) Lloyd George Papers C/3/10/6 Letter from Smith to
Hamilton, U March 191A
(16) Report of an Inquiry into the Earnings and Hours of *178
Labour of Workpeople of the United Kingdom in 1907.
V. Agriculture Cd.5460 (1910) p. xiv
(17) F.E. Green, The gyannv of the Countryside (1913) pp.223-233
(18) B.S. Rowntree and M. Kendall, How the Labourer Lives (1913)
p. 28
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(19}hundred and twenty, '
Clearly, a considerable section of the community had to 
live with insufficient money, Mrs. Peel, an accomplished 
journalist has indicated just how difficult life must have 
been for the poor. She tabulated the income per head needed 
just to purchase enough food and cleaning materials*- 
8s 6d for ’plain but sufficient living’
" 1 5 s  Od for ’good living’
17 6d*£1 for ’very good living’
Rowntree had shown that wages were very often lower than 
these figures, and he discovered that whenever the family 
earnings fell below £1 5s, the diet of the household was 
inadequate. He compared the food of the inmates of prisons 
and workhouses, and the poor of York, The average worker's 
family proved to be the worst feds- 1920
Dietaries
Protein per 
man per day 
(grams)
Energy value 
per man per 
day (calories)
Workhouse (York) 
Prisons: (English)
136 3,702
Class B 134 3,038
Convict (hard labour) 177 4,159
York, average of 14 families,
wages under £1 6s 89 2,901
Standard required for moderate
work (Atwater) 125 3,500
(19) M.F, Davies, Life in an English Village (1909) pp. 142,
H 7
(20) C.S. Peel, How to Keep House (1902) p, 14
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This type of undernourishment was further reflected by-
army recruitment figures. In the years 1897-1901 at York,
Leeds and Sheffield, 26.5$ were rejected immediately, while
21.0$ were accepted on trial, and subsequently rejected,
because they had failed to meet the physical requirements of
the infantry - a minimum height of five feet three inches, a
thirty three inch chest, and a weight of eight stones three
( 21)pounds. The Government’s Report on Physical Deterioration
showed an even worse state of affairs. In 1899, twelve
thousand men were examined for military service. Eight
thousand were turned down at once, and after initial service,
(22)only one thousand two hundred were fit in all respects.
The implication was that the working man tended to be
physically deficient. This point was made by several visitors
to England. Samuel Gompers, the American labour leader,
noticed that the Lancashire mill hands were short, thin and
weak looking. He was surprised that they could perform a full 
(23)day’s work. Jack London, another American, a former
sailor, gold miner and tramp, and at- this time an established 
writer, went even closer to the British working class. He 
moved into the East End of London, with a small amount of 
money, and experienced the conditions of the poor at first 
hand. Like Gompers, London was struck by the smallness of the 213
(21) B.S. Rowntree op.cit. pp. 23A> 258, 216-8
(22) Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on Physical
Deterioration. Minutes of Evidence Cd.2210 (190A) 
p. 173
(23) S. Gompers, Labor in Europe and America (New York, 1910)
p. 20
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people. At a Salvation Army breakfast centre, he looked
around, and-observed 'one thing particularly conspicuous in
this crowd was the shortness of stature. I, who am. but of
(2L)medium height, looked over the heads of nine out of ten1.' ^
The most probable explanation lay in on inadequate diet, 
which was not confined to York. The Fabian, Mrs. Pember 
Reeves, inspected conditions in London in 1913, and pointed 
out the scarcity of cooking utensils, which usually consisted 
of two burned pots, a frying pan, and a kettle. Moreover,
Mrs. Reeves did not believe that the standard of cuisine was 
very high; 'To boil a neck with pot herbs on Sunday, and moke 
a stew of "pieces" on Wednesday, often finishes all that has 
to be done with meat. The intermediate dinners will ring the 
changes on cold neck, suet pudding, perhaps fried fish or 
cheap sausage and rice or potatoes. Breakfast and tec, with 
the exception of the husband's relishes, consist of tea and 
bread spread with butter, jam or margarine'.
Edward Cadbury and George Shann, the one a member of the 
wealthy confectionary family, and the other a self-educated 
manual worker who became a university lecturer, examined the 
wages of workers in the "sweated" trades, and discovered that 
they were often as low as 10s a week in 1907. This resulted 
in diets even worse than those outlined by Mrs. Reeves. The 
typical daily fare of such people was bread and lard for 
breakfast, either meat and bread for dinner - in which case, 
the meat would have cost about 2d - or bread and jam, cheese, *25
(24.) J. London, The People of the Abyss (1903) p. 153
(25) Mrs. P. Reeves, Round About a Pound a Week (T913) p. 111
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lard, or milkj bread and butter for tea, and, if supper was 
eaten, bread and land.
Such limited menus worried medical experts. Dr. Robert
Hutchinson told the Committee on Physical Deterioration, n,If
I were asked to state the chief fault in the diet of the
working.classes of this country, I should say it is tho
(27)excessive use of tea end bread'". The results were hardly
surprising: many school leavers had difficulty in finding
(28)employment because of deficiencies in health and physique.
Of course, some of the working class did earn enough for
a better way of life. Gompers had remarked on the unhealthy
appearance of Lancashire cotton workers, but they were
relatively prosperous, and would have ’a breakfast of coffee
or tea, bread, bacon and eggs - when eggs were cheapj a dinner
of potatoes and beefj an evening meal of tea, bread and butter,
cheap vegetables or fish, and a slight supper at moderate price
a few newspapers, cheap clothes, sometimes a day or two at the 
(09)seaside’.v Another group which enjoyed above average pay 
were the steel workers. Lady Florence Bell, wife of the 
ironmaster Sir Hugh Bell, looked at Middlesbrough, the centre 
of her husband’s business. Wages varied from 19s 6d to £4. a 
week, according to the skill of the worker. The whole area
(26) E. Cadbury and G. Shann, Sweating (1907) pp. 4-6-50
(27) Physical Deterioration, op.cit. Report and Appendix
Cd.2175, p. 4-0
(28) LAB 2/210/LE 701
(29) ' A Clarke, The Effects of the Factory System (1913 ed.)
pp. 109-110
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was commonly regarded as affluent, but Lady Bell discovered 
that ’most of the people at the iron works are living under 
conditions in which the slightest lapse from thrift and fore­
thought is necessarily conspicuous, and brings its immediate 
consequences'. If employment was regular, then the wages
would keep the fcmily in food, but unemployment or illness 
would reduce the amount of money available. Virtually all the 
working families had certain fixed costs - notably rent, 
possibly clothing, boot, and burrials clubs - and the expense 
of coal, gas, wood, and cleaning materials. The rent had to 
be paid, or eviction would result; if the family did belong 
to any clubs, non-payment caused the policy to lapse, so 
these items would be the first to be deducted from wages.
Any cooking would require heat, which had to be paid for, so 
that if the income of the family varied, the amount of food 
purchased would alter, to coincide with the money available.
The life style of the middle class was very different.
Not only were incomes, in general, larger, but they could be 
relied upon: there was no chance of being laid off from work 
for a few days without pay. Hence, there was a very different 
spending pattern. The food eaten was more plentiful and of 
better quality than that of the working class. This is 
illustrated by Mrs. Beeton, whose Book of Household Management, 
first published in 1861, but regularly revised and enlarged, 
and still widely used, provided a series of what she described 
as 'very economical' meals. One day's food - Wednesday - was 
as follows 30
(30) F. Bell. At the Works (1911 ed.) p. 87
Breakfast - tea, milk, bread, buttered toast, liver and 
bacon.
Lunch - potato pie made from cold neat, plain coke, 
cheese, bread, ale.
Dinner - boiled beef, potatoes, carrots, suet dumplings 
and baked rice pudding.
Tea might also have been eaten. Mrs. Beeton's 'little
tea’ involved tea, bread, butter and potted meat, or sardines,
(31)
or cake, or watercress.
The aristocracy fed even better. Edward VII's food for
one day demonstrates this. Breakfast had fifcie courses, while
lunch and dinner were of between ten and fifteen. Tea was an
elaborate affair, with a wide choice of scones and crumpets,
torts, rolls and cakes. However, this did not constitute the
whole of the day1s eating. It was necessary to ward off hunger
pangs between main meals, so that there would have been a
morning snack of lobster salad and cold chicken, or something
similar, and, after dinner, the King was,likely to take
( 3 2 )sandwiches, a quail, or a cutlet.' '
Such lavishness was not confined to the monarch. It was 
common for members of the upper class to dine expansively and 
expensively. An example of this was provided by the 1900 Club, 
a Unionist organisation. In 1907, it gave a dinner at the 
Albert Hall for colonial premiers - and it proved to be one 
of the largest dinners held in London up to that time. There 312
(31) Mrs. Beeton. The Book of Household Management (1892 ed.)
pp. 1324, 1330, 1358,' 1U5.
(32) V. Cowles, Edward VII and his Circle (1956) p, 281
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were 1,600 diners, so the club hired five hundred cooks and 
waiters, and ensured the success of tho evening by an 
appropriately extravagent table, at a total cost of £4.,000;-
Beef for the soup (lbs.) ¿>500
Whole salmon 200
Quail 2,500
Asparagus sticks 25,000
Fresh stawberries (lbs.) 600
Bottles of:-
Champagne 1,400
Hock 1,500
Liqueur brandy 300
Chartreuse 300
Creme de menthe 500
(33 ).
Whisky 300
Arthur Ponsonby, fomerly at Eton, then Balliol, and 
afterwards in the Diplomatic Service, had become a Liberal 
Member of Parliament in 1908. Such a background suggests that 
he would not support a radical cause, but, in fact, he was 
later to join the Labour Party. A book published by him in 
1909 contrasted affluence such as the 1900 Club dinner with 
the poor, giving examples of the different life styles of the 
jobless in Britain. He quoted one unemployed man, with a 
family of four, who had fourteen servants, and in one week 
spent £60 12s 7d on food - excluding the three hundred eggs, 
the fruit, vegetables, and poultry that had been sent from 3
(33) C. Petrie, Scenes of Edwardian Life (1965) p. 42; The 
Carlton Club (1955) p. 157
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the country. It was not an exceptional week: there had been 
one or two guests at luncheon, but the fmily dined out on 
one night. Ponsonby compared with this with impecunious
(o/)
jobless, who were unable to find work, despite their efforts. 1
Fall in the Standard of Living
From the middle of the nineteenth century, the standard 
of living of the working man had improved constantly, but by 
about 1900, wages remained static, while prices rose, Many 
economists and statisticians have produced tables on this 
point, and all draw similar conclusions. For instance, 
Beveridge’s figures take 1900 as the base year:
Year Wages Wholesaleprices
1900 100.0 100.0
1910 100.8 108.8
1911 101.1 109.4
1912 103.7 114.9
1913 106.8 116.5
1914 107.8 117.2
Burnett’s calculations indicate that the purchasing power 
of the pound in 1896 had fallen to 16s 3d in 1912,^^ and 
Pollard has obtained similar results from a study on Sheffield, 3456
(34) F. Ponsonby, The Camel and the Needle’s Eye (1909)
p. 153 et. seq.
(35) W.H. Beveridge, Unemployment. A Problem of Industry
(1930) p. 433
(36) J. Burnett, Plenty and Want (1966) p, 93
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remarking on ’a stagnation, if not decline, in Sheffield real •
(37)wages in the fifteen years preceding the First World War1. 
Contemporary sources verify such figures. Frederick Rogers 
was ’pretty certain that, although the workmen's wages are 
larger than when I was young, their spending power is less', 
while Fhilip Snowden published the housekeeping book of the 
Superintendent of the St. Mark's Boys' Home, Birmingham. For 
the same quantities of identical articles, bought in June and 
July 1903, and in September 1911, the price had risen from 
12s 10^3 to 17s 1li-d/37 89 *^
The Government confirmed this change in the cost of 
living. A Report by the Board of Trade revealed that between 
1905 and 1912, rents rose by 1.8% and the retail prices of 
food and coal increased by 13.7^, while another Report 
showed wage fluctuations from 1299:-
(37) S. Pollard, 'Real Earnings in Sheffield 1851-1914-’
Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and Social Research 
1957, p. 61
(38) F. Rogers op.cit. p. 300
(39) P. Snowden, The Living Wage (1912) p. 65
(4-0) Report of an Inquiry into Working Class Rents and Retail 
Prices together with the Rates of Wages in Certain 
Occupations in Industrial Towns of the United 
Kingdom in 1912 Cd. 6955 (1913) P. vii
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Increase or decrease in 
total weekly wages in £s
+208,590
- 86,587
- 72,595
- 38,327
- 39,230
- 2,169 
+ 57,897 
+200,912
- 59,171
- 68,922 
+ 14,534
(41)
+ 34,578
Bowley has demonstrated that even when there were rises, they 
were not general to all workpeople, but were gained by only a 
small number of occupational groups. He took 1880 as his 
base year:- 412
Year All occupations Agriculture Coal Mining Building
1900 130 109 163 115
1910 130 110 ’ 146 *115
1911 131 112 VJr 115
1912 135 114 152 116
1913 137 118 162 119
(42)
1914 138 122 160 123
(41) Report on Changes in Rates of Wages and Hour of Labour in
the United Kingdom in 1911 Cd. 6471 (1912) p. 8
(42) A.L. Bowley, Wages and Income in the United Kingdom since
1860 (Cambridge 1937) pp. 6, 8
Year
1900
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907
1908
1909
1910
1911
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Thus it is clear that in the early twentieth century, 
the improvement in the standard of living of the working 
class, which had been a feature of the previous half century, 
ceased, and, indeed, for many there was an actual worsening 
in the way of life. A large section of the community had 
cone to- expect that their position would continually improve, 
for in the life time of the majority of the population, it 
had consistently done so. Hence, the deterioration was 
greatly resented.
Domestic Service
Perhaps the working class would not have objected so 
strongly if the rest of the society was suffering similar 
privations, but this did not appear to be the case. One of 
the great ambitions of the poorer sections of the aspiring 
middle class was to earn enough to employ a servant. Indeed, 
this had almost become the dividing line between the 
"respectable” and "disreputable" sections of the society, 
end there was no diminuation in demand for servants, even in 
the period of falling working class wages. Banks has observed 
that *a lady could not be expected to do household chores, 
and a middle class housewife who was, if only temporarily, 
"without" was on object of general sympathy,1 Thorne,
when he was earning £95 a year, had not reached this point, 
and, with his prospects, he and his wife ‘were not likely, 
for many a year, to rise to the slavey line in the social *
(A3) J.A. Banks, The English Middle-Class Concept of the 
Standard of Living and its Relation to Marriage 
and Family 1850-1900 (H.A., London, 1952) p. 208
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stage’.(44)
Mrs. Beeton was extremely instructive on the subject of 
income and social status. She believed that servants were 
absolutely essential, and compiled a table showing the number 
and type that could be expected with a variety of household 
incomesr-
£1,000 p.a. cook, 2 housemaids, man servant 
£750 p.a. cook, 1 housemaid, nan servant 
£500 p.a. cook, 1 housemaid, footboy 
£300 p.a. cook, 1 housemaid
f/c)
£150 p.a. general servant or girl for the rough 
work
There were a very large number of servants in Britain - 
about 1.3 million in 1911, out of a total population of 43 
million. Not only were they numerous, they were also 
extremely cheap, which is why such a large section of the 
population expected to be in the servant keeping class. A 
letter from "A Middle Class Man" which appeared in the Times 
in 1909 illustrates this point. He-lamented that his tax bill 
had risen by £12 a year, with the result that he had ’decided
( i£\
that our only course is to dispense with one maid servant*.^
Given that domestic staff were so inexpensive, and that 
the society was accustomed to keeping servants,.it is hardly 456
(44) S.F. Bullock op.cit. p. 176
(45) Mrs. Beeton op.cit. p. 7
(46) Times. 24 August 1909, p. 10. On the same day, the same
paper (p. 16) contained several advertisements for 
maids at £12 to £16 a year, and even experienced 
nurses at £22 a year.
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surprising that the nore affluent manual workers should have 
aspirations"in this direction. When Jack London visited some­
one in the Erst End of London, he was convinced that he was in 
a working class area. The row of houses was unimpressive, 
each house having ’but one entrance, the front doorj and each 
house is about eighteen feet wide, with a bit of a brick wall 
behind...But it must be understood that this is East End 
opulence we ore now considering. Some of the people in this
(/-7)
street are even so well to do as to keep a "slavey"’. 1
Thus, at the fringe of the working class and the middle 
class, there was an overlap. Some manual workers earned 
enough to adopt the habits of the non-manual class, and kept 
a servant, while the poorer white-collar workers, who claimed 
middle class status could not afford a servant, which would 
have established them fully in that grouping.
Earl Winterton, a Conservative Member of Parliament in 
this period, has recalled in his autobiography the difference 
in the life style of the aristocracy, who were so much 
wealthier; ’My father was a poor nan by the standards of a 
peer and country landowner of his day, yet we had when I was 
young a butler, two footmen, a hall-boy, ah odd man, a cook, 
a kitchen maid, scullery maid, a dairy maid who made the 
butter and cooked the bread, a laundry maid who. did the wash­
ing, two housemaids, a lady's maid for my mother and a nurse 
maid for me. When we went abroad, we were accompanied by my 
mother's maid, a footman, and my nurse', ana, of course, a 
courier. There was also 'the modest total of nine on the
(4-7) J. London op.cit. pp. 28-29
-  57 -
outdoor staff.
Clearly, the possession of noney and the nunber of 
servants that a household employed were related, and were 
inportont in Edwardian England. Mrs. Mastemon, recalling 
the period, insisted that 'you placed people' according to 
the size of their donestic staff. Occupation, incone,
and servants would all contribute to placing people into 
certain social groups.
Health end Housing
Money bought an easy way of life, while the lack of an 
adequate incone would ensure a permanent state of unhealthi­
ness, due to a shortage of food, and this meant succumbing 
easily to disease. In the seme way, low i/ages meant living 
in an area of cheap housing. R.A. Bray, writing at the time, 
insisted that with town life, 'children's faces lost the colour 
of health, girls became anaemic, women became shrunken, narrow- 
chested and ill-developed'. However, it seemed to be only
the poorer elements in the working class who suffered in this 
way. A great deal of medical opinion at the tine condemned 
the housing of those in poverty as being unhealthy. Birmingham 
City Council investigated housing conditions in 1913> and dis­
covered that, out of 175,000 dwellings, 50,000 were unfit for 
habitation; 58,000 had no separate water closet; and A2,00Q *50
(4-8) Earl Winterton, Fifty Tumultuous Years (1955) pp. 102, 
1°3.
(A9) Interview given by Mrs. Masterman to this writer, 10 
May 197A.
(50) R.A. Bray, The Town Child (1907) p. 13
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had no separate water supply, no sinks, and no drains.
Rowntree revealed an equally depressing scene in York. He
studied 11,560 houses, end of these, 3,130 had no separate
water closet} 228 shared 33 closets; and 2,229 houses lacked
any water supply. Moreover, 442 houses shared 30 water 
(52}taps. ' In Shoreditch, 'the sanitary arrangements of many
of the houses were literally nil, and the death rate of the
(53)area was actually four times that of the rest of London'.
In Manchester and Salford, the Citizen's Association documented
cases just as horrific, and announced that in one place, forty
dwellings shared one water tap, while eleewhere, there was
(54)one water closet for eight houses. ' Robert Roberts, in
his semi-autobiographical study of Salford just before the
First World War, recalled his mother having a bath installed.
The neighbours came to inspect it, for, 'till then, some had
(55)never seen a bath, much less used one'. ' These conditions 
were made even worse by overcrowding. The Census of 1911 
showed just how serious this problem was;- 51234
(51) M. Abrams, The Condition of the British People 1911-
1945 (1945) p. 44 ;
(52) B.S. Rowntree op.cit. pp. 184-187
(53) A.0. Jay, A Story of Shoreditch (1896) p. 12
(54) T.A. Mari, Housing Conditions in Manchester and 8alford
(Manchester 1904) pp. 44>46
(55) R. Roberts, The Classic Slum (Manchester 1971) p. 19
(51)
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Average number 
of - oocupants 
per room
England
and
Wales
London RuralDistricts
Urban
Districts
or less 9.7 5.7 11 .A 9.2
i-1 22.0 1A.9 23.5 21.6
1 15.0 1A.5 1A.5 15.1
1-11 ‘ 23.2 20.8 22.2 23.5
li-2 15.9 20.1 13.8 16.5
2-2^ A .8 7.5 3.9 5.1
2i-3 2.8 6.2 1.9 3.0
3 -A 0.8 1.7 0.5 0.8
A and more 0.7 2.3 0,3 0.9
in tenements 
of over 9 rooms 5.1 6.3 8.0 A.3
• 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 ■
Almost one tenth of the population were living in conditions 
of more than two too. room. Medical men at the time were 
convinced that this caused ill-health and premature death. . 
The Medical Officer of Health for Birmingham noted that the 
year 1911, 'by reason of having a long, dry, and very hot 
summer, a year of high infant mortality. Particularly was , 
the mortality in the poorer ports of the city inflated in 
this way. In the affluent district of Edgebaston and 
Harbourne, the death rate was 12.3 per 1,000; In the poor, 
working class area of St. Mary's, the figure was 25.A.
Infant mortality rates in that city in the same year showed 
a similar tendency for death to be concentrated in the
456) Census of England and Wales, Vol. VIII. Tenements 
Cd. 6910 (1913) p. 10
least prosperous regions*-
St. Mary’s
St. Bartholomew’s
St, Thomas’ s
prc
St. Martin’s
299 per 1,000 live births
207 ” i i* n
171  ii n n n
1 7 8  ii n n ii
Edgbaston and Harbourne 105 rf ” f "
In Sheffield, the figures for 1913 revealed that there
was a. far higher rate of infant mortality in the poor areas
than in the rich. The contrast between the most depressed
districts and the wealthiest was large:-
Brightside East 193
Sheffield North 188
Eccleshall Sputh 65 ^
Again, in Blackburn, the statistics illustrate this point.
In the wealthier suburbs, infant mortality was 96^per 1,000, 
but in the least affluent parts of the town, it was 315 per
1,000.^
Sir George Newman, the Chief Medical Officer at the Board 
of Education, and a Lecturer in Public Health at St. 
Bartholemew’s Hospital, concluded that there were two 
features ’which appear to be common to the high infant 
mortality districts, namely a high density of population,
(57) City of Birmingham Report of the Medical Officer of
Health for the Year 1911 (Birmingham 1912) pp. 12, 
16.- *
(53) S. Pollard op.cit. p. 194
(59) M. Laski ’Domestic Life' in S. Nowell-Smith (ed.) 
Edwardian Life 1901 -19 U  (196a) p. 205
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and a considerable degree of manufacturing industry*.
The problem was that the poorly paid could not afford better• 
housing, so that they had to remain in their badly sanitated 
and overcrowded homes, and suffer as a result. The 1911 
Census shows the class bias in this suffering: - 
Mortality rates of legitimate infants under one year of age 
in England and Wales according to the occupation of the father
1. Upper and middle class 76.4
2. Intermediate between wage earners ,
and middle class 106.4
3»*,s8. All wage earners 132.5
3. Skilled 112.7
4. Intermediate, mixed skilled and
unskilled 121.5
5. Unskilled 152.5
6. Textile workers 148.1
7. Miners 160.1
8. Agricultural labourers 96.9
The classes could also be separated by the number of 
servants that they employed, if any, and in>another way, by 
the education received. The aim of the middle-clasfparent 
was to send his children to public school, for this was 
regarded as the best type of education. The Headmaster of 
Shrevsbury,the Reverend C.A. Arlington, summed up this 
attitude by insisting that *cn English public school is the
(60) G. Newman, Infant Mortality (1907) pp. 26-27
(61) Census of England and Wales. Vol. Marriages. Births
and Deaths Cd. 6578 (1912-13) P* 88
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best instrument yet devised for making a decent citizen out
(6 2}of the average English boy*.' ' This meant someone who
would uphold the ethos of the existing society, with its 
emphasis on capitalism and the perpetuation of class differ­
entiation. If a child did not attend a public school, he 
would merit a lower social standing than those who did,
unless the teaching had been done by a private tutor, rather
ui( ^
io 1/*«*<, ;(;}>> 
^  Rc Y u  f
lJ'V 5. J
^  J A t \ {  of
than at a school.
F.G. D’Aeth’s analysis of social classes included 
education as well as wages and occupation. However, he did 
not even begin to consider this point until he reached 
Class D, the small shopkeeper and clerk. These, he thought, 
would have received an elementary education. The smaller 
business men, group E, would have been to a grammar school, 
and the professional and administrative class, earning £600 
a year, might have been to a public school, and would 
generally have attended a university. The rich were expected 
to have gone to a public school.
To ignore the educational standards of groups A, B, and 
C does not mean that they did not receive, an education. 
Elementary schooling was both free and compulsory. All the 
children of the neighbourhood were instructed together.
Thus, working class boys and girls were born' in an area, 
brought up and schooled in it, and probably settled down 
1 in the same locality to work, marry, and raise their own 
\ children. This could well have intensified the feeling of 623
(62) C.A. Arlington, A Schoolmaster^ Apology (191-4) p. 1A
(63) F.G. D'Aeth op.cit. pp. 270-1
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solidarity common to traditional working class districts.
However, it does not follow that the education provided 
matched that of the more prosperous children. Some of the 
off-spring of the lowly paid parents were unable to profii> 
fully from the instruction that was offered. At the time, 
Dr. A. Arkle maintained that in Liverpool, the most poverty- 
stricken children were simply unable to benefit from the 
teaching available because hunger made it impossible for 
them to learn. Nevertheless, literacy was reaching most 
children in the Edwardian era. There are figures to support 
this assertion. The Local Government Board investigated 
social conditions, which included basic literacy:-
In 1865, for every 1,000 men married in England and 
Woles, 225 could not sign the register, while in 1907 the 
number was only 1Aj the respective rates for women were 
312 and 17. ^
While this does not provide an indication of the 
absolute level of literacy, it was an indication that educa­
tion was reaching the messes - certainly, everyone was 
supposed to go to school. The improved standard of learning 
could, in itself, have an effect on social stratification 
and relationships, for a literate population could have 
higher material asperations than on illiterate one. *65
(6a) A.S. Arkle ’Child Life in Liverpool’ Liverpool Medico- 
Chlrurglcal Journal. July 1907, pp. 25-28
(65) Public Health and Social Conditions Cd. A671 (1909) 
p. 102
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Causes of Poverty
However, standards of living were falling, and several 
associations existed which were designed to alleviate 
poverty. Perhaps the most famous of these was the Charity 
Organisation Society. One of its founders was Helen 
Bosanquet, a fomer student at Newnhan College, Cambridge, 
and later a University Extension Lecturer, before becoming 
the Secretary of the Society. Her views on the poor reflec­
ted those of the Organisation. She was convinced that many 
were in dire financial straits though their own inadequacies, 
jdue to •excess or self indulgence’. She did not believe 
|that such people should receive any help. In the some way, 
Mrs. Bosanquet thought that the inmates of workhouses were
usually there unnecessarily, having entered because they
(66}were ’suffering from sheer laziness’.
Other bodies were prepared to blame the working classes’
inefficiency for contributing to inefficiente^ Miss Loane, 
the superintendent of a voluntary group which sent nurses 
to working class hones to tend the sick, felt that the very 
people she wanted to help lacked ’thrift, foresight, order, 
and cleanliness’, and insisted that ’if the true cause of 
death could be narked on every certificate, laziness of 
husband, of wife, even of nother, would be a frequent 
entry'. Certainly, such views were in keeping with 
those of Mrs. Bosanquet and the Charity Organisation Society. 
Another charitable group was the St. Pancras School for
(66) H. Bosanquet, The Poor Law Report of 1909 (1911) pp. A-5
(67) M. Loane, Neighbours and Friends (1910) pp. 10, 2A9
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Mothers,_which aimed to advise the working class wonen of 
the area on housekeeping. One of its supporters, Mrs. 
Humphrey Ward, the grand-daughter of Dr. Arnold of Rugby, 
argued that ‘even the labourer on 18s or 21s a week could 
live plentifully, so far as food is concerned, if he or his 
wife knew all there is to be known by ordinary, intelligent 
people about food and its preparation*.. The article
shows not only Mrs. Ward's feeling of superiority over the 
working class, but also her# inability to realise the true 
economic position of the poorly paid. She observed that she 
knew a crippled child who received neat, vegetables, pudding, 
and bread for 1-gd to 2d a neal, and used this as proof that 
a provident fanily could'manage with a snail income. Normal 
children, being active, would eat more then a cripple, and 
adults would eat more than children. Given a family of two 
adults and three children, one neal on that basis would cost 
at least 1 s, and the family would require at least two meals 
a day for seven days a week. In other words, more than 14-s 
a week would be spent on food alone. Clearly, then Mrs. 
Ward's calculations could not have been accurate. A house­
hold could not live plentifully on 18s a week.
Such errors angered those who were more sympathetic to 
the poor. Rowntree, in particular, objected to ill-informed 
or hostile comments. He conducted a running argument with 
Mrs. Bosanquet, and in a second study of York concentrating 
on 7-9 June, 1910, examined unemployment and its causes. 
Every household in the city was investigated, at a tine when 68
(68) H. Ward 'Letter' in Miss Bibb/ et al. The Pudding Club 
(1910) p. v
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trade was slightly depressed. 129 unemployed youths were 
discovered^ Of these, four-fifths had a deficient physique 
or cane iron inadequate hones, so that they were not amenable 
to the discipline of work. Of the adult males who normally 
worked in regular occupation, 23.3$ were unemployed because 
of their age - forty seemed to be the age at which employers 
began to discriminate against tin skilled men. Of the others, 
physical handicaps kept 7.2$ from work; bad character 
accounted for 15.5$, and a combination of physical hadicaps 
and bad character kept 3»1$ jobless. This left slightly 
over half of the unemployed who normally worked in regular 
jobs, and had satisfactory character, health, and age, but 
could find no appointment because of the state of trade.
Of the casual workers who were unemployed, Rowntree and 
Lasker discovered that well over half were in this position 
through no fault of their own. In the building trades, three 
quarters of the skilled men had good -character and health, 
while half of the unskilled men were similarly placed. Of 
course, the survey did uncover a small proportion of people 
who had no desire to find a job. About one tenth of the 
workless men of York fitted into this category. The 
investigators blamed their upbringing and environment, 
rather than the idlers themselves, saying that this brought 
about the state of mind which made then unwilling to seek a 
job. Thus, their attitude was far more sympathetic than
that of the Charity Organisation Society, which tended to 
regard a large proportion of the unemployed as work shy. 69
(69) B.S. Rcwntree and B. Lasker. Unemployment (1911) pp. 
1-6, 52-55, 93, 124, 64, 75.
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The Society saw another cause of poverty. Margaret Tree
represented this opinion in maintaining that »intemperance is
a contributing factor to the position of the lowest classes’.
This might have been true. General Booth, the founder of the
Salvation Amy, discovered that in 1890, there were 190,000
public houses in the United Kingdom, and concluded that »there
were half a million men who are more or less always 
(71)besotted*. Miss Lome’s books often refer to the heavy
drinking of the working classes. Certainly, the number of
people charged with drunkenness was increasing. In 1857,
3,94 per 1,000 of the population appeared in court as a
result of this offence, while by 1907, the figure had risen 
(72)to“1.01.' ' Of course, this could merely indicate increased
police vigilance. In fact, proportionately less money was 
being spent on drink. In 1876, 15/6 of consumer expenditure 
went on drink j between 1880 and 1900 this had fallen to 
about'12*5$, and from 1900 to 1914» there was a constant 
decline - in 1911» 8.5$ was devoted to alcohol.
A paper read to some Unionist M.P.’s in 1911 Insisted 
that ’the underpaid class1of working people seems to be too 
poor to drink. We did not expect to find this, but it is 70123
(70) M.C. Tree ’Worcester’ in H. Bosanquet (ed.) Social
Conditions in Industrial Towns (1912) p. 21
(71) W. Booth. In Darkest England and the Wav Out (1890) p.49
(72) Report on Public Health and Social Conditions op.clt. p.109
(73) A.E. Dingle ’Drink and, the Working Class Living
Standards in ^ Britain 1870-1914’ Economic History 
Review (1972) p. 611
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the working classes did drink heavily. Harold Levy has 
observed that a public house is 'where people go for the 
social life and entertainments, often in agreeable surround­
ings, which they lack at home. The drinking habit comes
This view was confirmed by the Reverend Dolling, a Catholic
priest who had been involved in social work before accepting
a living in the slums of Portsmouth, towards the end of the
nineteenth century. He observed that 'men were drunk because
their stomachs were empty and the public house was the only
cheerful place of entertainment*.Given the crowded and
insanitary homes of a large section of the community, the
public house must have appeared palatial, and of course,
drink soon brought oblivion from the harsh realities of life.
As the Daily Mirror put it, 'who can keep from drink with the
rent to pay and children to bring up and wives to support,
Take a man away from all that, give him a reasonable wage,
(77}and he will improve his ways'.' 1 Many doctors at the 
time noted a connection between poor environment and a steady *756
(7A) Unionist Party Papers on Unrest among the Working Classes
(75) H. Levy, Drink, An Economic and Social Study (1951) p,25
(76) R.R. Dolling, Ten Yean in a Portsmouth Slum (1896) p.17
(77) Dolly Mirror. 2L  March 1911, p. 7
with this attempt to meet the home's deficiencie
(1911) p. 65. The introduction was signed by
L.S. Amery, W. Astor, J.L. Baird, H.C. Bentinck;
F. Cassel, G.S. Goldman, W. Joynson-Hicks, G.L, 
Lempson, A.D. Steel-Maitland, and M. Woods,
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consumption of alcohol. Dr. R.J. Collie, once on the medical 
staff of the London School Board, felt that 'the close 
connection between a craving for drink and bad housing, bad 
feeding, a polluted and depressing atmosphere, long hours of 
work in overheated and often ill-ventilated rooms, only 
relieved by the excitements of town life, is too self- 
evident to need demonstration'.
No doubt drinking did contribute to poverty, as the 
Charity Organisation Society maintained, but the relative 
amount spent on alcohol was decreasing, so perhaps it was 
possible to over-emphasize this as a factor which worsened 
the position of the poor. Certainly, the paper read to the 
Unionist M.F.'s was unable to link the two, although kt* had 
firmly expected to do so.
Class Relationships
The question of the relationship between drink and 
poverty was just one part of the whole problem of the 
attitudes of the classes towards each other. Some of the 
middle class believed that poverty was the result of idle­
ness, while others denied this. Rerhaps one of the causes 
for the former view was the enormous disparities in wealth. 
Lady Jeune, at the end of the nineteenth century, could 
observe that young ladies often received between £250 and 
£300 for clothes, but 'even at that figure girls find it 78
(78) Report on Physical Deterioration op.cit. Cd. 2175 p.
30
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impossible to make both ends meet1.' J A few years later, 
the magazine Woman, which had a largely middle class reader­
ship, asked if a wife or daughter could ’be well-dressed on 
an allowance of from £30 to £50 a year’. The writer 
answered the question: ’I think she can if only she will 
be prudent and sensible. No woman who makes a figure in 
society can dress on twice these sumsj but there are 
thousands of girls who do not spend their days in a whirl 
of balls and bazaars and house party diversions' There
were also hundreds of thousands of homes which received £50 
as the total annual income to maintain a family. Thus, it 
could be that the rich, moderately off, and the poor were so 
separated that the problems of the worst paid were simply not 
appreciated.. -
The upper class had succeeded in retaining its aristo­
cratic framework, despite the arrival of people enriched by 
the changes in industry. This was a new phenomena. Until 
1885, only seven new peers had been associated with commerce 
and industry. Of these, three came from commercial families 
which had made outstanding contributions to public service, 
and all three had died childless. There had been three 
bankers, two with strong aristocratic family connections, 
and the other exercised a behind the scenes influence on 
government. The last of the seven, Edward Strutt, was the 
only true product of industry. His grandfather had started 
the family fortune in partnership with Richard Arkwright. 7980
(79) Lady Jeune. Lesser Questions (1894) p. 135,
(80) Woman. 10 October 1900, p,i3
( 79)
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Strutt himself vas involved in politics rather than business,-
but he was associated with industry in the public mind. In
1886, three industrialists were elevated, inaugurating a
period when an increasing number of such men were honoured.
From 1885 to 1914» 31.1$ of all new peers were connected
with commerce and industry, and 2 1.6$ lacked any noble or
( 81 Ìgentle background. Nevertheless, the upper class did
not generally work for a living, and tended to look down on 
those who did, and in particular, on anyone who was involved 
in shops of any sort. Marganita Laski has noted that 'vkre 
a person actually engaged in the retail trade to obtain a 
presentation, his presentation would be cancelled as soon
as the Lord Chamberlain was nade aware of the nature of his 
( B2Ìoccupation1. ' Yet even this disdain for those who did . 
earn their income was disappearing in the years immediately 
preceding the First World War, Two exceedingly rich 
"trades people" to be honoured were Thomas Lipton, the 
chain store magnate, who was knighted in 1898, and the 
grocer Hudson Kearley, who progressed from Baronet in 1908 
to Privy Councillor the following year, and emerged as Lord 
Devonport in 1910.
However, if the upper class was beginning to mix with 
the wealthier elements of the middle class, it remained
(81) . E.E. Pulphrey ’The Introduction of Industrialists into
The British Peerage; a study of the adaptation of 
■ " . a social institution1 American Historical Review
(1960) pp. 1-16
(82) M. Laski op.clt. p. 185
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largely ignorant of the ways of the rest of the country.
This was well illustrated by Robert Blatchford, the soldier, 
clerk, and Socialist journalist, who escorted Edward Hulton, 
heir to his father's newspaper business, round some of the 
inadequate houses of Manchester, his own city: 'I took him 
into a slum hovel where the jjusband had just died of con* 
sumption and was laid out dead on the table. There was no 
fire and no beds. Three young children crowded together on 
the floor with a couple of sacks over then, and the widow 
sat on an empty box crying herself blind. Young Hulton 
looked round, emptied all the money out of his pockets, and 
walked out without a word. When I spoke to him he could only 
shake his head. He was unable to control his voice. And he 
would not go into another house. He had seen all he needed 
to bring him to the naked, ugly truth'. . }
However, most of the upper class were not enlightened 
in this way, and remained ignorant about such evil social 
conditions, and, indeed, seldom gave a thought to the way of 
life of the inferior classes. As long as the servants per­
formed their work properly, and the country continued to run, 
the lower classes were considered to be maintaining their 
roles? it was believed that these people were intended for 
the more menial tasks of the society, and should remain in 
their places. An article in the Manchester Guardian illus­
trates not only this hierarchical view of society held by 
many of the upper class, but also the . way in which an 
enlightened newspaper was trying to overcome such attitudes. 83
(83) R. Blatchford, Mv Eighty Years (1931) p. 189
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It appeared beneath the headline 'People*s 'Btation in Life'". 
Lord Cross, after sitting as a Member of Parliament for 
twenty-three years, had been elevated to the peerage, 
serving as Home Secretary from 1874- to 1880 and 1885-86, 
Secretary for India from 1886 to 1892, and then Lord Privy 
Seal from 1895 to 1900. In his capacity as a minister, he 
had earned £60,000, and on his retirement from major office, 
he had made a declaration, as required by the Political 
Pensions Act, that he did not possess an income 'adequate to 
maintain his station in life', and so he was given a pension 
of £2,000 a year. He lived for twenty years after that, and 
in his will, he left £60,000. The Manchester Guardian 
commented: 'To Lord Cross it would probably have seemed 
extremely improper...that a labourer who had worked on a farm 
in all weathers for sixty years, without a half-holiday, 
should then be given a public pension of 5s a week on the 
grounds that his own savings - possibly producing as much 
as 4s a week - were "inadequate to maintain his station in 
life", Lord Cross would probably hav" felt that so lax a 
bestowal would undermine character in the working classes 
and destroy the virtues of thrift and individual initiative. 
He would no doubt have felt it quite sincerely. And we are 
sure he felt quite sincerely that his own station in life 
being different, it was perfectly proper that his country­
men, including this ancient rural labourer, should be taxed 
in order to give him the means of leaving £60,000 by his 
will*.v ■ In the same way, another Tory politician, 84
(84) Manchester Guardian. 22 April 1914, p. 8
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Gerald „Balfour, brother of A.J., the former Prime Minister, 
had been Chief Secretary in Ireland, President of the Board 
of Trade, and President of the Local Government Board, and as 
such had received a political pension of £1,200 a year from 
1905, yet he had been one of the most bitter critics of the 
1908 Old Age Pensions' Scheme. Clearly, such people did 
regard themselves as different from the rest of the
T
community, and quite entitled, though superior upbringing 
and attitude, to use such money properly, whereas the work­
ing class would not. Thus, the upper class, while remaining 
politically active, understood nothing of working class life, 
and resisted any movement towards equality, wishing, instead, 
to maintain their privileged position.
However, they were prepared to help allies from other 
classes when the need arose. A.J. Balfour, a former 
Conservative Prime Minister, and in April 1911, Leader of 
the Conservative Party, received a letter from T.E. Kebbel, 
aged eighty-four. He was a political writer, whose flow of 
books and articles had consistently supported the Tories. He 
had written to Balfour asking for £100, and he, in turn, 
communicated with Lord Cranbourne, heir to the Salisbury 
title and estates, and at this time in his final year at 
Eton. Balfour pointed out that Kebbel had an income of £500 
a year, which was 'much more then most clergy have and more 
than the younger children of the ordinary squire inherit.
But he had evidently got himself into a ness with money 
lenders'. He was prepared to pay a part of the debt, and 
looked to his colleagues for tho remainder. By October, the 
sum required had risen to £4.00, and Balfour and Cranbourne
75
were going to pay it between then. Balfour felt it 'a
nuisance, I think, however, the money will be well spent1. ?}
This would be a way of paying off on old political debt, 
but it does show that the upper class would help those who 
were in a position to give service. However, little was 
done to alleviate the condition of the working classes. Of 
course, when their conditions became evident, as they did 
to Edward Hulton, individual cases would receive charity, 
but general ignorance and apathy prevented a more general 
assault upon the problem of poverty.
n
The solid middle classes were also apart from the other
classes. As G.K. Chesterton, the author and novelist,
recalled, the middle class was ’separated both from the
class above and the class below it. It knew far too little
( 86 )of the working classes’. This was not deliberate. They
did live in suburbs, among others with similar social back­
grounds, so that they were apart from poor, and so failed 
to see or understand the problems of low wages. Class 
barriers were not erected by birth alone. L.E. Jones, later 
a barrister of note, recalling his youth spent at Eton and 
Oxford, asserted that in the Edwardian period, ’"class", with
us, was a matter of affinity and had nothing to do with what
(87}our fathers were, or how much money they had’,' 'but such 8567
(85) Balfour Papers Add, Ms 49758. Letters from Balfour to
Cranboume ff. 264-5, 9 April 1911j ff. 286-7, 18 
October 1911
(86) G.K. Chesterton, Autobiography (1936) p. 13
(87) L.E. Jones, An Edwardian Youth (1956) p, 42
(85)
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a class Identity was the result of upbringing, and children 
whose socio-economic status were similar tended to be 
brought up together, thus confirming group solidarity. A 
high proportion of the middle class were essentially ignorant 
of working class life. Of those who were not, many sub­
scribed to the views of the Charity Organisation Society.
Of course, some took a very diverse line. L. Woolf, after 
working in the Ceylon Civil Service from 190A to 1911, spent 
some time with the C.O.S., but resigned because he felt that 
it did not do enough: 'In Hoxton, one was confronted by some 
vast dangerous fault in the social structure, some des­
tructive disease in the social organis, which could hot be 
touched by paternalism, or charity, or good works. Nothing
but a social revolution, a major operation, could deal with
( 88)it'. ' Such feelings led him towards the adoption of 
Socialism.
Other members of the middle class were vocal in their 
condemnation of social conditions. Cadbury, Matheson end 
Shann complained that 'millions of people are doomed from 
their birth to hard and monotonous work in order to provide 
the comfort, culture, luxury and refinement in which they 
themselves never s h a r e W a t n e y  and Little thought that 
they could discern the beginnings of a 'feeling that labour 
is not receiving its due proportion of reward in general'. 890
(88) L. Woolf, Beginning; Again (196A) p. 100
(89) E. Cadbury, C. Matheson and G. Shann, Women's Work and
Wages (1908) p. 306
(90) C. Watney and J.A. Little, Industrial Warfare (1912)
pp. 5-6
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Another writer with considerable experience of working"
class life was Alexander Paterson. After gaining a degree
at Oxford, he taught in an elenentary school, end lived with
the poor in Bermondsey. In 1908, he took on the job of
supervising boys released frora borstal, and in 1911 became
the Assistant Director of the Central Association of
Discharged Prisoners. He argued that inadequate wages and
living conditions brought about a waste of strength, brains,
and character, and urged the rest of society to help with
sympathy and a sharing of knowledge, so that there could be
(91)a mixing of the classes and mutual understanding.
Thus, these, and others made up a small but vocal group 
which deplored working class life, and offered alternatives. 
Fabians saw the solution in political terms, while others - 
the instigators of surveys, the social writers and social 
workers - offered different answers, but all were united in 
demonstrating that a part of the middle class was concerned, 
and was prepared to be critical of a society which would 
permit such injustices to exist.'
Of course, the whole of the working class was not c 
destitute. It was not a single entity, but encompassed a 
wide variety of wages, and an equally wide series of social 
positions. Miss L o m e  has shown one aspect of this: ’The 
line which separates those who "dress for dinner" from those 
who do not is an almost invisible crack compared with the 91
(91) A. Paterson, Across the Bridges (1911). especially pp. 
255-273
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yawning gulf that divides those who "dress themselves of a
Sunday" from those who have none but their workaday
(92)clothes’. There was still a skilled and prosperous
section of the working class which felt itself distinct 
from, and superior to, their unskilled brethren.
Yet however well paid an artisan might have been, he 
would not have been able to enjoy the new range of consumer 
goods which the richer parts of the middle class were able 
to afford - the motor car, telephone, gramophone, and 
refrigerator, for example. Mrs. Masteman recalled that she 
heard reports of cars breaking down in working class areas, 
and the local population were hostile to the driver and his 
passengers, through jealousy. Certainly, such examples
of conspicuous consumption must have annoyed many working 
men, who were already aware of a variety of differences betwen 
themselves and the salaried employees. For instance, most 
labourers and tradesmen could be dismissed with only one 
hour’s notice, and were extremely unlikely to be included in 
pension schemes, holidays with pay, or to be afforded job 
security, or even promotion on merit, all of which were 
associated with middle class occupations.
Thus, there were a series of classes, the edges of one 
spilling over into the next, but they remained largely 
ignorant of the conditions of the lowest section. It was 
usual for the middle classes to aspire to a higher position, 
and, indeed, many of the working class would have liked to 923
(92) M. Loane. The Next Street But One (1907) p. 20
(93) Interview op.cit.
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reach the middle class, and adopted as many middle class 
customs as was possible, but, within the working class, 
there was also a strong group which objected strenuously to 
the privileges of the upper and middle classes.
literature and Social Stratification
One way of seeing the classes interacting together is 
through the literature of the period, for authors tend to 
confines themselves to topics within their own experiences, 
or display their prejudices when they tackle others. Thus, 
the novels and plays of the period help to illustrate the 
class structure of the country. However, most of the 
authors were middle class, so that their interpretations are 
usually seen through middle class eyes. Nevertheless, this 
does provide an insight into the way in which one part of 
the community thought of the rest.
There are some interesting exceptions. Perhaps the 
most celebrated writer dealing with working class life- was
D.H. Lawrence, the son of a miner. His descriptions of life 
in a coal village were the result of his own knowledge. He 
did not take up writing seriously until after the death of 
Edward VII, and his popularity cane later, so he had little 
impact on the Edwardians. Robert Noonan, whose pen name was 
Robert Tressell, was less famous. He was possibly of middle 
class parents, but worked as a house painter, and used the 
experience thus gained in his book The Ragged Trousered 
Phllcnthropists. which is a bitter attack on the capitalist 
system. It did not appear in its entirety until after the 
Second World War, and the version published in 1913 was not
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widely read, so that its influence was on a later generation.
Another writer detemined to alter the structure of 
society along egalitarian lines was H.G. Wells. He cane 
fron a lower niddle class background, and wrote largely 
about that group, yet he was able to comprehend the whole 
social structure: ’The shop young lady in England has just 
the sane horror of doing anything that savours of the servant 
girl as the lady journalist, let us say, has to anything 
savouring -of the shop girl, or the really quite nice young 
lady has of anything savouring of any sort of girl who has 
gone down into the economic battlefield to earn herself a 
living’. ^
This indicates a clear social order, in which everyone 
knew her place. Wells emphasized this point in describing a 
rural society in which ’above you were your betters, below 
you your inferiors, and there were even an unstable 
questionable few cases so disputable that you might, for the 
rough purposes of everyday at least, regard them as your 
equals’.v Hence, Wells was convinced that a hierarchy 
existed, but his work is unusual because of its political 
content.
Other writers, some long since forgotten, portray the 
range of social attitudes without any attempt to suggest 
that a radical change should take place. Typical of these 
is Mrs. Oliphant’s The Railwayman and his Children (1891) 
which showed the upper class attempting to maintain its *95
(91) H.G. Wells. Kioos (1925 ed.) p. 57
(95) H.G. Wells, Tono-Bunpay (1909) p. 14
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standards by refusing to allow anyone unsuitable into its 
ranis. A lady contenplated marriage to a wealthy engineer 
who travelled the world designing and superintending railway 
construction. Consequently, he was branded as a railwayman, 
and, ns such, a social inferior. This type of stratifica­
tion is also shown in Harker's The Ffolliots of Rednarley 
(1913)• In this, a young man, the son of a successful 
shopowner, uses his wealth and intelligence to become the 
local Liberal Member of Parliament, but the aristocracy of 
the area continue to regard him as a tradesmen, who doesn't 
know his place in society. The same theme is evident in 
Hope's Second String (1910). One of the main characters 
began as a butcher, prospered, and retained control of his 
shop, although he himself was involved only in the breeding 
of animals, especially horses. Nevertheless, his commercial 
connections meant that he was not socially acceptable. He 
was permitted to visit the local gentry only when there were 
no other guests, or when it was known that no-one present 
would object to him.
Hugh Walpole illustrated the class positions. 0ne of 
his characters, an aristocrat, analysed the way in which he 
looked on women: 'from four points of view, and he had, as 
it were, a sliding scale of manners on which he might mark 
delicately his perception of their position. There was 
firstly the Countess of Titled Nobility. His manner was 
slightly deferential, and at the same time a little familiar 
proof of his own good breeding.
Secondly, there was the Trojan, or lady of Assured 
Position. Here he was familiar, and at the same time just a
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little patronising - proof of his sense of Trojan superiority.
Thirdly, there was the Governess, or Poor Gentility
Position. To members of this class he was affably kind,
conveying his sense of the merits and sympathy with their
struggle against poverty, but nevertheless making quite
plainly the gulf fixed between him and them.
Fourthly, there were the Impossible or the Rest -
ranging from the wives of successful Brewers to that class
known as unfortunates. Here there was no alternative in his
manner; he was stern and short, and stiff with all of then,
and the reason of their existence was one of the unsolved
(96)problems that had always puzzled him*.
g.G. Wells went even further, and described the thinking 
of one section of the aristocracy as 'the pure reactionary 
whose prominent idea was that the village schools should 
confine themselves to ' teaching the catechism, hat touching, 
and courtseying, and be given a holiday whenever beaters 
were in request1. This was an exaggeration, of course,
but others portrayed stem nobility, Locke created on ex­
colonial governor who believed that 'to take folks out of 
the station to which it had pleased God to call then was an 
act of impiety'.
It was not only the upper class which looked down on the 
workers. Galsworthy's upper middle class Forsyte family felt 
the same way, end tried to avoid them whenever possible: 9678
(96) H. Walpole, The Wooden Horse (1934 ed.) p. 217
(97) H.G. Wells, The New Machiavelli (1911) p. 370
(98) W.J. Locke, Stella Maris (l913) p. 83
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1"Let’s go to the Zoo" they had said to each other, "it’ll
be great funI It was a shilling day and there would not be
(99)all those horrid common people’.
Novels with a great deal of social significance were 
rare; most were romances of various types, but whenever social 
stratification did enter into a book, it conformed to the 
hierarchy of socio-economic position prevalent in Edwardian 
England, though the differences were generally becoming less 
acute than the literature implied. The conspicuous consump­
tion of the period is well depicted, so that the general 
feel of the times is given.
The Causes of the Unrest
<* A working class political party did exist in this period,
but many men retained their traditional support for the 
Conservative or Liberal Party. Nevertheless, the Labour
Party did succeed in gaining some Parliamentary Representation;
a
Date No. of M.P.’s
No. of No. elected 
candidates unopposed
% of
total
vote
av. vote 
per
oppo sed 
candidate
1900 2 15
1906 30 51
1910
(Jan) 40 78
1.8 26.6
5.9 39.9
7.6. 38.4
1910
(Dec) 42 56 3 7.1 42.8
This increasing number of Latour Members of Parliament 
coincided with a Liberal Government, and several measures of 
social legislation, such as the establishment of Labour 9
(99) J. Galsworthy, The Forsyte Sapa (1967 ed.) p. 136
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Exchanges and the National Insurance Bill, so that it night '
appear that the representatives of the working class were
exerting an influence on Governnent. Indeed, by 1911 the
Liberals relied on the support of Labour to naintain their
majority, but nothing was done to prevent the falling
standard of living of the working class. If the Labour Party
had demanded action, and the Liberals had refused, the defeat
of the Government was likely, end this could have ruined the
Labour Party financially. Thus, the Labour M.P.’s appeared
impotent and captive. G.D.H. Cole, writing in 1913» argued
that the leaders were not even interested in struggling to
achieve anything for their constituents, as they had
•entered the governing class, and Labour was left, perplexed
, .  ( 100)and unmanned, to find new leaders in its own ranks'.
Cole was not the only person frustrated by the activities of 
t* ^the Parliamentary Labour Party. By-elections after the
General Election of December 1910 reveal that four seats were 
lost, though this does not suggest as much grass root dis­
content as the bald figures imply. An officially credited 
Labour candidate stood in only one constituency, Hanley. In 
1906, the seat had bedn won by Enoch Edwards, the moderate 
President of the Miners* Federation of Great Britain, on a 
Lib-Lab ticket, after he had contested the seat in 1900 as 
a Liberal. His death in 1912 occasioned the by-election, 
which was won easily by the Liberal! 10
(100) G.D.H. Cole, The World of Labour (1913) p. 207
Henley
Liberal
Conservative
Labour
December 1910
4,653
8,343
13 July 1912 
6,647 
5,993 
1,694
Another Labour loss was in Tower Hamlets, where George 
Lansbury resigned over the issue of female enfranchisement, 
and stood as a Socialist, without receiving official. Labour 
Party support:
26 Nov amber 1912Tower Hamlets (Bow and Bromiey) December 1910
Conservative
Labour
3,452 4,042
4,315 Socialist 3,291
It could be argued that here, the electors were voicing 
their disapproval of the concept of votes for women, rather 
than anger at the Labour Party, so that it is not especially 
valuable as a case study in the position of the Labour Party.
At Chesterfield, Barnet Kenyon, the candidate, would not 
ally himself solely to the Labour Party, end stood as a Lib- 
Lab. He was well known locally, being the Assistant Secretary 
of the Derbyshire Miners, and had been endorsed by the Miners* 
Federation of Great Britain before it had been realised that 
he would not take the Labour whip if elected. Moreover, he 
was contesting a seat previously held by another moderate local 
miner, James Haslcn. There was no official Labour -candidate, 
but a Socialist stood. His defeat by Kenyon was not surprising 
Chesterfield December 1910 20 August 1913
Labour 7,233 Lib-Lab 7,725
Conservative 5,055 5,539
Socialist - 583
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20 May 19U  
6,4.96 
6,155 
3,669
L
Finally, at Derbyshire North East, the death of the 
extremely moderate Harvey caused a by-election. The equally 
moderate Martin, in reality a Liberal, was the Labour 
candidate, and was opposed by an official Liberal, which 
allowed the vote to be split, and the seat was won by the 
Tory:
Derbyshire North East December 1910 
Conservative 6,038
Liberal
Labour • 7,838
Thus, the Labour Party did not fare as badly in the by- 
elections as a superficial inspection would suggest. An 
analysis of all by-elections contested from 1911 to 1914- 
reveals, that, compared to the Labour votes in 1906 and 
January and December 1910, in some constituencies the propor­
tional vote rose, and in others it fell, but, on the whole,
J? Labour's share remained fairly constant. On the other hand, 
the period after 1910 was one of wide spread industrial unrest, 
in which the working class seemed to ignore its political 
leaders, and it could be argued that one of the causes of this 
direct action was frustration at the failure of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party to alleviate the worsening lot of the vjorking
class.
The new leaders were much more militant, and persuaded 
the men that direct action was the solution to the economic 
ills, rather than political methods, which had failed up to 
then. The doctrine spread by many of these orators was 
Syndicalism, a movement that had originated in France, spread 
to America, and recrossed the GhBSSél, reaching Britain in
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about 1910* Its aims vere to organise the workers of a 
country Into several nass unions, which would then strike, 
destroy capitalism, and allow the unions to take over the 
various tmts, and, consequently, the government of the 
country. Two of the most famous names associated with the 
movement were Tom Mann and Ben Tillett, both of whome had 
helped to organise the Great Dock Strike of 1889.
It is difficult-to assess the degree of Syndicalist 
feelings in the country in the years 1910—14-« E*. Burdick's 
two volumed doctoral thesis Syndicalism end Industrial 
Unionism in England pitil 1918 (Oxford, D. Phil,, 1950) 
maintains that from the summer of 1911 until the end of 1913» 
the movement was strong within the trade unions, and powerful 
in international Syndicalism, Certainly, many of the strikes , 
in the years 1911—14. were blamed upon the Syndicalists, and 
the condemnation of this doctrine is a regular feature of the 
period, but it is not easy to estimate the depth of 
Syndicalist reasoning within the ordinary working man, nor the 
level to vhich he was influenced by such teaching, Hyndman, 
the leader of the British Socialist Party maintained, in 1912, 
that the ideology would never be influenzal in this country, 
Yet, even if he was correct, many did fear that Syndicalism 
and Socialism would destroy the existing social order. The 
London Municipal Society, founded in 1894 to organise 
Conservative candidates in local elections within the 
Metropolis, attacked the 'callow, ill-informed theorists who 
seek to subvert and annihilate the social system of 10
(101) H*M,-Hyndman, Further Reminiscehces (19121 t>. 457
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centuries’. The sane sort of line was taken by the nore
vigorous anti-Socialist Union of Great Britain, whose President 
was the Duke of Devonshire, and Vice-President Walter Long,
M.P. The Union issued a steady stream of books, such as 
Socialism Exposed (1914-)» and a very large number of pamphlets 
which pointed out the evils of Socialism. A typical comment 
was the claim that the fruits of Socialism were 'mismanagement, 
extravagance, favouritism, indolence, discontent, heathenism', 
compared to 'the sterling qualities colled forth by legitimate 
pride in industrial ownership', which were 'industry, economy, 
thrift, independence, self-respect and satisfaction'.
In the sane way, trade unions were criticised. Sir 
Arthur Clay, the artist and social writer, insisted that they 
'exist for the sole benefit of one particular class, their 
action is wholly self-centred, and they pursue what they 
believe to be the interests of their class without regard to 
the effects of their actions upon society at large, or upon 
the prosperity of the community'.
Thus, there was a considerable weight of opinion backing 
the idea that the unrest was fostered by extremists, intent 
upon the destruction of capitalism. Even the Labour M.P.'s 
were regarded as dangerous by some. The King's Secretary,
Sir Frederic kPonsonby, claimed that they 'were known as 1023*
(102) London Municipal Society, The Case Against Socialism
(1908) p. 529
(103) S. Graham, Socialism: An Actual Experiment (1910) pp.
A2-43
(104.) A. Clay, Syndicalism and Labour (1911) p. 111
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extremist^1. Qf COurse, others looked further for the
causes of the strikes, and decided that the fall in the
standard of living was a major factor. Violet Markham,
sister of the coal owner and Liberal M.P., maintained that
this was the reason. Writing later, she argued that ’the
cost of living had risen but the wages of unskilled labour
had not followed suit. No proportionate increase of the new
wealth, therefore, had found its way into the pockets of the
workers. Hence, a growth of discontent which flared up into
the violence of the 1911 strikes1. W.T. Layton,
Lecturer in Economics at London University, made the'same
point. His explanation was formulated and printed within a
couple of years of the events, and so could present a more
definitive account. He asserted that, 'as the downward
pressure of real wages had become more acute, the number of
(107)trade disputes has shown a tendency to increase1.
Similarly, a paper read to certain Unionists M.P.'s in 
October 1911 put the blame at the same door; *Up to 1900 
there had been a great impetus in the standard of comfort.
Since that date there has been an arrestment, if not a 
decline...I suggest, therefore, that here we have the main 
cause of the labour unrest of today1, while the Unionist
Party Conference in the seme year felt that both agitators 105678
(105) F. Ponsonby, Recollections of Three Reigns (1951) p. 235
(106) V.R. Markham, Return Passage (1953) p. 136
(107) W.T. Layton, An Introduction to the Study of Prices
(1920 ed.) p. 97
(108) Unionist Party op.cit. p. 13
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and falling living standards were to blame, and it took the
opportunity to attack the Governnent; 'As far as the unrest
has been confined to demands for higher wages to meet the
increased cost of living, and not to that part of it which
has been deliberately fanned and fostered by agitators of
the syndicalist school, it can, unquestionably, be ascribed
to the Government's neglect to take steps to increase
employment all round and to protect industries which at present
(109}suffer from foreign competition'. Of course, it has
always been difficult to decide when the party in Opposition 
felt deeply about an issue, and when it was merely making 
political capital out of events, but it does appear that at 
least some Conservatives were thinking deeply about the 
problems behind the militancy.
Other explanations for the unrest centred around the 
displays of conspicuous consumption by the middle and upper 
classes, which could have angered the poor, and driven then 
to militancy. S.A. Barnett, Canon of Bristol from 189A to 
1906 and Sub-Dean of Westminster 1906-13> had first hand 
experience of the poor, having been the original Warden of 
-yoynbee Hall from I8S4. to 1896, In a letter to his sister- 
in-law dated June 1912, he wondered 'whether the great . 
spectacle of pleasure and wealth at the Coronation has not 
had something to do with all the strikes - people could not 
help comparing and contrasting different conditions'• 109
(109) Annual Conference of the Conservative and Unionist
Party. Report of Council, 16 November 1911 (1911) p .18
(110) H.0, Barnett, Canon Barnett (1921 ed.) p. 728
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A Manchester J.P., T. Gregory offered a comprehensive 
analysis of the causes. He rejected the notion of agitators 
as they had 'little power where workers are satisfied with 
their conditions'. Instead, he looked at the reasons behind 
the discontent, and found a combination of static wages and 
rising prices, an improvement in education, the growing size 
of firms, which divorced the owner from his men, the increa- 
ing display of wealth, easier communications, and a cheaper 
press. This was coupled with the spread of mass unionism, 
and the appearance of more machinery, which led to industrial 
boredom. Finally, the trade boon had created a labour 
shortage. All these factors together, Gregory asserted, had 
produced the strike wave.^"^
This was a sophisticated view, and one that tended to 
occur to people later, when even more complicated accounts 
were presented. Perhaps the classical version was presented 
by Dangerfield, who argued in The Strange Death of Liberal 
England (1935) that the labour troubles were part of an 
organised attack on the existing society, the other prongs 
being unrest in Ireland and the female emancipationists. 
Dangerfield never explained how the onslaught was organised, 
and neither is there any evidence of co-ordination, so that 
his theory can be discounted.
Phelps Brown maintained that the working class had 
observed the rise in ppices, when 'they had been used to *•
(111) T. Gregory 'Labour Copartnership end Labour Unrest'
Journal of the Manchester Statistical Society (1913)
• PP. 3, 3, 9
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getting a little better off year by year, and now it seemed 
they had only impoverishment to look forward to. They 
resented this the more keenly because meanwhile their sub­
jective standard of living, the livelihood to which they felt 
themselves entitled, had been raised by the continued exten­
sion of education among them. The recent worsening of their
condition seemed to bear out the prophecies of Marx, whose
(112)work was becoming increasingly known*.
Henry Pelling has taken the line that in periods of good
trade, when unemployment is low, industrial unrest is always
prevalent, and the strikes of 1911-1A were merely a mani-
(113}festation of the prosperity of the period. It was
certainly true that unemployment was low:
Unemployment,1900-1A: percentages of 
all trade unions making returns 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
1900 2.32.A '2.0 2.01.92.1 2.2 2.53.0 2.82.73.5,
1901 3.5 3 1  3.1 3.4 3 .O3.O 2.9 3.4 3.2 3.2 3.3 4.2
1902-4.0 3.9 3.2 3.4 3.5 3.7 3.5 4.0 4.5 A.5 A.A 5.0
1903 A.9 A.3 3.9 A.6 3.5 3.9 A.A 5.0 5.2 5.6 5.5 6,3
190A 6.1 5.6 5.5 5.5 5.8 5.5 5.6 5.96.3 6.3 6.5 7.1
1905 6.3 5.7 5.2 5.2 A.7 A.8 A.7 A.9 A.8 A.6 A.3 4.5
1906 A.3 A.1 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.2 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.9 A.O A.4
1907 3.9 3.5 3.2 2.8 3 .O 3.1 3.2 3.6 A.1 A.2 A.5 5.6 123
(112) E.H.P. Brown, The Growth of British Industrial
Relations (1965) pp. 1A-15
(113) H. Pelling, Popular Politics and Society in Late
Victorian Britain (1968)
93
1908.. 5.3 6.0 6.4 7.1 7.47.9 7.9 3.5 9.3 9.5 8.7 9.1
1909 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.7 7.4 7.1 6.5 6.6
1910 6.8 5.7 5.2 4*4 4*2 3*7 3.3 4.0 4*3 4.4 4.6 5.0
1911 3.9 3.3 3.0 2.8 2.5 3.0 2.9 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 3.1
1912 2.7 2.8 11.3» 3.6 2.7 2.5 2.6 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.8 2.3
1913 2.2 2.0 1.9 1.7 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.6
1914 2.5 2.3 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.8 7.1 5.9 4.4 2.9 2.5
(■»distorted by the coal' strike)
However, Pelling does not accord sufficient attention to 
the falling standard of living. Even if more people were 
working in the period 1911-14- than in previous years, never­
theless, real wages were smaller than they had been, and this 
point should not be underrated. Moreover, there were enough 
people looking for jobs to supply firms faced with the 
prospects of a strike: blacklegs could still be bought.
The difficulties involved in deciding the causes of the 
unrest do not alter two basic facts. Trade union membership 
was increasing rapidly in the years immediately prior to the 
First Uorid War:'
, Year Total Number of Members .
1393 ' 1,559,000
1900 ' 2,022,000
1910 2,565,000
1912 3,416,000
1913 4,135,000 14
(114) Seventeenth Abstract of Statistics Cd. 7733 (1914-16) 
p. 322
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At the sane tine, the number of strikes grew:
Year Number of Working Days Lost
Number of 
Stoppages
Number of Worl 
Involved
1900 3,088,000 623 185,000
1910 9,867,000 521 514,000
1911 10,155,000 872 952,000
1912 40,890,000 S34 1 ,462,000
1913 9,804,000 . 1,459 664,000
1914 9,878,000 972 447,000
It is possible that there was a correlation between the 
increase in trade union manbership and the rising number of 
industrial disputes. However, this was in no way apparent at 
the time, and it is certain that the public was not prepared 
for the onslaught which cane in the last few years of peace. 
Before then, the workers had seemed reasonably content with 
their lot, and riots had not occurred for a number of years. 
This relative calm was to be shattered by the violence and 
bitterness of the years 1911-14.
Attitudes to Legislation in 1911
Only an aged man could have recalled industrial unrest 
which might have rivalled that of the years from 1911 to the 
outbreak of war. The disputes had begun in earnest in 1910, 
when three times as many working days had been lost than in 
1900, although there had been fewer strikes. 1911 inherited
one of the most fierce examples of the new militancy, that
of the Cambrian cool miners, in South Wales, but the continuing
stoppage did not attract much national comment. There were
other manifestations of discontent in the first half of the
year, but nothing to warn the nation of the onslaught to come..
The press and politicians were more anxious to comment on
other social issues, such as the National Insurance Act.
Nevertheless, a section of the community tended to be
suspicious of attempts by the working class to improve its
conditions, and launched an attack on those Institutions which
seemed willing to do so. The condemnations tended to be
arbitory, and often confused trade unions with socialism,
or at least regarded the two as synonymous, which was by
no means the case. This association was a common, if
erroneous, feature of the period.
However, in the months of relative industrial calm, some
were able to take a benign view of the English working man.
A good example of this appeared in the Spectator, which
described him as *a self respecting fellow with a great deal
( 1)of common sense*,' A similar opinion was expressed by Sir 1
(1) Spectator. 18 February 1911. p. 23S
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Alfred Mond, the industrialist end Liberal Member of
Parliament. In his Presidential Address at the Unemployment
Section of the National Conference on the Prevention of
Destitution in May 1911, he maintained that 'you con trust
the working man of England to treat you honestly', though he
did warn that this did not apply to everyone, because there
were a 'large number of those who are morally or physically
(o)deficient workers'.' ' The Home Secretary, Winston Churchill
had made a reputation as a radical, and if he had retained
this attitude, it would not be surprising to hear him
describing miners as 'well educated, peacable, intelligent,
(■>)
and law-abiding', even after the disturbances atTonypandy 
during the Cambrian strike. However, there were signs that 
his views were changing, and later events indicated that he 
was bitterly opposed to strikes. Yet, like so many of the 
middle class, he found little to fault in the working man 
who accepted what they believed to be his position in the . 
Society.
The Labour Bills
In February, the Parliamentary Labour Party introduced 
the Right to Work Bill. It had little chance of success, 
and was used to bring to the attention of the rest of the 
country the difficulties caused by unemployment, in a 
perfectly legitimate, legal and constitutional way, but it 
was not well received. In the House of Commons the Tory ' 
Industrialist Ernest lardine advised the Labour Party to
(2) Sir A, Mond 'The Problem of Unemployment', English Review
August 1911, pp. 161, 163
(3) House of Commons Debates, Voi. 21, col. 239, 7 February 1911
•drop socialistic wild schemes which will drive capital away,
which will drive employment out of our country'. ^  The
Conservative press tended to be just as anxious to reject
the measure. The Daily Express condemned the Bill under the
headline ’The Right to Sponge’, and advocated its rejection
because it was ’not only violently Socialistic’, but also
'utterly opposed to any imaginable interests of the working
classes...The workhouse system is, by comparison, a lesser 
(*)
evil'. ‘ The Spectator considered the matter in greater
depth, before concluding that the idea was unacceptable,
because of its Socialistbase, which failed to provide an
adequate incentive to persuade anybody to work hard.^
Similar reaction greeted the Minimum Wages Bill which
Willien Crocks Intrcduced in April. This laid down a
national minimum wage of £1 10s a week. The attitude of the
Daily Mail was, perhaps, typical of its critics. It did not
discuss the merits and demerits of the Bill, but insisted
that its application was impossible, and asked, sarcastically,
why the Labour leaders had not chosen 'a more generous and
satisfactory figure', if it was so easy to fix wages by a
(7}simple piece of legislation. ' The Weekly Dispatch did not 
consider that the figure wa3 excessive, considering the cost 
of living, but pointed out that the laws of economics insisted 
irrefutably that wage levels could be ascertained only by the
(A) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 21, col. 606 10 February 
1911
(5) . Dally Express. 11 February 1911, p. A
(6) Spectator. 18 February 1911, p. 238
(7) Daily Mall. 27 April 1911, p. 6
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supply of, and the demand for, labour, so that the Bill 
could not hope to succeed.'1 '
Thus the Conservatives were adamant in their opposition 
to these constitutional efforts of the working class to 
better its position, while the Liberals were silent. The 
great fear of Socialism had become apparent in the Unionist 
ranks, even when the Parliamentary Labour Party was attempting 
to aid those it represented: industrial unrest would increase 
apprehensions.
The National Insurance Act
The most important piece of social legislation in this 
period was the National Insurance Act. It was Introduced to 
the House of Commons by the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
Lloyd George, on 4 May 1911. Its aim was to encompass all 
manual workers, who would be obliged to contribute 4d a week 
into the scheme. The employer would have to add 3d, and the 
State would bring the weekly contribution up to 9d. This 
would be used to provide a small income for contributors who 
were sick wi employed, and would allow them to receive .
medical attention^ The Labour Party had attempted to 
ensure that the working classes did not suffer from unemploy­
ment by the Right to Work Bill, and it had tried to alleviate 
poverty caused by low wages In the Minimum Wage Bill, but 
both measures had been rejected, with special vehemence by 
the Conservatives. Bearing this in mind, it seemed possible 
that the National Insurance Bill would receive a hostile 
reception in the House of Commons, and denunciation from
(8) Weekly Dispatch. 30 April 1911, p. 8
that section of the press which opposed the Government.
In fact, this did not prove to be the case. The Morning 
Post greeted the Bill warmly, explaining that, ever since 
industrialisation, 'a spell of sickness, a time of unemploy­
ment, cutting off of wages, might at any moment break up a 
decent home and set the family sliding down the steep slope to 
pauperism and degradation. That is the danger overshadowing 
every wage earner, and if by the help of the State it can be 
aver ted, a great good has been accomplished that will affect
not the material prosperity alone but the moral character of
(9)the workers’, by providing them with security. ' Thus, a
Conservative paper had lent its support to a Liberal attempt
to improve social conditions. The Financial Times, which was
equally right wing in its outlook, considered that ’with its
main idea of the desirability of insuring workmen against
sickness and invalidity everyone practically is in agreement'.
The main doubts were summed up by the Daily Dispatch: 'There
is the question of malingering, and the question of the effect
on employers and of the burden to the taxpayer', but, the
paper conceded, if those to be insured accepted the spirit of
the Act, it was 'a finQ,and memorable achievement, marking
( 11)an epoch in the story of our civilisation'. These 
criticisms were repented in other journals. Walter Sichcl, 
writing in Nineteenth Century and After, asked whether 'skill *1
(9) Morning Post. A May 1911, p. 6
(10) Financial Times. 6 May 1911. p. A
(11) Daily Dispatch. 5 May 1911, p. A
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and thrift* would ’be called on to support the casual and the
loafer?’ Similarly, the Spectator felt that 'we shall be
lucky if the scheme does not stimulate the development of this
(13)class, and on a huge scale'. Thus, a section of the
middle class was expressing doubts about the reliability and
integrity of the working class, suggesting that any attempt
to alleviate the difficulties that can arise from illness
and -unemployment could - and, according to the most
pessimistic observers, would - result in a part of the
population taking advantage of the law, and ceasing work.
W.H. Dawson pointed out that a similar scheme operated in
Germany, where ’the insured German workman often seeks
medical advice on the slightest provocation, as his betters 
(1 /'N
sometimes do'. Thus, the singular lack of faith in the
British worker, displayed in some of the press, was given 
additional support by a foreign example. Nevertheless, the 
Act was accepted, albeit with reservations, because, in the 
words of Austen Chamberlain, 'the sickness scheme IS a good 
one'.(l5>
The main opposition came from two diverse sources. 
Employers of domestic servants disliked having to pay
(12) W. Sichel, 'A Downing Street Idyll'. Nineteenth Century
and After. February 1911, p. 264-
(13) Spectator. 6 May 1911, p. 676 *
(14-) W.H. Dawson, 'Insurance Legislation: the Larger View'
Fortnightly Review, 1 March 1911, p. 538 f.n.
(15) C. Petrie, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir 
Austen Chamberlain. 1939. p. 277
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insurance stamps for their employees. A letter in the 
Westminster Gazette, signed ’'Resistance”, summed up this 
attitude, asking why a nursery governess, ’who is perhaps a 
LADY (think of it!)...be dragged through the weekly ordeal 
of plastering nasty stamps on a grimy card?1' ‘ This 
provides a good example of the social stratification of 
the time, as the National Insurance Act would put on the 
same level an ordinary servant and a governess, when the 
two were far apart in the accepted social order of 
Edwardian England.
Ironically, the other groups which stood against the
Act were the Independent Labour Party and the Fabian Society,
both of which decided by small majorities at their annual
conferences that the workers should not be obliged to
contribute towards this type of social security. Hilaire
Belloc went even further, arguing that such measures weakened
the resolve of the workers to strike for better conditions,
(17)and thus had to be opposed.
In the past the ratepayer had been responsible for the 
maintenance of the poor, and this Act passed the burden onto 
the taxpayer, and, thus represented a change in the social 
policy of the Liberal Government. The workers themselves 
contributed, when they were employed, and would draw from the 
fund on any occasion that lack of work transformed then into 
the "idle", whereas the truly "idle" could not accumulate * 
insurance rights. Now, the worker himself paid a substantial
(16) Westminster Gazette. 22 November 1911* p.9
(17) H. Belloc, The Servile State (1912)i letter to Dally
Herald. 8 May 1912 * p. 3
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share towards supporting his own unemployment. The change in 
policy was partly financed by the working man, yet it did 
represent a major extension of Government policy. It is true 
that the Liberals had introduced a system of old age pensions 
in 1908 - 5s a week for those over the age of seventy - but 
National Insurance was different. The State accepted 
responsibility for illness and unemployment among that section 
of the population which had previously been regarded as 
capable of fending for themselves} the workhouse had been the 
solution to poverty, but now the family could remain together, 
supported by cash payments, while the wage earner recovered 
his health, or searched for another job. The reasoning 
behind this change of thought could be seen as the "New 
Liberalism", which was gaining strength in the early twentieth 
century. This relied on greater Governmental intervention 
into the economic and social life of the country, and 
completely rejected the laissez-Faire doctrine which had. been 
eroded in the nineteenth century, as successive Governments 
found it necessary or advantageous to interfere with the 
free working of the economy. Those vh,o believe that a 
capitalist ruling class would never do anything to help the 
workers unless it was absolutely imperative would argue that 
the Act was passed to appease the industrial masses, and 
prevent them from exercising their enormous power. The less 
politically committed would regard the Liberals as humanists, 
who did care about social,conditions. However, the 
Conservatives, in the main, lent their support to the Act, 
and they were traditionally regarded as opponents of working 
class advancement. let this Is not entirely fair. It was a
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Conservative, Disraeli, who had expounded the theory of the 
Tory working man. At the time of his premiership, many 
leaders of the working class had urged their men to vote 
Unionist, because that party was more inclined to social 
legislation than the Liberals. Thus, support for the 
National Insurance Act can be seen as an extension of the 
traditional Conservative policy.
Summary of Opinion
An inspection of the attitudes towards the legislation 
and the attempted legislation in the first half of 1911 does 
not produce very startling results. The Liberal press was far 
more sympathetic to the aims of the Liberal Party than the 
Conservatives, who adopted a variety of opposing stances. It 
would have been unusual if this had not proved to be the case, 
though on the question of National Insurance, there was broad 
agreement. However, the diverse views are useful in illustra­
ting the difficulties of analysing opinion, which did not 
exist on a simple class basis. For example, the middle class 
did not have one single attitude on a topic, but rather a host 
of views, which depended on political affiliation as much as 
social position. Although the Liberals tended to be more 
sympathetic towards the working class than the Tories, it 
will become apparent that there was no such thing as a 
Liberal opinion, for within that Party there were various 
diverse views on any topic. In the same way, the Unionists 
were not united. There was a moderate Tory approach, which 
considered the position of the workers, and allowed them 
certain rights, and there were extreme Tories, who felt that
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the working class should be subservient to the needs of the 
employers, while many fell somewhere between these two view­
points. However, it would seem true to say, using the 
reaction to the legislation of 1911 as evidence, that the 
Conservatives did tend to regard the workers with more 
suspicion than the Liberals, and were more prepared to 
think ill of them. This difference in thought becomes more 
obvious as the unrest of the next four years unfolds.
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Chapter IV
Yhe Strikes of the Simmer, 1911
The wave of industrial unrest which swept the country in 
the summer of 1911 was brought about by the actions of some 
of the worst paid sections of the community - the seamen, the 
dockers and transport workers associated with them, and the 
railwaymen. Seamen often earned less than £1 a week, while 
many dockers were casual workers, and as such did not have a 
guaranteed income. Their basic rate was generally 6d an hour, 
so that a full week’s labour -would produce around £1. 
Railwaymen, also, were poorly paid. In 1910, a porter with 
the Midland Railway Company could expect between 18s and 
£1 2s a week for seventy two hours, though he was not promised 
that amount of work.^ Such conditions did not pass entirely 
unnoticed. The Daily Mirror maintained that ’railway hours
(2)and railway pay are among the scandals of the labour world'.
J. Ellis Barker, who was devoting most of his time to point­
ing out the menace of German militarism, noted that the wages
of dockers were so low that they 'lived under conditions which
(3}are scarcely human'. '
However, such observations come from a minority of the 
more affluent population} most of the middle and upper classes 
believed that all was well inside the'country. The Daily 1
(1) Railway Conciliation Scheme. Statement Regarding Wages
and Hours of Labour under the Scheme for Concilia­
tion and Arbitration Cd. 5332 (1910) p. 4.6 f.n.
(2) Daily Mirror. 21 August 1911, p. 7
(3) J.E. Barker 'The,Labour Revolt' Nineteenth Century and
frCVjj-c
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Graphic went so far as to suggest that few people were even 
interested in the serious events of the time. It ran a 
cartoon centred around two newspaper vendors. One had failed 
to sell a single copy of his journal, which dealt with weighty 
constitutional natters, while the other had sold almost all of 
his tabloids, which were stuffed with sport and crime 
reports. ^  If the public was unconcerned with political and 
social events, the succession of strikes in 1911 must have 
caused a greater shock to the community than it would have 
done to a more socially aware society.
The strikes themselves did not follow each other. The 
seamen were the first out, and before that had been settled, 
dockers in many parts of the country had left their work.
Most of these disputes had been concluded before the London 
dockers struck, together with a large number of transport 
workers in the city. Tleso continued while a general strike 
took place in Liverpool. Out of the latter began the first 
national rail stoppage. Thus, for several days in August, 
the London transport workers, a large section of the inhabit­
ants of Livex*pool, and most of the nation' s railwaymen, were 
on strike. To attempt to investigate the reaction to ell of 
these movements as a single entity would be a task of 
inordinate complexity. Hence, they have been divided into 
four: the seamen; the dockers; Liverpool; and the railwaymen. 
It is important to remember that these disputes overlapped.
At least a prut of the upper and middle classes believed that
(A) Daily Graphic, 8 March 1911# p. 3
such a wave of unrest had common origins, common leaders, and 
common aims, and consequently, the reaction was more angry 
than it might have been.
The Seamens Strike
Behind the unrest of the seamen was the National Sailor’s 
and Firemen’s Union, which had originated as the National 
Amalgamated Union of Sailors and Firemen. It had been founded 
in 1887 by J. Havelock Wilson, and grew swiftly, aided by its 
initial victories, and by 1890 had a membership of about 60,000, 
The owners refused to recognise the Union, and were incensed 
when it threatened to call a strike against the employment of 
officers who were not members of the Certified Officers’ Union 
of Great Britain and Ireland, another association of which they 
disapproved. Thus, the owners joined together into the Shipping 
Federation in September 1890, and established registry offices 
in every port, offering the Federation Ticket, the possession 
of which would give preference in employment in return for an 
agreement to sail with non-unionists. The employers decided 
to enforce this the following year, and strikes failed, so that 
the Union was obliged to allow men to sign the Ticket. Member­
ship fell, and by 1894, it was in liquidation. When the 
affairs had been wound up, a new Union was started. Member­
ship was small, but had grown to about 12,000 by 1910, when 
there were signs of renewed vitality in the ports. However, 
the shipowners and other port employers had not been inactive, 
and had become involved in free labour associations to break 
strikes. Thus, the owners were strong, but they were faced 
by a growing Union, whose President, Havelock Wilson, was 
embittered by the earlier failure.
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'In early 1911, the National Sailors’ and Firemen’s Union 
had asked the Shipowners Federation to negotiate, which meant 
that the Union would receive recognition! the employers 
refused. This left the Union with two alternatives: it could 
accept the decision, which would mean another defeat, and its 
possible collapse, or it could take some form of industrial 
action. Thus, the decision to call a national strike was 
hardly surprising, but, before the order had been issued, 
sailors at Southampton walked off their ships, on 14- June.
This unofficial action compelled the Union to advise an 
immediate national, stoppage, with the dual aims of recogni­
tion and an increase in wages.
The press discussed both of these demands,'but were 
unable to agree on the conditions aboard ship. H.M. Toialinsom, 
’citing in the E*gli»h Review, insisted that 'the life of a 
sailor is more monotonous, squalid, and repellent...than 
that of the most badly paid labourers ashore’, ' and the 
Manchester Guardian told its readers that 'on average, seamen 
and firemen are worse paid, worse lodged, and probably, even 
today, worse fed than Englishmen doing comparable work shore’.^
The Times, however, was unconvinced, pointing out that 'higher
(7)wages are now paid in British vessels than in others'. If . 
such an assertion was accurate, it reflects the poor wages 
received by foreign seamen, for the Union’s demands were not.
(5) H.M. Tomlinson, 'The British Merchant Seaman’, English
Review, August 1911, p. 116
(6) Manchester Guardian, 15 June 1911, p. 6
(7) Times, 17 June 1911, p. 11
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over’ambitious. Men on cargo boats wanted £5 a month, instead
of £4. 10s, those on Atlantic lines asked for £5 10s, instead
of £5, and firemen required a rise from £5 10s to £6, J
However, discussions about conditions and pay did not
interest the press in the first few days of the strike. The
papers were convinced that there was no chance of success, and
the impending collapse filled the pages. The Drily Graphic
published a cartoon which depicted a ship, S.S. Shipping,
steaming along, and towing the strike with ease. Havelock
Wilson asked 1"Why don’t you stop? Can’t you see, you are 
(a)
anchored?"’. The Financial Times, using its position as a
paper devoted to economic matters, was able to reveal to its
readers that ’one of the biggest shipowners in London informed
our representative that the majority of the men are merely
humouring the agitators, and that they have not the slightest
intention of leaving their places'. Moreover, it was not
only the Tory press which anticipated the defeat of the men.
Reynolds's Newspaper, recognising the weakness of the seamen's
organisation, thought that the strike had been called to
organise the Union's existence and to try to recruit more
members into it, so as to prepare for a future conflict with 
(11}the employers, ' *1
(8) H.R. Hikins 'The Liverpool General Transport Strike, 1911'
Transactions of the Historical Society of Lancashire 
and Cheshire (1961), p. 172
(9) Daily Dispatch. 16 June 1911» p. A
(10) Financial Times, 15 June 1911, p. 7 .
(11) Reynolds's Newspaper. 18 June 1911, p. 6
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'‘ Surprisingly, the strike did not fail. Many non-union 
members joined it, and very quickly, some owners conceded the 
men's demands. This did not mean a resumption of work. The 
Union believed that a partial return would weaken its posi­
tion, so everyone stayed out. Their bargaining power was 
somewhat strengthened by outside influences. Dockers in Hull, 
Goole, and Manchester left their jobs, to demonstrate sympathy 
for the seamen. At the same time, the various unions con­
nected with dockside labour were formulating their own 
demands, so that the whole of the transport industry was 
threatened.-
The success of the shipping strike caused consternation
in Britain. Some newspapers were angry about the stoppage
itself, and even more disturbed that it coincided with the
Coronation of King George V. The Times and the Birmingham
Daily Post observed that this would result in a loss of public
(12)sympathy, ' but the Daily Telegraph was more expressive: 'It
struck the community as a particularly ungracious and impolitic
act to threaten the suspension of shipping business on the very
(13^eve of the Coronation'. ' In fact, there was nothing 
sinister about the timing. The Economist pointed out, that 
'it is significant that on Coronation Day several bodies of
(1A)
strikers sent loyal congratulations to the King'. ' Clearly, 
these people did not wish to be disloyal to the monarch, but
(12) Times. H  June 1911, p. 11, Birmingham Daily Post. 17
June 1911, p. 8
(13) Daily Telegraph. 16 June 1911, p. 10
(14) Economist. 29 July 1911. p. 227
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wanted to gain higher wages, and thought that the time was
appropriate. This end was also censured. The Daily Telegraph
insisted that it was 'civil war in its most invidious form',
and offered a solution - the employers should refuse to make
any concessions, and wait. Eventually, want would drive the
men back to work. Those owners who had settled were also
condemned: 'The resources of the sailors and fireman are not
great, and it might be thought that if they are met with an
uncompromising negative they will shortly be compelled to
re-engage on any terns. On the other hand, the men are
encouraged by their partial success in dealing with particular 
(I k)
owners'. Thus the Dally Telegraph revealed its opposition
to the trade-union demands.
Another paper critical of the men's actions was Liberal - 
the Manchester Guardian, which argued that transport workers 
were in a special position, because they could cause so much 
chaos. Thus, a strike by them became 'a weapon of social 
brigandage, and society will find it necessary to devise some 
means of self-protectionl
Other Liberal papers were more friendly towards the strikers. 
The Morning Leader discussed the refusal of the Shipowners' 
Association to recognise the Union, and commented, 'there may 
be reason in this, but it eludes ordinary observation'.' 1 
The Daily News was even more insistent on this issue. That 
the employers should decline 'carries the mind back to the
(15) Daily Telegraph. 28 June 1911, p. 10
(16) Manchester Guardian. 28 June 1911, p. 8
(17) Morning Leader. 29 June 1911, p. A
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atmosphere of two or three generations ago. It comes with 
singular 1'ck of logic from cne of the strongest employers' 
trade unions in the world1. The same paper demanded better 
conditions, and insisted that the men should have a greater 
say in determining them. Such improvements were 'very 
desirable in the public interest. It is of slight avail for 
Britannia to rule the waves if the waves are to be the strong­
hold of industrial serfdom'.
Thus, the reaction of the newspapers to the shipping 
strike was varied. It is unfortunate that the press is the 
only source on this dispute, but it was an event which went 
unrecorded in diaries and letters, unlike some of the later, 
and perhaps graver, confrontations between capital and labour. 
Nevertheless, there is a clear indication of the differing 
views. The Unionist papers objected to the strike, and the 
Daily Telegraph emerged as a. hitter opponent of direct 
industrial action. Hot all of the Liberal papers were 
sympathetic, however. The Manchester Guardian was firmly 
opposed to the strike. Thus, the attitudes are not deter­
mined purely on political grounds. Lord Davenport's 
memoirs provide a useful insight into the thinking behind 
some of the men's opponents. He noted that Sir Thomas Devitt 
'and at least one other shipowner flatly refused to sit in the 
some room' as Havelock Wilson. ' The reasons were partly 
personal, but this is a clear indication that some employers
(18) Daily News, 30 June 1911, p. 6, 16 June 1911, p. A
(19) Viscount Davenport, The Travelled Road (Rochester 19351
p. 168
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believed that they could do exactly as they wished, ignoring 
the' wishes of the men, and the associations which had been 
formed to represent their interests. Some papers agreed, 
while others argued that times had changed, and the owners had 
to be more conciliatory. This conflict of ideas was to con­
tinue throughout the period.
The Dock Strikes
Opposition to the shipping strike paled into insignificance 
compared to criticisms of industrial militancy as the dockers 
intensified their activities. The National Transport Workers* 
Federation had been formed in 1910 at the suggestion of Ben 
Tillett, an organiser of the 1889 Dock Strike, and an active 
trade unionist. The President was Harry Gosling, the 
Secretary of the Lightermen, and an Alderman on London County 
Council; the Chairman was Anderson of the Stevedores. The
N.T.W.F. was intended to be a body capable of uniting the 
various unions involved in shipping, so that they could take 
common action when necessary. It had been particularly 
successful in London. On 28 June 1911, the N.T.W.F. Confer­
ence informed the shipowners that, unless they had conceded 
the demands of the seamen by 1 July, the Federation would 
act. The following day, the Dockers* Union sent in its 
demands for higher pay. It had not intended to act so soon, 
although the campaign for higher wages had begun in April.
It was the climate of unrest which persuaded the Union that 
the time was suitable.
The driving forces behind this opportunistic attack were 
Tillett, and another veteran of the 1889 Dock Strike, Tom 
Mann, an avowed Syndicalist. The Daily Telegraph felt that
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their role had been important, and denounced the 'pernicious 
influence of one or two individuals who arrogate to themselves 
the title of labour leaders and guide their silly and' infatua­
ted followers into dangerous paths'. The Illustrated
f 2 1  ^London News described Tillett as 'The Dictator of Tower Hill'.
This tendency to blame a few men for a major dispute recurs as
strike follows strike, but in this case, Mann and Tillett were
certainly active. Writing later, G.D.H. Cole concluded that
Mann's 'influence counted for a great deal in the great wave
( 22)of unrest which swept the country'.' J John Lovell, who has 
made a detailed study of the London Docks, has maintained that 
'with two such persuasive orators as Mann and Tillett at work 
on the water front in 1910 and 1911, it would have been 
surprising if port workers had remained unmoved by appeals to 
militant action*.
It is difficult to estimate the influence of these men, 
but they had a greater impact on their own men, the London 
Dockers, than those elsewhere. At the end of June, the London 
men were waiting for the employers to reply, while Hull,
Liverpool, and Manchester were on strike. It should be 
remembered that the sailors had not returned to work, and 
this combination of strikes received strong expressions of
(20) Daily Telegraph. 16 June 1911, p. 10
(21) Illustrated London News. 19 August 1911, p. 300
(22) G.D.H. Cole. A Short History of the British Working Class
Movement 1789-1927. Volume III (1927) p. 73
(23) J. Lovell. Stevedores and Dockers (1969) p. 156
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disapproval. The Referee described it as 'a grim menace' and
hoped for an immediate settlement, together with 'an assurance
for the future prevention of a calamity •whose possibilities do
(2/,)
not fall short of an armed blockade'. ' The Sunday Times
was convinced that such activities meant the country was
(25)headed for "the rule of the mob'. The Times concurred,
arguing that 'more and more do strikes seem in our complica­
ted modern civilisation with the interdependence of all parts
(26^of society, a reversion to, or a survival of, barbarism'. '
Unionist M.P. Harry Lawson, eldest son of Lord Burnham, the
owner of the Daily Telegraph, used the word 'anarchy' to
(27)describe the state of affairs.v '
The Home Office papers reveal that some employers wrote
to the Home Secretary demanding more effective police protec­
ts)tion, especially in Manchester.'' J In that city, just as it 
seemed that the strike was about to end, violence erupted for 
a couple of days. Once again, the Manchester Guardian dis­
played its disapproval of direct action, condemning the weak- 
willed people who were prepared to resort to the use of force, 
and insisted that 'the restoration of normal conditions would 
be greatly assisted by a much more impressive demonstration 
of the authority of law than the Manchester police have yet
(24.) Referee, 2 July 1911, p. 7
(25) Sunday Times.2 July 1911, p. 10
(26) Times. 5 July 1911 p. 9
(27) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 29 Col. 1986, 16 August
1911
(28) H.0.45/10648/21065/8,26,3 1,45,46
•***
been able to offer’. ' Another Manchester paper, the
~y
Conservative Doily Dispatch, made the same point, and urged
that ’this behaviour must be put down, and all necessary force
must be employed for that purpose'. In fact, the Home
Secretary and the Lord Mayor had communicated on this matter;
and the Chief Constable and the Mayor had assured Churchill
that ’we have every reason to think that the Manchester police
with the aid of additional Constables from other towns which
we have secured and are securing will be quite able to deal
(31)with the unrest now existing in Manchester’. ' Perhaps the 
local press had over-reacted, but clearly the situation had 
been sufficiently serious for the Government to pay particular 
attention to the events.
However, the attitude of these papers is a recurring one.' 
They conceded that there was a cause for concern, but held 
that matters were critical because those responsible for law 
and order were not strict enough, so that the solution to 
strikes and riots was obvious - counter them with greater 
force. Of course, these disputes were more severe than the 
public was accustomed to, so they received wide coverage. The 
press was generally disapproving, but at this point, few 
papers were advocating punative measures to prevent a 
repetition. As the unrest intensified, so did the anger of 
the press, and, consequently, the solutions became more 
violent. The Government kept a keen eye on events everywhere
(29) Manchester Guardian. 5 July 1911, p. 8
(30) Daily Dispatch. 5 July 1911, p. 4
(31) H.0.-45/1064.8/21065/4O 5 July 1911
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117 -
and the day after receiving the communication from the Mayor
of Manchester, Churchill promised the Commons that he had
prepared for further trouble, and ’ample forces have been
placed at the disposal of the authorities responsible for
(32)maintaining order'.' '
As the Manchester strike came to an end, the possibilities 
of unrest in London increased as the month of July progressed. 
On 10 July, the N.T.W.F. met the employers. That, in itself, 
was significant, as the first fully representative meeting of 
shipowners and unions in London. The Federation wanted 
recognition,of all transport unions, and a minimum port rate 
of 8d an hour, with 1s an hour for overtime. This meant an 
increase of at least 1d an hour on basic rates. The Short 
Sea Traders refused to participate after the first meeting, 
but the others continued, and eventually, on 27 July, reached 
a compromise, known as the Devonport Agreement, after the 
Chairman of the Port of London Authority, Lord Devonport, who 
claimed that Tillett said ’if all employers were like Lord 
Devonport there would be very few strikes', a significant 
comment, bearing in mind the bitterness between the two in the 
following year.
The men’s leaders had agreed on a compromise settlement, 
with the promise of arbitration for those who did not receive 
8d and 1s. This was put to a mass meeting, Tillett and 
Gosling urged acceptance, but the dockers rejected the 
Devonport Agreement. On 29 July, the cool porters, who had
(32) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 27. Col. 13A1. 6 July 1911
(33) Viscount Devonport op.cit. p. 168
been excluded from it, left their work, and two days later, 
over a thousand were out, and the number grew hourly. On 2 
August, there was a mass meeting in West Ham, where Tillett 
supported the strike, and the N.T.W.F. called for a general 
stoppage in the Port of London. The sane day, the Lighter­
men's Union called its members out, demanding a ten hour 
working day.
Reaction up to this point was varied. The more
Conservative papers, such as the Standard and the Financial
(3 h )Times were anxious to blame agitators,' ' while the Morning
Post attacked the men for ignoring the advice of their union
leaders. Such an attitude 'is the same as that which
repudiates the binding force of lav/. It leads men not to
(35)liberty but, through anarchy, to despotism’. ^ ' There was 
no real contradiction in these views, for these papers were 
quite consistent in their attitudes towards workers taking 
industrial action. If the leaders were encouraging the men 
towards militancy, the leaders were to be condemned. If, on 
the other hand, the men were acting against the advice of the 
union officials, then the men were attacked. The common 
principle was that all wage increases were to be deplored, 
and any exercise of power by the workers had to be opposed. 
Such was the traditional reaction to working class militancy.
A different view was to be found in the Liberal Daily 
Chronicle, which discussed Sir Charles Macara's scheme for
■(34-) Standard. 3 August 1911, p. 3$ Financial Times. 3 
August 1911, p. 7
(35) Morning Post. 3 August 1911, p. 6
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compulsory arbitration in industrial disputes, and wondered
’whether the time has not arrived when some industrial
tribunal of a special character should be devised to meet
(37)the case on industrial deadlocks’. ' Methods of preventing
strikes were to appear regularly in the weeks and months that
followed but it is interesting that a popular newspaper - and
a Liberal one at that - was dealing with the question so
early. Of course, the Daily Chronicle was not seeking a
solution through increased police activity, but any attempt
to limit working class activity could indicate a lack of
sympathy. The Daily News was less moderate in its support.
It was impressed that the dockside unions had co-operated,
f38)instead of fighting each other. This was an important
point. Although the various unions wanted to retain their. 
sectional differences, they had come to realise that con­
certed action, through a body such as the N.T.W.F., provided 
the only chance against the strong and determined opposition 
of the shipowners.
John Burns was worried that this united front would
crumble in the face of the allied employers. He advised
Tillett to 'settle before what has been secured had been
frittered away'. Burns believed that Devonport 'although
firm was kindly to the men but reasonably disgruntled about 
(39)leaders'. ' This entry in his diary is ambiguous, as it 
could mean that Devonport had reason to be unhappy with the
(36) The scheme is described at length in the next chapter
(37) Daily Chronicle. A August 1911, p. A
(38) Drily Dews. 7 August 1911, p. A
(39) ' Burns Papers, B.M.Add.Ms.A6333 f.1A6a. Diary 9 August 1911
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leaders, or that his discontent was not massive. If the former 
were the case, it would tell us something about Burns' attitude, 
but in either case, it revealed that Devonport was unhappy 
about men such as Mann and Tillett.
The Devonport Agreement had promised arbitration. This 
was conducted by Sir Arthur Rollitt. He had won law prizes 
when studying at King's College, London, had subsequently been 
Mayor of Hull, and was both a business man, and a member of 
the Commercial and Intelligence Committe of the Board of Trade. 
Politically, he was known to be a progressive Tory. He 
announced his decision on 6 August, in favour of the men.
The leaders of the 1I,T»W,F, advised a mass meeting to stay 
out until all of their claims had been met, The strike con­
tinued to grow. On the same day, the carmen decided to 
cease work, and two days later, the stevedores were called 
out officially,
At this juncture, the Board of Trade intervened, and v 
persuaded the employers of the coal porters and the lighter­
men to meet their employees. The Government's chief trouble­
shooter was George Askwith, a barrister who had been appointed 
Controller-General of the Commercial, Labour, and Statistical 
Department of the Board of Trade in 1909, and Chief 
Industrial Commissioner in 1911. He also brought the owners 
together with the carmen and the sailing bargemen, and 
secured a settlement in each case, so that the Federation 
declared an end to the strike, and on K  August, most men had 
returned to work. Unfortunately, that did not mean a resump­
tion of normal operations, for the same day, Lord Devonport's 
Port of London Authority refused to reinstate about three
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thousand men, so that the remainder of the P.L.A.'s employees 
walked out. The action was endorsed by-the N.T.W.F. the next 
day, and the strike continued until 21 August, when all the 
men except those concerned with the short sea trades resumed. 
On 23 August, this group decided to arbitrate, and returned at 
the end of the month.
Devonport disapproved of the settlement, and claimed that 
it had been reached only because Churchill and Masterman, his 
Under-Secretary, had used the Agadir incident to persuade the • 
shipowners to concede over the manner of employment. Now, men 
would be taken on outside the dock gates, which Devonport 
insisted would lead to intimidation of non-unionists.
This question became an important point in the London Dock 
Strike of 1912.
Two Tory papers, the Birmingham Daily Post and the 
Financial News had complained about the poor wages earned by 
dockers, as had the Westminster Gazette which had been 
impressed by the men’s solidarity, that had ’reminded us of 
the power which organised labour possesses of striking at the
( I A \
vital interest of the community’.v ' However, this should 
not infer that the strike received a great deal of support.
It must be remembered that this was a dispute involving 
dockers and those employed around the docks. Thus, shipping 
was brought to a standstill» no boats were loaded or unloaded. 
London, even more than most other cities in the country, 401
(40) Viscount Devonport op.cit. pp. 170-172
(41) Birmingham Daily Post. 4 August 1911, p. 6j Financial
Nows. 14 August 1911, p. 4j Westminster Gazette.
12 August 1911. T). 1
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depended on the docks, not just for the import of raw materials 
from abroad and from other parts of the country, but also for 
food. Consequently, the strike caused shortages, which grew 
greater as the dispute progressed and existing supplies were 
consumed. So as to ensure that essential commodities did reach 
the community, the Strike Committee issued permits allowing 
the unloading and carriage of goods. Articles bound for 
hospitals, for example, would receive permits. However, the 
shortages, and the very existence of permits angered a large 
section of the community.
At the head of those who were outraged was William 
Collison. The son of a policeman, he had been a soldier, 
bricklayer’s labourer, and casual waterfront worker, before 
becoming an omnibus driver. In 1889, he helped form the 
London and County and Omnibus Haployer’s Trade Union, and was 
a full-time official until he left after an argument, and in 
1893 founded the National Free Labour Association, of which 
he became General Secretary. This was an organisation 
opposed to trade unionism, and from its establishment, the 
members had been used to break strikes. Collison insisted 
that, during this dispute, ’milk and ice intended for
(/p)
hospitals and other public institutions were refused passage’, ^ ' 
This was published in 1913, so that Collison's memory could 
have been faulty. Certainly, at the time, such an accusation 
was not made. The Times condemned the system of permits, 
pointing out that ’the Federation is good enough to permit 
the conveyance of ice for the use of hospitals, the removal
(4.2) W. Collison, Apostle of Free Labour (1913) p. 288
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of decaying refuse, for the maintenance of the main drainage 
system, and the supply of fresh water to ships. Apart from 
these exceptions, for which the public are perhaps expected 
to be thankful, there is to he a total stoppage’, Thus,
it would appear that Collison overstated his case, in his 
anxiety to denounce militant trade unionism.
More influential attacks appeared in the press, a large
section of which was furious about the food crisis. The
Daily Mail was convinced that London was ’threatened with
f a m i n e T h e  Times agreed, and pondered on the
’conspiracy, to bring the life of a great capital to a stand­
by tr1}
still’. ' In the House of Commons, Unionist Joynst on-Hicks 
asked if the Government had made any arrangements ’with 
regard to the provisioning of London...There is really a 
crisis in that respect’. Churchill assured him that, if the 
need arose, ’.all the forces at the disposal of the Government 
will be employed to preserve peace and secure the observance 
of the law and the free working of the food supply of the 
p e o p l e T h e  whole question had worried Churchill, who 
had asked Buxton, the President of the Board of Trade, about 
the stocks of provisions in London, the minimum amount of 
foodstuffs and other items that would have to be delivered 
in London, and the smallest ’number of distribution centres
(A3) Times, 8 August 1911, p. 9 
(AA) Daily Mall, 9 August 1911, p. A 
(A5) Times, 11 August 1911, p. 7
(AO House of Commons Debates, Vol. 29, Col. 1523, Col, 15A6 
1A August 1911
-  124 -
( i n )
front which the food supply could be maintained.'' / Clearly,
Churchill was extremely worried about possible developments.
Other members of the Cabinet were closely involved. The
Secretary for War, Haldane, wrote that he had *30,000 troops
standing by ready to march (indistinguishable mark) if
that (?) should be necessary to save London from starving*.
By 12 August, he recorded that 'last night I had our Home
Secretary, the Chief of Police and some soldiers here. I
resisted bringing the troops before the early morning - and
I think I was right. It meant fixed bayonets and ball
cartridge. The only justification could have been the danger
of London Starving*. Thus it is evident that the
military was ready to take over London. The Cabinet was kept
up to date, for Asquith wrote to the King, informing him that
the Ministers had ‘agreed that the Government must assume
responsibility in the last resort for the food supply of 
(¿o)
London*. ' The matter had been discussed at length, all 
the forces necessary to maintain order had been organised, 
but it had been concluded that starvation was not imminent at 
that time.
Nevertheless, imported food was running low, and there 
was much criticism of the Government's inactivity. As might 4789
(47) Buxton Papers. Letter from Churchill to Buxton 10
August 1911
(48) Haldane Papers. N.L.S. Ms. 5986 f.110. Letter from
Haldane to his mother, 11 August 1911 and 12 
August 1911
(49) Letters to the King at Windsor CAB 41/33/25
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have*been expected, the strongly Tory Dally Telegraph was one
of the first to launch such an attack. It asked ‘what hope
of settlement is there so long as the Government permit
public outrage to paralyse the whole commercial life of the
Metropolis?’ The Standard was similarly outraged that
such events could take place, and insisted that ’capital has
its rights, and so does the community at large. It is
monstrous that the interests of both should be sacrificed as
they have been’, and condemned the Government for doing
nothing, asserting that ’public opinion will not condone the
dereliction of duty which made it easy for the dock strikers...
to intimidate both the employers and the country by methods
(51)which an enemy would resort to at his peril’. ' This paper
was equating strikes with foreign wars, and was thus insisting
that an attack upon the national economy, which brought
suffering to the community, from no matter what source, was
an act of hostility. The Financial Times returned to the
Government’s culpability, insisting that ’there can be no
doubt that the chief underlying cause of the serious and
widespread unrest which exists in the ranks of labour lies
in the fact that the men believe they have the sympathy of
the Government’, whose duty it was ’to see that order is
resotred without delay'. The Daily Graphic objected to
'the spirit of anarchy’ and pointed out that ’the duty of the
(53)Home Secretary is obvious’. 50123
(50) Dally Telegraph. 11 August 1911, p. 8
(51) Standard. 11 August 1911, p. 6, 12 August IVH, p. 6
(52) Financial Times. 10 August 1911, p. 6
(53) ......Dally Graphic. 10 August 1911. p. 3
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In total, this amounted to a terrific onslaught upon the
Government by a Conservative press which had never offered
any real alternative except repression by force. Of course,
it is possible that this was an attempt to make political
capital from the gravity of the situation, and merely taking
advantage of events to lambast the Liberals, without really
believing what was said. However, it is interesting that the
attack was not matched by a corresponding defence in the
Liberal newspapers, which were extremely guarded in their
views. Only two papers had much to say in support of the
strikes. The Nation explained that ’profits and salaries have
rapidly advanced and the expenditure of the luxurious classes
is on a much greater scale than ever. This contrast is
affecting the minds of the workmen’, ' while Reynolds’s
(55)Newspaper applauded the successes of the men in London..
Several Liberal politicians were also pleased. Viscount 
Samuel wrote to his mother, telling her that ’there is no 
doubt that, in the main, the men were in the right. The 
advances in the wages have been long overdue, and I am glad 
they have won them’, and Burns Diary reveals that he was 
’sincerely pleased that carmen, dockers, labourers and
( e f t )
stevedores have done so, well’. / However* such opinions 
were not made in public, so that the published sentiments 
of the Liberal politicians and the general tone efthe press 
was one of opposition, especially from the papers which sided *56
(54-) Nation. 12 August 1911, p. 698
(55) Reynolds’s Newspaper. 13 August 1911, p. 6
(56) Samuel Papers. A/156/384. Le
Mother 13 August 1911
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with the Unionists.
Liverpool
On U  June 1911, five hundred Liverpool firemen had 
refused to sign on, and a fortnight later, ten thousand 
dockers left their work, after the Liverpool Shipping 
Federation decided that its affiliated companies could con­
cede at their discretion. Tom Mann had been appointed 
Chairman of the Strike committee, and succeeded in avoiding 
outbreaks of sectionalism. He persuaded the dockers to 
return on 3 July, but they were out again at the beginning of 
August. The Chief Constable expected serious trouble: on 9 
August, he asked for troops to be stationed nearby, and the 
following day requested that cavalry should be held in
/rg\
readiness.' ' It seemed that he had not been especially
pessimistic, for on 13 August, there was extensive rioting in 
Liverpool, and about two hundred people were injured. The
«
following day, a general transport strike paralysed the city, 
and riots resumed on a larger, scale. Two men were killed and 
three wounded by gun shots fired by the Army. The next day, 
a mob attacked a police van carrying prisoners to Walton Jail, 
and two deaths resulted.
The Chief Constable sent a telegram to the Home Secretary 
on 15 August, informing him that he »need not attach any very 
great importance to the rioting of last night. It took place 
in an area where disorder is a chronic feature ready to break/ 
out.when any abnormal excitement is in f o r c e ' , b u t  it was 589
(58) H .0.4-5/10658/21247031,2
(59) H.0.45/10654/212470326
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hardly likely that such extensive disorder would be ignored, 
for there was a very serious danger to the safety of both 
people and property. Reactions were almost predictable. The 
Daily Telegraph was disturbed at the existence of 'mob law in 
the city', and this description of events was echoed else­
where. The Illustrated London News showed photographs of the 
streets after the disturbances, describing the scenes as being 
'as after a civil var1, ^ ^  while the Daily Express discovered 
a 'positive state of rebellion in all the big cities'.
The Referee believed that the strikes were 'approaching more 
nearly to red revolution on an intensive scale than anything 
that our eldest inhabitants can remember'. The Morning 
Post expressed simiD.cr views, insisting that 'this country 
was nearer to open revolution than at any time within the 
memory of living man!,^°^ Philip Gibbs, an experienced 
journalist, was in Liverpool at the time. He has recalled 
that events represented 'the nearest thing to civil war I have 
seen in any English city1,' ' Margaret Postgate, later to
marry G.D.H. Cole, spent part of .her summer holidays in 
Liverpool with her father, Professor John percival Postgate, 
before going up to Girtcn College, Cambridge in the autumn 
of that year. She recollects that she 'could not altogether 6012345
(60) Drily ^elegraph, 14 August 1911, p. 9
(61) Illustrated London News. 19 August 1911, p. 296
(62) Daily Express.» 16 August 1911, p. 4
(63) Referee, 20 August 1911, p. 7
(64) Homing Post. 14 August 1911, p. 6
(65) P. Gibbs, Adventures in Journalism (1923) pp. 198-199
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fall to notice the Liverpool Dock Strike...I remember the 
stench of unscavenged streets - the Corporation employees 
cane out in sympathy - and of the truck loads of vegetables 
rotting at Edge Hill station. I ramember bits of broken bottles 
relics of battles down by the Docks, the rain-patter of feet 
walking the pavements when the trams ceased to run and clank, 
the grey "Antrim1' lying on guard in the Mersey, the soldiers 
marching through the streets...I gathered from my father’s 
thunderous noises that it was the beginning of the end of the 
world’.
Thus there was a very real fear that the riots in 
Liverpool could intensify, and even result in revolution. It 
is immaterial whether or not such fears were realistic. The 
crucial point is that so many people considered the situation 
to be extremely grave. Moreover, it was not confined to the 
Conservatives. The former Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Austen Chamberlain, accused the Government of failing to give 
’sufficient protection to those in the position of small shop­
keepers and tradesmen to carry on theii’ lawful business and to 
get the supplies on wlich that lawful business depends’.
Yet Lord Haldane informed the House of Loras that there were 
A,700 troops in Liverpool, and a cruiser, the "Antrim", moored 
in the Mersey. He pledged that ’if violence of that kind - 
utterly unreasonable, turbulent violence - is repeated, the 
policy of the Government is to put It down, and to use all 67
(66) M. Cole, Growing up into Revolution (19391 pp. 3A-35
(67) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 29, Col. 19A5, 16
August 1911
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the force necessary for the purpose’. Clearly, Haldane
was worried, and his words indicate the seriousness with
which he viewed the situation, though he did feel it was
under control. By 16 August 1911, the Cabinet did not believe
that Liverpool was ’free from danger', and John Burns felt
that, even allowing for the exaggeration in the reports that
had reached him, the news was ’ugly' . Samuel described
the position as 'serious' and maintained that Liverpool was
(71}'verging on a state of revolution','' ' while Sydenham-Clarke, 
the Governor of Eombay, received information which led him to 
a similar' conclusion, that 'England was very near.to revolu­
tion'. ^
There were those who were unconvinced that the faults 
lay exclusively with the men. Some reports indicated that 
the riots of Sunday 13 August had been induced by the police.
The Manchester Guardian correspondent condemned the police 
for unnecessary violence, but the editorial softened the blow 
by insisting that 'it is to be remembered that once the con­
flict had begun, the position in face of so vast a crowd was 
a dangerous one, and it may well be that they lost their 689701*
(68) House of Lords Debates. Vol. 7, Col. 114-5, 17 August
1911, Col. 1136, 16 August 1911
(69) Letters to the King at Windsor CAB.A1/33/26 16 August 1911
(70) Burns Papers B.M. Add.Ma.¿6333 f.150(a) Diary 15 August 1911
(71) Samuel Papers A/157/553. 560 Letters from Samuel to his 
wife, 1A and 17 August 1911
Sydenham Papers B.M.Add.Ms.5083A f.103. Letter from 
Sydenham-Clarke to Chirol, 2A August 1911
(72)
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heads'. Some were not so charitable. Captain Tupper,
who had given a great deal of assistance to the National
Sailors' and Firemen's Union, blamed the riot on the police
imported from other forces. He commented on a film which he
claimed had been made by the press: 'We saw it privately.’
The Government never allowed that film to be shown to the
(7Z.)public. The inference is obvious'. ' Tom Mann alleged
that the police had secured cuts, and it had been impossible
(76}to recover the vital bits. The ex-railwayman, Rowland
Kenney, also raised the question of a film, which he believed 
had been destroyed by a frightened owner. ; If such a film 
had existed, it could have solved the question of police 
behaviour. The Home Office files contain a variety of letters 
complaining about the excessive zeal of the police. Some are 
from individuals, who were present, and other are resolutions 
from local trade union branches, or, in one case, the results 
of an open air meeting of about a thousand citizens in 
Warrington.
The only national paper to express serious reservations 
on this question was the Daily News, which demanded 'an 73456
(73) Manchester Guardian. 14 August 1911, p. 6
(74) E. Tupper, Seamen's -Torch (1938) p. 61
(75) T. Mann, Memoirs (1967 ed.) p. 224
(76) R. Kenney, Men and Rails (1913) p. 179
(77) H.0.45/10654/212470/i8,50,59,103. H.0.45/10655/212470/
196,204,226,249
(73^
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investigation in which there must be no concealment of the 
facts'. The Daily News was generally the most sympathetic 
mass circulation paper. One editorial examined the cause of 
working class violence: 'So long as Liverpool continues to 
inflict on a large proportion of its workers not only dire 
poverty but the soul and body destroying system of casual 
labour, so long will you have a Liverpool mob whose flash 
point...is low; and the some is true of ports like Hull and 
Cardiff. So long, again, as the men in hastily developed 
colliery districts have to live under such unrelieved con­
ditions of bestial housing, heavy toil, and sordid social 
life as prevail in the mining valleys of South Wales, youwill 
get there also such mobs as those at Llanelly or Tredegar. 
Disorder in such cases is a disease not strike bred, even if 
sometimes strike occasioned. Nor can it be cured by mere 
surgical operations; its roots lie far deeper'. J
Naturally; a Socialist like George Lonsbury took a 
similar view, and suggested that 'instead of sending soldiers 
and policemen to bludgeon them, let us bring in such legisla­
tion as will secure for the man who does a day's work a
living wage'. Liberal M.P. Chiozza Money maintained that
(79)'you cannot cure strikes by bullets'.
Thus, there were a variety of opinions about the unrest 
in Liverpool. The Conservatives, perhaps without exception, 789
(78) Drily News. 24 August 1911» p. 4
(79) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 29, Vol, 1976, 1981,
16 August 1911
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condemned the strikers, while a section of the Liberals, 
including the Government, similarly argued that the stoppage 
of work and the riots could not be excused. The solution 
advocated by such people was matching the violence of the men 
with an even greater show of force. The remainder of the 
Liberals sought to uncover the causes of the disturbances 
from the social and economic conditions in which the poor 
lived. It was this part of the community which showed some 
sympathy for the menj their very existence was a clear 
indication that the numbers of those concerned about the way 
of life of the working class was increasing..
The Railway Strike
Event followed event in the summer of 1911, and the wave 
of strikes had not finished. Trouble had been brewing on the 
railways for some time, and the cause of the dissatisfaction 
dated back some years. In 1906, the Amalgamated Society of 
Railway Servants had requested that the directors of the 
railway companies should meet a deputation of workers, to 
discuss the requests for improvements in wages and conditions 
that the Union had presented. The directors refused to meet 
the deputation on three occasions, and the men voted over­
whelmingly for a national strike. At this point, Lloyd George 
then President of the Board of Trade, had intervened. He 
persuaded the men to accept Conciliation Boards to settle rail 
disputes. In each company, there was a Board for every group 
of workers, composed of an equal number of men and represen­
tatives of the employers. This was to remain in operation 
■until 1914-, and no strike was to be undertaken or endorsed in
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the period 1907-14. However, the various rail unions were 
still not recognised by the companies. The scheme proved to 
be slow in arriving at any decision, and was, therefore, 
unpopular amongst the men. For about a month before the 
Liverpool general transport strike began, railwayman had been 
expressing their resentment. At the end of July, a strike 
had begun on the Great Central Railway, at New Holland, 
Lincolnshire and had spread through various grades and to 
other centres on that line. On 5 August, men employed on the 
Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Company had ceased work in 
Liverpool, and their actions had been repeated along the 
lines of that Company, so that by 14 August, the stoppage had 
reached Sheffield, Birmingham, Cardiff, Warrington, and 
Rochdale. On 10th, goods workers and carmen at Paddington 
left their work, and were quickly joined by men at Bristol. 
Thus, the railways were in a state of ferment when the 
Executive Committee of the rail unions met on 15 August in 
Liverpool. This seemed to be a hastily convened conference, 
probably called to answer the clear rank and file demand for 
action. Already, a section of their members had ignored both 
their Union and the terms of the Conciliation Agreement, and 
gone on strike. The Unions had to do something to regain 
their former control over the men. If success could be 
achieved without union assistance, then the official leaders 
were redundant. Thus, the Executive Committees of the 
Amalgamated Society of . Railway Servants, the Amalgamated 
Society of Locomotive Engineers, the General Railway Workers’ 
Union, and the United Pointsmen’s and Signalmen’s Society 
decided on militant action, and they gave the companies
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twenty-four hours to decide whether they would prefer to 
negotiate or face a strike.
The Times knew how to answer such a threat. It published 
an article by 'The General Manager of a Leading Railway 
Company', who wrote: 'We have come to the conclusion that 
there are occasions when in our Interests and in the interests 
of the public it is better to have a battle...provided only 
that we can get reasonable protection for our men'. The 
editor himself was staggered a.t the very threat of a rail 
strike: 'So monstrous a proposal that it is difficult to 
believe there is not some mistake...These trade unionists in 
their crazy fanaticism or diseased vanity are prepared to 
starve the whole population'. The Daily Mail, on the 
same day, dealt with the promoters of strikes, and concluded 
that the origins of the dispute lay with the mob rousers, 
rather than the union officials, for 'responsible leaders 
have allowed themselves to be deposed. Their places have been 
usurped by agitators who acknowledge no responsibility beyond
/g1 \
the promoting of strikes'.'
The Manchester Guardian was equally concerned, and
declared that 'a general strike on the railways at twenty-four
fQo)hours' notice would be a crime against society',' ' Never 
before had a general rail stoppage been so imminent, and at 
a time when road transport was in its infancy, and most people 
and goods travelled by rail. Thus, a cessation of this type *812
.(80) Times, 15 August 1911, p. 8j 16 August 1911, p. 7
(81) Daily Mail. 16 August 1911, p. A
(82) Manchester Guardian. 16 August 1911, p. 6
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of traffic would end the movement of raw materials, and a 
prolonged strike would bring industry to a halt.
Despite the seriousness of the situation, many of the 
Liberal papers attempted to understand the basis of the 
dispute, rather than merely attacking the men. The Morning 
Leader declared that ’it is pretty clear that we have 
evidence of a wide unrest that is not rooted in any accidental 
circumstance; and for which nothing but the application and 
acceptance of wise and comprehensive principles will provide 
a remedy1, while the Daily News felt that it was up to
the companies to ’recognise firstly the great claim which 
the public has on them for the maintenance of services even
at the cost of some concessions, and secondly the impossibility
(8A)of ignoring a discontent so widespread among their employees’.'
The complaint was that wages were low - on the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway Company, the Dally Dispatch discovered 
AA1 men earning less than £1 a week, and half of these were 
performing ’hard, heavy manual, labouring work’,'  ^ and hours 
were long. Moreover, despite increasing prices, the wages of 
railwaymen had risen by only 2.9$ between 1900 and 1910. '
W.T. Layton, the Cambridge economist, has maintained that wages 83456*
(83) Morning Leader. 16‘August 1911, p. A
(84) Daily News. 16 August 1911, p. A
(85) Daily Dispatch. 21 November 1911, p. A
(86) Bureau of Railway Economics, A Comparative Study of
Railway Wages and the Cost of Living in the United 
States and Continental Europe. Bulletin No. 34 
(Washington, D.C. 1912) p. 11
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were the same as they had been in 1907, and in many cases,
they had been unaltered since 1886. In comparison, he
examined the fate of the blast furnacenen in a large company
in the North East. Between 187S and 1909, their hours had
(87^been reduced by a third, while wages had risen by 25$. J 
Sir Arthur Markham, a Liberal M.P., argued that the pay of 
railwaymen was too low, and found it ’amazing that they have 
not revolted long since’.
Thus, the men had their sympathisers, and they themselves 
were in a militant mood. The threat of a strike was enough 
to force the Government to intervene, and on 16 August,
Sydney Buxton, the President of the Board of Trade, asked the 
managers of the main railway companies to meet him in the 
morning, and he invited the union leaders to confer with him 
in the afternoon. The research of Bagwell, the railwaymen's 
historian, had led him to insist that ’the managers went to 
the interview already inclined to favour a showdown with the 
men'. Certainly, no solution resulted from these meetings.
J.H. Thomas, the Assistant Secretary of the A.S.R.S., had 
attempted to persuade the General Manager of the Lancashire 
and Yorkshire Railway to negotiate, using the Lord Mayor of
Liverpool as an intermediary, but, ’he’d rather see the rails 
rust, he was heard to say, than parley with the hired advocates 
of the men’. - 890
(88) Westminster Gazette. 29 August 1911, p. 2
(89) P.S. Bagwell, The Railwaymen (1963) pp. 291-2
(90) G. Blaxland, J.H. Thomas. A Life for Unity (1964.) p. 68
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^ The folloving day, the men held a Joint Executive Committee
Conference at Unity House, and in the afternoon met the Prime
Minister and the President of the Board of Trade. Asquith
held that 'there is no doubt that the men have real grievances',
but believed that the threat of a strike at twenty-four1hours'
(91}notice had lost them 'all claim to public sympathy'. ' 
According to the official Board of Trade Report on this meet­
ing, he told the men that 'the Government had to regard 
exclusively the interests of the public, and, having regard 
to those interest, they could not allow a general paralysis
of the railway system of the country and would have to take
(92)the necessary steps to prevent it'. Consequently, he
offered the unions a Royal Commission to investigate the
workings of their Conciliation Agreement, but this was
regarded as inadequate, and the representatives of the men
insisted that the strike would take place. According to '
Asquith, the Prime Minister replied 'then the blood be on
(93)your own head', and left the room. ' Chamberlain's letter • 
to his father tells the story at greater length.' Ramsay 
MacDonol-’. from whom I have this, tells me Asquith infuriated 
them. He marched into the room where they were meeting at the 
Board of Trade and, without so much as saying "Good Morning" 
to them, sat down end read in his most aggressive tones the 9123
(91) Letters to the King at Windsor CAB.Al/33/26. 16 August
1911
(92) Buxton Papers. Board of Trade Report, 17 August 1911
(93) Lord Asquith. Industrial Problems end Disputes (1920)
p. 64.
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published statment. Then he added a few words which they 
interpreted as a threat to shoot them and, without giving 
any time for a question to be asked and without a further 
word, marched out of the room*v  ^ Whatever actually trans­
pired, Asquith must have been extremely disturbed at the 
possibility of a strike, and determined that it should not 
succeed. Nevertheless, the rail men left in a more convinced 
mood than they had entered. The Executive Committees of the 
unions sent a telegram to each of two thousand centres: ‘Your 
liberty is at stake. All railwaymen must strike at once.
The Loyalty of each means victory for all*. The first 
national rail strike was about to commence.
John Burns believed that there was 'needless alarm, undue 
excitement, too much parade of preparations. Took a cool, 
true and long view of the situation. Railway strike must fail
Not enough men, tired leaders of limited capacity, lack of
( gc )
moral courage', 1 while another Cabinet Minister, Herbert 
Samuel, didn't 'expect the main line traffic will be stopped*, 
and anticipated 'the railwaymen will probably be beaten but 
it will be a disastrous struggle*. 9456
(94) A. Chamberlain, Politics from Inside (1936) p. 346.
Letter from Chamberlain to his father,.19 August 
1911 -■ '
(95) Burns Parers B.M.Add.Ms.46333 f.151(a) Diary, 17 Angust
1911
(96) Samuel Papers A/157/553 and 560. Letters from Semuel
to his wife, 16, 17 August 1911
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? Others did not even think there would be a stoppage.
The Daily Express had 'confidence1 in the 'sanity1 and the
(97)'sense of honour' of the men. 1 Some papers were less 
friendly to the workers. The Standard regarded the threat as 
“an 'insolent decision'. Moreover, 'never was a great indus­
trial war threatened on grounds so frivolous, or announced 
with such cynical levity'. The men had no case, but 'the 
position of the railway directors is quite reasonable and 
l o g i c a l T h i s  was not an isolated attitude. The 
Birmingham Daily Post talked of the 'most momentous industrial 
struggle of modem times - we are tempted to add, the most 
reckless, for whatever may be the legitimate grievances of the 
railwaymen they can have none sufficient to warrant this 
deliberate attempt to bring the trade of the country to a 
standstill, and cut off the food supplies of millions of
people who are no parties to the quarrel. There can be little
(99)public sympathy for them'. The Sunday Chronicle took a
similar line, pointing out that 'where the public finds its 
sympathy for the underpaid stretched to the breaking point is 
where the underpaid show no more consideration for the public, 
which is not to blame, than they allege the railway directors 
show to their servant s ' . T h e  Daily Telegraph also 
attacked 'the utter disregard of the railwaymen's leaders 97810
(97) Daily Express. 17 August 1911, p. A
(98) ' Standard. 17 August 1911, p. 6
(99) Birmingham Daily Post, 17 August 1911, p. A
(100) Sunday Chronicle, 20 August 1911 p. A
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and their friends for the convenience and welfare of the
(101)public’. ' It is interesting to note that the papers were 
claiming that the general public were opposed to the strike. 
As a matter of fact, there had been little attempt to check 
whether or not the whole of the nation condemned the action 
of the men. It is likely that business men, who would be 
unable to ensure that their raw materials and finished goods
could move freely, would attack the stoppage. In the same 
way, those wishing to use the trains would not be pleased to 
discover that there weren’t any - and such people were likely 
to be reasonably affluent. The strike was likely to affect 
the upper and middle classes, and here is a significant point. 
In the past, disputes had seldom touched the whole of the 
population, and especially not the prosperous section of the 
community, and now, everyone had to suffer, so it was the 
rich whose complaints were the most vocal. The reaction of 
the poor was less often recorded, but as most of the less well 
paid sections of the community became involved in the unrest, 
they were not very likely to.criticise each other.
The effectiveness of the stoppage can be judged from 
figures showing the decline in total receipts from goods and 
passengers for the week in which the strike occurred - and it
should be remembered that it lasted for only two days!- , _
Barry Railway 31%
Lancashire and Yorkshire 35*U%
■ %
London and North Western 2 9 . 6 %  10
(101) Daily Telegraph. 19 August 1911, p. 8
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Great Central 
Taff Vale 
Great Western 
North Eastern 
Midland 
Great Eastern 
London and South Western 
South East and Chatham 
The differing success of the strikes reflects the fact 
that some companies were more effective in discouraging union 
membership than others. The completeness of the shut down on 
some lines worried the Government. Chamberlain noted that 
‘there are rumours of dissension in the Cabinet - Asquith and 
Winston for strong measures, Lloyd George against them’.^"*^
In the House of Commons, the Home Secretary revealed the 
preparations that the Government had undertaken, which showed 
clearly the degree of their concern. Should the:measures 
already taken prove to be .inadequate, ‘other measures, even 
of a large scope will have to be token promptly, so that the 
transport of everything really necessary will be assured’.
The Government was clearly planning for every contingency.
Sir Guy Granet, a qualified barrister who was the General 
Manager of the Midland Railway Company at this time, wrote an 
article for the Railway Gazette, in which he insisted that ‘the 1023*
(102) Railway News. 26 August 1911, p. 473
(103) A. Chamberlain oo.cit. p. 346. Letter to his father,
19 August 1911
(104.) House of Commons Debates Vol. 29, Col. 2248, 18 August 
1911
29.3%
28.8%
28. IS  
21.7JS 
21.2%
1 3 . 0 %
2.1%
2.7% 1^°2^
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Government at our Conference today have undertaken to put at
the service of the railway companies every available soldier
in the country...The companies are prepared even in the event
of a general strike to give an effective, if a restricted,
service’. It is evident that the Government would have
used the Army. General Macready, the Director of Personal
Services at the War Office, was in charge of the organisation
of the troops, and he has recalled that ’practically the
whole of the troops of Great Britain were on duty scattered
along the railway systems’. Haldane, the Secretary of
(107)State for War, was 'busy all day detailing troops’.
Churchill made it easier to dispatch troops on 19 August,
when he sent a telegram to the Chief Constable of every 
county and to the Mayors or Lord Mnyors of every town or city 
with a separate polioeforce situated within the disturbed 
areas. It announced that ’the Army Regulation which requires 
a requisition for troops from a civil authority is now sus­
pended’. ^ ^  Two days before, he had urged all Chief 
Constables and Mayors to swear in Special Constables if that 
was necessary, as, ’in the event of a general railway strike 
or other serious emergency, it will be the duty of each 
Police Force to give effective protection to life and property 
and also to all railwayman within their jurisdiction who wish 105678
(105) Railway Gazette. 18 August 1911, p. 142.
(106) N. Macready. Annals of an Active Life. Vol. 1 (1924) p.163
(107) Haldane Papers. N.L.S.Ms.5986 f.118. Letter from
Haldane to his mother, 16 August 1911
(108) H.0.A5/10655/212470/152
-  144 -
to work’. C h u r c h i l l  continued to keep a careful eye on 
the situation, and on 19th, sent a memo to Sir Edward Henry, 
the Commissioner of Metropolitan Police, and to the Receiver 
of Police, informing them that he wanted to send some of the 
troops stationed in London elsewhere, and asked them to 
engage up to three thousand ‘trustworthy men1 to do regular 
duty within the police.
Thus, it is evident that the Government was very active 
in ensuring that soldiers were available to defend the rail­
way lines in case of attack. Such preparations did not pass 
unnoticed. Kenney, writing two years later, recalled that 
one of the outstanding features of the strike was ‘that the 
military forces were used freely',' while Alcock, whose 
book was published shortly after the First World War, believed 
that ’for a short time the signs looked ominous of civil war, 
because of the Government’s deeds, and especially those of 
Churchill’.^ ^  However, not everyone disapproved of such 
activities. The Tories applauded these attempts to safeguard 
the nation against possible insurrection. Colonel Sir 
Robert Saunders, M.P., entered in his diary: ’Churchill took 
a pretty firm attitude," sending troops wherever they were 
wanted. Granet of the Midland told me that he had been to
see Churchill about the prospect of a railway strike and the 
latter told him that he was ready to use every soldier to 1092
(109) , H.0.4.5/10663/214312/1, 17 August 1911
(110) H.0.A5/10710/2A3128/61
(111) R. Kenney op.cit. p. 187
(112) G.W. Alcock, Fifty Years of Railway Trade Unionism
(1922) p. ¿29
protect his lines, and would call out the reserves if 
necessary’ . A bitter opponent of trade unionists, the
anonymous author "One Who Resents It", felt that ’the firm­
ness of the Government in coming to the defence of society 
had administered a check on the policy of Syndicalism and 
SABOTAGE'.
Others were not so pleased, and accused the Government 
of failing to prevent the brow beating of those who wished to 
continue at the posts. Oliver Berry, the General Manager of 
the Great Northern Railway, complained to the Home Office 
that the position was worsened by 'the fact that the pickets 
either forcibly take our men from their work, or intimidate 
them to such an extent as . to prevent them from working', 13'
while Sir James Inglis, the famous engineer and Chief Manager 
of the Great Western Railway, claimed that 'the strike would 
not and could not have attained the dimensions it did but for 
widespread and gross abuse of the system called "peaceful 
persuasion" which furnished guise £>r intolerable acts of 
intimidation'. ^  ^
On 20 October, the Home Office wrote to each company, 
requesting information about damage and intimidation, and 
received replies from many companies, all of which described 
threats which persuaded their loyal employees to cease work. 13*56
(113) Sanders Diaries. Vol. 1 f.22 August 1911
(11A) One Who Resents It, The Tyranny of Trade Unions (1912) 
p. 125
(115) H.O.A5/10655/212470/167, 19 August 1911
(116) H.O.45/10656/212470/267, 22 August 1911
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in the seme file was a letter from General Macready, pointing 
out that Army recruitment rose by 30% during the strike, 
compared with the same period in the previous year, and he
concluded that 1 evidently the action of the Government and
• (117)the Army did not disgust the recruiting market?. It is
possible that some sought to use the unrest to alleviate
their aggressive instincts, or who did feel that the nation
was in danger from inside, but, equally, the Agadir indicent
threatened the peace of Europe at this time, and the storm
clouds had been building for several weeks prior to this date,
so that the jump in recruitment could.have been a response to 
the international crisis.
Certainly, public opinion was divided on the Government's 
action. Groups such as the Parliamentary Committee of the 
T.U.C. condemned the 'needless display of force by the police 
and the military', while many Conservatives believed, that the 
action taken had been quite adequate and reasonable. In the 
same way, society was divided on the issues involved. The 
companies had refused to meet the representatives of the men, 
and this was the basic cause of the dispute. The Liberal 
papers were, in general, amazed at this. The Nation announced 
that 'the time had gone’by when it was possible-for employers 
to refuse so much as to meet the accredited representatives 
or organised labour' The Daily News was even more
insistent, asking 'what possible harm can come of two parties 17*
(117) H.O .A5/10658/212A70/AA8,U9. Letter from Macready to 
Sir Edward Ward, 23(?) August 1911
■(118) Notion, 19 August1911, p. 729
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meeting in a room? The labour leaders are not lepers. There
is surely no physical pollution in their presence, even for
(119)a railway director’. The Westminster Gazette was
inclined to blame much of the unrest onto such attitudes ’The 
young men protest that the old trade unionists have been 
bested and outwitted by the employers in recent negotiations} 
that their present policy has failed to get the working class 
what they were entitled to in recent years, that a new and 
fighting spirit must be infused into the unions. And so 
instead of the old hard bargaining we get strikes without 
notice or in defiance of the leaders, unrest, hostility 
suspicion between classes, a bad condition for industry as 
well as for that nation.' It is mere shortsightedness for 
employers in these conditions to flatter themselves that they 
have done a good stroke for themselves or the public when they 
have succeeded in keeping the unions low or discrediting their 
leaders’/ 19 20 12^
That such papers should oppose the companies was far less 
surprising than the similar line adopted by the Financial News, 
which asked ’Why should railway directors, many of whom, in 
their private and personal capacity as manufacturers and mill 
owners, "recognise” trade unions, become so stiff;necked when 
they enter a railway board room? ’ ^ 2^
Most Tory papers had different ideas, however. The Daily 
Telegraph thought the companies were quite correct: ’The
(119) Daily News. 19 August 1911, p. A
(120) Westminster Gazette, 17 August 1911, p. 1
(121) Financial News. 19 August 1911, p. A
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Amalgamated Society thrives on agitation - the fluctuating
figures of its membership prove this beyond cavil - and that
is why the managers want to have as little as possible to do
with the officials of unions, to which only a quarter of the
( 122)whole body of railway workers belong*. The Economist
agreed, and regarded the strike as ’conclusive proof that
the people of this country must not be placed at the mercy of
(123)a small group of trade union officials*. ' The Financial 
Times praised the employers for the stand that they had 
adopted, as ’the position taken up by the companies is wholly 
just and logical; they have no option but to fight if they are 
to retain a vestige of independence, and in courageously 
facing the music they have the country behind them'.^2^
The Times was equally disapproving, and analysed the 
causes at lengths 'Behind it is an outbreak of the spirit of 
"Syndicalism" which has lately been growing in this country 
and has manifested itself in other directions. It is one of 
the fruits of the Socialist teaching so assiduously disseminated 
in recent years; it regards society as an enemy and is abso­
lutely reckless in its methods. This spirit has been dis­
tinctly fostered by the conspicuous incitements to class 
hatred uttered by the Chancellor in his electioneering 
campaigns and by the coqueting of the Home Secretary with 
disorder, If it is allowed to succeed now in its attack on 
the public, all the forces of disorder and anarchy will be 123*
(122) Daily Telegraph. 19 August 1911, p. 8
(123) Economist, 19 August 1911, p. 371
(12A) Financial Times. 18 August, 1911, p. A
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fatally encouraged. Happily, there are signs that the 
Government does not intend to yield to the attack*.
The accusation that a part of the Cabinet was extremely 
radical was a recurring one in this period.
Naturally, most of the press had a solution to the rail 
strike. That of the Economist was simple: 'it should be a 
condition of the railway service that no employee should be 
entitled to strike’, ^ ^  The Standard concurred, suggest­
ing that ’the Government may' at least secure powers to place - 
the railway services on a different footing from ordinary
industrial enterprises and may subject the workers to special
(127)regulations which cannot be contravened with impunity’.
The Daily Graphic also urged legislation: ’If our criminal 
conspiracy law is not at present adequate to deal with such a 
wicked conspiracy against the very existence of the State, it 
ought to be amended without delay'. The Daily Mall felt
that the solution lay in preventing picketing, and urged that 
it be made i l l e g a l . ' g .K. Chesterton, an avowed opponent 
of Socialism, dealt with all of these points. Writing in the 
Illustrated London News posed a crucial question about railway- 
men and their rights: ’We must really moke up our minds about 
this perfectly simple and primary point of what a railway 
porter is - whether he Is a citizen, or a serf, or a criminal, 1256789
(125) Times. 19 August 1911, p. 7
(126) Economist. 19 August 1911, P. 371
(127) Standard. 19 August 1911, p* 6
(128) Dally Graphic. 17 August 1911, p. 3
(129) Daily Mail. 19 August 1911, p. A
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(130)or an infant in arms1. Such a point had been ignored by
those most vigorously opposed to the action of the men, yet 
it was one that ought to have been considered.
The strike itself did not continue for long. An inter­
national incident caused Anglo-German relations to deteriorate 
and they were already strained - so that the Government felt 
obliged to intervene once more, so as to obtain internal 
peace. On the morning of 19 August, Lloyd George and Buxton 
saw representatives of the companies, and in the afternoon 
the management and the unions met, in the presence of the 
Cabinet Ministers. Even this was more than Lloyd George had 
expected. He wrote to his wife, telling her ‘that is at any 
rate, an achievement I never hoped for* ,^^'0 Moreover, the 
two sides agreed on various points, such as the reinstatement 
of strikers, a speedy convening of the Conciliation Boards, 
and the establishment of a special Commission of Inquiry, in 
returnjfor a; pledge to end the strike by the union leaders.
Many rank-and-file workers were extremely •unhappy at 
this agreement. For example, in Manchester, three thousand 
railwayman met, and only six voted for a return to work, 
while at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, a mass meeting resolved to 
remain on strike until an eight hour day and a rise of 2s 
a week was granted. However, in London, under the influence 
of J.E. Williams, the General Secretary of the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants, twenty thousand men in Hyde Park 130
(130) Illustrated London News, 23 August 1911, p. A68
(131) Lloyd George papers N.L.W.MS.20A30C/1375. Letter from
Lloyd George to his wife, 19 (?) August.1911.
voted unanimously for a resumption of work.
In consequence, by 21 August, rail services were as 
normal virtually everywhere, and on the some day, the London 
Dockers recommencedwork, and the great industrial unrest of 
the summer of 1911 was at an end. The King's Private 
Secretary, Francis Knollys, who had previously served in this 
capacity with Edward, and was known as a staunch Liberal, 
expressed the feelings of many: 'What a relief that the rail­
way strike should have come to an end. I fear that if it had 
gone on all sorts of regrettable incidents would have occurred 
which would have created a lasting feeling of unwill on both 
sides, independent of course of the mischief it was doing in 
a variety of ways'.^^2) ^Xoyd George was officially thanked 
for his efforts. The King was 'very glad to hear that it was 
largely due to your energy and skill that a settlement with 
regard to this very serious strike as (sic) been brought 
about. I heartily congratulate you and feel the whole 
country will be most grateful to you for averting a most 
disastrous calamity'. Asquith was even more fultsome in his 
praise: '^cannot sufficiently express to you how strongly I 
feel the debt of obligation which I myself and all our 
colleagues owe to you*for the indomitable purpose, the un­
tiring energy, and the matchless skill with which you have 
brought to a settlement one of the most formidable problems 
we have had, as a Government, to confront', ^ 3 )  132
(132) Asquith Papers Mss.3 f.A. Letter from Knollys to Nash
20 August 1911
(133) Lloyd George Papers. C/5/6/1. Telegram from the King
m o
to Lloyd George, 20 August 1911} C/6/11/9 Letter
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A Royal- Commission was set up at once. Itsmembers were 
David Harrel, Thomas Ratcliffe-Ellis, the Secretary to the 
Mining Association of Great Britain, G. Beale, Arthur 
Henderson, the trade unionist and labour leader, and John 
Burnett. The evidence of the management of the railway 
companies indicated how much they had learnt from the dispute. 
They continued to 'object strongly to the intervention of any 
person, not being an employee of the Company, at any stage of 
conciliation', and the Commission itself came out against 
recognition, deciding that 'with their great responsibilities 
the Companies cannot and should not be expected to permit any 
intervention between them and their men on the subjects of 
discipline and management',
The actual evidence shows how such a decision was reached. 
The management pointed out that it wanted its men to be happy: 
Sir Charles Owens, the General Manager of the London and South 
Western Railway, told the Commission that 'it is only by the 
agency of contented servants that we can possibly get the best 
results from the working of our railways; therefore our whole 
object is peace*. On the other hand, he could not say 'that 
the whole object of the sooieties is peace. Peace for the 
Societies means stagnation and reduction of membership, so 
that our position is entirely different fromyurs'. Lord 
Claud Hamilton, a director of the Great Eastern, and a Tory 
M.P., made the some point, arguing that 'the unions want war 
because...when things are quiet they languish, but when war is
(134-) Report of the Royal Commission on the Railway
Conciliation and Arbitration Scheme 1907. Cd.5922 
(1911) p. 10, para. p. 11. para 52.
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in the o ffing, they flou rish '.
The management seemed to suggest that the men did not 
actually lik e  trade unionism. Lord Claud Hamilton fe l t  that 
'the majority do not want to belong to the unions and dread 
-the tyranny and intimidation which usually accompany the 
operation o f those •unions under the provision o f the Trades 
Disputes Act’ . Ammon Beasley, General Manager o f the Taff 
Vole Railway, had 'never heard any demand for recognition 
except from a representative o f a trade union'. He explained 
that recognition could not be granted anyway, because 'the 
safety o f the public is  in the railway company's hands, and 
the responsibility for that safety cannot be delegated to others 
and i t  must therefore have unrestricted control over it s  opera­
tion s '. Sir Guy Garnet, the General Manager o f the Midland 
Railway, agreed with th is, insisting that 'on railways more 
than in any other trade discipline has to be maintained and... 
therefore, the authority o f the o ffic e rs  must not be in ter­
fered w ith '. A ll o f the representatives o f the employers 
expressed strong opposition to recognition, and Robert Glover, 
the Assistant to the General Manager o f the Great Western, 
said he would rather face another strike than concede on this 
point.<135> *26
(135) I M d  Evidence Cd.60U (1912-1913) p. 369 para. 9638 
15 September 1911; p. 393 para. 10, 023 18 
September 1911; p. A25 para. 10, 64.8, p. A26 para.
10, 652 19 September 19115 p. 537 para. 12, 912
26 September 19115 p. A80 para. 11, 707 21 
September 1911.
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A similar argument was repeated in the House of Commons. 
Lord Hugh Cecil, who had been described in Pod's Parliamentary 
Companion as being 'favourable to well-considered measures of 
Social Reform', insisted that a national rail strike was 
'in effect, a rebellion'. Lord Claud Hamilton felt that the 
unions were at an advantage, as they could call strikes, but 
the companies could not order a-lock-out or alter prices. 
Evelyn Cecil opposed recognition as it was 'really the 
admittance of a third and biassed party as a permanent inter­
mediary between employers and employed'. However, gnoh views 
were not accepted by the whole of the House. William 
Rutherford, himself a Unionist, denounced the low wages in 
the industry, and insisted that 'the attitude of the railway 
companies in regard to recognition is absolutely illogical? I 
go a step further and say now, almost at the end of the year 
1911, that such an attitude has become practically sense­
less'. ^ 37) Beiiefs such GS that were very rare within the 
Conservative Party at that time, for Rutherford was expressing 
an opinion held by only a section even of the Liberals, His 
plea for recognition of trade unions by employers, in response 
to the altered circumstances of the time, was, however, 
ignored by management in many different trades,
General Views on the Strikes *
By the end of August, the series of strikes was still a 
common topic of conversation, and the range of opinions was 1367
(136) Pod's Parliamentary Companion (191.1) p. 247
(137) House of Commons Pebates, Vol. 31, Cols. 1248, 1254,
1306, 1291-2. 22. November 1911
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very diverse. The political affiliations of individual ' 
citizens and the various newspapers had become increasingly 
evident as the seriousness of the disputes had become 
apparent. Of the views recorded, few actively approved, but 
there were several which had genuinely attempted to study the 
causes of the unrest, feeling that the employers were being 
unreasonable. Others changed from sympathy for the men's 
position to opposition, as the strikes intensified, and there 
was a large section of the community which consistently 
opposed any end every attempt of the working class to improve 
its conditions, especially by strike action, feeling that the 
employer had the right to dictate wages, hours, and conditions.
One end of the spectrum was represented by T. McKerrall, 
a Labour Party candidate in the by-election at Kilmarnock 
District, which went to the polls on 26 September 1911. He 
devoted about a third of his address to industrial unrest, 
explaining that the standard of living of the working men had 
fallen, and as ’Parliament will do nothing for him, he has no 
alternative but to strike’. The Liberals and the Tories had 
no ’remedy for this state of affairs but to send the soldiers 
out to help the employers when the workmen go on strike’, and 
’this remedy for poverty, if the same industrial conditions 
obtain during the next eleven years, will produce a CIVIL 
WAR’/ 138)
An equally under standing view, though from a very different 
source, came from the Reverend Carlyle at the Interdenominational
(138) T. McKcrrell, Election Address (Kilmarnock 1911) p. A*
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Summer School at Swanwick in 1913* He insisted that it was 
impossible to 'dismiss the industrial troubles...as though 
they arose from the mere greed, the mere foolish greed, of 
the wage earning classes', who had begun to realise that their 
conditions were 'intolerable'. Of 1911, he pointed out that 
'we did not at first think much of the troubles in the trans­
port trade. If we were sympathetic we spoke kindly: if we were 
not, we spoke contemptuously', but they had shown the mutual 
dependence of the society. If the poor conditions were not •
improved voluntarily, then there would be widespread disrup-
(139)tions caused by strikes. J '
Herbert Samuel noted that 'the middle classes have been 
much alarmed by what has taken place', but he, too, took an 
understanding line, declaring that 'the root of the whole 
trouble lies, of course, in the rise in the cost of living 
coinciding with an improvement in trade and a rise in 
profits'. George Askwith, the Government's chife
industrial negotiator, was equally prepared to see the men1s 
case. In his autobiography, he explained the origins of the 
unrest: 'Trade has been improving, but employers thought too 
much of making up for some lean years in the past, and of making 
money, without sufficient regard to the importance of con­
sidering the position of their workpeople at a time of
(139) Rev. A.J. Carlyle 'The Industrial Unrest: its causes 
and characteristics' in Rev, W. Temple (ed.) The 
Industrial Unrest and the Living Wage (1913) pp.
56-61
(14-0) Asquith Papers Mss.93 f.A8. Letter from Samuel to 
Asq-dth, 13 September 1911
( 1 A 1  )improvement of trade'. ' In his report to the Cabinet in 
June 1911, he made a similar point. There had been a fall in 
real wages, and the rich were engaged in conspicuous con­
sumption - for instance, the increasing number of motor cars. 
Askwith believed that the growth of the press and improvements 
in communications had all contributed to the unrest, which he 
thought was a genuine expression of resentment by working men 
angry with their conditions.
The News of the World concluded that the discontent behind 
the strikes 'will pass away, as they have done in previous 
years, but in the interests of the social and commercial 
prosperity of the nation the causes of this unrest and dis­
satisfaction should be investigated in a generous and kindly 
spirit'.
If that paper wanted to treat the men with benevolence,
H.J. Wilson, the elderly radical M.P. and industrialist, did 
not feel quite so friendly towards them. He condemned 
employers and workers equally, describing the railway strike, 
in particular, as 'a case of selfishness on the part of both 
sides, perhaps not a pin to choose between them'.^J^
Wilson was approaching the view of a large section of the 
population, who opposed the strikes, because, as the Daily 
Mirror put it, 'we only approve of strikes that do not worry *10
(141) Lord Askwith op.cit. p. 175
(142) G. Askwith, The Present Unrest in the Labour World
GAB 37/107/70, 25 June 1911
(143) News of the World, 2 0 'August 1911, p. 8.
(14-4) Wilson Papers M s.2605/18. Letter from Wilson, probably
10 September 1911.
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ourselves* Hone Secretary Churchill was even more .
opposed to the stoppage, for, according to Lucy Masterman, he 
telephoned Lloyd George when the-strike had ended, to say 
*"I’m very sorry to hear it. It would have been better to 
have gone on, and given these men a good thrashing'.
The Tories shared that fierceness. The Annual Conference 
of the Conservative and Unionist Party in November blamed the 
increased cost of living, the Government, and agitators.
The latter factor received a great deal of attention. The 
Times believed that the strikes had Syndicalist origins, and 
represented *a revolt against s o c i e t y ' , w h i l e  the 
Spectator saw in the events of the summer of 1911 a new type 
of industrial revolt, with *a network of interdependent and 
sympathetic movements'. The Daily Sketch held similar
views, insisting that agitators had 'organised enormous, 
chaotic strikes. They linked up one strike with another, and 
proceeded to rioting'. The Honourable George Peel felt
that Syndicalism itself had been 'ousted by something akin to 
anarchy', (^0) even the King was much disturbed by the 
unrest. In particular, he was worried that a revival 'might 
lead to (a) political element being introduced into the con­
flict which might perhaps affect, not the existence, but the
(145) Daily Mirror. 21 August 1911. p. 7
(146) L. Masterman, C.F.G. Mnsteman (1968 ed.), p. 208
(147) Times. 21 August 1911, p. 7
(148) Spectator. 19 August 1911, p. 268
(149) Daily Sketch. 23 August 1911, p. 3
(150) G. Peel, The Future of England (l911) p. 38
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position of the Crown, independent of other evils’.
However, these were not the only people who blamed the 
unrest onto the Syndicalists. Burdick’s study of the subject 
has revealed that 'foreign Syndicalist publications, during 
the period, viewed the London and Liverpool strikes as strong 
evidence that the Syndicalist movement was coming to dominance 
within England’. Moreover, the Independent Labour Party 
claimed that its agitation had been the basis of the unrest. 
The Chairman of the Party, William Anderson, told the Annual 
Conference in May 1912 that ’the responsibility for all the 
upheaval and industrial disturbance is being laid at the door 
of Socialist agitators. We do not seek to evade our share of 
the responsibility. Millions of workers have been deeply 
influenced by Socialist thought, and this is resulting in a 
change of temper in the face of oppression, a quickness to 
resent wrong, a keenness to grapple with the inequalities and 
wrongs of our civilisation, a growing sense of working class 
comradeship and solidarity', but he went on to warn that 
’industrial action can never take the place of political 
action. Syndicalism...has made no real appeal to the British 
workers, and offers them no means of escape from the exac­
tions of landlordism and capitalism’.^^3) *6
(151) CAB 37/107/107. Letter from the King to Asquith,
6 September 1911
(152) E. Burdick, Syndicalism and Industrial Unionism in
England until 1918. Vol. 1 (D.Phil., Oxford 1950)
p. 277 f.n.
(153) Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the
Independent Labour Party (l912)pp. AO, A1,
27 May 1912....... . ... .......- ............... -
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Whether or not it was the Syndicalists who were behind 
the strikes, a section of the community attacked the dis­
loyalty shown to Britain as a country. The Weekly Dispatch 
carried a cartoon: 'John Bull (to hooligan) "The strikes 
have at least taught me that all my worst enemies are not 
Foreign"'. Thus, the paper had suggested that there 
were traitors inside the country, inducing decent men to 
leave their work. An anonymous opponent of militancy main­
tained that the unions sought 'by methods of monstrous 
tyranny and rabid violence to compass the downfall of 
society' .^55) This was not an uncommon attitude. The 
official historians of the Times, Pound and Harmsworth, 
record that Shadwell, an assistant editor, 'had too much 
admiration for the working man to believe that those were not 
coerced by a minority of trade unionists1.' , The Daily 
Express agreed that there had been a very large number of 
workers who had no wish to leave their work, but who had 
been 'compelled in fear of their very lives to join the 
ranks of the unemployed'. ^  ^  ^
Out of this emerged the idea that the working class was 
harming itself by agitation. A cartoon by Bernard Partridge 
in Punch epitomises this: 'Police Constable "Who have I got
(15A) Weekly Dispatch. 27 August 1911, p. 6 „
(155) One Who Resents It op.cit. p. 6
(156) R. Pound and G. Harmsworth, A History of the Times.
The 150th Anniversary and Beyond 1912-19A8. Part 1 
1912-1920 (1952) p. 59
(157) Doily Express. 1A August 1911, p. A
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here? Why, a bottle throwing hooligan." 'Mr. Punch "March
him offj that's the worst enemy of labour. You've done your
(158)duty, as you always do'". '
Solutions to Strikes
Just as there were a variety of opinions about the causes
of the strikes, so, also was there an assortment of solutions.
Some were quite modest, given the degree of disturbance that
the country had suffered. The Daily Dispatch was convinced
that the nation would accept a law to settle disputes by
compulsory arbitration, but, if the country did reject it,
'we must be further along the road to anarchy than the most
( 1 5 9 )pessimistic of use have yet realised'. The Daily Mail
made the same proposal, but with less confidence. It con­
cluded that 'employers may be amenable to its decisions, but 
how can the workmen be compelled?' Yet it was not only -
the Conservative newspapers which advocated Governmental 
action. Reynolds's Newspaper was convinced that 'nothing 
short of a permanent, peaceful method of settling labour 
disputes will satisfy the general public' , but it was
not sure what this method should be. The Morning Leader 
pointed out that »all this widespread unrest of labour must 
naturally suggest the inquiry whether some new machinery can­
not be set up to deal with industrial deadlocks in a more
(158) Punch. 23 August 1911, p. 135
(159) Daily Dispatch. 2L August 1911. P. A
(160) Daily Mail. 1L August 1911. P. L
(161) Reynolds's Newspaper. 27 August 1911, p. 1
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satisfactory and scientific fashion'.
A different type of solution come from those who advocated 
restricting the activities of the unions. William Satchwell, 
an Inspector of Tickets at Manchester Royal Exchange, wrote 
to the Home Office suggesting that any damage to life or 
property should be chargeable against trade unions. The
King himself asked his Prime Minister to 'devise a scheme, 
although not entirely preventing strikes (perhaps that is not 
possible), would prevent a threatened strike from coming to a 
head, and might be the means of preventing "sympathetic" 
strikes from taking place'. In particular, he asked that 
peaceful picketing should be made illegal.' u Asquith 
wrote to Sir Edward Grey, who was about to visit the King, 
informing him of this letter, and telling Grey that he was 
'sending a rather cold water reply...If you have an opportunity 
you might put to him the impossibility of handling problems of 
this delicacy and complexity by anything in the nature of a 
legislators' coup do main'.
Yet others were advocating public|<.ly some sort of 
legislation. W.A.S. Hewins, the first Director of the London 
School of Economics, from 1895 to 1903» insisted, in his 
election address as Conservative candidate in the by-election 
at Hereford City in March 1912, that 'labour unrest is
(162) Morning Leader. 11 August 1911, p. A
(163) H.0.A5/10654/212470/11, 12 August 1911
(164) CAB 37/107/107. Letter from the King to Asquith, 6
September 1911
(165) Grey Papers. F.0.800/100 f.265. Letter from Asquith
to Grey, 9 September"1911
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universal in the country, and the Government is much to be
(1 AMblamed for not taking steps long ago to deal with it1. '
The Daily Graphic knew what these steps should have been. It
asked ’whether the unlimited privileges enjoyed by trade
unions can any longer be maintained, and whether, in cases
where the vital interests of the nation are affected, it ought
(1 f>7')not to be made a criminal offence to aid or abet a strike’. ' 
The Economist advocated, quite simply, that all strikes be made^, 
illegal, 'not merely to secure all parties from aggression, 
but also to preserve the general public from danger, loss, and 
grave inconvenience’. 1 Such answers were not confined to 
the Tory press. The Liberal paper, the Daily Chronicle, wanted 
a law banning all transport strikes: ’The whole life of the 
country cannot be allowed to become paralysed, nor can the 
food supply of the people be suffered to be in peril, because 
the danger is involved in the course of an industrial dispute.
It is no case of favouring one side or the otherj it is a case 
of the protection of the community'1. ^
Other solutions were even more extreme. One letter in 
the Home Office files appealed to Churchill ’on behalf of the 
middle class of people who are suffering from the effect of the 
general strike the sole cause of which is none other than the 
Socialist Tom Mann’. The writer advocated expelling him from 
the country, and said that there were plenty of young men 
prepared to take the law into their own hands to achieve that
(166) W.A.S. Hewins. Election Address (Hereford 1912) p. 3
(167) Daily Graphic. 16 August 1911, p. 3
(168) Economist. 16 911. t>. 558
(169) Dally Chronicle. 17 August 1911, p. A
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end. The Sunday Times continued this threat, and
established it os a genuine policy: 'We suggest that every
male citizen of a certain social class shall be voluntarily
enrolled as a special constable, instructed in the use of
the rifle and the bayonet, and placed under a special
command...Let society express itself in a manner which admits
(171)of no misunderstanding'. ' This is quite clear: the
Sunday Times was preparing for a realC class war, fought out
quite literally in military terms, with the higher classes
trained in warfare, so as to defend themselves against the
attack1 of the lower classes - or perhaps, even to take the
initiative, so as to ensure that the workers were sufficiently
intimidated as to remain subservient.
The Standard advocated an idea almost equally extreme.
It wondered If 'it is time to consider whether there is not
much to recommend in the C'mtinental plan of putting mis-
clievious agitators under effective restraints in times of 
(172)crisis'. ' The Roman Catholic paper the Universe made the
same point, insisting that 'it is the amputation of sedition-
(173)mongers from society that is primarily needed'. All of
these comments imply that any concept of "law1' or of "society” 
was that of the middle class, and ignored other principles 
such as justice, equality, or a balance of power between the 
classes. The workers were expected to behave in certain ways,
(170) H.0.45/1065A/212470/68. Letter from W. Davil(?) to
Churchill, 16 August 1911
(171) Sunday Times. 3 September 1911, p. 6
(172) Standard. 22 August 1911, p. 6
(173) Universe. 22 August 1911, p. 6
(170)
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and would be condemned for failing to do so, no matter how 
inadequate their conditions were. Indeed, the ruling classes 
could do virtually anything to maintain the subservience of 
the lower orders and nobody would mind. On the contrary, 
many would applaud.
J. Ellis Barker had warned that 'the revolt of labour 
is apparently only beginning, but the State cannot afford to 
keep neutral in the coming struggle because it threatens to 
endanger its own existence’. The Home Office files
reveal that the Government was paying especial attention to 
events, and was expecting further trouble. Special Constables 
had been sworn in during August, and such people were regarded 
as a sound base for future preparations. In September, the 
Home Secretary wrote to all Chief Constables informing them 
that ’it is of great importance that the steps which have been 
taken for the registration of suitable persons ready to serve 
as Special Constables should be continued and that in every 
Police District a classified Register of persons whose servants 
would be available for the assistance of the Police if any 
serious emergency should arise'. He defined this force more 
carefully: ’The "First Police Reserve" should consist of men 
of the most useful class, viz., men who are accustomed to 
discipline and have been trained in the Police or Army, or 
are otherwise specially qualified for Police Work...In the 
registration of persons willing to work in the Police Reserves 
the greatest care should be taken only to register men of 
suitable age, physically fit for the work, and of steady
(174.) J.E. Barker ojnclt. p. 4.5O
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habits and trusworthy character’ .
A Conference o f Chief Constables was to be held at the
end o f October. McKenna produced a confidential draft fo r
th is, informing the readers that reservists ’may at the
discretion o f the Chief Constable be supplied with a revolver
• (175)
or other firearm for the protection o f property’ .
A deputation o f Chairmen o f Watch Committees and Chief 
Constables v is ited  the Home O ffice on 10 November 1911 to 
discuss the question o f Special Constables. Alderman 
Thewlis o f Manchester said what others had observed: ’ Former 
strikes have been practica lly  confined to the particular 
works or places where the dispute arose, but in the recent 
strikes the dissatisfaction spread over a l l  our c it ie s  and 
towns’ . He urged that pickets should be limited in number, 
end confined to the place o f the dispute, while Alderman 
Cattell o f Sheffield advocated that peaceful picketing should 
be made i l le g a l.
Thus, the Government was very concerned about the 
industrial situation. There were two distinct a c tiv itie s  
which occupied the attention o f the Home Secretary end his 
colleagues: the strike i t s e l f ,  and the violence which could 
be perpetrated in the course o f a stoppage. In the la tte r  
case, the usual solution was to use the Police and the Army. 
Few people actually disapproved o f this method once the r io ts  
had begun, and i t  was probably sensible o f the Government to 
ensure that adequate provisions had been taken to deal with
(175) H .0.45/1C663/21A312/1A,76, 15 September 1911 and n.d.
(176) Ibid/101 pp. 6,7,9-10
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any further outbreaks in what were unusually troubled tines. 
However, it seened that this special force might be used 
simply to break a strike. Here, the Government would be 
taking sides in a simple trade dispute. Of course, there was 
a section of the community which would not have objected to 
this. Such people had their own solutions, such as the 
imprisonment of strike leaders. These tended to be the more 
Conservative elements of the society, while the Liberal press 
tended to be less extreme, though most expressed concern, and 
pondered over what could be done to reduce the amount of 
unrest'. The press, perhaps, divided on roughly political 
lines, but at least a part of the Liberal Cabinet was follow­
ing policies approved of by hard line Tories. There was a 
general consensus that the existing laws were inadequate to 
deal with the upsurge of unrest that had frightened so many 
people.
Yet the anger and the fear quickly subsided. As soon as 
the rail strike had ended, the Morning Post congratulated 
those involved for remaining peaceful; ’in no other country 
in the world would a crisis so serious have passed with such 
relatively slight suffering or c r i m e T h e  outburst of 
the working class was virtually forgotten, or blamed upon 
agitators, and nothing was done to relieve the conditions of 
the poor. It seemed ns though the troubles had been dismissed 
as soon as they had subsided. It is possible that the papers 
did not really mean what they had said about the vicious, 
barbarous, unpatriotic strikes. On the other hand, it is clear
(177) Morning Leader. 21 August 1911, p. A
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that the traditional attitude of the society excluded any 
possibility of militancy, so that many people would have been 
outraged at the events. Industrial peace could cause no 
comment, as it was only to be expected, and the sooner the 
society returned to its old-fashioned ways, the better many 
would feel. Indeed, some concessions had been made so 
grudgingly that it would not have been surprising if the 
employers had revoked them later. Looking at the period with 
the aid of historical hindsight, it seems evident that revolu­
tion was unlikely, although sections of the press behaved as 
though it was just around the comer, and the Government was 
preparing, just in case. Moreover, it is clear that strikes 
could be settled, no matter how serious they appeared, 
because employers could afford to pay higher wages, despite 
their denials at the time. On the other hand, no attempts 
were made to remedy the evils of the social structure after 
the summer of 1911. This suggests that few people had learnt 
anything from the events. -
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The Industrial Council and its  Frilure
Of all the suggestions to prevent a repetition of the 
strike wave of the summer of 1911, one, in particular, 
received widespread publicity, and was accepted as one of the 
few practical possible solutions. It was an idea put forward 
by Sir Charles Macara, the President of the Master Cotton 
Spinners* Federation. In July 1911, he made public a plan 
that he had been advocating privately for some time. He 
wished to see the creation of *a new, impartial, non-political 
Government Department to deal with...deadlocks’. This would 
consist of hx permanent non-political chairman, deputy and 
staff, together with an advisory body consisting of the men 
both on the side of Capital and Labour*. The point was that 
'when efficiently organised bodies come to a deadlock in 
negotiations over a disputed matter they should take their 
case before a tribunal capable of giving an impartial 
decision...There is no suggestion of arbitrarily enforcing 
that tribunal's decision...What the tribunal would ensure is 
that the matters in dispute would have calm and dispassionate 
consideration*. '
Buxton, the President of the Board of Trade, did not feel 
that taking away the powers of Conciliation of the Board of 
Trade, and giving than to an industrial court, under an 1
(1) Sir C. Macara, 'Proposed Industrial Court for the
Settlement of Labour Disputes’, Financial Review of 
Reviews, October 1911, pp. 6,9,10
Chapter V
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industrial judge, was a sound policy. He argued that ' so great
a change as this is not really practicable, and, if practicable,
(2)would not meet the situation'.' Instead, he proposed the 
Industrial Council, which closely resembled the body advocated 
by Macara. It was a voluntary organisation, with an equal 
number of representatives of employers and employees, financed 
by the Government, and with a Governmental nominee in the 
Chair - Sir George Askwith. The members, on the employer's 
side, were George Ainsworth, Chairman of the Steel Ingot 
Makers' Association and President of the Cleveland Ironmokers’ 
Association} Sir Hugh Bell, President of the Iron, Steel and 
Allied Trades Federation} G.H. Claughton, Chairman of the
L.N.W.R.} W.A. Clownes, President of the London Master 
Printers' Association} J.H.C. Crockett, President of the 
Incorporated Federated Associations of Boot and Shoe 
Manufacturers of Great Britain and Ireland} F.L. Davies,
Chairman of the Board of Conciliation for the Coal Trade of 
Monmouthshire and South Wales} T.L. Devitt, Chairman of the 
Shipping Federation} Sir T.R. Ratcliffe Ellis, Secretary of 
the Lancashire and Cheshire Cool Owners Association} F.W. Gibbins, 
Chairman of the Welsh Plate and Sheet Manufacturers' Associa­
tion} Sir Charles Macara} A. Siemens, Chairman of the 
Executive of the Engineering Employers' Federation} R. Thompson, 
past President of the Ulster Flax Spinners} and J. White,
President of the National Building Trades Employers' Federa­
tion. 2
(2) CAB/37/107/98, 9 August 1911
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The Trade Union representatives were Thomas Burt, M.P., 
General Secretary of the Northumberland Miners’ Association, 
former President of the T.U.C., a staunch Liberalj Thomas 
Ashton, Secretary of the Miners’ Federation of Great Britain;
C.W. Bowerman, President of the Printing and Kindred Trades 
Federation and Secretary to the Parliamentary Committee of 
the T.U.C.; F. Chandler, General Secretary of the Amalgamated 
Society of Carpenters and Joiners; J.R. Clynes, Organising 
Secretary of the National Union of Gas Workers and General 
Labourers; Harry Gosling, President of the National Transport 
Workers’ Federation; Arthur Henderson, M.P.; J. Hodge, 
Secretary of the British Steel Smelters, Mill, Iron and 
Tinplate Workers’ Amalgamated Association; W. Mosses, General 
Secretary of the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding 
Trades; W. Mullin, President of the United Textile Factory 
Workers’ Association; E.L. Poulton, General Secretary of the 
National Union of Boot and Shoe Operatives; A. Wilkie, M.P., 
General Secretary of the Shipconstructors’ and Shipwrights’ 
Association; and J.E. Williams, General Secretary of the 
Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants.
Askwith explained that the functions of the Council were 
to give its opinion,*privately, on matters referred to it, and 
recommend, when requested, or it could make its findings 
public, if this had been agreed before the Council met. Both 
sides in a dispute could invite the Council to decide a 
question, on the understanding that they bound themselves to 
accept the decision, and the Board of Trade or the Government 
could refer a case to it, or, indeed, invite its opinion on 
any point
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The Industrial Council was well received, when it Was
announced, together with its membership, in October 1911. The
Liberal press was especially enthusiastic. The Daily
Chronicle heralded it as 'a great and welcome advance towards
(3)industrial peace1, "  while the Morning Leader believed that
’the stability which our independent industries will gain
from its decisions will be a national asset of the highest
value’. ^  The Daily News observed that ’it would not, of
course...eliminate the strike or the lock-outj but it will.
(5)
tend to diminish their number and restrict their ravages’.
The Westminster Gazette was convinced that it would be a
benefit to most of the community; ’The Syndicalists who
dream of the general strike as the means of bringing capital
to its knees and subverting the existing order of society
will, of course, regard the Industrial Council as an
anathema...But for the others, who are the vast majority,
and who have in view not the subversion of society but the
betterment in definite'and practical ways of working class
conditions, the Industrial Council is a great move forward’,^
A large section of the Tory Press was equally optimistic. The
Morning Post felt that ’the best wishes of the whole nation
(7)
are with the new Council and its Chairman’,' while the 
Daily Mail maintained that ’if it fulfils reasonable hopes 3*567
(3) Daily Chronicle. 11 October 1911, p.
(A) Morning Leader. 11 October 1911, p. A
(5) Daily News. 12 October 1911, p. A
(6) Westminster Gazette. 11 October 1911, p. 1
(7) Morning Post. 11 October 1911, p. 6
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( i t )  w ill be an instrument o f great value fo r the prevention
(8)o f serious labour disputes'. '
Thus, i t  started with the support o f a wide section o f the
middle class, who wished to find some permanent solution to
the industrial unrest. Yet, from it s  foundation, i t  had
many cr it ics , especially within the labour movement and the
employers' associations. The Council was not elected, and
it s  decisions were not binding on anyone who sought it s
advice, so that'there was no real need for anyone to consult
i t .  The trade unionists represented on the Council were
mainly moderates, and William Thorne, the President o f the
T.U.C. at the time, refused to become a member, simply
because it was intended to prevent strikes, and thus reduce
(9)the militancy o f the workers. The trade unionists who were 
members o f the Council tended to be the very people whose 
advice was so frequently ignored at this time. The fa ilu re 
to attract such men as Thorne might have suggested that i t  
was equally unlikely to appeal to the increasingly m ilitant 
working class.
It'was not only the'militant working class who were 
unimpressed by the creation of this body. At-the other end 
of the political spectrum, it was rejected by an extreme 
group of Conservatives who attempted to introduce legislation 
of their own. The Bill was not debated, so the amount of 
support it might have received cannot be measured, but five
M.P.'s were instrumental in the introduction of a Bill to 
reform the 1906 Trades Disputes Act, They were Sir J'rederick 89
(8) DonyJ^Wl, li October 1911, p. 6
(9) Labour header, 20 October 1911* p. 6G3
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Banbury, a retired stockbroker, and Chairman of the Northern 
Railway Company; Sir Henry Craik, Allen Bathurst, Sir Alfred 
Cripps, a barrister, and John Rawlinson, another barrister.
The Bill received its First Reading on 1 November 1911, and 
a week later, Banbury asked the Prime Minister if he would 
’give facilities for the further stages of the Trade Disputes 
Act (1906) Bill?’^* 1°V Asquith refused, so that it must have 
appeared that he and his Liberal colleagues were satisfied 
with the arrangements that had already been made, even if a 
small group of Unionists had made it very plain that they 
were anything but happy.
The first chance for the Government’s new machinery to 
deal with industrial disputes arose very soon after its 
establishment. For at least eighteen years before 1911, cotton 
.had been one of the most strike prone industries in the 
country, together with mining and engineering-shipbuilding.
The cotton trade, despite this, was in a healthy state, and 
provided Britain’s most valuable export. According to 
Mitchell and Deane, the value of its exports was twice that 
of any other industry in the period 1911—13-v ' The 
employers were well organised, as were the unions. Sir 
Charles Macara had-been President of the employers’ associa­
tion, the Master Cotton Spinners* Federation since 1894> and 
he remained in that position until 191A. He founded the
(10) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 30, cols. 878,1644,
1 and 8 November 1911
(11) B.R. Mitchell and P. Deane, Abstract of British
Historical Statistics (Cambridge 1962). p. 305
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International Federation of Cotton Spinners in 1904-, and was
its President -until 1915. The men were equally well grouped.
In some districts, virtually every cotton operative was a
member of the appropriate trade -union. The Amalgamated
Weavers' Association was especially anxious that every cotton
worker should be a trade unionist. In May 1911, its General
Council decided that in areas with an 85$ membership, it was
prepared to offer financial support to members who refused to
(12}
work with non-unionists.' ' This threat went unnoticed by
the general public, but a dispute on that issue broke out
later in the same year. In October, some men gave notice of
intended strike action, unless everyone in their mills joined
the union. The Tines opposed such action, but blamed
agitators for arousing the operatives? 'It is difficult to
conceive that any sensible man, left to himself, would think
it worth his while to subject his family to privations merely
because three or four non-union men vork in the same mill.
This kind of trouble comes from the subtle machinations of
professional agitators, who care little about the welfare of
(13)
those they dupe with inflammatory appeals to prejudice'.
The Daily Graphic, without producing any evidence for its 
assertion, found it 'not surprising that public opinion should 
be growing more and more impatient of the intolerable tyanny 123
(12) E. Hopwood, A History of the Lancashire cotton Industry
and the Amalgamated Weavers' Association
(Manchester 1969) p. 78
(13) Times. 10 October 1911, p. 7
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( 1  A.)of modern trc.de unionism1. ^
The strike led to a general lock-out, affecting 126,000
Council was not invited to investigate the dispute. The
relevant employers’ body was the North East Lancashire
Master Cotton Spinners and Manufacturers’ Association, the
Chairman of which was Wilkinson Hartley, and it was he who
had a leading voice in reaching the decision to lock out the
members of the Northern Textile Trades Federation. Thus,
Charles, in a recent survey, has explained that the failure
to use the Industrial Council was in no way the fault of 
( 1
Macara. Certainly, Macara thought that it should have
been consulted. He wrote to the Prime Minister, pointing 
out that ’many prominent men who rendered valuable assis­
tance in the autumn...with the movement I led which resulted 
in the'establishment of the Industrial Council by the 
Government in October last, are at a loss to understand why 
this Council was not used at all in connection with the recent 
lock-out in the cotton trade’. In his autobiography, he
explained that ’while the Industrial Council met a number of 
times for discussion, it never had a chance to settle a single 
dispute, and one can only come to the conclusion that they 
were afraid of the practical men holding controlling positions 1456
(14) Daily Graphic. 9 October 1911, p. 3
(15) R. Charles, The Development of Industrial Relations in
Britain 1911-1939 . p.63
(16) Buxton Papers. Letter from Macara to Asquith, 30 March
Christmas. Strangely, the Industrial
1912
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in industry becoming too powerful or too popular in carrying
(17}out the work for which they were so eminently fitted’.
Such comments would appear* to confirm Charles’ view that 
Macara was unable to persuade the cotton employers to use 
the Council. The records of various associations ignore 
the dispute completely, so that no decision can be reached 
from that material, but it must be remembered that Macara 
was very influential among the cotton owners. He had led the 
movement to form the Manchester Cotton Association, and had 
helped to bring the local bodies together into the Federation 
of Master Cotton Spinners' Associations. It is unfortunate 
that no evidence has been found to reveal whether or not 
Macara did use his influence and position to attempt to 
persuade his colleagues to arbitrate through the Industrial 
Council.
Whatever Macara may have advised, the lock-out did take 
place. Its origins were clear, and unusual - an aggressive 
strike over the closed shop. A large section of the press was 
equally clear in its attitude to this question. The
Manchester-based Daily Dispatch asked, rhetorically, 'can
< (1S}
employers consent to such a vast revolution as this?’ ,
while the Daily Telegraph maintained that ’the unions are
tyrannical and insist on coercing every operative into their
ranks...an end not only to all industrial labour but of all
personal freedom. The owners of cotton mills are simply bound
to protest...otherwise they cannot be masters in their own 178
(17) C.W. Macara, Recollections (1921) p. 173
(18) Daily Dispatch. 23 December 1911, p. A
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„house'. ' This was the argument adopted by many of those 
who opposed the concept of the closed shop. Victory for the 
men would mean the establishment of 'tyranny', according to 
the Daily Express. Vfeekly Dispatch, and Spectator.
As the demand of the men was adjudged to be unacceptable, 
support for the employers followed. The Morning Post and the 
Birmingham Daily Post congratulated the owners on their firm 
stand, while the Standard, after expressing anger that men 
could strike on such an issue, looked at the principle 
involved: 'Capital, on this occasion, is fighting not merely 
for itself, but for the tens of thousands of labourers who 
have not yet bowed their necks to the yoke of the trade union 
wire pullers, and these still form the majority of the English 
working classes'.
The Daily Mail revealed its attitude to the working class 
when commenting on this dispute. It urged a return to work, 
as the industry was experiencing high demand, and a cessa­
tion of production entailed a loss to the nation: 'It will be 
a grave reproach to the good sense and patriotism of organised 
labour if the promised "boom" in the cotton trade is destroyed' 
The writer suggested that the argument could continue in a 
time of poor trade. Thus, the Daily Mall was considering
the matter purely from the point of view of the middle class
ok
employer, anxious for the largest profit^all tfcs times The 
claims of labour were ignored, and the men were even condemned 1920
(19) Daily Telegraph. 28 December 1911, p. 11
(20) Standard. 28 December 1911, p. 6
(21) Daily Mail. 28 December 1911, p. U
(19)
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for deciding to.strike at the tine most opportune to- themselves.
The Conservative papers were arrayed against the cotton
operatives. In general, this had been the case in the sunnier
of 1911, with the Liberals tending to side with the men, or at
least to display more sympathy. On this occasion, the political
division of opinion was not so apparent. The Daily Newsf for
example, did not approve of a closed shop, arguing that men
should have the right to leave their unions should they wish
to do so. This would ensure that the unions did not exceed
their powers, and was 'a prudent check on possible tyanny,
and...a wholesome guarantee against the abuse of the immense
(22)powers with which unions are rightly and properly endowed’.
The lock-out continued into the New Year, and George
Askwith, who had just been knighted for his services to the
nation in industrial affairs, acting in his customary position
as arbitrator, persuaded the men to return to work for a six
month trial period. The Morning Post saw this as a salutory
lesson for those firms which, in various industries, were
prepared to concede to the men; ’All those who value the
industrial position of England will rejoice that by the
fairness of the employer it has received a severe check at
(23)least in the cotton trade'. '
Events from October 1911 to January 1912 are extremely 
instructive when studying industrial relations in the years 
prior to the First World War. In answer to the wave of unrest 
the Government established the Industrial Council, encouraged 23
(22) . Daily News. 27 November 1911, p. A
(23) Morning Post, 20 January 1912, p, 6
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-.by the majority of the nation - or at least the majority of 
recorded comments were favourable, and hoped for its success.
A group of Unionists did not believe that the body would be 
sufficiently strong, and attempted to introduce legislation 
which would make a strike difficult by removing the right to 
picket, but, in the main, the Conservatives and the Liberals 
hoped that the new organisation would prove to be the answer 
to industrial unrest. Their earnest desire was that all 
disputes would be referred to the Industrial Tribunal, and 
actual stoppages of work would seldom, if ever, occur. The 
power of the employer, and, perhaps more importantly, the 
union, would diminish when this safe body could consider the 
matter in dispute. In fact, it achieved little. It lacked 
any real power, so that it was ignored. The first major 
dispute after It had been set up was in the cotton industry, 
where the instigator of the movement leading up to the founda­
tion of the Council was a leading light} yet even there it 
remained unused. The unrest in the cotton industry centred 
around the question of the closed shop, and it was this issue 
which united a large section of the nation against the 
actions of the men and their union. A large port of the 
Conservative press consistently assumed that the unions 
be in the wrong, and this case was no exception. Indeed, the 
return to work was hailed as a victory for the employers, and 
the firmness displayed was urged upon others faced with labour 
unrest. On the other hand, a large part of the Liberal Party 
had previously supported the men’s claims for better condi­
tions, higher wages, and recognition of the union. This 
matter was further than many would go. It is interesting
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that the cotton industry was one in which the unions had 
long been recognised, and in which there existed a sophistica­
ted method of dealing with grievances. Thus, the cotton 
owners could be regarded as enlightened, certainly in 
comparison with other groups who refused to even negotiate 
with the unions. Thus, it is strange that the Industrial 
Council was ignored, especially considering Mecara’s position 
within the cotton industry, and his activities leading up to 
the Industrial Council. It is obvious that employers’
Ve>
organisations, just like trade unions, seek^the maximum 
benefit out of any situation, and look at on incident from 
their own point of view, but, nevertheless, to ignore the 
Industrial Council does seem strange. Certainly, the fact 
that nobody used the Industrial Council during the cotton 
lock-out destroyed its effectiveness as the Liberal Party’s 
answer to industrial unrest, and it also showed that even 
reasonable employers would make a stand over certain issues, 
without regard for the wishes of the Government, for the 
Government must have hoped to see the Council used.
It Is unfortunate that there is not more material on the 
Industrial Council. Certain questions loom large, and the 
answers to them are speculative. It would be valuable to 
know why the Council was ignored, and to discover exactly 
what Macara was doing during the dispute. However, the 
published and unpublished sources provide no clues. The 
private papers of Macara have not been uncovered, despite an. 
extensive search, which included solicitors offices in 
Lancashire. Indeed, the minutes of many of the employers’ 
associations fail to even record the simple fact that the
182 -
lock-out took place, while dealing with other natters 
involving arguments between employers and men in the same 
year* Thus, the historian is left to ponder about the failure 
of the Industrial Council, without the necessary documents to 
reach a firm decision.
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Chapter VI 
The Coal Strike
There had been discontent in the coal industry for sone 
years over the methods of remunerating colliers. The problem 
centred around face -workers, who were paid according to the 
amount of coal hewn, so that their wages varied with the 
type of seam encountered. If it was thin, or twisted, or if 
the roof was difficult, or much water was present, the miner 
would earn considerably less than he could expect under 
easier conditions. Different areas had evolved various methods 
to arrive at their pay rates in such cases. In the north of 
England, the collier did nothing but cut the coal, and he ’ 
could appeal to a Joint Committee if he considered that his 
wag6 had been worsened by the physical circumstances of the 
seam. Nevertheless, Sidney Webb has recorded that Durham 
hewers ’would sometimes find themselves earning, net, under 
£1 in a fortnight*.^ In South. Wales, this method of con­
sultation did not exist* .s»4,lv&oreover, the collier had to 
take his tubs to the surface,-and alsa set timber and rip- 
stone, for which he was paid at-prearranged rates. Thus,, the 
system of payment was more complicated, and, - coupled with the • 
extremely variable faces of the region, provided more chances 
of friction than in the north of England. Consequently,, the 
notion of establishing rates of pay.for working in difficult 
seams had a wider following in Wales than elsewhere. The 
strike of 1010-11 in the Cambrian coalfield was over wage 
rates, bit out of this emerged a national movement for a 
special payment for those working in abnormal places, 1
(1) The Story of the Durham Mines 1662-1921 (1921) p.94.
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In September 1911, there vas a Special Joint Meeting of 
the Coal Owners* and Miners* Representatives of Great Britain 
to discuss this matter. The owners accepted the principle of 
a different pay scale for men obliged to work in such condi­
tions, but they insisted that it was a local question, which 
should, therefore, be referred to the individual districtsjpor 
negotiation. The miners wanted a national settlement, and 
proposed that the rate for working in an abnormal place should 
be the average wage of workmen under normal conditions. As 
neither side would give way, there was a deadlock, which left 
the way open for the Executive Committee to link that question 
to the demand for a minimum wage for all underground workers. 
The Annual Conference of the Miners* Federation, at the 
beginning of October 1911, discussed the minimum wage, and 
decided that the District Federations should meet the 
employers, and then report back to a Special Conference, 
which took place in the middle of November. Local talks had 
given little satisfaction, but the Conference decided against 
ordering a strike ballot at that time. On 20 November, a 
further Conference took place, and agreed to ballot the men.
A factor which could have caused this change of mind was the 
fact that the owners in the English Federated Area had con­
ceded the principle of_the minimum wage. This included 
Lancashire, Yorkshire, Cheshire, North Wales, and the Midlands, 
However, after criticism from other employers, they backed 
down and withdrew their acceptance. , The ballot was to take 
place on 10-12 January 1912. John Wilson, a Lib-Lab M.P, 
since 1890, pointed out that in his district, Durham, a 
majority of two thirds was needed before a proposal could be
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executed, ensuring that there was a very real demand for action, 
and he persuaded the Conference to adopt this at a national 
level.
The result was announced at a Special Conference at 
Birmingham on 18 January 1912, and was decisive. 443,801 had 
voted for strike action, and 115,921 against. This represen­
ted a total vote of about 80$ in favour of militancy. The 
Conference decided that the members of the Miners’ Federation 
should give in their notices, and cease work at the end of 
February 1912. However, it was by no means certain that a 
Strike would occur. Negotiation» continued. On 1 and 2 
February, the miners fixed their claims, after the various 
districts had met individually to discuss the question. On 
7th, the Executive Committee end seventeen additional 
representatives met the owners at the Westminster Palace 
Hotel. The South Wales owners, headed by D.A. Thomas, a
former Liberal Member of Parliament, and now ’the master mind
(2)on the side of the employers’, ' left the meeting after 
hearing the men’s demands. The meeting continued, with both 
sides advancing their own proposals. The other owners decided 
that payment by results was the best method of wage remunera­
tion in the pits, while the miners insisted that the concept 
of a minimum wage should be accepted. Thus, the Conference 
ended in deadlock, and no more were proposed. The miners 
were ready to strike, but they still hoped that they might 2
(2) D. Evans, ’The South Wales Coal Industry’ in M.H.
' Mackworth (ed) D.A. Thomas, Viscount Bhandda
(1921) p. 123
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gain their demands by discussion. David Shackleton, a former
cotton operative who had been a Labour M.P. and President of
the T.U.C. before becoming a Senior Labour Adviser at the
Home Office, felt that the leaders had become unpopular
because they 'stand for arbitration and conciliation as the
(3)best means of settling trade disputes’. This comment 
is instructive, showing that knowledgeable observers could 
believe the union representatives were working very hard to 
achieve a peaceful solution to the dispute, while the 
militancy came from the grass roots level.
Certainly, the Government was keen to prevent a strike.
On about 20 February, the Prime Minister wrote to Thomas 
Ashton, the Secretary of the Miners’ Federation, and offered 
to mediate. On 27th, a Conference of one hundred and seventy 
delegates agreed to proceed to meet Asquith, Grey^Lloyd George, 
and Buxton. The Prime Minister attempted to persuade the men 
to discuss the actual sums demanded in each district, but 
they refused, insisting that their own proposals were the 
lowest figures that could be accepted. The Government then 
advanced four points:-
1. It was sometimes impossible for colliers to earn 
reasonable wages.
2. The solution was to be through district arrangements.
3. The Government would confer with the parties.
A* If the owners and the men could not reach a
decision, the Government representatives would do 
this for them. 3
(3) CAB/37/107/78 22 July 1911
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The Miners' Federation accepted the first and second points, 
and would agree to the others, provided that the rates agreed 
to at their Conference were adopted. The employers did not 
share a common policy. The English Coal Conciliated Board, 
which coincided with the English Federated Area, agreed to 
the proposals, as did Cumberland. Durham, accepted, though 
reluctantly. The Northumberland owners rejected than by a 
small majority. The answer of the Scottish employers was 
ambiguous, while that of South Wales was a straightforward 
rejection. Although the Government continued to attempt to 
effect a settlement - Haldane assured his mother that 'all 
that can be done is being done'.^ The strike began on 1 
March 1912.
Opinion on the eve of the stoppage was divided. A typical 
comment in support of the miners appeared in the Manchester 
Guardian: 'The average wages actually made by a hewer probably com­
pare favourably enough with those of other workmen, although we must 
remember.that the arduous and exacting character of underground 
work is likely to use up a man's strength prematurely', so that
life earnings were probably less than those in other industries.
(5)The notion of a minimum wage was advocated. Sir Arthur 
Markham, the coal owner and Liberal Member of Parliament, 
told a Liberal Party meeting at Creswell that 'if he were a 
miner, and had done a fair and honest day's work, and could *5
(A) Haldane Papers N.L.S.Ms.5987 f.77. Letter from Haldane
to his mother, 29 February 1912 —
(5) Manchester Guardian. 16 January 1912, p. 8
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not get a fair day’s wage, he would strike’,' ' a remark 
which reveals that not all employers were irrevocably opposed 
to the cause of their employees. Other Liberal papers lent 
their support to the men. The Westminster Gazette and the 
Daily Chronicle argued that the colliers obviously had griev­
ances, which ought to be remedied, and the News of the World
emphasised the contribution to the national economy mado by 
(7)the miners.
The Morning Leader could not understand what all the
discussion was about. The demand for a minimum wage was not
In., itself excessive. It is no more than most organised trades
have long ago secured, meaning, in fact, no more than a day
( 8)wage’. The Daily Chronicle adopted the same argument:
'When the whole body of employees in an industry so vast as 
coal mining demand unanimously the application of a quite 
unrevolutionary principle already satisfactorily at work in 
other trades, surely there is an overwhelming case for the 
employers to consider it, upon terms'. ' The last two 
words were of considerable importance. What the writer 
meant was that a minimum wage should be paid, providing that 
there were some safeguards to ensure that the miners produced 
a reasonable effort at the coal face. This was one of the 
points raised by those who opposed the concept. These people 
fell into several categories: there were some who felt that it 
would lead to malingering} others who believed that a *9
■ ({¡0 Derbyshire Times, 20 January 1912» p. 3.
(8V Morning Leader. 2 February 1912, p. A
(9) Daily Chronicle. 23 February 1912, p. A
( 6)
national coal strike would ruin the.country, but insisted that 
the nine owners should not give way; and those who held that 
the novenent was organised by Socialists or Syndicalists, 
whose aim was to destroy the economy.
As early as October 1911» the Daily Graphic had warned 
that with a minimum wage, 'a considerable percentage of men 
will give very little work in return for the guaranteed wage. 
The result would be that many collieries would have to close 
down altogether'. This argument was used by the Morning
Post, the Financial Times, and the Economist, all of which 
pointed out that the closing of pits would cause unemploy­
ment, and increase prices. The same cry was to be heard in the 
House of Commons. Bonar Law commented on the 'irresistable 
tendency to reduce the output and produce less for very 
nearly the same amount of money', while Laurence Hardy, a - 
Unionist business man who had associations with coal and 
iron work, believed that most of the men in the collieries with 
which he was associated earned less than the minimum that the 
miners wanted, so that the demand had to be regarded as
(ill
impossible. '
Some papers tried to be reasonable, and considered both 
sides. W.H. Renwick, writing in Nineteenth Century and After, 
admitted that 'there is undoubted hardship to those colliers 
who work in abnomal places', but a minimum "wage could not 10
(10) Daily Graphic. 2 October 1911, p. 3
(11) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 35» Cols. 1738, 1757,
19 March 1912
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be considered, because it placed 'a premium upon idleness
and an encouragement to the shirker to win as little coal as 
(12^possible'. ' The Birmingham Daily Post agreed. There was
no provision for checking the amount of work done, so that
the claim 'to what is virtually an unconditional minimum is,
on the face of it, inadmissable, and so long as it is main-
(13)
tained, the employers must offer resistance*.
Thus, a section of the press and some Conservative 
politicians refused to support a minimum wage, because they 
did not believe that the collier was honest enough to work 
properly for it. They maintained that only the inducement 
of piece work could ensure this. The consequent argument, 
that to grant the minimum wage would cause a price rise, 
seems to have been a secondary consideration to the assump­
tion that the minimum wage could cause a fall in profits, and 
had, therefore, to bG rejected.
The effect on the nation was another reason for opposing 
the threatened strike. This anxiety was shared by represent­
atives of all political views, who agreed with the Daily Mail
( u )that a stoppage would be a 'national catastrophe'. A
cartoon in the News of the World depicted the anxiety felt by 
many people. An owner and a miner were arguing as their car, 
named "British Coal’ Trade" was about to plunge over the cliff, 
"National Stoppage", onto the rocks below, which represented 123
(12) R.H. Renwick, ‘The Coal Crisis', Nineteenth Century and
After. February 1912, pp. 380, 381
(13) Birmingham Daily Post. 11 January 1912, p. 6 
(1A) Daily Mail. 9 January 1912, p. 6
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"misery" and "ruin", while John Bull implored them to stop.
Sir Edward Grey's speech in Manchester on 17 February 1912
indicated that his fears were as acute as those of the
cartoonist. He spoke of the terror aroused by the prospect
of the Napoleonic invasion a century earlier, and compared
the possibilities to those of 1912: 'Today we have perhaps
a greater danger coming from within, not from without - the
danger of industrial catastrophe, which might assume such
proportions that no ships, no soldiers, no police, nothing
at the disposal of the Government could protect the country
from the consequences of it'.^^ This military metaphor
was used by various people during the strike period. The
Observer, for example, declared that 'economic war on this
scale is only less serious than war between armies and
navies. A coal strike would be a disaster only next in
Í17)destructiveness to an invasion'.' ' The anyonymous "One
Who Resents It" wrote at this time: 'To say that war was 
declared on society in July 1911 and that the campaign has not
/•jQ)
ceased yet is not to exaggerate the position in the least'.
Senior policiano were Just as disturbed. Viscount Milner,
the experienced Conservative politician, whose views were
rigidly orthodox - he had wanted the House of Lords to
reject the Budget and the Parliament Bill -.described the
(19)situation as 'severe', ' while Lord Furness informed the 156789
(15) Hews of the World. 25 February 1912. p. 1
(16) Umpire. 18 February, 1912, p. 1
(17) Observer. 18 February 1912, p. 8
(18) One Who Resents It op.cit. p. 93
(19) Milner Papers Ms.275 (1912) Diary, 2 March 1912
( 15)
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House of Lords about his feelings: ’I earnestly believe that
if the chieftans of Capital and Labour persist in using against
each other the weapon of stubborn tenacity, and refuse to walk
in ways more-in harmony with common sense, they will inflict
upon the nation...one of the gravest injuries it has ever
sustained in the whole course of history1 A source
closer to the Government, Llewellyn Smith, wrote to Buxton,
expressing similar concern: 'The coal outlook, as you say,
looks bad, but there is still time for further consideration
and the very magnitude of the calamity that would be caused
by a National Stoppage will, I hope, induce caution. D.A.
Thomas is making an ass of himself, as usual: I presume he
( 21)sees some personal advantage in a stoppage*. ' Certainly,
Thomas did not seem to want any compromise. He was quoted
on 23 February, saying that the owners did not want the .
( 22)strike to be postponed, while David Daniel, the 
Secretary of the North Wales Quarrymen's Union, observed him, 
a few days before the strike began, after a meeting in 
Downing Street had failed to produce a settlement: *D.A.
Thomas I saw walking alone in Victoria Street with a sinister 
smile on his l i p s ' . I n  fact, he was not the only owner 
anxious to face the stoppage. A Scottish employer, Robert 
Moore, wrote to Bonar Law, informing him that 'down here - 2013
(20) House of Lords Debates Vol. 11, Col. 16, 1A February 1912
(21) Buxton Papers. Letter from Smith to Buxton, 15 January
1912
(22) Manchester Guardian, .23 February 1912, p. 8
(23) Daniel Diaries N.L.W.Ms.536, 26 February 1912
we coal people would like to fight it out'.^^
The enemy to be fought was often seen to be Socialism or
Syndicalism. The Referc-e expressed the opinions of many: 'It
is needless to say that Socialist agitators are well in front
(25)of the present dispute'. The Daily Express renewed the
military concept, in pointing out that the miners 'have been
the tools and the dupes of noisome agitators, who have stung
them to revolt with wild words and frantic baits. The men,
the Syndicalist Socialists, are the curse of the coalfields
and the country, and the enemies of the people. They want
war at any price. They preach the general strike as a step
towards 'universal anarchy, and they see in this struggle an
opportunity of advancing their frankly’- revolutionary aims.
These are the men who, masquerading as trade unionists, want
to overthrow all established authority’-'. The Standard
agreed that what thes men wanted was 'something closely
(27)resembling civil war'. Sir Arthur Markham, who had
expressed so much sympathy for the miners in this dispute, 
believed that the old leaders had been 'replaced by extreme 
Socialists'. 245678
(24) Bonar Law Papers 25/2/58. Letter from Moore to Law,
26 February 1912
(25) Referee. 1A January, 1912, p. 7
(26) Daily Express. 29 February, p. A
(27) Standard. 26 February 1912, p. 8
(28) Sir A.B. Markham, 'The Coal Strike', Quarterly Review.
April 1912, p. 555
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It is extremely difficult to assess the influence of“
Syndicalists in this conflict, but there is evidence that
some militants were active within the Miners' Federation. As
early as February 1911, Tom Mann's Industrial Syndicalist
had devoted a complete issue to the position of the miners,
and had included an article by W.F. Hay and Noah Ablett
entitled 'A Minimum Wage for Miners'. Those two men were
active in South Wrles, and were amongst the authors of The
Miners' Next Step (Tonypandy 1912), which advanced a
Syndicalist policy for the pits. The old leader of the
South Wales Miners, William Abraham, better known as "Mahon",
was disturbed about extremist infiltration into the union.
He told John Burns that he regretted 'he did not take a
(29)bolder line with the hot heads years ago'. ' In October 
1911» in the elections to the Executive Committee of the 
South Wales Miners’ Federation, Syndicalists won all three 
seats. Lenin paid particular attention to events in Britain, 
where he found encouraging signs. In general, he declared, 
the 'strikes are assuming a mass characterj moreover, they 
are ceasing to be purely economic and are developing into 
political strikes', and the action by the miners showed that 
•the workers have learned to f i g h t ' . T h u s ,  it is clear 
that there was a core of Syndicalist support in South Wales 2930
(29) Bums Papers B.M.Add.Ms.4-6334- f.57. Diary, 27 February
1912
(30) V.I. Lenin, Collected Works. Vol. 18 (Moscow 1963)
pp, 270, 4-67. Quotations from Pravda. 12 August 
1912, 1 January 1913
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-y-if nowhere else, and at least one Socialist leader abroad
believed that the miners were leading the way to proletarian
' unrest in Britain. However, the extent of the influence of
Syndicali&m upon the result of the miners’ ballot remains
unknown. Certainly, some newspapers believed that it was the
determining factor, and were worried for the future. This led
to a demand that the Government should intervene to prevent
the cessation of work. The News of the World took a relatively
moderate line, insisting that there should be compulsory
arbitration,^”^  while the Daily Mail vent a little further,
demanding that the strike 'must be repressed by the whole
( 3 2 )power of the Government’. Exactly how this was to be
accomplished was unclear, but presumably the method would
have included the use of troops to force the miners to work. 
Any type of intervention, and especially one of this kind, 
would have involved the Government in activities not normally 
within its ambit, and could have established a dangerous 
precedent, but that was unimportant to those who believed that 
the workers were there to work, and not to protest. Lord 
Northumberland certainly felt that something ought to be done. 
He wrote to Asquith, explaining that there were two reasons 
for the strike wave: ’One may be that the men are entitled 
to a rise owing to good trade, but the chief reason is that 
the men can picket and intimidate all workmen and employees 
and destroy property without any fear of being stopped from 
so doing by your Government. This had undoubtedly been 312
(31) Hews of the World. 1A January 1912, p. 8
(32) ■Daily Hail. 17 February 1912, p. A
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.„caused by the Trades Disputes Act of 1906, and I implore you
to repeal this by a short Act of Parliament as one immediate
means of reducing these strike troubles. Owing to this Act,
intimidation and sympathetic strikes have increased in every
direction, and it is now necessary for your Government to take
(33)strong action in this natter', Charles Bathurst, the
Chairman of a colliery company, was of the same opinion, and 
wrote to Bonar Law, asking him to attempt to repeal the
(3/)
clause in the 1906 Act which permitted peaceful picketing.
Thus, on the eve of the strike, there was a general 
congensus that the situation was serious, but no real agree­
ment on the causes or the solutions. It was not entirely a 
division on political lines. The Liberal press did tend to 
•argue that the miners had a reasonable case for a minimum 
wage, while the Conservatives did not. Nevertheless, one of 
the most fierce opponents of the men's claims was D.A. Thomas, 
a staunch Liberal. However, in general, the Conservatives 
were more afraid of the dangers of concessions, and were more 
likely to urge the Government to intervene so as to end the 
dispute. This, of course, would have meant siding with the 
employers.
Certainly many people expected something to happen to 
prevent a stoppage. The Standard summed up this view, when 
pointing out that 'the calamity would be so tremendous that *16
(33) Crewe Papers. C/39, Letter from Northumberland to 
Asquith, 17 February 1912
(3A) Bonar Law Papers, 25/3/AO. Letter from Bathurst to Law,
16 March 1912
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-the public has been unable to take it seriously'. ' The 
cessation of work cane as a surprise to much of the nation, 
but it was rapid. By 2 March 1912, the pits of Britain had 
become inactive. The Government continued its efforts at 
mediation. On 7 March, the Prime Minister met the Miners' 
Executive Committee at 10 Downing Street, and invited them to 
attend a joint meeting. Several days later, the Miners' 
Conference accepted this offer, on the condition that the 
discussions were confined to the principle of the minimum wage. 
Between 12th and 14th, this Joint Conference took place, with 
Asquith as Chairman. On 14th, he suggested district negotia­
tions. The miners realised that this involved the possibility 
of. a split in their united approach, and so insisted that their 
main figures should be accepted first. On 15 March, Enoch 
Edwards, the President of the Miners' Federation of Great 
Britain, informed the Miners' Conference that the Prime 
Minister had promised legislation, and his reply had imposed 
four conditions:-
1. No resumption of work until the Bill had passed 
through Parliament.
2. A time limit of one month after that date to 
settle the details.
3. The wages to be retrospective from the .resumption 
of work.
4. The Bill had to contain the minimum figures of 
five shillings for men and two shillings for boys. 35
(35) Standard. 17 February 1912, p. 6
(35")
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On 19 March, the Bill was introduced. It contained no 
figures. The following day, the Miners' Conference reiterated 
its demand for the inclusion of five shillings and two 
shillings - "five and two" as it was called. Nevertheless, 
the Bill continued.' On 21st, it passed its Second Reading; 
on 26th the Third Reading, and on 27th it went to the House 
of Lords. It became law with the granting of the Royal 
Assent on 29 March. Needless to say, the miners were not 
enthusiastic. On 27th, their Conference decided to take 
another ballot of its members. The result was announced on 3 
April. The vote had produced a narrow majority for the con­
tinuation of the strike, by 2A4»011 to 201,013. The colliers 
of Lancashire and Yorkshire were more against a return to 
work than those of the other regions:
For strike For continuation 
January April
- % • >
South Wales 85 32
Scotland 8A 57
English Federated Area 82 62
Northumberland 75 56
Durham 67 66
Rest of England 65 U2
Out of the vote in the English Federated Area, 12% of miners
voting in Lancashire had elected for continuance, and 77% in 
Yorkshire. The Executive Committee decided that the majority 
in favour of remaining on strike was too small, and so it was 
called off, and the men returned-to’work, placing their faith 
in the Minimum Wages Act, which laid down that the actual rates
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were to be fixed by Joint District Boards, retrospectively 
from 29 March. The Chairmen, appointed by the Board of 
Trade, were to have the casting vote. If the District Boards 
had been unable to make a settlement on wages or rules three 
weeks after it had been convened, the Chairmen were to take 
all the decisions. In fact, within that time, agreements 
were reached in Lancashire and Cheshire, South Derby and the 
Forest of Dean, and after three weeks in Cumberland and 
Warwickshire. In the other districts, the Joint Boards 
achieved nothing. In these areas, the figures decided upon 
by the Chairmen were often considered unfairly low by the 
men, and this was a cause of resentment.
Opinion did not remain static while all this was taking 
place. The longer the strike continued, the greater were 
the effects on the national economy. Industry could not con­
tinue without coal, so that as R. Page Arnot put it, ‘there 
was a gradual slowing down of the pulse of economic life*. ' 
Actual figures for the number of men temporarily unemployed 
by the action of the miners vary, but were considerable. The 
numbers given out in the Daily Mail Yearbook were typical:-
4- March 250,000
6 March 350,000
7 March 375,000
8 March 4-00,000
9 March 4-50,000
13 March 565,000
20 March 720,000 36
(36) R.P. Arnot, The Miners. Years of Struggle (1953) p* 103
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25 March 800,OOO^37^
The official view of the situation was expressed in a
paper circulated to Cabinet members, commenting on the
increase in pauperism, and the establishment of relief
committees in some towns, but observing that there was an
adequate supply of coal, and that there had been no run on
(38)the banks. ' However, Mrs. Wood of Bradford, writing to
her friend, the newly elected Tory M.P., W.A.S. Hewins,
informed him that 'we are feeling the coal strike badly in
Yorkshire, and if it is not settled soon, we shall have a
(39)regular panic'. '
Although panic and violence did not materialise, it had 
been widely expected. Before the men had even left work, the 
Hone Office received several requests for troops, and the •
War Office was taking precautions to ensure that the trans- 
mission of messages would be facilitated if disturbances did 
a r i s e M a n y  people expected violence. Sir Ernest Jardine, 
the textile machine manufacturer and Unionist M.P., told Sir 
Austen Chamberlain on 12 March that he was going to his 
country house, and, considering the mood of the time, went to 
a gun smiths, to purchase enough weapons to protect his 
household, should the need arise. However, he was unable 
to do so, as the shop had sold out of revolvers, including
(37) Daily Mail Yearbook of 1912 (1913) t>. 57
(38) CAB 37/110/56 30 March 1912
(39) Hewins Papers. 56/144# Letter from Mrs. Annie Wood
to Hewina, 17 March 1912
(40) H.O.45/10674/218781/6,9,11,89
one hundred in that and the previous day.1 ' Clearly; a 
group within the community were seriously disturbed at the 
possibilities of an insurrection, or at least extensive 
rioting.
Another example of the concern about the possibilities
can be found in a letter sent to the Home Secretary by Lord 
Loreburn, the Lord Chancellor. His forecast of events was 
pessimistic: ’If there is a breakdown then want and scarcity 
may be within sight very soon, and when once it is begun . 
acutely the progress, breoii riot, etc., may be very sudden 
end grow at an incredibly rapid rate in number and intensity.
It is not only reserves of police, etc., but also reserves of 
food. transport, etc., which may soon be needed. .1 do hope 
you are now equipped for this contingency. In my opinion not
(¿.2)a day has to be lost in getting ready for all that may happen’.' ' 
Robert Cecil, the barrister and Unionist Member of Parliament 
adopted a slightly different approach, arguing that the miners
had to be opposed at all costs, as their victory ’would really
(A3)mean anarchy and ultimately actual fighting’.
Thus, a group of well-informed political figures were 
seriously alarmed at the possibility of unrest and violence.
The ordinary citizen might not have access to this amount of 
information, and would have to reach his decisions from the *9
(A1) A. Chamberlain op.cit. p. AAA
(A2) McKenna Papers. MCKN A/A/19. Letter from Loreburn to 
McKenna, 2A March 1912
(A3) Bonor Law Papers. 25/3/19. Letter from Cecil to Law
9 March 1912
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newspapers. Here, coianent was very varied. Those of a
Liberal disposition tended to support the miners. For them,
there were no great fears of an imminent catastrophe. The
Morning Leader believed that 'everybody - who is not a South
Welsh or Scottish coal owner - agrees that the minimum vuge
ought to be conceded', and a few days later, the same paper
(44)
demanded that the Government should legislate for it.
Sir Arthur Markham, who had already sided with the men, 
announced that some areas had paid a minimum wage for years, 
including the Leen Valley of Nottinghamshire, all of 
Warwickshire, and most of the large companies in Derbyshire.
He insisted that 'in these districts there is no complaint 
that the output of coal has been diminished by this system 
of payment'.
Sir Richard Redmayne, an experienced colliery manager, 
and a former Professor of Mining, was His Majesty’s Chief 
Inspector of Mines. 'As early as July 1911, he had warned of 
the 'great probability.of unrest culminating in a general 
strike', because of the unpopularity of the three shift system, 
which had resulted from the Eight Hours' Act, the question of 
abnormal places in South Wales, and the activities of young 
militants. His opinion at this time has not been dis­
covered, but in his autobiography, he sided with the men on 
this issue: ’Whilst one would not go so far as to say that 
strikes are a justifiable means of attaining an end, even 
supposing the end sought were a rightful one, it is difficult *456
(¿4) Morning Leader. 5. 15. 16 March 1912. p. /
(45) Sir A.B. Markham op.cit. p. 56O
(46) CAB 37/107/78 22 July 1911
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to see what other course was open to the workers in the past 
towards securing the enenities which they now enjoy, and one 
is forced to admit from an historical review of the subject 
that in many cases the miners were in the right - though I 
know I m i l  be criticised for so saying. Such, in my 
opinion, was the case in regard to the 1912 national 
strike*.^
For such people, the Minimum Wages Act was entirely
log ica l and reasonable. The response o f the Daily Chronicle
was a common one: *The f ir s t  impression on the public is
likely to be one of relief’, but, after further thought,
could not -understand why the Government was prepared to
f ¿8)antagonise the miners by omitting the "five and two". J 
Even the Manchester Guardian, which had not always been 
sympathetic to the cause of men involved in trade disputes, 
gave limited approval to the legislation: ’Given the 
circumstances of the case, the national emergency, and the 
failure of a settlement by agreement between the parties, 
the Bill brought in by the Prime Minister...appears to us, 
in general outline, to be the best - perhaps we may say the 
only possible - method that could be devised for dealing with 
the situation’.
If the Liberal press was in favour of the Bill, the 
Cabinet itself was divided. Lord Riddell later claimed,' 4789
(47) Sir R.A.S. Redn&vne. Men, Mines and Memories (1942) p.
169
(48) Daily Chronicle. 16, 23 March 1912, p. 4
(49) Manchester Guardian. 20 March 1912, p. 6
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quoting iron his diary, that Lloyd George and Rufus Isaacs
(50)wanted to see the inclusion of the "five and two" ' and
(e-l )
Haldane thought the existing Bill 'a good one1, but
Lord Morley and Churchill ’expressed doubts as to its
(52)expediency’. Austen Chamberlain believed that Grey
(53)
detested the Bill, but at a Cabinet meeting, he proposed
that the figures should be included, and, if it did result
in a loss for the coal owners, the Government could make it
up. Grey suggested a fund of £250,000 for this purpose.
Asquith agreed, should the scheme prove absolutely necessary,
(5 A )but Burns, McKinnon, Wood and Runciman were ’very adverse’. '
Such Liberal opposition was not whispered in secret.'
Public announcements were made, though not by the leading 
politicians, who had to remain loyal to the decision reached, 
bound by the cloak of collective responsibility. The Daily 
Chronicle, though editorially in favour, included criticism.
It printed a series of articles, side by side, discussing the 
issue of the minimum wage from several points of view.
Professor Alfred Marshall, who held the Chair of Political 
Economy at Cambridge University, declared firmly against the 
concept, claiming that it would become the ’beginnings that 
might bring a national disaster’. In the next column,
L.T. Hothouse, a Liberal, and Professor of Sociology at the 501234
(50) Lord Riddel. More Pages from my Diary (1934) p. 44
(51) Haldane Papers. N.L.S.Ms.5987 f.108. Letter from
Haldane to his mother, 19 March-1912 -
(52) Lettersto the King at Windsor CAB 41/33/41, 16 March 1912
(53) A. Chamberlain op.cit. p, A&3
(54) Letters to the Kinp: at Windsor CAB 41/33/44, 26 March 1912
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University of London, declared, the claims 'modest1, while,
along side that, W. Pember Reeves, the Fabian, argued-that
’Parliament cannot fix miners' wages but it con give arbitrat-
(55)ors a lead. ' Thus, an extremely wide range of views on the 
topic were presented in the Daily Chronicle. The Morning 
Leader encouraged discussion of the points involved by 
permitting the Independent Labour Party M.P., Philip Snowden, 
to contribute an article, the contents of which could have 
done nothing to enhance the reputation of the Independent- 
Labour Party amongst militant workers. The piece observed 
that 'the miners have won a tremendous victory, not only for 
themselves, but for wage labour as a whole. There is a 
possibility that the results of this great success may be
/ f* Z \
lost by the pursuance of a mistaken policy'. p ' Now Snowden 
might urge caution for several reasons. It could have been 
that he did not want public opinion to move against the miners, 
or he may have been worried that if the miners pushed too 
hard, they would make the employers even more determined to 
crush then, either at this time, or whenever the opportunity 
arose. On the other hand, it could have been that he wished 
to appear bourgeois and respectable, and did not. want to arouse 
public disapproval by siding with miners engaged in a national 
strike. It is possible that Snowden was representing the 
interests of the Independent Labour Party with this article. 
This does imply that his motives were not entirely honest, 
and there is no evidence for such an accusation. Yet the 56
(55) Daily Chronicle. 25 March 1912. p. L
(56) Morning Leader.. 7 March 1912, p. <4
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^Labour Party, despite the unrest of the period, failed to 
increase its support at this tine, which does suggest that it 
could not natch the militancy of the workers. It would be 
unrealistic to suggest that this article was so important and 
so unpopular that it caused a loss of support for Labour as a 
whole, but it could be that Snowden's attitude was typical of 
those held by the Labour hierarchy, and all of them together, 
contributed to the failure of the Labour Party to gain 
popular acclaim. Such an argument cannot be proved, and relies 
upon a particular interpretation of Snowden's words, but given 
the state of the Labour Party, and its failure to attract 
interest at this time, it does not seem an unrealistic 
hypothesis.
The Manchester Guardian did not need to employ outsiders 
to draw attention to the dangers of the position. It sympa­
thised with the miners, and supported the Bill, but it felt 
that 'industrial war on a large scale is incompatible with 
the existence of society, and that compulsory arbitration,
accompanied by the prohibition to strike or to lock-out, is
(57)the only practicable way to avoid it'. ■ Some Liberal 
politicians were equally worried. Lord Crewe, the Secretary 
of State for India, and Leader of the Liberal Party in the 
House of Lords, wrote in his diary a complaint .about 'the 
apparent callousness of the miners, who are essentially the 
best of working men, in contemplating the shortage of a 
necessity of general life'.'3 1 Such an attitude epitomise® 578
(57) Manchester Guardian. 22 March 1912, p. 6
(58) J. Pope-Hennessy. Lord Crowe (1955) p. 138
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'the traditional concept of the relationship between employer 
and worker. The nen wore at fault by thoir strike action.
That the owners had brought about the strike by refusing to 
grant a minimum wage was not even considered - the nen should 
accept the edicts of their roasters without question, and then 
they were fine fellows. It was this very view which was being 
challenged during the whole period of unrest before the First 
World War, and some people did start to adapt their thinking 
to the changing circumstances of the time. Not so Winston 
Churchill. He had gained a reputation as an advanced Liberal, 
but he was rapidly losing this. According to Lucy Mastermon,
he was 'becoming less and less radical in his sympathies, and
(59)was practically in a "shoot 'em down" attitude'. However,
if he was becoming increasingly opposed to the demands of 
labour, another Cabinet member was giving active support. 
Herbert Samuel was M.P. for Cleveland, where the local iron 
ore miners, although voting against the strike, were involved 
in the stoppage. They had £10,000 invested in Middlesbrough 
Corporation, but their broker, 'for anti-strike reasons' , 
refused to advance any money on this security. Thus, there 
was no strike pay. The men met Samuel, who gave them £10,000, 
and took over their securities: 'I saw no risk. Even if the 
Cleveland men had not come out on strike, they, could not have 
gone on working, as the mines close as soon as the coal supply 
stops, because the blast furnaces cannot work without coal, 
and the iron stone cannot be used when the blast furnaces
3top'.^59 60)
(59) L. Mastcrman op.cit. p. 23A
(60) Samuel Papers A 156/102. Letter from Samuel to his VI '¡wo.rch
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Clearly, the Liberal Party was divided on the question 
of the miners' strike, and some politicians and newspapers 
emerge as greater sympathisers with the men than others.
Some side with the miners, even when the strike was taking 
place, though everyone accepted that it was damaging to the 
economy. On the other hand, the more traditional Liberals 
thought that the employers had the right to dictate terms to 
their employees, so that the men were in the wrong. In 
essence, this was the Conservative's reaction to labour 
unrest, so that their approach tended to represent a wider 
spectrum of opinion. Two cartoons in Punch sum up these 
opinions. In one, entitled 'The Victim', a miner is standing 
over Britannia, who is kneeling and bound, and he holds the 
rope that ties her. The other, called 'The Final Arbiter', 
shows the Spectre of Famine, assuring Asquith that 1"If you 
can't settle this, I will"'.^^ Thus, the feeling was, in 
the words of Emily Shawcrop, a,vicar's wife from Worcestershire, 
that the country was fin the midst of apparent, ruin and utter
(6 2)muddle', ' but no-one seemed able to produce a viable 
alternative policy.
It wa% of course, easy to attack the miners for jeopardis­
ing the national economy - many people really did not believe 
that they could have a case if the owners had rejected their 
demands. Further, a national stoppage had h«ver occurred 
before, so that this would add to the feelings of anger and
(61) Punch. 6 March 1912, p. 175; 27 March 1912, p.lb33 
(6?) Hewins Papers 56/115. Letter from Mrs. Shaven# to 
Hevins, 19 March 1912
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-frustration. Indeed, many people found it easy to convince
themselves that the miners were well off, and thus, did not
deserve any consideration. For instance, Lord Lansdowne,
the Leader of the Unionists in the House of Lords, declared
that colliers were 'liberally paid and...do their work under
conditions which seem undistinguishable from the conditions
under which men employed in other industries perform their
allotted task'. In the same Debate in the Upper Chamber,
the Bishop of St. Asaph observed that 'no doubt the risks
and hardships of his occupation are exceptional, but his work
is not unhealthy, his wages are higher than those of most
workmen in the country, and his hours of leisure are larger
(61)and more at his command'. J Several newspapers adopted the 
sane argument, while others decided that the miners had not 
even wanted to strike. Henry Seton-Karr, a former Conservative 
Member of Parliament, told the readers of Nineteenth Century 
and After that 'there is good reason to believe that many did 
not understand what they were voting for; while others voted 
in the belief that there would be no strike; or that it would 
only last a few days. The desire to have a holiday and spend 
some strike funds actuated many*. Walter Sichel made a
similar comment: 'On the whole, it would seem that no large 
section of the miners came out with any fixed or definite 
aims. Not a few of than wanted, apparently, to make their
(63) House of Lords Debates, Vol. II, Cols. 667, 763-A.
27 and 28 March 1912
(6/+) H. Seton-Karr, '"We are the Government Now"', Nineteenth
Century and After. April 1912* p*
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■union disgorge something for a holiday at last1.  ^ In the 
sane vay, less than half way through the stoppage, the Daily 
Telegraph declared that it had information which demonstrated 
that 'there is no longer any doubt that most of the miners 
have had enough of the strike both in spirit and in pocket, , 
and they are not going to stay away much longer from the work 
where high wages await them'.^^ However, there was no kind 
of evidence to support such statements, and the result of the 
'"second ballot must have indicated that a large number of 
'miners were convinced that the struggle was worth continuing. 
Thus, the claims that the men did not really want to strike, 
and were prepared to return to work, appear to have been 
wishful thinking. Perhaps the writers put forward these 
unsubstantiated claims simply because they wanted them to 
materialise. It is certainly indicative of the way in which 
some newspapers would misrepresent the news concerning the 
course of labour disputes.
Yet no clear alternative policy had been advocated. 
According to Chamberlain, it was Bonar Law's and the official 
Conservative opinion that 'there were only two courses - one 
to hold aloof but to'say and TO PROVE that absolute protection 
by police, special constables, military or whatever was needed, 
would be given to those who were willing to vorkj the other 
compulsory arbitration with effective penalties by imprison­
ment and by attachment of funds against all who aided, abetted
(65) W. Sichel 'The Strike and the Stricken', Fortnightly
Review, 1 May 1912, p. 831
(66) Daily Telegraph, 1/+ March 1912, p. 11
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or procured resistance to the award. He thought the first
course the right one and I agreej the second he thought
possible and justifiable and I agree again. But we both
thought that it was not our business to hurry the Government,
and that the mass of the public must feel the effects of the
strike before it would give the necessary support to the
Government for such drastic action.*' ; This policy of
inactivity meant that the Conservatives appeared to have
nothing to contribute. As back-bench M.P. Robert Sanders
put it, ’it cannot be said that anyone on our side has
(6S)useful proposals to make*. ' Not that the Conservative side 
was entirely without suggestions. A.H. Heath of Stoke-on- 
Trent wrote to Bonar Law, with the idea that it should made a 
criminal offence to interfere with the right to work, with a 
punishment of at least two month’s hard labour, He added that 
’special constables might be sworn in at the request of owners 
to secure freedom and security’. The solution of the
Morning Post was more simple, ’a short Bill to attach the 
funds of bodies engaged in this conspiracy might even be 
welcomed by a public grown desperate through unemployment and 
wont'.^^ If the idea of seizing the funds of trade unions 
was startling, the proposal of the Weekly Dispatch was even 
more extreme. While the second ballot was taking place, the *12
(67) A. Chamberlain op.cit. p. 44.1,. 7 March 1912
(68) Sanders Diaries, vol. I. f. 31, 11 March 1912
(69) Bonar Law Papers 25/3/24. Letter from Heath to Law,
12 March 1912
(70) Morning Post. 9 March 1912, p. 8
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paper declared that the mines should be opened, and that 'they 
should s t i l l  be kept open, under police and m ilitary protec-
tion, i f  the ballot is  against ending this senseless s tr ik e '. ' 
There was no explanation o f how this could be done, and whether 
i t  was merely those miners who wanted to work who would be 
allowed to enter the p its, or every c o llie r , in which case 
coercion would have intensified the labour unrest. In either 
case, a democratic decision o f the men would have been over­
ruled. The Standard could see no reason fo r  such complicated 
methods. The answer was simple: 'The Welsh coal owners are 
prepared to keep their p its empty -until the union funds are 
exhausted, and strike pay ceases. Then the men would come
in again, having learned a useful, and as some o f their
(72)
employers think, an indispensable, lesson '.
A ll o f these approaches indicate a harsh attitude to the 
problem o f labour unrest. The essential difference between 
such polic ies and those held by the majority o f Liberals can 
be seen from an a rt ic le  in the Westminster Gazette: 'The 
worst feature is , to our thinking, what some short-sighted 
people appear to think the best. This is  the possib ility  
that organised labour may be drained o f i t s  funds, and reduced 
to impotence by the prolongation o f th is struggle. Let us be 
quite sure that the downfall o f trade unionism would be a 
great disaster, since i t  would merely pave the way fo r the 
operation o f Syndicalists and other vio lent agitators whose
(71) Weekly Dispatch. 2 March 1912, p. 6
(72) Standard, 2 March 1912, p. 6
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perpetual theme is  that trade unionism is  played out1.
Thus, one o f the most loyal organs o f the Liberal Party 
wanted to destroy the extremist element within the trade 
union movement, just as the Conservatives did, but wished to 
preserve the o f f ic ia l  unions,. Here lay  one o f the d if fe r ­
ences between the two parties. Neither approved o f 
industrial unrest, end both wanted work to be uninterrupted 
by s tr ife , but the Unionists thought that one o f the ways to 
achieve th is end was to destroy trade unionism, whereas the 
Liberals realised that the trade union movement had grown too 
large for such repression, and sought ways to reduce the 
degree o f militancy.
The Tories tended to see Syndicalism as the driving force
behind the strike and it s  prolongation. I t  was not just the,
newspapers, such as the Horning Post, Daily Mail and Sunday
Times who fe l t  th is. Prominent individuals made similar
remarks. The Bishop o f Southwell, in his sermon during an
Intercession service at Chesterfield Parish Church, told his
congregation, which was composed la rge ly  o f miners, ’ there
are forces at work today which may oust your leaders, and
introduce a system o f new lenders; a system which I  dare to
proclaim is  wicked, caruel,' and criminal. I  mean the system
which goes by the name o f syndicalism, the men being used as
(7A)pawns in the game o f war’ . ' Thus, the press was not alone 
in arguing that Syndicalism was a force which had to be 
opposed.
(73) Westminster Gazette. 27 March 1912, p. 1 
(7A) Derbyshire Times. 23 March 1912
(73)
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The tone of the language used could Identify the
political affiliation of the speaker. The Conservative
section of the community tended to regard the strike as a
conspiracy, and condemned the Government for failing to
regard it as such. Sir Aimeric Fitzroy, who had acted as
Private Secretary to several Conservative ministers, and at
this time was Clerk to the Privy Council, expressed himself
briefly, saying that the miners 1 should have been told that a
general strike would not be allowed. It should, in short,
(75)have been treated as a conspiracy against the State1.
Many newspapers adopted the some line. The Sunday Times 
explained that the strike relied on disrupting industry, 
and so should be dealt with as ’a criminal conspiracy against 
the citizens or treason against the State',' ' while the 
Observer attacked the Government: 'In a sane nation, under a 
competent Government, any movement to bring about on arti­
ficial fuel famine should be regarded as no less admissable
(77)
than an artificial bread famine, and treated as conspiracy'.
The Financial News, which was normally a very moderate supporter 
of the Conservatives, was equally angry, pointing out that 'we 
should offer a warm reception, and an instant answer, to a 
foreign invader. „Need the temperature of the reception be 
lower, or the reply less peremptory and decisive when the 
assailant is a home-made thing*,
These comments led to even greater condemnations of the
(75) Sir A. Fitzroy, Memoirs. Vol. 2 (n.d.) p. ASO
(76) Sunday Times. 10 March 1912, p. 10
(77) Observer. 31 March 1912, p. 8
(78) Financial News. 7 March 1912, p. 6
Government. The ^m ing^gog^ warned that with any compromise 
'the people w ill r ise  in their wrath and demand that the 
Government end the strike, and their wrath w ill be directed 
not only against the Government for neglecting to take strong 
measures, but against the miners for refusing a reasonable 
compromise. And the Government might be driven, either by 
leg is la tion  or extra-ordinary administrative action -  fo r 
anything is  ju stified  by emergency -  to take drastic action 
against the form o f syndicalism which is  now being used by 
the miners'.
The Liberals had accepted the minimum wage leg is la tion  
as the best way o f ending the strike, and the Daily Chronicle 
had even critic ised  the Government fo r fa ilin g  to include the 
" fiv e  and two", but there was l i t t l e  chance that the 
Conservatives would approve o f the B il l .  This was unusual in 
i t s e l f ,  fo r  i t  was normally the Liberals who opposed State 
interference, and the Conservatives, especially over the 
question o f protection, who were inclined to invoke i t .  Here 
the roles were reversed, with Liberal support fo r the le g is la ­
tion and Tories, such as Austen Chamberlain, arguing that 
'State interference is  bad and...can only be rendered 
tolerable i f ,  in trades where the State does in terfere, 
strikes are forbidden and rendered i l le g a l and all'd isputes 
are compulsorily referred to a rb itra t io n ',^ ^  The press was 
even more condemnatory. The Daily Express, fo r  example, 
insisted that the Government had 'surrendered, bag and baggage,
(79) Morning Post. 9 March 1912, p. 8
(80) A. Chamberlain op.cit. p. 449, 16 March 1912
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(Si1)to the Syndicalists'. ' Parlianentary Debates on thq Minimum 
Wage revealed that the viev of the press was shared ,by many 
Unionists. Sir Robert Cecil denounced the legislation as 'a 
mere surrender to the Syndicalists'. The Daily Express 
article appeared the following day, so the phrase could well 
have been borrowed fron this speech in the House of Commons.
In the some Debate, Claude Lowther, who was a former diplomat, 
holder of the Victoria Cross from the Boer War and the 
Secretary of the Anti-Socialist League, described the strike 
as 'purely political', and warned that 'Syndicalism unchecked 
spells industrial suicide'. In the House of Lords, the
Marquis of Lansdowne maintained that the Bill was a means of 
'buying off the assailants of the country'.'' It could 
have been that the whole.of the Cabinet did not support the 
Bill. Chamberlain reported a meeting between Grey and Balfour 
which indicated the attitude of the former: 'Grey was gloomy 
in the extreme, did not conceal his detestation of the Bill 
or its dangers, but we were on the brink of revolution, we 
must sacrifice principle, and let the future take care of 
Itself. We must do anything to end the strike. London would 
be without water or light, etc., etc. Do you wonder that a 
Government, in which he ranks as a strong man, is not equal 
to such a crisis?'v This could be extremely important 
material. There Is no record of such a meeting in the Balfour *19
(81) ' Daily Express. 20 March 1912, p. A
(82) House of Commons Debates Vol. 35, Cols. 1773, 216A-5,
19 March 1912
(83) House of Lords Debates. Vol. 11, Col. 665, 27 March 1912 
(8/+) A. Chamberlain op.cit. p. 4.63, 26 March 1912, referring
to a meeting the previous day
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Papers, nor in the Grey Papers, but neither o f then kept 
diaries, or, i f  they did, they have not survived. The Grey 
collection contains manuscripts relating, in the main, to 
foreign a ffa irs , and so gives l i t t l e  help, but the extensive 
archives o f Balfour do not contain any le tte rs  relating to the 
encounter. This does not imply that Chamberlain reported 
events which did.not take place. I t  is  evident that Grey 
was deeply concerned about the stoppage. He wanted to meet the 
miners' leaders to try to persuade them to accept the B ill as 
soon as i t  was introduced, and return to work immediately, 
but was advised against this by Llewellyn Smith,' ' and his 
speech in Manchester in the middle o f February indicated the 
serious view he took o f even a threatened strike. On the other 
hand, i t  was Grey who had proposed the inclusion o f the " fiv e  
and two", and even a fund to make up any loss incurred by the 
owners. Of course, this could be indicative of^the fear 
displayed by Grey, who, as Chamberlain reported, just wanted 
the whole a ffa ir  settled as soon as possible, no matter what. 
Thus, there could well be some va lid ity  to Balfour's alleged 
meeting with Grey, and the la tte r  was probably extremely dis­
turbed about the poss ib ility  o f further disaster and unrest 
following on from the miners' strike.
Certainly, the Government was obliged to withstand a 
barrage o f criticism  attacking the alleged weakness displayed 
in introducing the B ill .  The Conservative barrister Henry 
Duke told the Commons that 'the Government denies its,, e le ­
mentary duties when i t  o ffers  the reward o f success to the
(85) Grey Papers F.O. 800/89 f.205-6. Letter from Smith to 
Grey, 23 March 19"! 2
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persons who have brought the country to the plight in which 
it is, when it refuses to the country any safeguard for its 
future security, and when it refuses to the worker any pro­
tection for his individual liberty'. The Liberals
expected that the legislation would end disputes, but Duke 
w'.s insisting that, on the contrary, it would act as an 
encouragement to industrial disorder. Others opposed the 
Bill because it appeared so one-sided in favour of the men. 
There was no guarantee that they would accept it, although 
the owners would be compelled to do so, and, moreover, there 
was no check to ensure that the men would do a reasonable 
day' s work in return for their promised minimum wage. As it 
was so difficult to supervise colliers at the face, many 
thought that some sort of promise should have been extracted 
from the miners. Moreover, there was no clause to prevent 
strikes in the future. Thus, the Financial Times dismissed 
the Bill as 'extremely unsatisfactory', especially as the 
local boards had 'no power whatever to enforce their rulings', 
so the men could refuse to accept any decision they did not 
regard as sufficiently high. The Morning Post took a
slightly different line; 'The principle of the minimum wage 
was given without the conplenentary principle of compulsory 
arbitration. Disliking both, but believing that one cannot 
be given without the other, we regard that settlement as being 
unduly favourable to thd men'.' J The Observer made similar
(86) House of Commons Debates Vol. 35 Col. 213A, 19 March 1912
(87) Financial Times. 20 March 1912, p. 10
(88) Morning Post 27 March 1912, p. 6
comments, hinting that something should have been included to 
make strikes less frequent, but the Daily Express was for 
more explicit. It insisted that the Bill 'will be a halter 
round the neck of the State unless it is swiftly supplemented 
by reasoned legislation designed to make impossible a coal 
strike or a railway strike or any industrial upheaval threat­
ening the life of the community’.
Perhaps the most interesting comment came from the fifth 
son of the late Marquis of Salisbury, Lord Hugh Cecil, whose 
belief in true Conservatism was unmoved by the passage of 
years. He was amazed that the Bill should have been passed, 
and Informed his readers, incredulously that 'measures have 
been token to protect miners, although adult men'.^^ Of 
course, it must be recognised that it was a drastic piece of 
intervention-into the free working of the economy. It was 
the first example of legislation to fix men’s wages for almost 
one hundred end fifty years, so that the response of a hardened 
Tory could well have been one of amazement. Lord Hugh Cecil 
was forty three at this time, which was, perhaps, young-enough 
to have noticed the changes which were taking place in the 
society, and the gradual erosion of the old ideas of laissez
.YvC,
faire, but if, had observed them, he would have disapproved, 
for he was a real Conservative, one who did not want change, 
and in particular, nothing which could affect his position 
in society. No doubt, he and many like him, could not conceive 
that legislation was necessary, for the men could always
(89) Daily Express. 8 April 1912, p. U
(90) H. Cecil, Conservatism (1912) p. 187
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refuse the employment if they did not like the wages. However, 
once having accepted the terms, they had to remain unaltered.
Thus was the community split. The Liberals tended to 
feel that the demands of the miners were reasonable, and that 
legislation was the best solution. Nevertheless, some dis­
tinguished Liberals recorded their disapproval of the strike 
itself, and many were anxious about the possibilities of major 
industrial unrest, such as had occurred in the summer of 1911. 
They were worried about the effects on the economy, and deeply 
disturbed about the activities of labour agitators, yet they 
clung to a belief in moderation. Mrs. Masteman, in a recent 
conversation about Asquith, said that he ’would put down what
he thought were fair terms - and they probably were’ - but
(91)they could not be amended, and had to be accepted.
Thus, he was sympathetic to the cause of labour, but only so 
long as he was in control. This was typical of the pater­
nalistic attitude towards the working class displayed by the 
wealthy in Victorian England.
The question of what to do when the men took militant 
action was discussed in a paper entitled Industrial Unrest, 
prepared by Buxton,* and circulated to members of the Cabinet, 
He denied that ’Syndicalism, as such, has yet acquired any 
hold in the country’, but saw ’the almost complete collapse 
of the Labour Party in the House as an effective influence in 
labour disputes'. The men resorted to strike action because 
there seemed to be no alternative, but 'the comparative ill- 
success of the Railway Strike, the failure of the miners to
(91) Interview given by Mrs. Masterman to this writer at,
extract their terras, have shown that the country is not so 
easily held up as was supposed’. Thus, Buxton argued that the 
nen had been put in their places, but ’the public, sick of, 
and suffering from strikes and industrial disputes, would, 
as a whole, heai*Ily welcome some stringent action to prevent
then, or to bring then more speedily to a conclusion’, but
he did not know how. Compulsory arbitration would be
resented, and it would be difficult to use sanctions to
enforce decisions. There would be insufficient cells to
imprison all strikers, and if strikes then selves were made
illegal, the men would demand extensive legislation on wages 
(92)and conditions. The following day, Sir George Lskwith
issued a cabinet paper, with a similar title to Buxton’s. It 
investigated the possibilities to end unrest. Firstly, he 
suggested doing nothing, but that would mean ’a constant war 
between the parties, growing bigger until possibly it would 
reach something like.civil war, end even then matters would 
remain unsettled’. Secondly, he proposed that the Government 
could intervene to deal with each difficulty as it arose, but 
that solution 'ultimately offers no relief from the harassment 
of industry’. Finally, he urged that careful inquiry was the 
best start, rather than rushing into one of the popular 
answers, such as compulsory arbitration. There were three 
viable forms of inquiry: by Parliamentary Committee, which 
would include Labour M.P.’s, but they ’are not the labour 
leaders of the present labour movement, so it would be 
unrepresentative} by Royal Commission, which would provide
(93) CAB 37/110/63* April, 1912
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a mass of information, but would take a long time; and by
Commissioners, who could look at selected industries, or all
trades, and could include some of the real labour leaders.
This was the best method, Askwith thought, and his view was
endorsed by I.H. Mitchell, who worked in the Department of
(93)the Chief Industrial Commissioner.
Thus, the Liberals were busily engaged in talking about 
reasonable ways of discouraging further strikes, though they 
ignored completely the Industrial Council, which they had 
established but months before, to arbitrate in trade disputes. 
The more conservative elements of the community were less 
conciliatory. Seldom did they agree with the moderate section 
of society when it claimed that the men had a case. In the 
miners* strike, they saw the minimum wage as a potential 
cause of unprofitable pits. Their mistrust of the working 
man led them to the conviction that the collier would become 
a malingerer, and they concluded that at the heart of the 
disturbance lay sinister Syndicalists, who wished to destroy 
the economic fabric of the nation. Hence, the strike could 
only be seen as a comspiracy against the State, and, as such, 
had to be resisted to the utmost. This attitude is well 
expressed by J.P.Ci Heamshaw, who, immediately after the 
First World War, looked at the problems of Britain, and 
concluded that 'the great coal strike of 1911 and the railway 
strike of 1912 (sic) were distinctly Syndicalist, that is, 
revolutionary, in character. They were both marked by 
flagrant breaches of contract, by lawless violence, remorse­
less intimidation, widespread sabotage, by open defiance of
(93) CAB 37/110/63, U  April 1912
-  223 -
the State, by reckless disregard of thd community, by anti­
ng/)
social criminality'.'4'' If the author perhaps recalled 
events that did not really happen, that too is significant.
He was so perturbed that he believed that they could have 
occurred.
In fact, the coal strike was remarkably peaceful. As 
soon as it had ended, the Times was congratulating all con­
cerned because of this: ’In no other country could a strike 
approaching this in magnitude and character have been con­
ducted in a similar manner. In most countries, there would 
have been riots and bloodshed from the first. The national 
character has asserted itself...friendly and cordial relations 
between masters and men have"subsisted from beginning to 
end’ . ^
If there had been little or no violence, Hearnshaw was 
right that there had been ’reckless disregard of the 
community'. The Conservative view of the social structure 
of Britain becomes increasingly clear, in the light of. 
remarks like that. Britain is a single entity, and everyone 
has a place in it. The owners of capital are the most impor­
tant members of the society, because they wield the most power. 
The working nan has a position at the bottom of the power 
scale. He has rights - basically, the right to fair treat­
ment - and it is the most powerful members of the community 
who will judge whether or not one of their number has acted 
unfairly. The workers cannot assume such a role, and if they
(94) J.F.C. Hearnshaw, Democracy at the Crossways (1919) p.260
(95) Times, 8 April 1912, p. 7
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act in unison to improve their conditions, they are likely to 
be condemned for acting against the interests of the society, 
and not praised for acting in the interest of a large section 
of it. This must be true, if the original concept of social 
structure is accepted. Reedless to stress, it was not only 
Conservatives who held such opinions. Some Liberals also 
maintained such ideas. The difference between many Liberals 
and the majority of Conservatives lay merely in the different 
interpretations of social justice, rather than notions of 
class order.
The workers were expected to be loyal and brave, and would 
be praised when they acted in such a way. Hence, after the 
Cadeby Colliery disaster in July 1912, when the rescue parties 
demonstrated remarkable courage and tenacity, the press 
lauded them. As the Manchester Guardian pointed out, ’the 
victims and heroes of Cadeby are the men who only a few 
months ago were standing out with their fellows for a minimum 
wage - striking and picketing and sending up coal bills and 
making some of us even talk angrily about calling out the 
troops to overcome them'.^^ It may appear that there was 
something of a dichotomy in views here: the collier was 
courageous in an emergency, but cowardly and evil when 
seeking a wage advance. However, there was no real contra­
diction. It was not the miner who was evil, but the strike 
itself, and, in particular, the minority who persuaded the 
men to cease work. The very courage of such people in a 
pit accident provided a splendid example of how the worker,
(96) Manchester Guardian. 10 July 1912, p. 8
when properly led raid ¡activated, behaved in the way that the 
community expected. Thus, the heroism displayed by the 
men during a pit tragedy brings forth comments on the splendid 
character of the collier, because he is acting in a public- 
spirited fashion, just as the rest of society thought that 
he should. On the other hand, a strike, though it might 
similarly imply hardship, courage and self sacrifice on the 
part of the workers, was not public spirited, but the very 
opposite; the interests of the "public" in whose favour he 
struck. The wage earning class in his industry simply did 
not appear to figure in this kind of attitude to society.
~  225 -
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Chapter VII
The London Dock Strike of 1912
Very soon after the conclusion of the miners' strike,the 
London tailors ceased work, having failed to negotiate a 
higher wage with the employers. Yhis was not token very 
seriously, for,, as the Times explained, 'Londoners of the 
upper or middle class have as a rule a stock of clothes which
h)might at a pinch last them for years'. Since this was the 
type of dispute to which everyone was accustomed, one which did 
not harm the public, it attracted little attention or comment, 
but the whole question of industrial stoppages was considered 
in a Debate on Industrial Unrest in the House of Commons on 
8 May 1912, when a great deal of sympathy for the working 
class was expressed. Keir Hardie seemed to accept that 
militants were extremely active, for he claimed that 'Syndical­
ism is the direct outcome of the apathy and the indifference 
of this House towards, working class questions', but on this 
occasion, some members agreed that wages and conditions ought 
to be improved. Crawshay-Williams, a recently elected 
Liberal, announced: 'I conceive it to be our duty, as the 
ruling body in this great nation, to see to it that labour gets 
its due without the miseries and calamities of industrial 
strife' . ^  ,
One group of workers who did not feel that they were 
being treated fairly were the London dockers. They had been - 12
(1) Times, 7 May .1912, p. 9'
(2) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 38, Cols. 520, 503, 8 May
1912
~  227 ~
successful in the summer of 1911, with the result that the 
unions had been able to increase their memberships in the 
Port, but unrest continued. Much of the trouble resulted 
from the settlements of August 1911. On 21 August, most had 
returned to work, but the men in the short sea trades 
remained out. Previously, they'had been paid the same as the 
overseas men, who were to receive 8d and 1s under the Rollitt 
Award, but the short sea workers had been excluded from this 
agreement, and remained on 7d and 3d. Many were members of 
the Stevedores' Society, whose standard rate was 3d and 1s.
The National Transport Workers' Federation had taken up their 
case: some firms had conceded and their employees resumed 
work, but the rest did not. On 21 August, the Short Sea 
Traders offered 3d and 10d, but this was rejected. Two days 
later, both sides agreed on arbitration, and a return to work 
came at the end of August 1911* In October, the award went 
against the men, but on 27 December, the Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration Board granted the stevedores a rise from 3d and 
1s to I0d and 1s, together with an increase in piecework rates.
In the meantime, another dispute had occurred. The "Sea 
Belle" was ovned by Mr. Leach, who also controlled the Mark 
Brown Wharf. He paid his men 7d an hour, according to the 
terms of the Devonport Agreement. Most of his dealings were " 
with the short sea trades, but occasionally, overseas vessels 
such as the "Sea Belle" used his wharf. Now, according to^  . 
the Rollitt Award, men in the overseas section were to be paid 
3d and 1s when the employers were shipowners or contractors, 
but, at the end of October 1911, Leach refused. This resulted 
in a boycott of the vessel, so the Port of London Authority
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took it into dock, where their employees refused to touch it.
In November, the Board of Trade intervened, and persuaded 
Leach to accept arbitration. On 27th, the Lord Chief Justice 
decided in favour of the men. It was hoped that this decision 
would apply to all overseas vessels using wharves, but the 
employers deolined to interpret it in that way.
Unofficial stoppages took place in the short sea trades 
in December, and were intensified in January 1912, when the 
new stevedores' agreement came into operation, making an even 
greater differential between union members in different sec­
tions of the docks. The Stevedores' Society instructed its 
members to return to work, while negotiations took place, but 
they never materialised.
Just as the men wanted parity on wages, so also they 
demanded equality of job opportunity. The London Master 
Stevedores' Association employed Society foremen, and 
recognised the right of Society members to be taken on first, 
but this did not apply in the new areas of organisation, the 
branches that had been established as a result of the dispute 
of 1911.
Another union with‘.grievances was the Lightermen's 
Society. It had allowed sailing bargemen to join in 1910, 
and they had all been'on strike in 1911, with the result that 
an agreement had been reached between the Society and the barge- 
owners. The Board of Trade had drawn up a schedule for 
sailing barge work, to operate retrospectively from 21 August 
1911. It had been completed in December, but by May 1912, 
none of the owners had paid the back money, and many had 
retained the old rates. Both the union and the Board of
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Trede had failed to gain the money.
The tugmen were employed by members of the Association 
of Master Lightermen. By 1911» they had no collective agree­
ment, and no -uniform rate for deckhands. On 28 March 1912, 
the Lightermen's Society invited the owners to discuss this, 
and were refused. The union submitted its terms, and gave 
notice of a strike on 26 April. The Association of Master 
Lightermen replied by threatening a lock-out of the whole of 
the lighterage trade if the deckhands struck. The Government 
intervened, and the notices were withdrawn.
Thus, there was widespread discontent on London docks, 
and Askwith was correct to assert, in a paper circulated to 
Cabinet members in April 1912, that 'an immediate upheaval 
was possible, and that at any rate there is grave unrest 
which may possibly cone to a head',' The following month, 
it did. Since 1910, a man called Thomas had been employed 
as a watchman by the Mercantile Lighterage Company. He had 
been a founder member of the Foreman Lighterman's Union, 
which was not affiliated to the National Transport Workers' 
Federation. A1though he was no longer employed as a foreman, 
be declined to take the N.T.W.F. card. A union delegate 
approached the manager of the firm and was told that"all; . 
complaints should come through the Masters' Association.
This meant that no action would be taken, so all the men in 
that company were called out on 16 May. The work was given 
to other lighterage firms, but their employees blacked it, 
and were dismissed. On 19 May, the Lightermen's Society
(3) CAB 37/110/63, U  May 1912
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called out all its nembers. The employers refused Askwith's 
offer of negotiation. The London District Committee of the '
N.T.W.F. met two days later, and the Dockers' and Stevedore^' 
Unions promised not to do the work of the Lightermen. At the 
same time, the Executive Committee of the N.T.W.F. was called 
to London,-and called a general strike in the Port of London 
on' 23 May.
Askwith's immediate reaction was that 'the main cause of
the dispute is the question of union and non-union labour'.^
In other words, Askwith took the strike at its face value, but
Harry Gosling, the President of the N.T.W.F., later claimed
that the issue of Thomas was one of a whole series of ■
grievances - and certainly, there were plenty of others -
and a strike would have taken place anyway. This matter was
(5)merely 'a match to a fire ready laid'. r
The Government acted at once, and appointed Sir Edward 
Clarke to hold on inquiry into the origins of the unrest, and 
he began his investigations on 2A May. Within a few days, his 
Report was published, but sides had been taken well before it 
had been passed. The Times maintained that It was a conspiracy 
'planned by the agents of the National Transport Federation',^  
while the Daily Express believed that it was 'really a fresh 
action in the revolutionary campaign of Syndicalism, a new *56
(A) Buxton Papers. Letter from Askwith to the King, 24 May 
1912
(5) H. Gosling, Up and Down Stream (192?) p. 158
(6) Times. 23 May 1912, p. 9
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' (7)blow in the sacred cause of muddle-headed anarchy1. The 
Daily Telegraph was in a thoughtful mood. .It insisted that 
the stoppage was ’to an even greater extent than those of the 
miners and the rcllwaymen inspired by a spirit of ruthless 
class warfare’ and commented that ’the irony of the situation 
is that the public thus threatened was never so well disposed 
as it is today towards the claim of labour to enjoy a larger 
share than has hitherto fallen to it of the fruits of an 
enlarged prosperity. It has learned in the past twelve 
months more of the truths about the conditions of the working 
class existence than had come to its knowledge in a life-time; 
conscience and sympathy, considerations of national honour and 
the national well-being, are moving the people to seek 
remedies, to discuss ways and means of curing the disease of 
industrialism, of which constantly recurring labour trouble 
is the symptom. There is a harsh interruption of this mood 
when the country finds itself plunged into a situation in 
which trade union leaders are Qssuming nil the airs of 
omnipotent and ruthless despots holding the language of,menace 
and proclaiming themselves ready to inflict upon all and 
sundry incalculable loss and suffering. They do not maintain - 
nobody could maintain -that there is no other way of securing 
the legitimate object of improving the condition of a section 
of the working class’. J Clearly, the Daily Telegraph clung 
to the traditional view that the conditions of the working - 
class should be improved as and when the employers thought 
fit. It is interesting that the writer argued that the rest 78
(7) Daily Express. 24-Hay 1912* p. 4.
(8) Doily Telegraph. 24 May 1912. p. 10
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of the community was becoming aware of the conditions of 
working class life, and was attempting to alleviate the worst 
parts of it. The Daily Telegraph had been one of the firmest 
opponents of militant action, and had always faulted any 
strike action, demanding repression, but it had not supported 
alternative policies which would render the dbrike redundant.
That paper and others with a similar outlook, would 
attack this strike, just os they had attacked all others.
l ‘
Thus the Observer denounced the stoppage as 1 a particularly
naked exhibition of revolutionary strategy. It is a strike
which does not know its own mind - a product of casual impulse,
(9)supplemented by official manipulation*. Other papers 
regarded the dispute as an act of disloyalty to the nation by 
the dockers, or even on attempt to ruin the country, so that 
the Government was criticised for failing to do anything.
Yet it was not only the Conservative papers which appealed 
for Governmental intervention. Haldane wrote to Lloyd George, 
telling him that 'unless the Government acts decisively in 
this transport strike, it will be very much blamed*, end 
also to Buxton, informing him that *1 am strongly of opinion 
that we shall all be held deeply responsible unless a 
striking step is taken which may give this dispute a chance 
of being checked; the only sanction we have got at the present 
time is public opinion. It appears to me that nothing short 
of an almost immediate announcement of a public enquiry will 910
(9) Observer. 26 May 1912, p. 6
(10) Lloyd George Papers C//+/17/2. Letter from Haldane to 
Lloyd George, 21 May 1912
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satisfy Parliament and the people that the Government has done
( 11)its duty'. ' Reynolds’s Newspaper made a similar point, 
pointing out that the 'question of labour unrest and dis­
satisfaction is knocking at the door of the Government waiting
( 1?)tc be dealt with', though, in fact, Asquith was on holiday, 
which would have delayed any Cabinet decisions on this issue.
Thus, for the Conservatives, there was the usual accusa­
tion that the strike was unjustified and instigated by men who 
looked for trouble for its own sake, and it was proposed that 
the Government should intervene. There was also the more 
liberal element of the society, who thought deeply about the 
background to the unrest, The Westminster Gazette was not 
very happy about the cause of the strike, and warned that if 
the dockers wanted frequent stoppages, 'the most stubborn kind 
of masters get the excuse, of which they are only too glad to 
avail themselves, for saying that the union must be brokenj
and the more enlightened kind of masters have no strong ground
(13)to withstand them'.' . The Daily Chronicle was equally
dubious about the origins of the strike, and asked 'was it
worthwhile bringing the whole trade of the Port of London to
( 1 A )a standstill because of a dispute about this individual?*' ' 
However, one Liberal paper did not think that the closed shop 
was an unreasonable demand. The Daily News and Leader argued 
that it 'is substantially the same as what the doctors and 1234
(11) Buxton Papers. Letter from Haldane to Buxton, 21 May '
1912
(12) Reynolds's Newspaper. 26 May 1912, p. 1
(13) Westminster Gazette. 25 May 1912, p. 1 ,
(14) Daily Chronicle. 25 May 1912. P. A__ ______ .___ _ _ ____
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lawyers assert, and, having the power, assert successfully.
The doctors’ trade union and the lawyers’ trade union can,
and in effect do, prevent a doctor or a lawyer working at his
profession except on terms approved by,the union. It is a
very old principle, and there is a great deal that can be
said for and against it. When labouring men put it forward,
judges and lawyers call it tyranny and persecution and it
would be interesting to know how many of the doctors who are
eealous supporters of the British Medical Association’s
ultimatum to Mr1. Lloyd George, happen to sympathise with the
(15)Amalgamated Society of Watermen’.
Thus, many opinions had been expressed before the 
results of the investigation by Sir Edward Clarke was 
announced. He was a man who might not have appeared unduly 
sympathetic to the working class. After leaving school, he 
worked in his father's silver smith’s shop, before becoming 
a clerk in the India Office. He read for the bar, supporting 
himself by journalism, and entered Lincoln's Inn in I86A. He 
was appointed Q.C. in 1880, and in the same year was elected 
Conservative M.P. Clarke served as Solicitor-General from 
1886 to 1892, but declined office in the Government of 1895- 
1900, and criticised it freely, so he was asked to resign 
from his seat. He had a reputation as an able barrister, fair, 
honest, but tending to be conservative in outlook.
His report dealt with six complaints made by the men:-
(i) The employment of Thomas when he was not a union- 
member. Clarke concluded that the strike over 
this was wrong. 15
(15) Daily News and Leader. 22 May 1912. p. A
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(ii) A similar allegation of breach of agreement 
made between the short sea trades and the
N.T.W.F. on 23 August 1911 over the employment 
of non-union men. Again, Clarke decided that 
the men did not have a case.
(iii) The refusal of the Association of Master
Lightermen to meet the Amalgamated Society of 
Watermen, Lightermen and Bargemen, to discuss 
wages and conditions: ’It is clear that the 
peremptory refusal to consider this application 
for a higher wage was one of the causes, and 
not an unimportant one, of the present 
dispute1, ,
(iv) He had been offered no explanation of why certain 
bargeowners had refused to pay the new rates from 
1 January 1912.
(v) As far as wharfingers not paying the amounts 
agreed in the Rollitt Award, there had been a 
decision in favour of the men, and Clarke could 
•not understand why that decision was not accepted 
as governing the case of all overseas ships1.
(vi) A carter who was not paying the accepted rates 
had left the Master Carters* Association to 
avoid censure. Clarke was unhappy about this. 16*
(16) Report upon the Present Disputes Affecting Transport
Workers in the Port of London and on the Medway 
(The Clarke Report) Cd. 6229 (1912) pp. A-6.
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Some points had been in favour of the men, and others 
against. The reception of the press was equally nixed, 
ranging from that of the Daily Herald which believed that it 
was ’a striking vindication of the men and their leader s’, 
to that of the Daily Telegraph, which argued that the Report 
proved the strike to be 'the most wanton, the most indefens­
ible, the most deeply discreditable to the leaders of labour 
concerned', since trade unionism became a power. ' Thus, 
the Report was acceptable, because it proved that the men 
were villains. Lord Devonport, the Chairman of the Port of 
London Authority would not even applaud the conclusions. The 
men were supported in part, so the Report was condemned. 
Devonport pointed out that at the Inquiry, there had been no 
oaths, and no examination of witnesses. Devonport asked, in 
his autobiography: 'How an experienced lawyer like Sir 
Edward Clarke came to imagine he could arrive at sound con­
clusions by such a procedure is more than I have ever been
(IQ) '
able to understand'. ' An even more sustained attack on
the conclusions was made in the House of Commons at the time. 
Sir Frederick Banbury was well-known for his strongly conserva­
tive views. He had retired as the head of a stock-broking 
firm in 1906, and had been a Unionist M.P. since 1892. He 
dealt with the Report clause by clause. The first two wore 
in favour of the employers, so needed little comment. On the 
third point, ha naked why the Association of Master Lightermen 
should meet the Amalgamated Society of Watermen, Lightermen 
and Bargemen. They had made an agreement on 27 July 1911, 189
(18) Daily Telegraph. 27 May 1912, p. 10
(19) Lord Devonport op.cit. p. 174.
and ’it is absolutely impossible to carry on business if, 
after having made on agreement within two or three> or five 
•or six months, as the case may be, that arrangement is to be 
reopened’. On the question of the bargeowner refusing to 
pay the agreed rates, Banbury said that Clarke didn't hear 
the employers' side of the story. Mr. Brooks, who signed 
the agreement, insisted that Gosling had repudiated it, 
which was why the rates were not paid. On the fifth point, 
Banbury insisted that only Mr, Leach was paying 7d, and as 
far as the sixth was concerned, if someone wanted to withdraw 
from the Master Caters’ Association, the Government ’should 
not interfere between employer and employed ’.
Thus, the Clarke Report produced a variety of comments, 
and no agreement about whether it favoured the men or the 
employers. However, on some points, Clarke had decided in 
favour of one side, and on others, his decision had gone the 
other way. Thus, it might have appeared that there was a 
basis for discussion. Buxton invited the N.T.W.F. and the 
Shipping Federation to a Conference at the Board of Trade on 
31 May, but the employers refused to attend, and on 3 June 
issued a statement, part of which insisted that 'the agree­
ment s' which they have signed have been flagrantly broken by 
the officials of the Transport Workers' Federation, and the 
same officials are now trying to make use of the Government 
to force shipowners to oonclude a new agreement with them'. 
Devonport himself made a statement, undated, but probably on 
the same day, putting forward the feelings of the Port of 
London Authority, which, 'conscious of the unjustifiable 20
(20) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 39, Cols. 225-229, 5 
June 1?12
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pretext’of this strike, prefer to allow matters to take their
own course, leaving It to His Majesty's Government to
( p i  )initiate such action as it deems expedient*. ' Devonport 
wrote to Buxton a month later, reaffirming that there would 
be no negotiations while the men remained out on strike, for
v
it 'was entirely unjustifiable and unprovoked and no allega­
tion of unfair or inconsiderate treatment, either as regards 
pay or working conditions, has been substantiated - or even 
made against the Port of London Authority - by leaders or 
men. Our treatment of our workmen in the future will be 
precisely on the same lines as in the past when the (illegible
word) submission of grievances has always been allowed and
(22)just and generous consideration accorded them'. In his
autobiography, Devonport reiterates that a conference was
ruled out because 'the vital issue in the strike was one in
(23)which no compromise was possible'. '
Support for the owners come from the usual sources.
Papers such as the Times, the Daily Telegraph and the Morning 
Post argued that the men had broken their agreements, so that 
the employers had to adopt a firm line, to teach them a lesson. 
Opposition to this attitude was equally predictable. The 
Daily Hews and Leader was the most critical of the Liberal 
papers, followed by the Drily Chronicle. Both were convinced 
that the shipowners had placed themselves in the wrong by 
refusing to meet the union representatives, and the Daily
(21) Lloyd George Papers C/21/1/24 and C/21/1/25, 3 June 1912
(22) Buxton Papers. Letter from Devonport to Buxton, 2 July
1912
(23) Lord Devonport op.cit. p.175
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Hews and Leader went so far as to suggest that 'they
apparently prefer a war, which is not merely a war against a
particular body of workmen, but against the principles of 
(2A)trade unionism'.^' The attitude of the Manchester Guardian 
is interesting. It disapproved of the strike, but disliked 
the actions of the employers, pointing out that ’The public 
interest demands not that the strikers should be starved back 
to work in sullen resentment, determined to strike again at a 
more favourable opportunity, but that they should go back 
under conditions and in a spirit that will give some hope of 
future peace'. Once again, the Manchester Guardian
displayed its genuine interest and concern in the well being 
of the working class, while at the same time insisting that 
such people should conform to what it believed were the 
standards of proper behaviour.
Having refused to negotiate, the Shipping Federation 
counter-attacked through one of its ships, the "Lady 
Jocelyn", which was used during trade disputes on the docks. 
It would be loaded with strike breakers, and sail into the 
port, where it would remain as a floating hostel for the 
"free labourers" who had travelled in it. When the "Lady 
Jocelyn" sailed up. the Thames, it was refused permission to 
land by McKenna, on the grounds that were it.allowed, dis­
turbances would result.
The Morning Post was displeased, observing that ’if 
the Imperial Government surrenders now to these strikes 
England passes under a new authority, the authority of
(24.) Daily News and Leader. 1 June 1912, p. 6 
(25) Manchester Guardian. 31 May 1912, p. 6
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Syndicalism*.' ' The Debate in the House of Commons on the
Protection of Workmen revealed that some M.P.'s felt the some 
way. Austen Chamberlain attacked the Home Secretary, who,
•in defiance of the Law and the Constitution, has arrogated 
to himself a dispensing and discriminating power which has 
no basis in law or justice*. He was referring to the way in 
which convoys were defended, but individuals who wanted to 
work, such as those on the "Lady Jocelyn", were not. Other 
Conservatives made similar comments, and several Labour 
Members took exception to their remarks. Ramsay MacDonald 
pointed out that *the employers were not bringing these men 
from Newport to keep them in Londonj they are not bringing 
the inhabitants of doss houses from Sheffield and other 
places in order to make regular dock labourers of themj 
they are not giving them the extra money necessary to bring 
them down to London, and they are not giving them their 
beer and the carnal facilities they have to offer them as 
permanent things. No, it is for a special purpose,..the 
right to work*, which the same people always rejected when 
the Labour Party advocated it. Clement Edwards, the Liberal 
barrister who had a particular interest in trade union cases, 
as well as social and labour questions, insisted that the 
"Lady Jocelyn" *has been utilised as a sort of floating 
boarding house for professional strike breakers by the 
Shipping Federation and the National Free Labour Association 
to my knowledge since 1890’. ^ ^
(26) Morning Post. 1 June 1912, p. 6
(27) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 39, Cols. 883, 932,
(26)
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The way in which the Tories supported strike breakers 
during this dispute seems to have appeared extremely un­
realistic to the Reverend Lord Williams Gascoyne-Cecil, the 
Rural Dean of Hertford from 1904 until his appointment as 
Bishop of Exeter in 1916. He wrote to his brother, Lord 
Robert Cecil, questioning the basis of Conservative social 
policy: 'Why is it necessary for the Unionist Party to 
advertise itself as being the greatest supporters of strike 
breakers? I have quite given up hope now of a return of the 
Unionists to power, from the working man's point of view the 
Unionist Party seems to be impossible. It is no good telling 
them that strikes tend to lower wages - every working man 
wanted to see the strikes succeed. They have, after all, a 
very real grievance namely the purchasing power of money has 
fallen so seriously that they are all poor and they believe 
that the money they are losing is going into someone else's 
pocket. Now however foolish and wrong it may have been of 
them to try and remedy a thing by a strike, it was a very 
natural course to take and however individually certain 
bodies of men may have broken faith the great crowd will only 
look at their own poverty and forget everything else'. Cecil 
warned that if the Tories drove the Government into taking
harsher measures, then the Conservatives 'will be regarded as
( 2 8 )the anti-working class party1.' ■ This was a particularly 
interesting comment. The fall in the standard of living 
was recognised by a member of the tipper class, who was trying
(28) ^ Cecil of Chelwood Papers B.H.Add.Ms.51160 ff. 153-4.
Letter from William to Robert, 14 June 1912
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to moderate the tone of his political party. Cecil's 
attitude was not beligerent, like so many other Conservatives 
but understanding and conciliatory. Unlike so many others, 
he could at least understant that n fall in real wages was 
quite likely to result in industrial unrest.
However, most Tories were far less concerned with 
finding explanations for the strikes, and regaining the 
support; of the working man than with trying to defeat the 
dockers. Thus, the Government was urged to protect the 
strike breakers, the very thing that Lord William disliked. 
There was no agreement about the amount of support given to.
. such people^/The Labour Party maintained that the Government 
was providing too much, but others, such as the Financial 
Times and the Manchester Guardian, one Conservative, and the . 
other Liberal, argued that the Government had achieved the 
right balance. Thus, one section of the community .thought 
that the Government was doing enough, or even too much, 
while others maintained that it was not offering stifficient 
assistance. Bonar Law, the Leader of the Opposition, told 
the Commons that he did 'not believe there is a man in this 
House at this moment who doubts that there are thousands of 
men who used to work in the docks who are not working now, 
but who would be working if intimidation did not exist and 
if the Government had done what every Government ought to 
do - moke perfectly certain that, while they do not interfere 
with men who want to strike, they make it certain that any 
man who wants to work should be able to work in this great 
Port'. In the same Debate, K0rmal Craig, a Unionist 
barrister, observed that 'no-one can say the men are out on
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strike because they have any grievance they wish to have 
remedied* 1, but 'they are out by order and because they dare 
not go back'.
One way to investigate the question of intimidation is 
to study the numbers injured around the docks. Most, people 
relied on impressions rather than facts - a cartoon in Punch 
epitomises this attitude: a worker was talking to Mr. Punch: 
'Trade Unionist "Whose the Lady?"
Mr. Punch "That's Justice. She weighs arguments- 
f ir s t ,  and then, i f  necessary, she uses her sword".
Trade Unionist "Ah'. That's where we differ. I'm 
all for striking first and arguin' afterwards1" .
However, some papers did attempt to discover the figures. The 
Daily Express published in heavy print a paragraph informing 
its readers that 'the Poplar Hospital is full of victims of 
this cowardly ruffianism, who have told their stories on 
their sick beds. In each case, they have been hit with loaded 
sticks on the back of the head, while a party of these brave 
strikers engaged their attention In front. Some of the •
in')victims are young boys'.' ' Other papers, including the. 
Times, claimed that non-unionist labour had been assaulted. 
Members of Parliament made similar accusations. Rowland 
Hurst, the Unionist, whose principal hobby was hunting with 
hounds, claimed that he 'went down to the East End, and in 
one yard alone the foremen told me that iwelve of his men had
(29) House of Commons Debates. V0I.4.O, Cols. 869, 890,
1 July 1912
(30) Punch. 5 June 1912, p.
(31) Daily Express. 20 June 1912, p. L,
Mt
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been assaulted outside in one way or another. There is also
the evidence of the law courts and the reports in the press'.
Clearly, these people believed that the London Dock strike
had resulted in extensive violence, but Williams Crooks, the
Labour Member for Poplar, insisted that there were only six
cases of assault in the Poplar Hospital, and Ellis-Griffith,
the Under-Secretary at the Herne Office, informed the House
that up to and including 20 June, twenty one people had been
treated for assault in all hospitals serving the area of the
strike. Eight had gone to Poplar, where six had been
detained. He observed that 'these figures do not justify the
(32)opinion that a widespread system of terrorism exists*.
Thus, it would appear that the sternest critics of the
activities of the strikers were more concerned with finding
fault than discovering the truth. They used what they
believed as evidence, rather than taking the trouble to
investigate the veracity of their suspicions.
The intimidation could hardly have been as severe as
some suggested, judging from the numbers returning to work.
On 28 May, there were 1,035 employed on the docks, and on 19
June, 11,000, which was the normal level, and by the
beginning of July, 18,000. The extra men can be explained
by the amount of arrears and the inexperience of the new
(33)dockers. ' This hardly bears out the accusations that men 
were too frightened to work. . ■
(32) House of Commons Debates. Vol. ¿0, Cols. 4.5, 47,
24. June 1912; Cols. 213, 2U, 25 June 1912
(33) Lord Devonport op.cit. p. 181
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Some people were demanding that the Government should 
offer greater protection to those who wanted to work} at the 
some time, others insisted that the Government should inter­
vene to settle the dispute. As early as 20 May 1912, the 
Government was advised to legislate, for 'the question of 
a minimum wage in the Transport trades and in Agriculture 
should bedealt with by special legislation with provisions 
applicable to each industry'. This was signed by Massingham,
A.S., B.S. and J. Rowntree, Hobson, Hobhouse, Percy Alden 
and E.R, C r o s s . O f  course, this would have been written 
before the dispute had begun, but it indicates the direction 
of thought of one section of the Liberal Party. From the 
onset of the strike, it was clear that the Government was 
observing the events carefully. R.W. Matthew, an official 
at the Board of Trade, •wrote to Buxton on 24 May, telling 
him of the King's anxiety about the dispute, and was going 
to see McKenna and Askwith about it. The Home Secretary 
had called at the Board of Trade that day 'to get some idea 
of what labour would be available to maintain the public 
utility services in ihe extent of their being endangered by 
the s t r i k e ' . T h e  Cabinet itself discussed the possibilities 
of legislation. Lloyd George and Samuel suggested on act which 
would moke representative agreements compulsory for everyone 
in the Port, or to give power to the Port of London Authority
(34) Lloyd George Papers C/21/1/17. Letter from various
Liberals to Lloyd Goerge, 20 May 1912
(35) Buxton Papers. Letter from Matthew to Buxton, 24 May
1
1912
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to fix wages. Asquith himself was unconvinced of the need
(l6)for any action, ' and Burns, especially, was 'against any
legislative settlement that as a means of settling this
strike would permanently fetter general amelioration of all
(37}classes of labour'. 7 On the other hand, Samuel believed
that something had to be done: 'If the men recognise that
they are going to be beaten, they may accept a promise of
legislation...as sufficient saving of face to enable them to
go back to work - if the employers can be induced to agree to
complete reinstatement'. The type of legislation he had in
mind was some sort of method 'of ensuring the validity of
(38)industrial agreements'. 7 Lloyd George was even more 
anxious, and was extremely disappointed that no action was to 
be taken. Lucy Masterman recalls that 'the Cabinet's action 
on the subject irritated George very much. "They moke me
(39)wonder" was his comment "whether I cm really a Liberal at all"' 
There had been a Minimum Wages Act for miners a couple of
months previously, so a similar Act for London dockers would
not have been without precedent, but nothing did materialise.
However, the Government did approach the owners several times,
and on about 4. July, Devonport confirmed this in a statement
pointing out that 'the employers adhere to their decisions
conveyed to members of the Cabinet Committees on, several
occasions when meetings have taken place, viz that they will
(36) Letters to the King at Windsor CAB 41/33/52 12 June 1912
(37) Burns Papers B.M.Add.Ms.46334 f.114. Diary, 11 June 1912
(38) Lloyd George Papers C/6/7/2. Letter from Samuel to Lloyd
George, 13 June 1912
(39) L. Masterman op.cit. p. 235
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agree to no conditions precedent to the men returning to 
work'. The Government had done far more during the coal
strike, perhaps because the miners were closed, while the 
docks were still working, although many men remained out for 
more than two months, so that direct intervention did not 
appear to be necessary.
Certainly, the Cabinet was divided on its course of action. 
In the same way, the press had a variety of opinions. The 
Conservative papers made their customary attack on the men 
who had broken agreements. This attitude was summed up in 
the Liberal Westminster Gazette, which published an article 
by J.G. Broodbank, the Chairman of the Dock and Warehouse 
Committee of the Port of London Authority. He maintained 
that 'never was a strike less justified in its cause, and 
still less will it be justified by its results» It Is
noticeable that every serious stoppage wa3 described as the 
least justified ever. Opponents of militancy were responding 
to the events of the times in the only way they could - with 
indignation, amazement and anger, for workers in all parts of 
the country, in a variety of different jobs, were behaving as 
never before, and disturbing the industrial peace of the 
country. Such behaviour could never be justified, and, 
therefore, had to be condemned.
One of the greatest criticisms was based on the accusa­
tion that the dispute was affecting the whole of the population. 
Thus, the Observer accounced that 'the country will not long.
(40) Lord Devonport op.cit. pp. 178-9
(41) Westminster Gazette. A June 1912, p. 2
tolerate strikes which attempt to reinforce pressure on the
employers by direct attacks upon the general interest of the
( ¿2)
country'. ' Benjamin Taylor made a similar point, writing
in the Fortnightly Review: 'The new strike is nominally 
directed against employers, but is really waged against the 
public'. He knew why this unrest was emerging: 'Democracy 
is unsettled and -undisciplined because every man is beginning 
to think he is as good as his neighbour - or better'.
This revealing remark, reflecting an elitist philosophy, 
presumably was intended to mean that democracy would have 
been better served if everyone did not regard themselves as 
equal. He, clearly, did not regard the working class as 
being anything like equal. His concept of a democratic 
society hinged on a social hierarchy, and he objected to the 
lower elsaents attempting to disrupt the arrangement, as, 
for example, in this strike.
A commonly offered explanation for such attacks on society 
as the dock strike was a hard core of agitators, who allegedly 
travelled the country, fermenting unrest. Those papers which 
had attacked the strike leaders in the past did so again, 
with the sternest words coming from the Standard: 'The strike 
was brought about gratuitously and deliberately by an un­
scrupulous clique of agitators who thought that the time had 
come to squeeze out free labour altogether and levy contribu­
tions on every worker by forcing him to take the "federation *1
(42) Observer. 9 June 1912, p. 8
(43) B. Taylor, 'Labour and Socialism', Fortnightly Review.
1 July 1912, pp. 76, 93
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ticket". The men were induced to come out partly by pressure, 
partly by cupidity, partly by the braggart promises and 
threats of the wire p u l l e r s ' . J o h n  Burns, himself a 
former leader of the London dockers, blamed Ben Tillett, who 
had 'prevented an early settlement by his personal attacks', 
and by the middle of July, he recommended the leaders 'to tell 
the men they were beaten and to go back with a full surrender *.
The antjpr at the activities of the leaders was intensified 
by a speech on 24. July. . On that day, Tillett spoke to the men 
on Tower Hill, end asked the crowd to call on God to strike 
Lord Devonport dead. He was probably expressing his impatience 
at Devonport's continual refusal to talk, after the men had 
been out of work for more than two months, but the result was 
a reaction against the workers, not only from those papers 
that would be expected to take exception to such a remark, 
but from others, such as the People, which argued that 'Mr. . 
Ben Tillett has done more harm to trade unionism in ten weeks
l,£\
than Lord pevonport could do in ten years'. ^ ' The Daily- 
News and Leader, a paper that usually sided with the men 
against employers who had not realised the changed mood of 
the period, described Tillett's words as 'an outrage', and 
maintained that 'it has been the tragedy of this struggle that 
it should have been subject to the mischievous influence of two 
men such as Lord Devonport and Mr. Tillett'. ' William
(44) Standard. 20 June 1912, p. 8
(45) Burns Papers B.M.Add.Ms.46334 Diary f. 114 12 June 1912,
f. 138 17 July 1912
(46) People. 28 July 1912. p. 12
(47) Daily News and Leader. 25 July 1912, p. 6
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Crooks told the House of Commons that the speech was 
•repudiated by the majority of the Labour members in this . 
H o u s e * . ^
An attack on the Chairman of the Port of London 
Authority would have appeared reasonable to much of the 
nation. His unbending attitude was widely criticised.
However, Tillett’s words shocked the society. He had invoked 
the deity, and wished Devonport dead, and has thus forfeited 
the support of many people. However it was easy to see why 
Devonport attracted the extreme hatred of the union officials. 
He was the driving force behind the employers, and had gained 
a great deal of publicity by his attitude. Being intransigent 
himself, he refused to permit any face saver, and accused the 
National Transport Workers* Federation of intransigence.. In 
his autobiography, Devonport explained his attitude in these 
terms: *My position was that I was a public servant who had 
no option but to act as I did if I were to be faithful to my 
trust*. The N.T.W.F. had adopted an 'arrogant and ambitious 
policy', which had to be opposed. ^ '
This clear-cut line taken by Lord Devonport allowed the 
organs of opinion to decide with clarity in their own. minds 
what the role of the trade unions should be. There were 
those who accepted that trade unions should have power and 
those who rejected this concept, and wished to retain the 
traditional role of the employer as the man who owned the 
firm, and made all the decisions, including those concerning
(4-8) House of Commons Debates. Vol. A1, Col. 1361,
25 tfiily 1912
(49) Lord Devonport op.cit. p. 186
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his men.
The view of the Daily Herald was hardly surprising: 'If 
the Board of Trade is not willing or strong enough to bring 
Lord Devonport and the Port of London Authority to reason, 
then Parliament must be moved straight away. The nation can 
stand no more nonsense, intolerance and inhumanity in this 
business'. The Nation was also unhappy that 'Lord
Devonport is defying public opinion and the Government by 
his resolve to reduce the workers of the Port of London to 
the level of casual labour, and to break the organisation 
which is the sole bulwark of their independence and their
( 5 1 )
self-respect', ‘ The Daily News and Leader, though 
unhappy about Tillett's role, was equally dissatisfied with 
that of Lord Devonport, insisting that he 'is placing himself 
outside the pale of citizenship. There is yet time for him 
to retrieve the situation and if he will think for one moment 
not of his dignity but of the stiffering which his policy is 
causing in thousands of homes he will agree to meet the men. 
They cannot accept less; he cannot give less. If he will not 
• give so much then other measures must be taken without delay, 
for this crime against a people cannot be tolerated longer'.^2) 
The Westminster Gazette thought that Lord Devonport's policy 
was an attempt to destroy the unions, and rejected this aim:
'We cannot contemplate with equanimitythe smashing of the 
unions, the wholesale substitution of non-unionist and casual 
for unionist and regular labour, the slipping back of the Port 
into the condition in which it was before the first dock 
strike. An employers' victory which had these consequences 
would be a disaster for London and for the whole country».
(5°) Daily Herald. 13 July 1912, p. 6
(51) Nation. 27 July 1912. p. 612
(52) Daily News and Leader. 11 July 1912, p. 6
(53) Westminster Gazette. 12 July 1912, p. 1
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Another Liberal paper, the Daily Chronicle, agreed that the
employers wanted 'to employ all the port labour on their own
terms without any agreements at all and without any trade
union negotiations. That is, of course, plain union smashing'.
Harold Spender, an experienced Liberal journalist who had also
gained a double first at Oxford, was amazed that 'in the whole
of their dealings with the workmen, the riverside masters of
East London cannot claim one involuntary concession to labour -
one single touch of uncoereed sympathy and consideration for
the toiler. Devonport insisted on a return on new conditions,
the men having forfeited all privileges and pensions. He had
to be regarded as 'the most pugnacious of modern leaders in
a great labour fight. The men might come back, but they must
(55)come back crawling on their knees'. Buxton thought that
Devonport was 'so very unnecessarily stiff*, ' and Burns
felt that his attitude was dangerous. He had seen Devonport, 
and 'told him plainly that the defeat of the Dockers would 
mean no victory for Port of London Authority as humiliated 
men returning to work,would do more harm than good. P.L.A, 
was created to humanise not to brutalise labour conditions'.
His trouble was that he 'mistakes obstinacy for firmness and 
force for power'.^^ The moderate Liberal paper, the 
Manchester Guardian, was very upset. The men would return to
(54) Daily Chronicle. 9 July 1912, p. 6
(55) H. Spender 'The London Port Strike', Contemporary
Review. August 1912, p. 177
(56) Buxton Papers Letter from Buxton to Askwith, A July 1912
(57) Burns Papers B.M.Add.Ms.46334 Diary f ,111 5 June 1912,
f. 138 18 July 1912
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work if there was a promise of discussion, and 'to deny so 
much as this to beaten men is thought by most people to be- 
exceedingly hard measure1, and Devonport's refusals had 
brought sympathy to the dockers. A few days later, the
N.T.W.F. promised a resumption if the 1911 Agreement was 
honoured, and the reinstatement of strikers was "favourably 
considered". To decline this offer would mean that Devonport 
was 'unfit to retain his position as chairman of a great
(eg)
public undertaking'. 0 '
Thus, the Liberal press was unanimous in its condemnation 
of the behaviour of the Liberal Chairmen, of the Port of London 
Authority. It was felt that he had gone too far in refusing 
absolutely to discuss the grievances of the men, and insisting 
that the men should return to work unconditionally. Such 
people did not believe that the destruction of the trade 
•unions would be good for the men, or even for the employers.
Against this, there was the opposite view that Devonport 
had pursued the correct policy, and deserved to be congratu­
lated rather than condemned. The Sunday Times was delighted 
that ’the masters have at last done what they should have
done two years ago. They have taken their stand on the firm
(59)
basis of economic law and human necessity'. The Morning
Post appeared to be even more satisfied: 'We congratulate the
*
employers, and especially Lord Devonport, on their courage in 
resisting the pressure of Messrs. Tillett and Lloyd George.
If they had succumbed their surrender would have ruined the 
Port of London, for it would have meant the victory of the
(58) Manchester Guardian. 12 July 1912, p. 8; 18 July 1912, p .8
(59) Sunday Times. 2 June 1912, p. 10 .
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sympathetic strike and a whole series of new and incalculable 
risks against which no employer - however fair to his men', 
however eager to keep his engagements - could possibly 
provide’. The Daily Mail agreed that the actions of the
men gave the employers no option. They were ’quite entitled - we 
may almost say they are bound - to refuse to "consult" with 
those who stirred up their workmen without any valid cause 
After all, as the Financial Times put it, if the men had 
gained a closed shop, ’it is that conspiracy which, if 
successful, would have left London absolutely at the mercy of 
a handful of paid agitators, which has been defeated by the 
firmness of Lord Devonport’. ; The Times summed up the 
attitude of a large section of the community when it main­
tained that ’the whole industrial community is much beholden 
to Lord Devonport and his colleagues for their firm resistance 
to one of the most arbitary and arrogant attempts that can be 
conceived to use alike masters, men and the industrial unrest 
of the country to promote a mad and wicked scheme of personal 
ambition’. The . support for Devonport’s actions was shown
in November 1912, when he was cheered and applauded by .the 
other guests at fthe Lord Mayor’s Banquet.
Thus, Devonport was seen as the man who had saved the 
nation in an industrial war. Just as there had been few
(60) Morning Post. 20 June 1912, p. 8
(61) Daily Mail. 8 July 1912, p. 6
(62) Financial Times. 20 July 1912, p. A
(63) Times. 29 July 1912, p. 7 
(6A) Lord Devonport op.cit. p. 186
-  255 -
alternative policies, so few solutions were offered to 
prevent disputes in the future. The British Constitutional 
Association, whose Assistant Secretary was W.V. Osborne, 
famous for the court case which had resulted in trade unions 
being unable to make levies for political parties, advocated 
permitting only two pickets, with badges, who could operate 
only at the work place. It was believed that this would end 
intimidation, and thus limit the extent of strikes, and 
there were various suggestions about disfranchising a part of 
the population, or, once more, declaring strikes illegal, but 
little new was offered.
In the face of this consistent and stern policy by the 
employers, the men had little chance of success, and by the 
end of July, the N.T.W.F. was out of funds, and its leaders 
had to call off the strike, with no provision for reinstate- . 
ment. The dockers were to be taken on inside the gates, which 
repudiated the Home Office agreement of 18 August 1911.. Thus, 
all those who had applauded Devonport had their trust vindica­
ted, though it had been apparent for at least six weeks that 
the owners would be victorious.
The dispute itself is instructive in illustrating the 
reaction to working-class unrest. It would be far too simple 
to argue that the Liberals took one side, and the Tories 
another. Very few people believed that the men had a case, 
and they were attacked by the Conservatives and by many 
Liberals when they took strike action. The Government 
ordered an immediate inquiry, and Sir Edward Clarke produced
(65) Spectator. 29 June 1912, p. 1035
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his report almost immediately. He found that both sides had 
been in the wrong on certain points. This aroused some 
sympathy for the men, but opinion was still largely against 
them. The Chairman of the Port of London Authority, Lord 
Devonport, took an exceptionally hard line, and refused to 
consider anything but unconditional surrender from the 
strikers. This resulted in a protracted dispute, and much 
suffering. Such an uncompromising reaction brought much 
criticism, for it was seen as unnecessarily harsh. This 
demonstrates the basic humanity of a large group of people.
The working class might have been in the wrong, but they 
still deserved decent treatment, and it was the responsibility 
of those in higher positions to ensure that they were well 
looked after. Most of those displaying this attitude were 
Liberals, and included the most traditionally-minded. The 
opposite outlook was demonstrated by that section of the 
community which applauded Devonport’s actions as the only 
ones likely to teach the men that they could not do as they 
wished. The role of workers in industry was to take orders, 
and do their jobs for the benefit of the national economy, so 
that if they or their families were to suffer, then it would 
be a sound object lesson. Thus, the 1912 London Dock Strike 
once again showed a-division of society in principle in its 
views on how the workers and strikers should.be treated.
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Chapter VIII
Two Railway Disputes, 1912 and 1913
The events of 1911 had revealed that the railwaynen were 
becoming militant, and were faced by a group of employers who 
could be regarded as some of the most intransigent in the 
country. They were not even prepared to concede recognition 
to the men. Two incidents, one at the end of 1912, and the 
other in the first quarter of 1913, demonstrated the mood 
that had been created on the railways, and provide another 
excellent illustration of the ways in which the people of 
Britain reacted to industrial unrest.
Driver Knox
The first incident began on 26 October 1912, when Knox, 
a driver for the North Eastern Railway Company, was arrested 
in Newcastle for being drunk and assaulting the police. It 
appears that he came off duty in the afternoon, and between 
9 p.m. and 9.40 p.m.’drank two rums. He was cleared of the 
assault charge, but fined with 5s costs, two weeks later, for 
being drunk. Early in December, Knox was informed by Vincent 
Haven, the Locomotive Superintendent of the district, that, 
because of his conviction, he was to be downgraded from mineral 
driver to pilot driver. This meant a reduction in wages of 
about 9s a week. On 7 December, nine hundred men at Gateshead 
struck, against the advice of J.E. Williams, the General 
Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants. A 
week later, three thousand five hundred men were out, before 
a resumption of work on 14 December. The men were particu­
larly angry at Knox’s demotion because there was a thirty
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hours* gap between his arrest and the beginning of his next 
shift, so they did not feel that the issue was one of public 
safety, even if Knox had been drunk, which he had denied.
J.H. Thomas, the Assistant Secretary of the A.S.R.S., asked 
the Home Secretary for an inquiry on 10 December, and this idea 
v/as adopted. On 13th, Chester Jones, a Home Office Commissioner, 
reported that he was not satisfied that Knox had been drunk.
As a result, that some day, McKenna granted him a free pardon, 
so the men returned to work. The strikers had, of course, 
broken their contracts by leaving work, and were liable to 
fines. The union showed its conciliatory attitude by paying 
these, so as not to arouse the men by forcing them to pay, 
and so as to avoid prosecution by the Company.
Before the Inquiry, press opinion was virtually united 
in its opposition to the actions of the men. The Times 
described the stoppage as an ’explosive revolt against disci­
pline*, and insisted that any argument that the conviction 
had nothing to do with the company because he was off duty must 
be 'untenable*.^  The Daily Mail went a little further, 
calling it 'a strike against public safety', and insisting 
that * for the security of passengers'it is essential that 
the drivers of main line trains should be abstentous men of 
high character*.^  • The Standard claimed that the strike was 
'an attempt to deprive the railway management of a right 
claimed by every employer, a right the free exercise of which 
is essential to discipline among a large body of men, and a 12
(1) Times. 9 December 1912, p. 9
(2) Daily Mail. 9 December 1912, p. 8
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right, moreover, that in this special industry is the chief
guarantee for the safety of the travelling public. Vie neon
the right to demand that employees shall be men of good
(3)character cold responsible habits’.
Perhaps it was not surprising that the Conservative 
papers should side with the North Eastern Railway Company, 
but some Liberals did so as well. The Daily News and Leader 
found it ’difficult to be patient with the latest strike’, 
because the men are ’practically fighting for the right of 
railway workers to endanger the safety of the public. They 
need not under such circumstances look for the sympathy of 
the public’. ^  The Nation, a journal famous for its 
radical opinions, agreed that men could usually act as they 
wished outside of work, but there were a few exceptions, and 
this was one of then. ’A man must not so behave in his 
leisure time as to make himself incompetent, or prove that * 
he is incompetent, for the particular job which he is employed 
to do, particularly when that job involves public responsibility'. 
Even if Knox had been wrongly convicted, as he claimed, never­
theless 'a strike on such an issue is not an incident of 
industrial warfare, but a strike against the public and the
(  c N
judicial authorities’. J Given this position, the Morning ■
Post could 'hardly see how the Company can give way, if it is 
to maintain discipline and continue to enjoy the confidence 
of the public',^ and the Daily Graphic was able 'to assure 3*56
(3) Standard, 9 December 1912, p. 8
(A) Daily News and Leader. 10 December 1912, p. 6
(5) Nation. U  December 1912, p. /+82
(6) Morning Post. 9 December 1912, p. 8
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the North Eastern directors of the strong and universal
support of public opinion in standing firm and to express
the hope that the men's society will, for their own part,
also stand firm in refusing the smallest sympathy to the
strikers and in using their every influence to prevent a
(7)spread'.
The strike itself was quickly labelled as 'the right to 
get drunk' by some people, notably the Daily Hail, Weekly 
Dispatch, Daily Mirror, end Daily Express, all of whom insis­
ted that the men were completely in the wrong. It was left 
to the Daily Chronicle to make on obvious point, which seems 
to have been ignored by everyone else: 'The case illustrates 
what sometimes appears an almost irreconcilable conflict 
between the freedom from restraint which men claim as human 
beings, and the discipling which may be required of them if 
they are to.be safe and efficient cogs in our great industrial 
machinery'.^
Predictably, support for Knox come from the Daily Citizen.
It printed a cartoon entitled 'Held Up', depicting a train
(9)
stopped at a signal called 'Justice for Knox*. However, 
the majority of opinion was against the railwayman, and the 
strike by his colleagues. The whole of the traditional 
political spectrum supported the Company, which indicates that 
the employer was accorded the right to discipling, his men as 
he felt fit, especially when a potential danger to the public 789
(7) Daily Graphic, 10 December 1912, p, 4-
(8) Daily Chronicle, 9 December 1912, p, 6
(9) Daily Citizen, 10 December 1912, p, 5
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existed.
The announcement of an inquiry brought a condemnation of
the Government from many quarters, as it was believed that
this was a submission to pressure, when firmness was the real
solution. A typical remark from the Tory press was that of
the Spectator, which held that such action was ’another step
in the direction of placing trade unionist above the law of
the land'. Similar remarks were to be heard in
Parliament. Lord Charnwood informed the House of Lords that
’an impression is growing up that if a strike can only be
made sufficiently injurious to trade, and if it can only
cause sufficient suffering to the poor, then the Government
(11)
will in some way or other intervene'. In the Commons,
Sir Frederick Banbury made an almost identical comment. One 
of his constituents had been convicted, and wanted the trial 
to be renewed, but had been refused. He wondered 'are we to 
understand that there is to be one law for a man who is a 
member of a trade union, and who thought that powerful trade 
union can make himself disagreeable to the right hon. 
Gentleman and his constituents, and another law for the 
ordinary citizen of this country, who is only one by himself, 
and who, unless he is able to obtain the assistance of a 
Member of Parliament,>has no redress whatever'. John 
Rawlinson, a Unionist barrister, described the investigation 
as ’unprecedented', but McKenna had already denied this. He 10
(10) Spectator. 14 December 1912, p. 8
(11) House of Lords Debates, Vol. 13, Col. 198, 12 December
1912
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assured the House that a nan had been convicted of poaching 
■well before the Knox case, and had been sentenced to a month’s 
jail. As a result, he had lost his job vith the Thanes 
Conservancy Board. The case had been investigated, and the 
nan had been granted a pardon, vith ’no strike, no trade 
union, and none of the incidents of publicity that attended 
Knox's case’. ^ ^
It was not altogether surprising that the attack upon 
an inquiry cone fron the Conservatives: while it could,no 
doubt, have arisen fron a genuine feeling that the Governnent 
was in the wrong, it could have been that the Tories were 
nerely making political capital out of the situation.
However, what is surprising is that several Unionist papers 
were doubtful about the evidence that convicted Knox. The 
Morning Post had reservations, while the Sunday Chronicle 
declared that he was probably innocent. The police had 
given evidence for assault, and he had been found not guiltyj 
it had been the same police who provided evidence for drunken­
ness, where there was far greater room for error than in an 
(1 3)assault case.
Needless to soy, the papers most,sympathetic to the 
cause of labour greeted the result of the inquiry most warmly, 
and saw it as a vindication of the men’s actions.~ Reynolds’s 
Newspaper ran a cartoon entitled ’And the Verdict was - Free 
Pardon'. It showed a pair of scales: on one side was the 123
(12) House of Commons Debates. Vol. 45, Cols. 1851-3, 19
Decanber 1912; Vol. 50, Col. 950, 18 March 1913;
Vol. 45, Cols. 1957-8, 19 December 1912
(13) Sunday Chronicle, 15 December 1912, p. 6
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cc.se against Knox - unsatisfactory evidence plus conviction,
and on the other, the scales for - reliable testimony plus
thirty nine years unblemished service. Words accredited to
McKenna appeared underneath: 1"Now, gentlemen, I have asked
you to weigh the evidence, and I an delighted with the 
(1/)decision"’. ' Two papers which had been extremely critical 
of the strike itself agreed that the whole dispute had showed 
how difficult it was for the poor to gain justice in England. 
The Nation had decided that, after all, there had been some 
justification for the stoppage of work, and asked 'how does 
it come about that justice has to be obtained - and sometimes, 
it is to be feared, only to be obtained - by irrational 
methods’ and commented on 'a certain callousness and care­
lessness in our social system which, in spite of all our 
boasts about equality of all men before the law, still regard 
the police courts as essentially a place for disciplining the 
humbler classes'. The Daily News and Leader felt that
the events had revealed 'a real peril to the liberty and 
reputation of those who cannot, for a dozen reasons, set up 
an elaborate defence against such charges - in a word, of
/-jZN
most of the poor’.
It was all very well for the Westminster Gazette to joke: 
'Nervous traveller:‘"Oh guard! Before I get into the train, 
will you be so kind, please, as to make the engine driver say, 
very distinctly, 'Truly rural British constitution"” . *1567
(14-) Reynolds’s Newspaper. 15 December 1912, p. 8
(15) Nation. 21 December 1912, pp. 518-9
(16) Daily News and Leader. 16 December 1912, p. 8
(17) Westminster Gazette, 15 December 1912, p. 1
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Nevertheless, several, serious issues had been raised. There 
was the problem of finding some sort of balance between what 
an employee, could do in his leisure time, and the way in 
which this could, in certain circumstances, result in a 
danger to public safety. On this, most people were agreed: 
if the community would be jeopardised, then the rights of the 
worker had to be limited. In this particular case, the fact 
that the man, even if he had been drunk, would not have worked 
for thirty hours after his arrest, was ignored. Perhaps it 
had been considered, and thesjrejected, so as to ensure the 
protection of railway passengers. The rights of employers 
were also raised. Here, some Tories believed that there was 
an absolute right for the owners to do whatever..they.wanted 
with their firms, and both Conservatives and Liberals agreed 
that where public safety was concerned, the employer had to 
be able to mete out whatever disciplinary rooa.sures-.-he- con-- 
sldered necessary. The result of the North Eastern Railway 
Company’s demotion of.Knox had been a wildcat sympathetic 
strike. This, again, was condemned almost universally as 
being unwarranted and unnecessary, but it was only the 
Conservatives who accused the Government of yielding to trade 
union pressure when it announced an inquiry into the convic­
tion. This was indicative of the harder line which the 
Conservatives were prepared to take against strikers. Finally, 
the Knox incident left some of the Liberal papers wondering if 
it was always so difficult for the working class to obtain 
justice in England.
Thus, the dispute had revealed that there were probably 
more old-fashioned, autocratic thinkers in the country than
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had been Imagined previously. It certainly showed that some 
Liberal supporters would not always side with the men, as 
might have seemed the case before. As so many Liberals were 
convinced of his guilt, it was rather surprising that McKenna 
should order an inquiry. Perhaps he did so to prevent a 
spread of the strike. There is no material on this question. 
The Home Office files appear to ignore this event, and no 
private papers mention the case. Thus, the reason for the 
Home Secretary's intervention must be speculative. The 
reactions to this eposide must be viewed in the light of 
another event which occurred the following month, and became 
a potentially serious incident several months later.
Guard Richardson
On 17 January 1913» when working a goods train from 
Nottingham to Sheffield, Guard Richardson was ordered by his 
foreman to put on three additional wagons. Richardson knew 
that according to the rules, this would leave him without an 
adequate brake, so he refused, and was given fourteen days' 
notice, despite his twenty-one years' service. Exactly one 
month after this incident, a guard on a mineral train left 
Storries Hill, Cudworth, for Gowhole sidings. The foreman 
ordered that more wagons should be attached, leaving an 
inadequate brake. The guard obeyed, and the train broke 
loose at the second wagon from the engine, and ran off the 
rails. This could have had some effect on later opinion 
regarding Richardson. His dismissal brought together the 
Exececutive Committee of the rail unions at Unity House on 
5 March 1913» after which they demanded his reinstatement, 
and requested that, whenever any man was asked to vary from
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any printed rule, he should be given written authority, and 
this was eventually agreed on 7 March.
These were the facts reported at the tine, and there 
seems no reason to doubt them. The company involved, the 
Midland, issued a statement, but this was not done until 2 
March, by which time most people had arrived at an opinion.
It seemed that as far back as January 1909, the Midland 
Railway Company had issued an Appendix of Rules, which said 
that the loading of trains would eventually be'arranged by 
the District Controller, and in November 1912, this was done. 
On 21 November 1912, Richardson objected when he was told to 
take more wagons than the Appendix Regulations permitted. He 
was informed that it was his duty to obey. On 17 January 
1913, he refused again. He saw the Chairman and Directors, 
and said that he would disobey even the General Manager on 
this point, as it would be contrary to his rules. Con­
sequently he was dismissed.
Needless to say, there was some comparison between this 
case and that involving Driver Knox. For Reynolds's 
Hewspaoer it was simple. It published a cartoon called ’A 
Confusing Inconsistency', explaining that when the incident 
involving Knox 'was before the public a little whjle ago the 
Railway Authorities insisted that their action was entirely 
in the interests of Public Safety. Now - in contrast to that 
attitute - the Midland directors have dismissed Guard 
Richardson for refusing to break their own printed rules for 
the safe working of the system'. In the centre of the drawing 
was a plump railway director, who was giving with one hand a 
notice to a railwayman, 'Driver Knox reduced for breaking the
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rules of public safety’, and with the other hand a notice
'Guard Richardson dismissed for refusing to break the rule's
of public safety’ to another railwayman, who was pointing to
a card upon which was written ’railway rules must be followed’
Underneath was the caption:
’If you break the rules of safety
You’ll be punished for your act;
And if you REFUSE to break them
You’ll be summarily "sacked"’.' 1
For the Daily News and Leader, the issue was equally,
uncomplicated. It pointed out that ’Knox was reduced out of
regard for public safety. Richardson has been discharged for
insisting on the observance of the company’s own provisions
for public safety’. The rules ’are intended to give the
public a false sense of security for they can have no value
if they can be set aside when convenience requires it’, and,
moreover, ’it is not a question of discipline. If it is,
(19}it is not Richardson who was guilty of indiscipline».v1 "
Support for Richardson, and the action of the Executive 
Committees, came, of course, from the two Labour papers. The 
Dally Herald would lend its support to virtually any militant 
action by the working classes, and the Daily Citizen was 
amazed that the Midland Railway Company, which would fine its 
workers for failing to carry its rule book, should wish to 
diverge from l t . ^ ^  In the Rouse of Commons, J.H.* Thomas 18920
(18) Reynold’s Newspaper. 2 March 1913» p. 9
(19) Daily News and Leader. 25 February 1913, p. 6
(20) Drily Citizen. 24 February 1913, p. 4
revealed that, on Richardson's 'appeal, to 
the chief official at Derby, Mr. Owen, he was told that he 
must do what he was told, even if it was to take his train 
onto the wrong line...seriousness of such instructions, 
dangers...uncertainty...amongst the men as to what their 
duties are’.^2^
Far more surprising was the attitude of many of the 
traditionally Conservative papers, which, albeit reluctantly, 
sided with the guard. The Daily Mail explained that 
Richardson's 'action was dictated, not by contumacy but by 
the honest belief that the rules were necessary for safe 
working', so that the Midland owners were 'in the wrong», 
especially considering that a driver had just received 
eighteen months for man slaughter after obeying his formen, 
instead of the rule book. The Daily Mail insisted that 'it 
is unfair to ask railway servants to face such a risk as 
this'.^22  ^ The Manchester Guardian, which adopted old- 
fashioned Liberal attitudes when dealing with labour disputes, 
took the same line, and made a similar reference to a court 
case. It agreed that 'there must be a limit to passive 
obedience if the subordinate is to remain a responsible agent' 
although the writer was unsure about this incident. However, 
he told his readers that 'we must remember that "breakaways” 
of long goods trains due to insufficient brake power are by 
no means uncommon occurrences’, and pointed out that in the
(21) House of Commons Debates, Vol. 47, Col. 1824., 3 March
1913
(22) Daily Mall. 7 March 1913, p. 6
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manslaughter trial, 'the judge declared that the foremen had
no authority to give orders contrary to the company's written
(23)instructions'. Nevertheless, the Manchester Guardian did
not side firmly with Richardson. It has been extremely diffi­
cult to find any further information about the court case to 
which these two papers referrred. The only additional details 
that have been uncovered appeared in an article in the 
Manchester Guardian. J.H. Thomas mentioned a letter he had 
received from a solicitor in the North of England, which 
furnished all the details, but provided no names. It is
unfortunate that a full report has not been uncovered, as 
that could prove conclusively that the conviction did occur, 
and would raise questions about the other newspapers ignoring 
the news.
Other Conservative papers did support Richardson, though 
with reservations, because the Midland had not issued a 
statement. This implied that any version of events offered 
by the union should be treated with the greatest caution, and 
journals such as the Daily Express and the Financial Times 
gave their support to the guard. The Daily Telegraph did so 
in an extremely grudging fashion. It admitted that 'it is 
impossible to doubt.that the men of the Midland are genuinely 
convinced that injustice has been done', but.the Company had; 
not issued a reply. However, if Richardson and his supporters
(23) Manchester Guardian,.26 February 1913, p. 6; March 3 — 
1913, P. 8; 27 February 1913, P. 7.
(ZA) Daily Telegraph; 26 February 1913. P. 10; 28 February 
1913, p. 7
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had stated his case correctly, then 'it would be idle to
pretend that public opinion can support the company's action'.
If the Daily Telegraph itself had doubts, its correspondents
did not. David Morgan, who had been the traffic manager of
Bat Docks, Cardiff, from 1882 to 1896, wrote to say that
•Richardson was right...he...deserved to be rewarded rather
than censured and dismissed', and another letter, from an
"Ex-Traffic Manager", stated that he was 'naturally all on
the side of discipline but I cannot help thinking the Midland
(2/)have placed themselves very much in the wrong'.
The Times adopted a rather different line. It agreed 
that 'the argument of safety Is on the side of the men', but 
it was disturbed by an article in the January edition of
. • v
the Syndicalist by 'A Midland Railway Guard', in which he 
argued that it was not necessary to strike in order to being 
the railwaysto a halt. This could be done by the rigid obser­
vance of the rules.' The Times wondered if there could have
been any connection between the word and the deed, although
(25)it could find no evidence for such a suggestion,' and none 
has been found since.
Other papers were opposed to the threat of strike action, 
and argued that it was the wrong way to tackle the question, 
advocating, as an alternative, compulsory arbitration.
These proposals came from, amongst others, the Spectator, the 
Daily Mail, and, as usual, the Daily Chronicle, all' of which
(2A) Daily Telegraph, 26 February 1913, p. 10; 28 February 
.1913, p. 7
(25) Times. A March 1913, p. 9
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felt that Richardson had a strong case.
Llewellyn 3nith had written to Buxton saying that, at •
the beginning of March, he believed that ’The Midland Company
have not a friend at present’, 2^^  but this was not true.
The Company did have its supporters. When'.its statement had
been issued, the Financial Times argued that their position
(27)was ’undoubtedly a strong one’, while the Standard did 
not think that the Midland directors could have acted in any 
other way,^2^  and the Daily Graphic was delighted that the 
Company’s version had been published, for ’reasonable people, 
of course, knew that there must be another side to the story 
and withhend their judgement until they have heard it...The 
railway unionista have only to ask themselves how their own 
Society would fare'if every clerk they employ chose to' adopt 
the attitude of Guard Richardson.’ After all, 'the new 
tactic of manufacturing a universal strike out of a local - 
grievance shows an indifference to the interests of the 
nation and of humanity which had hitherto only been found in 
mediaeval tyrants’. 2^^  The Morning Post went even furhter 
in condemning the men. It believed that ’the particular 
question at issue is really of secondary importance. What 
it is necessary to bear in mind is the agitation to which it
(26) Buxton Papers Letter from Smith to Buxton, 3 March 1913
(27) Financial Times. 4 March 1912, p. 4
(28) Standard. 4 March 1913, p. 6
(29) Daily Graphic. 3 March 1913» P. 4j 5 March 1913, p. 4 .
-  272 -
has given rise is  inspired by tactica l motives. I t  is  a move 
in the old struggle between the railway workers and the 
companies over the issue o f the men's Unions. The Unions wish 
to have the right to intervene between employers and employed 
in a l l  disputes which may arise1, and this was considered 
e ffe c t iv e ly  proven when the writer asked 'i s  i t  conceivable 
that i f  he had been simply acting out o f regard for the safety 
o f the train he would have been dismissed for simply refusing 
to put on some extra carriages'. Thus, the Morning Post 
revealed that i t  did not believe that employers could rea lly  
be in the wrong. The threat o f a strike aroused that paper 
even further. I t  announced that 'apparently i t  is  their 
intention to persevere in the attempt to use the dispute over 
Guard Richardson as the means o f pressing the claim o f the 
Unions fo r fu l l  recognition ', and, should a strike material­
ise , 'the Companies are bound to stand together and to figh t 
to the end. And whatever side public opinion might have 
taken over the particular case o f Guard Richardson, i t  could 
not f a i l  to declare i t s e l f  against the extravagent demands o f 
the unions'.
Of course, a lengthy attack on the position o f the men
could be expected from such a paper, but the reaction o f the
Westminster Gazette was less predictable. I t  pointed out
that Richardson had already refused to obey orders, and the
Company had assured the public that the addition o f "extra
wagons would not have caused qny danger, so i t  was up to the
(31)men 'to  make good their ca se '. '
(30) Morning Post. 25 February 1913, p. 8j 6 March 1913, p.8
(31) Westminster Gazette. 3 March 1913, p. 1
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Thus, the affair of Richardson divided opinion, just.as 
that of Knox had done several months previously, and, 
similarly, the split had not been on purely political grounds. 
The reinstatement was received with general approval, and 
such papers as the Times, the Dolly Express, the Drily 
Telegraph. Sunday Chronicle, and the Ne\Js of the World all 
expressed delight that the Midland directors had adopted 
what they regarded as the correct course, end were pleased that 
the matter had been settled peacefully. The Spectator was 
especially satisfied at the outcome, both because the 
employers had adopted what was seen to be the right course, 
but also because of the action of the union. Traie unions 
had two roles, *first the protection of the individual 
workman against harsh or unjust treatment, and, secondly, a 
general improvement in the pecuniary position of the wage 
earning classes'. It rejected the latter view, and used 
Richardson as an example of the 'true function of trade 
unions'.
The dispute had been settled because the employers had 
admitted that they were in the wrong. The cases of Knox and 
Richardson are particularly interesting because of their 
proximity in time, yet their distance in cause. - In one, a 
driver was demoted because it was claimed that he had behaved 
in a manner contrary to the interests of safety, and it was 
generally accepted that had the facts been -Wwfe straight­
forward, the company would have acted in an extremely reason-- 
able fashion. In the other, a guard insisted on obeying his 
rule book, because he believed that to disobey it would be
(32) Spectator, 15 March 1913. PP. ¿35-6
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against the interests o f public safety, and fo r.th is  he was 
dismissed. Many people fe l t  that to sack him was illo g ic a l 
and unreasonable, and this viewpoint was by no neons confined 
to Liberals. Railway safety had been a particular concern in 
la te  Victorian England, and i t  was understandable that, in 
the case o f Knox, the papers sided with the companies, arguing 
that everything possible should be done to reduce accidents, 
or the possib ility  o f accidents. With Richardson, the 
anxieties o f the travellers was, once more, the central 
concern, so the company was in the wrong. The usual ottitixde 
was that the public should not be made to suffer from any 
inconvenience caused by workers, but here was a case where 
safety could be seen as a higher consideration. However, 
other papers denied that this was the point at issue, and 
argued that the incident was being used to forient trouble, 
although there was no evidence for such an assertion. Thus, 
the company was in the right, and i t  had acted in a perfectly  
sensible way. Such opinions could be regarded as being 
derived from sheer prejudice, but this would be something o f 
an oversimplification. The question centred around who could 
give orders at work, and most people agreed that this was the 
right o f the employer, especially on the railways, where 
safety was so much a factor that there could be only one 
authority. The question, with Richardson., was whether a iului 
could be told to ignore his orders, which were la id  down in 
his rule book, when he w as 's t ill personally lia b le  should 
anything go wrong, in the some way that a soldier would be. 
responsible, should he obey an order which involved committing 
a crime, while no-one doubts that in principle the o ffic e r  has
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every right to give orders. This sort o f attitude was 
significant. Many employers did believe that any order 
should be obeyed im p lic itly  by a ll  o f their workers, and in 
this they were supported by trad itionalists from both 
p o lit ic a l parties. The workers themselves were increasingly 
prepared to oppose this autocratic approach to industrial 
relations, so that a dispute over this issue was always 
possible. The cases o f Knox and Richardson are symbolic o f 
the attitude that lay behind much o f the unrest.
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Chapter IX
The Strikes of 1913-14
The years 1911 and 1912 had seen large scale strikes 
involving sailors, dockers and transport workers, railwaymen, 
and miners. The next two years did not produce any stoppages 
of such magnitude, but rather a series of smaller disputes, 
which alarmed a section of the community because there seemed 
to be sone trouble somewhere, all of the time, and often in 
trades which had previously seemed free from militancy.
Trade unions had been increasing their membership for 
years, but the period 1910-1914 produced an extremely rapid 
growth, which could have been connected with the well- 
publicised success of certain groups of workers;- ; /
„ Number of trade union
ïeaT members (in 000*s)
1900 1,911
1910 2,477
1911 . 2,565
1912 3,139
1913 3,416
1914 4,135
The possession of a union card could have fostered a
willingness to strike, but it is more likely that people were 
becoming increasingly discontented with their share of the
(1) Report on Strikes and lock-Outs and on Conciliation and 
Arbitration in the United Kingdom in 1913 Cd. 7658 
(1914-16) provides all the figures
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national prosperity. The year 1913 was distinguished by the 
fact that, although there was no single dispute involving.more 
than fifty thousand workers, it had the largest number of 
strikes on record, and the highest number of people involved, 
apart from 1911 and 1912. Ignoring strikes which carried over 
from the previous year, the aggregate number of working days 
lost was exceeded only in 1893, 1898 and 1912, and there was 
a relatively high success rate for the men. All of these 
factors contributed to making 1913 an unusual year. Statistics 
show these points better than words:-
No. of workers affected (000's)
Year No. of disputes Directly Indirectly Total
1902 442 116,824 139,843 256,667
1903 387 93,515 23,386 116,901
1904 355 56,380 30,828. 87,208
1905 358 67,653 25,850 93,503
1906 486 157,872 59,901 217,773
1907 601 100,728 46,770 147,498
1908 399 223,969 71,538 295,507
1909 436 170,258 130,561 300,819
1910 531 385,085 130,080 515,165
1911 903 831,104 130,876 / 961,980
1912 857 1,233,016 230,265 1,463,281
1913 1,497 516,037 172,888 688,925
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Aggregate‘duration in working 
days of disputes beginning
Year each year previous years Total
1902 3,082,291 396,964 3,480,255
1903 1,443,781 894,887 2,338,668
190 4 1,316,686 167,534 1,484,220
1905 2,295,973 174,216 2,470,189
1906 2,570,950 457,866 3,028,816
1907 1,878,679 283,472 2,162,151
1908 10,632,638 201,551 10,834,189
1909 2,560,425 213,561 2,773,986
1910 9,545,531 349,300 9,894,831
1911 7,620,367 2,699,224 10,319,591
1912 38,142,101 2,772,574 40,914,675
1913 11,484,534 146,198 11,630,732
It is necessary to distinguish between the total numbers 
of days lost in a year from disputes beginning in that year, 
and the total number of days lost from all disputes in a 
year, which would include a number of days lost from disputes 
in the previous years the two sets of figures can be very 
different. The table shows that 1913 was a year of unrest, 
and the workmen tended to gain their demands more often than 
was usual. It was a time of good trade and low unemployment, 
which meant that enployers could not find alternative labour 
easily. Moreover, the favourable economic situation offered 
sound profits, so the owners wanted to see their firms active, 
and, moreover, they could afford to pay the advances. These 
factors probably account for the relatively large number of 
successes by the workers.
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Year % of workmen directly involved in disputes, the
results of which were:- •
In favour 
of
workpeople
In favour 
of
employers
Compromise 
or partly 
successful
Indefinite
or
unsettled
1904 27.3 41.7 30.9 0.1
1905 24.7 34.0 41.2 0.1
1906 42.5 24.5 33.0
1907 32.7 27.3 40.0
1908 8.7 25.7 65.6
1909 11.2 22.3 66.5
1910 16.3 13.8 69.7 0.2
1911 6.6 9.3 84.1
1912 , 74.5 14*4 11.1
1913 31.4 21.0 47.6
Most of the strikes were fairly short, four fifths lasting 
for less than a month each, but the disputes involving the 
largest number of workers tended to last longer.
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Limits of 
duration
No, of
disputes
beginning
in 1913
Total no. of 
workpeople 
involved 
directly and 
indirectly
Aggregate 
duration in 
working days
under 1 week 669 246,942 624,113
1-2 weeks 288 85,428 535,036
2-4 weeks 219 140,128 1,155,767
4-6 weeks 100 50,514 1,035,016
6-8 weeks 63 33,945 1,137,472
8-10 weeks 44 22,614 962,869
10-15 weeks 53 81,108 3,109,220
15-20 weeks 24 9,540 675,756
20-25 weeks 17 24,566 2,420,280
25 weeks and 
above 15 4,140 609,700
Total 1,497 688,925 12,265,129 ,
* Aggregate duration of disputes beginning in 1913, and * 
including all days lost by such disputes as were prolonged 
into 1914
Reactions in the years 1913-14 showed that an
increasing number of people were coming to believe that
something had to be done to prevent industrial unrest. For
example, the Debates in the House of Commons on the Minimum 
*
Wage in March and April 1913 produced more support than would 
have been expected two years previously. Unionists from a 
variety of backgrounds revealed similar ideas on the subject. 
Richard Cooper, a partner in a firm of chemical manufacturers, 
argued that * some movement forward in the lower paid wages of 
the people of this country is certainly the greatest domestic
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problem we have to face at the present time,,,The higher the 
wage bill the greater is the Industry and the greater the 
prosperity*, Lord Robert Cecil insisted that *a less share 
of that wealth is going to the workers*, and L.S. iimery, 
journalist, barrister, and recently elected M,P,, agreed 
that *the minimum wage should in this country be far higher 
than it is’, but he could not accept the idea of legislation 
to gain this, as economic laws would ensure that higher wages 
with a certain volume of production and a certain number of 
people would mean that the less profitable industries went 
out of business and then more workers would be competing for 
a lower total production, which would result in lower wages. 
Arthur Bigland, a merchant, felt it *a crime that women 
workers are paid wages as low as they are’^ ^ihus, some 
Unionists, very different in outlook and experience, were, 
nevertheless, adopting a uniform approach to the finalcial 
difficulties of the poorer sections of the working class, 
just as many Liberals had done years before, A typical 
comment from the other side of the House came from William 
Ellis Davies, a former clerk articled to a solicitor, who 
had qualified, and won a Law Society Prize. Thus, he knew from 
personal experience the problems of a moderage wage. He 
maintained that *it must be admitted on all hands that the 
conditions of the working classes has not grown in proportion 
to the increase which has taken place the wealth of the 
country?. This reaction was very similar to that of the 
Conservatives already,quoted. There was an awareness that ■ 
faults existed in the nation’s wage structure, end the 
beginning of a common policy to deal with the problem.
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However, the sane Debates revealed that others had retained 
the opinions which they had held before the onslaught of * 
industrial unrest. Ernest Craig, a mining engineer and 
colliery proprietor, used the pits as an example, and noted 
that 'the lower grade section of the working men, finding 
themselves secure of a fixed minimum wage, no longer put 
forward their best efforts'. He believed that a national 
minimum would have 'a demoralising influence upon that class 
of workmen who are influenced more by their desire for an 
easy life than they are for conscientious achievement'.
Leslie Scott, a barrister, was equally upset at the idea, 
saying it was 'obvious that any wholesale legislation 
adopting 30s as a fixed figure would destroy the industries 
of the country'.^  The Tory Spectator adopted a similar line 
about the financial organisations of the country: 'No doubt 
occasions arise where economic forces result in injustice, 
but on the whole they tend towards securing a balance of 
advantages and disadvantages in the different occupations'of 
human beings, while simultaneously stimulating production and
(o')
thus enlarging the possibilities of enjoyment for all',w/
It was evident that such persons as these had dis­
regarded the causes of the unrest, and wished to see a 
perpetuation of the traditional patterns of society, even 
though the working class was becoming increasingly discontented
(2) House of Commons Debates. Vol, 50, Cols. 4.88, 525, 546,
556, 537, 13 March 1913} Vol. 51, Cols. 1298-9,
1322, 9 April 1913
(3) Spectator. 9 August 1913» p. 202
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about the share of the national wealth it was receiving, and 
despite the growing feeling within the other sections of the 
community that perhaps the masses had been treated unfairly. 
The strikes of 1913-1A are important in demonstrating that 
the views of some people were changing, while others retained 
the attitudes of the previous decade. Because there were so 
many small strikes, it has been necessary to select a number 
of the more significant ones. They have been chosen either 
because they attracted national publicity, or because they 
involved groups of workers not previously associated with 
militancy.
Lancashire farm workers' strike
A large section of the community agreed that the wages
of farm workers were inadequate, though this did not lead to
an increase in their remuneration. It has been estimated
that in 19U, the earnings of such men varied from U s  3<3
in the South West to 22s 3d in the North,^ and there were
claims of lower pay. It was alleged that around Hereford,
labourers were on 12s a week, with a cottage, and one row of
(5)potatoes, but money was stopped on wet days. It was 
hardly surprising that the founder of the National Union of , 
Agricultural Workers, George Edwards, should insist that 
things must be ensured to the agricultural labourer: first, a *5
(A) C.S. Orton end B.I. Felton »A Century of Wages and 
Earnings in Agriculture1, Journal of the Royal 
Agricxatural Society of England (1930 pp. 233, 2A7
(5) Letter from A. Watkins in Westminster Gazette. 12 July 
1913, P. 3
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wage brought about by Act of Parliament, and aided by Trade 
Unionism} second, security of tenure in his home, and thirdly, 
free access to land'.^ Nor, really, was it unusual that an 
active reformer such as Rowntree should demand that 'the 
wages of farm labourers must be raised*.N ’ Again, it was 
not out of place that the editor of the Manchester Guardian.
C.P. Scott, should write that 'better wages con be afforded'.^ 
More startling was the statement of Lord Hugh Cavendish- 
Bentinck, who told the House of Commons that 'we owe a deep 
debt of reparation to the agricultural labourer' who has been 
victimised and exploited many times in his c a r e e r * . A  
further indication of the increasing social concern of the 
Conservatives can be found in a letter from Stanley Baldwin, 
and the future Lords Aston, Halifax, Mauntenple and Swinton.
It told Bonar Law of the need for an Inquiry to ascertain the 
best ways of raising the wages of agricultural labourers, 
especially 'in those districts where wages are notoriously
Despite this sympathy, which came from all sides, wages 
remained low, and on 20 June 1913, labourers in Lancashire - 
in the market gardening region within the triangle of 
Liverpool, Wigan and Southport - went on strike for a minimum
(6) G. Edwards 'The Life of the Labourer' in L. Gardner (ed.)
Land and Labour (N.d.) p. 37
(7) B.S. Rowntree, The Labourer and the Land (1914) p. 25
(8) C.P. Scott Papers B.M.Add,Ms.50901 f.89 Diary, 3 February
1913
(9) House of Commons Debates. Vol, 51, Col. 1315, 9 April 1913
(10) Bonar Law Papers 30/4/12 Letter from Baldwin et al. to
Law, 8 November 1912
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wage of £1 4-s a week, which would have been a rise of 2s a week,
a half day on Saturdays, finishing at 1 p.m., and union
recognition. About two thousand men came out, and they
gained their rise, with a 2 p.m. finish on Saturdays, so
there was a return to work on 8 July. The Liberal press was
pleased at this success, but the Standard was quite happy to
argue that because farmers had never paid their men a fair
wage, then such a system should be perpetuated: ’While it
is right and proper that the rustic should get an adequate
return for the sweat of his brow, or for as much of it as
goes to the cultivation of his master’s farm, it is equally
proper to recollect that in the history of British husbandry.
the farmer has never been expected to bear the whole cost of
every labourer’s maintenance. The latter has almost always
supplemented his wage by subsidiary employment whether on a
( 11)strip of ground or in some handicraft’. Thus, the
Standard was not interested in joining the ranks of those 
Tories who were adopting a policy of social concern. It was 
quite content to continue advocating traditional answers, 
despite the growing opposition, and hoped to steer the force 
of public opinion away from such dangerous new concepts, which 
could disrupt the established social order.
Strikes in the Midlands
On 25 April, men at a railway wagon and carriage firm in 
Birmingham struck for higher wages. On 9 May, three hundred 
workers left the Tube factory at Wednesbury, demanding a rise 
of 2s a week for time workers and 10$ for piece workers. A 1
(11) Standard, 12 May 191A» p. 10
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week later, the dispute had spread to Walsall, and by the end 
of the month, all the tube workers in that town and in 
Wednesbury were on strike. A month later, the stoppage had 
reached West Bromich, Wolverhampton, parts of Birmingham, and 
the area in between. It was only the unskilled and semi­
skilled vho had walked out, but the result was that skilled 
men were prevented from working# At the height of the unrest, 
fifty thousand were affected. On 29 May, a representative of 
the Chief Industrial Commissioner visited the district where 
he attempted to persuade both sides to compromise. Early in 
June, the newly formed Midland Employers* Federation offered 
£1 3s to those in the Birmingham area, £1 1s to Black Country 
workers and nothing to any piece workers. The ballot resulted 
in the rejection of this offer by A,717 to 99. Askwith's sub­
ordinate had not succeeded, so Askwith * went in person, to attempt 
to redeem this apparent failure. He arrived on 2 July, and a 
settlement was reached two days later: £1 3s in Birmingham and 
£1 2s in the Black Country, rising to £1 3s after six months.
This was signed on 7 July, and work was resumed the following 
week.
: Once again, the Liberal press gave its approval to the 
actions of the men, and the Daily News and Leader made a note­
worthy point: *We are inclined to attach very considerable 
importance to this movement in the Midlands. It marks the 
progress of the idea of the minimum wage; that is significant.
It may also mark the beginning of the overthrow of an obscur­
antist political domination. Trade Unionism and the temper 
of labour generally has been very inert in Birmingham country 
for seme thirty years...the strike now over suggests that the
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spell has been broken’.
Not only had the men resorted to militant action, but 
examples of violence had been recorded, both in tie press, 
and in letters from individual companies and the Midland 
Unployers* Federation received by the Home Office. Of course, 
it could have been that there were particular circumstances 
in the Midlands trades which caused this reaction. The 
small workshops were on the decline, and, consequently, a 
reduction in the personal contact between employer and 
employed« The greater the alienation, the more difficult it 
becomes to sort out grievances without having to resort to 
strike action. In addition, the newer type of trade union 
organisation, with its emphasis on confrontation, was gain­
ing strength in the Midlands, Nevertheless, an area which 
was not regarded as militant and engaged in a large stoppage, 
which had begun with the actions of a few men, had spread 
from town to town throughout the industry, with the whole 
body of strikers remaining solid until everyone was satisfied. 
There could be little doubt that unrest was rife in the 
Midlands, if nowhere else, and the rise in trade union 
membership, which helped to give rise to this, was in itself 
a manifestation of discontent,
Dublin
Trade unionism had been growing steadily in Dublin, thanks 
largely to the efforts of Jim Larkin, whose Irish Transport and 
General Workers’ Union controlled almost all of the unskilled 
labour in the city except Corporation and builders' labourers,
(12) Daily News and Leader. 12 July 1913, p. U
(12)
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who were in different unions. By August 1913, there were 
only two large firms whose workers were still unorganised - 
Guinness Brewery and the United Tramway Company. Gusmess paid 
the best wages in the city, as well as offering fringe benefits 
such as cheap houses and medical care, but they would not 
permit trade unionism, and would have been an extremely 
difficult target for Larkin, so he decided to concentrate on 
the United Tramway Company, whose Chairman, W.M. Murphy, 
owned or controlled the largest daily paper in Ireland, the 
largest department store, the most prominent hotel, and 
several railway companies in Ireland and West Africa, His 
United Tramway Company employed permanent and casual men.
If a permanent man was evetf late for work, the man at the top 
of the list of casuals took his job, and the tardy worker 
went to the bottom of the casual list. Anyone suspected of 
being in a trade union would be dismissed. Nevertheless, 
about half of the 1,700 tramwaymen had secretly joined the 
Irish Transport and General Workers' Union when the strike 
began on 26 August. Sir George Askwith later insisted that 
it was 'founded upon poverty, low wages and bad conditions', 
but also included a desire on the part of the leaders 'to 
establish the transport workers' union as the "one big union" 
in Ireland, and to put into practice the doctrines of 
Syndicalism', while, on the other hand, Murphy »was out for 
a fight to the finish'.
Whatever the causes, the strike had begun, and violence 
soon followed the cessation of work. There were riots from 
30 August until 2 September, resulting in one death and four
(13) G. Askwith op.cit. pp. 259, 262
hundred and thirty injuries. There were many who accused the 
police of employing excessive violence to curb the disorder. 
The Lord Mayor of Dublin moved a resolution at a meeting of 
the Corporation on 1 September, asking for a public inquiry 
into the behaviour of the police, and such papers as the 
Manchester Guardian, the Sunday Chronicle and Reynolds1 s  
Newspaper condemned the police. There was an official 
investigation, which exonerated the Dublin Constabulary.
This was described as ’a travesty’ by Frederick Booth, the 
Liberal industrialist, in the House of Commons. He had seen 
the disturbances, and described police brutality, as did 
George Barnes, who read many statements alleging misconduct 
by the police.
After the riots, on 3  September, the Dublin Baployers’ 
Federation, which had about four hundred members, decided to 
lock out all of the members of the Irish Transport and Gênerai 
Workers’ Union, and there was a major stoppage in Dublin. It 
received widespread publicity in Britain, and opinions on the 
merits of both sides were as varied as might be expected.
The Conservatives made their customary condemnation of the 
agitators who had whipped the men into a fury sufficient to 
cause the unrest, but the Daily Mail, which, in the past, had 
been as opposed to trade union militancy as any other paper 
supporting the Tories, did not agree that the owners were 
necessarily right* ’Any employer who in these days declines 
to have any dealings with trade unionism is assuming a heavy
(1A> House of Commons Debates. Vol. 58, Cols. 995-1010, 976- 
988, 18 February 19U
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responsibility end in the case of a company owning and.
operating, a public utility such as a tramway the responsibility
is proportionately heavier. That is an aspect of the recent
occurrences in Dublin that is of far greater moment than the
more or less of violence on the port of the police under the
stress of transient excitement1. Later the same paper went
so for as to demand 'the abandonment of the haughty mediaeval
( 15^attitude towards labour*. ' Thus, the Dally Mall was making
renarks that resembled closely those of the Liberals. It was 
beginning to realise that trade unions did exist, and were not 
going to disappear, so that it was necessary to accept their 
existence, and work with them, rather than create ill-feeling 
and unrest by constantly attempting to ensure their destruc­
tion.
The dispute itself continued until the end of the year, 
and received periodic coverage in the press. Such papers as 
the Westminster Gazette and the Manchester Guardian commented 
on the low wages paid in the city, and argued that they should 
be raised. Several Tory papers, such as the Morning Post and 
the Economist made similar points, and attacked the inadequate 
housing conditions as well.
Thus, the Dublin strike could indicate the extent to 
which some opinions were changing. Certain papers, which in 
the past had adopted traditional attitudes, were prepared to 
concede that the working class quarters of Dublin were an 
unpleasant place in which to live, and the Daily Mail could 
even appreciate the workers* cause, and went so far as to
(15) Drily Mall. 3 September 1913, p. 4-j 22 October 1913» p. 6
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criticise the inflexibility of the employers. However, it 
could have been that the men gained sympathy because their 
battle was a long and bitter one, and because it was waged 
in Ireland, and not in England, so that, it was not regarded 
as part of labour's onslaught at hone. Thus, it could be 
argued that the reaction to this dispute is not entirely 
relevant to this study. Nevertheless, it is significant that 
some Tory papers were sympathetic to the men in a disturbance 
centring around union recognition, and might reveal a growing 
tendency to accept and work with trade unions. •
Tillings
Another stoppage caused by the reaction of employers to 
trade unionism occurred in London in September. The omnibus 
and tube company made a rule that its employees should not wear 
the badge of their trade union while at work. By the evening 
of 17 September, one hundred and twenty five men had been 
dismissed for refusing to obey this regulation, so the union 
called a strike, end members employed by the London General 
Omnibus Comapny came out in sympathy. The demand for reinstate­
ment was quickly extended to include recognition.
The Daily Mail had already praised the bus drivers for 
their industry. It pointed out that in 1912 in the Metro­
politan police district and the City of London, drivers worked 
a thirteen hour day, and had to exceed the speed limit because 
they were paid according to the number of journies completed: 
'The men have a right to better treatment as they are the very 
pick of their class, conspicuous for their skill and courage... 
unless these- inordinate hours of labour for drivers are
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reduced the companies cannot escape the charge of placing 
their ovn profit before the safety of the people of London*. 
The Home Office files reveal that rules at Tillings were 
strict, and a man could be suspended for failing to collect 
a 1d fare.
Given the combination of strict employers, long hours, 
and the prevalent mood of militancy, trouble was always 
possible, but it was the employers who had forced the issue 
on the matter of the union badge, and they did not gain much 
popular support. The Liberal press weighed in on the side of 
the men, and the Daily Mail, which was increasingly becoming 
a paper ready to champion the cause of the working man, 
pointed out that'the »company has chosen, for some reason 
best known to itself, to issue a declaration of war upon a 
trade union...the sympathy of the public...will inevitably 
be with the men. The omnibus drivers and conductors are 
remarkable even among British workers for their courage, 
skill, efficiency and energy and they live on excellent terms 
with the Londoner*. Another paper which normally supported 
the owners in industrial disputes was the Daily Express, but 
on this occasion, it insisted that »employers must get it out 
of their heads that their employees can be dragooned or treated 
like children. Strikes, syndicalist unrest and financial
(lON
losses are often the result of masters forgetting the. date.», ' 
Even the Daily Telegraph, one of the most consistent champions
06) Dally Mail. 28 March 1913, p. U
(17) H . 0.4.5/10710/243128 
08) Drily Mail. 18 September 1913, p. U 
(19) Dally Express. 16 September 1913, p. A
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of the employers, agreed that ’the badge question was 
childish...If Messrs. Tilling had been well advised they 
would never have issued their rule at all...To forbid it was 
exactly the way to make the men cling to it, to create a 
purely fictitious attachment to it, and so invest it with a 
wholly false importance’. However, the union had brought up 
the question of recognition, which had to be resisted.
This was a matter which disturbed other journals, and the 
Financial Times and the Standard, in particular, warned that 
the union had to be defeated on that issue.
In a thoughtful editorial, the Dally Graphic examined 
the origins of the dispute and the problem of recognition, 
under the headline ’How to Provoke Strikes’: ’Messrs. Tilling 
cannot be congratulated on the way in which they have con­
ducted their relations with their staff. They first put 
forward a demand which they defended on certain grounds, and 
then when a strike was threatened, they ignominously collapsed. 
The point at issue was the wearing of the trade union badges. 
Under normal conditions it is an unjustifiable interference 
With individual liberty for an employer to prohibit his 
employees from wearing a badge or any other harmless decora­
tion. The whole* point with regard to the trade union badge 
is the wearing of it by union men is intended to facilitate 
the terrorising of non-unionists. If Messrs. Tilling had 
token this point and adhered to it, they would have commanded 
the sympathy of all persons who resent the ever-growing 
tyranny of trade unionists. Instead, they-talked merely
f20) Dally Telegraph. 19 September 1913. p. 10
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about the word Tilling on the men's caps...If "recognition"
only means that the trade union officials are to be allowed
to negotiate on behalf of the men, It is a claim that might
very well, if it stood alone, be conceded. The danger is
that recognition may be used as a base for compelling non-
unionists to come into the union when they would prefer to
remain outside. If this is what Messrs. Tilling are fighting
they have a good case'.^21  ^ On the other hand, several papers
could not see any objection to recognition, and accused, the
company of being reactionary. The Daily Sketch, for example,
noted that the owners seemed 'to ignore the development of
modern industry...They have declared definitely against the
principle of collective bargaining, a principle which all Trade
( 22)Unionists ore pledged to support'.
The dispute was quickly settled. Askwith stepped In as 
mediator, and on 22 September, after a seven hour conference, 
concluded an agreement. The union was recognised, the dis­
missed men were reinstated, the right to wear the badge was 
given, and the men agreed not to participate in sympathetic 
strikes.
Here was on example of industrial unrest which produced 
a variety of opinions. Over the original controversy, support 
was almost exclusively for the men, although certain papers 
refrained from comment. However, when the Issues were broad­
ened to include recognition, the traditionally conservative 
papers changed their views, and defended the employers, as '
(21) Dnilv Graphic. 19 September, 1913, p. 4
(22) Daily Sketch. 19 September 1913, p. 3
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they had not accepted the principles of trade unionism, or at 
least rejected the concept of unions involving themselves in' 
collective bargaining.
U.K. Employers1 Defence Fund
Just a few days after the dispute at Tillings had been 
concluded, it was announced that the United Kingdom Employers* 
Defence Union had been formed, with funds of £5Qm. It was a 
national union of employers, each member of which guaranteed 
a certain sum of money, which would be used as a defence 
against the new trade unionism, and would also work to amend 
the Trade Disputes Act on picketing. Its supporters included 
Lo id Avebury, the Duke of Bedford, Sir Arthur Clay, Lord Dysart, 
Sir Philip Magnus, M.P., and a variety of industrialists. Its 
foundation suggests that part of the community was so con­
cerned about the industrial climate that they were prepared 
to spend large quantities of money to prepare themselves for 
further trouble.
However, it was not well received by the whole of the
press. The Liberal journals felt that it could help to unite
the trade union movement in opposition, and the Times agreed
that it might be-regarded as a threat to the unions. The
Sunday flhronicila noted that agitators 'will not neglect to
point out that employers who will close their works rather
than grant a farthing an hour increase can put down tO, 20 or
(
£50,000 for the purpose of smashing their unions' . K The 
Daily Mall agreed, saying that «whatever may be the errors of: 
the new trade unionism, some of the advisers of capital itself
(23) Sunday Chronicle. 26 September 1913, p. 6
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can be equally myoptic, equally provocative, equally anti­
social».^
On the other hand, other Conservative papers were 
enthusiastic about the measure, and its greatest champion was 
the Standard, which lauded its promoters as ’men of the highest 
repute, whose motives are beyond suspicion...Honest and self- 
respecting labour has nothing to fear from such an organisa­
tion. What it seeks to oppose is a reckless attack as 
damaging to the honest and capable workman as to his 
employer*. It is intriguing that this paper was able to
impute the finest moral motives to the employers* leaders, 
and at the same time to condemn.those of the workers’. The 
Standard had never attempted to understand the position of 
the men, and provided another example of its cycloptic approach 
to social matters.
Debate on the merits and demerits of the body filled the 
correspondence columns of the newspapers, and an excellent 
version of the good that many anticipated from it appeared in 
the Times, in a letter by E.P. Hewitts 'To expect a Radical 
Government, supported by the votes of Labour M.P.’s, to repeal 
the objectionable clauses of the Trades Disputes Act, or to 
otherwise deal with-the question in a manner fair to employers 
and employed is hopeless: and it may be doubted whether even 
a Conservative Government would have the necessary courage.
The only safe course, therefore, is for employers, relying 
upon themselves, and not upon the Government, to form an
(24.) Daily Mail. 26 September 1913, p. 4 
(25) Standard. 26 September 1913, p. 6
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organisation as complete as that of the employees, and in 
doing so they are performing a service as useful to the public 
as to themselves*.
In fact, very little was heard of the United Kingdom 
Employers’ Defence Union after this, but its formation was 
significant, and its reception interesting, indicating that 
some papers were well aware of the likely working class reac­
tion, while the hard core traditionalists did not care, and 
applauded the union of employers, which aimed to defeat the 
workers, and accepted it as the only union which should be 
permitted.
The case of DriverCaudle
Caudle was an experienced railwayman. Aged fifty-nine, 
he had been with the Midland Railway Company for forty years, 
and had been a driver for twenty nine years. On 2 September 
1913, he was driving the Scotch express, and ran into a 
stationary passenger train at Aisgill, Cumberland. His 
previous record was excellent, with seven commendations for 
caution and maintaining a good look-out, but this accident 
was serious, with sixteen fatalities. Ah inquiry was ordered, 
and it transpired thit he had taken his train through several 
signals which were at red. He had not seen them because he 
was oiling his box, and looking at his injector and water 
gauge. Small coal had reduced his steam level and kept him 
more busy than usual. The train he ran into should not have been 
there, but it had lost steam on an incline, and come to a 
halt. The trouble with this engine, just like Caudle’s was
(26) Tines, 29 September 1913» p. A
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snail coal. It had also been overloaded, with 2A3 tons ' 
instead of 230. The driver had asked for a pilot engine, but 
this had been refused. It was pointed out that the overloading 
was not dangerous: it merely meant that some speed would be 
lost. It was not uncommon for goods trains to lose steam on 
that stretch of the line, but very rare for this sort of 
passenger train. Thus, there were extenuating circumstances, 
but Caudle had made a mistake, and was prosecuted for man­
slaughter. The jury found him guilty, but asked for clemency, 
and he was sentenced to two months in the second division, 
which caused much discontent among railway workers, and 
aroused threats of a strike to secure his release. On 31 
October, he was granted a pardon, and left jail. Such papers 
as the Daily Mail and the Manchester Guardian had followed the 
case, disliked the sentence, and welcomed the pardon. Cole 
and Arnot have argued that it was given as the direct result
of the imminent stoppage, but provide no evidence. If it were
\  . ,. -  ...
the case, then it would be a clear indication of the Government’s 
concern about the possibilities of a rail stoppage, and would 
show that this was an industry in which the Government was 
prepared to intervene, on the side of the workers, in order to 
ensure that the system continued to operate. It had initiated 
an investigation in the Knox case, and thus ended a dispute, 
and it had worked continually to prevent, and then to end, the 
1911 strike. Qf course, it is mere speculation on this 
occasion, for the pardon could have been granted on purely ' 
humanitarian grounds. Unfortunately, the Home Office files 
do not even mention the affair, but certainly the anger of 
the railway workers shows their restlessness, and typifies
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the year 1913-
Discontent of postal workers
Postal workers had been expressing discontent at their
wages for sane'time, and by November 1913 this had become a
matter which could have resulted in a stoppage unless an
advance was awarded. The men’s demands were not treated
very sympathetically in the press. Many papers, including
the Manchester Guardian. Daily Mail. Daily Graphic and Sunday
 ^ Chronicle, reminded their readers that the workers enjoyed
medical attention and job security as part of their wages, so
that they were better off than most of the working class.
The Morning Post was amazed: ’There was a time when a Post
Office servant would have thought it unworthy of his service
and of his tradition to threaten a strike, when a sense of
loyalty and discipline would have made the.humblest Post
(27)Office servant recoil from such a proposal'. Times
were changing, at least as far as the men were concerned, and 
it is instructive to observe that papers such ns the Morning 
Post wanted to live in the past, and made no attempt to 
discover the causes of the changes in attitude which brought 
about discontent amongst the postal workers.
This was a threatened cessation of work by employees in 
a public service and the State was generally considered to be 
.a far better employer than private concerns, so the demand for
a wage increase, and the possibility.of astrike was not
-Particularly well received: the men, were fairly treated.
-and, therefore., they had no.rigM-lQ-Droiest. Public employees
(27) Morning Post 12 December 1913, p. 6
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actually did stop work in Leeds at this tine.
Leeds Corporation strike
There had been a strike of gas workers in Leeds in June 
1913, which had resulted in 857 nen gaining advances of 
between 1s and 2s. The other Corporation workers wanted to 
gain a sinilar rise, but the Council had refused to discuss 
the natter, and a strike began in December. A few nen con­
tinued to work, and they were assisted by clerks fron the 
various departments, all of whon received 7s 6d a day, 
compensation for spoilt clothes, food and sleeping accommodation 
at their works, and police protection. Thus, the strike 
breakers were paid considerably more than the regular employ­
ees, They were assisted by ordinary citizens and by'students 
at Leeds University, who were greatly encouraged in their 
efforts by Vice Chancellor Sadler. The Corporation remained 
firm, and the nen were defeated. By 3 February 19U, about 
seven hundred former employees had not been reappointed.^28^
Just as many papers had argued that the postal workers 
had no case because o f their additional benefits, so those o f 
the Corporation employees were lis ted : job security, paid 
holidays, and better pay than in the private sector. Thus, 
the Morning Post, the Spectator, and the Daily Graphic dis­
missed the men's case. Even those moderate Liberal papers 
the Dally Chronicle and the Manchester. Guardian argued that
(28) A useful account o f the dispute, and especially the role 
o f the students, appears in J.E. Williams ’ The Leeds 
Corporation Strike in 1913* in A. Briggs and 
J. Saville Essays in Labour History 1886-1923 (1971)
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the strike vas anti-social in that it affected the whole' 
community, and so it ought not to have taken place. The 
section of the press that was continually opposed to trade 
unionism - the Standard» the Sunday Tines especially, blamed 
the Syndicalists, while the Tines was delighted at the 
resolute action taken by the employers in Dublin, Leeds, and 
at the Post Office: ’The outstanding feature presented by 
industrial affairs, as this stormy year draws to a strong 
close, is the resolute resistance offered to the attacks, of
militant trade unionism on the comunity in three prominent
, (29) cases’. '
Of course, support for the Corporation was not unanimous. 
The Daily News and Leader felt that there were faults on both 
sides. The employers had refused to even talk to the men:
’It is difficult to understand the indifference to the public 
interests of which they are the appointed guardians which 
such inaction implies in the Leeds Council. True zeal for 
the ratepayers real interests could not seriously contemplate 
the prolongation of the strike on any economic grounds. On the 
other hand, the apparent indifference of the men to the loss 
and mischief they are causing is not a point in their favour’ 
The way in which the Corporation refused to discuss the natter 
with the men brought adverse comment from the New Statesman 
and Arthur Greenwood, writing in the Economic Journal, as 
well as the Labour press,' while Frank'Smith' pondered on the
(29) Times. 18 December 1913, p. 9
(30) Dally News and Leader. 16 December 1913, p, 6
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logic of a Corporation that spent enough on breaking the -
( o - i  \
strike to have paid the increased wages for several years.
Thus, the Leeds Corporation strike and the unrest of 
the postal workers raised the question of the rights of 
employees in the public service. It was only the more 
radical section of the community which would accord to such 
people the right to strike, and even the traditionally Liberal 
Daily News and Leader felt that there was a distinction 
between such workers and those in the private sector. It 
was certainly true that they did receive better fringe 
benefits, but their wages were not high, and they were still 
working for an employer, even if they were paid out of the 
public purse. Some of the work did affect the health of the 
population of Leeds, and this could have been a cause of the 
opposition, though the reaction to the threat by postal • 
workers nakes this seen somewhat doubtful. It is more 
likely that a large section of the community felt that public 
employees should be ready for work at all times, simply 
because they worked for the community, whereas an individual 
had a person or group of shareholders as their employer. At 
least this distinction meant that some papers had accepted 
that there would be. strikes, on the other hand, many of them 
had devised lists of industries in which strikes should not be 
permitted, and this dispute had emphasised the need for 
stoppages by public employees to be added to this list.
(31) F. Smith ’The Industrial Unrest from Labour’s
Standpoint ’ Fortnightly Review. 1 Kay 19U, p. 902
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S+.rike of London builders
1913 had seen a wave of small disputes in the London 
building trade, often over working with non-unionists.
This led the employers to introduce its ’'document" in '
January 19U. They wanted all their workers to be bound baL 
the following declaration: »1 agree, if employed by you, Vo * 
peacefully work with my fellow employees (engaged eithejt ±n 
your direct employment or with a sub-contractor), wheifeer• 
they are members of a trade society or not, and I agree that 
I will not quit your employment because of any offmy fellow 
employees is or is not a member of any trade society; and I also 
agree that if I commit any breach of this agreement I shall be 
subject to a fine of 20s and I agree that the amount of such 
a fine nay be deducted from any wages which nay be due to me*. 
The men refused to sign, and by 21 January 1911, virtually 
all of London's builders had been locked out.
The Daily News and Leader advised the .employers to 
forget about their "document", and to negotiate with the 
union, but other papers, such as the Daily Telegraph, the 
Dally Express, and the Spectator, felt that a stand had to be 
taken against the militant methods of the titadg, unions. Thus 
there was the usual range of opinion, and the Labour Party 
itself was especially watchful, because of the questions it 
raised. W.A. Middleton of the General Federation of Trade 
Unions wrote to the Joint Board of the Party, noting that 
'the attack of the employers upon the building trades 
appears to me to so seriously endanger the general principle 
of trade unionism that I an anxious to do something about it 
and to do it very quickly', and ho suggested meetings of the
- 304 -
Joint Board and the National Finance Comittee to raise funds
(32)to resist the document, but when this was convened, the 
decision was to observe the situation, and to take action 
when it seemed necessary.
The strike continued, and on 16 April, the employers
agreed to withdraw the document, and the men held a ballot to
decide whether to return to work, or to stay out for a closed
shop. The terms were refused by 23,4^1 to 2,021, despite the
advice of the Daily Citizen, which had urged a resumption.
The other Labour paper, the Daily Herald, which was liable to
lend its support to the men in any dispute, was delighted at
the decision of the building workers, who had followed the
policy that it had advocated.
In May, the employers threatened a national lock out if
a settlement was not concluded. Another ballot resulted in a
refusal to return to work by 21,017 to 5,824» contrary to the
wishes of the relevant unions. The Daily Chronicle had been
anxious that the men should have settled, but felt that
their vote ’ shows how fat? the trade unions, even old unions
of skilled men like the Carpenters and Joiners, are moving
away from the disciplined traditions that made them successful
in the past. In the- disciplined days, the present conflict
would probably have been avoided, but, if not, it would
(33)
certainly have been stopped’. In fact, the masons did
go back to work, and the national lock-out never materialised, *5
(32) L.F./J.B./11/1/77 Letter from Middleton to Joint Board
5 February 1914
(33) Daily Chronicle. 29 May 1914, p. 6
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but the comment on the lack of discipline is indicative of the 
mood of the tines.
The nen were generally castigated for renaining out, 
as they did throughout the gunner. The reactions to this 
dispute illustrate the fact that the notion of a closed shop 
was one which few people were prepared to accept at that tine. 
The length of the stoppage indicates the degree of feeling on 
both sides but especially by the nen, who remained out, even 
against the overwhelming public support for employers, and; 
even though the tro.de unions and the official newspaper of 
the Labour Party favoured a return to work.
Strike at the Woolwich Arsenal
Another dispute over trade unionism began at the Woolwich 
Arsenal on 3 July 19U. An employee, a member of the 
Amalgamated Society of Engineers, was instructed to erect 
some machinery on a concrete bedding which had been prepared 
by non-union labour. He refused to do this, and was dismissed. 
A union meeting later in the day decided to coll out all the 
members of the Amclgamated Society of Engineers employed in 
the factory, and also to urge the unskilled unions to join 
in. This was so successful that by A July, between seven and 
eight thousand men had left their work. Two days later, 
production at the Arsenal cane to a complete halt when nen in 
the Army end Naval Ordnance Department responded to the 
strike call. At that point, about ten thousand workers were 
involved in the stoppage, and only a few hundred had reported 
for duty, end even they were defecting rapidly - the Arsenal 
vas highly unionised, with almost everyone belonging to some
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organisation. The Prime Minister intervened, and gained, a 
resumption by establishing a Court of Inquiry, with Askwith 
as Chairman, two representatives of the Government, and two 
union nominees. The dismissed nan was reinstated, and would 
not be punished if the result went against him.
The course of the dispute was followed in the press, 
where there was almost universal opposition to the behaviour 
of the men. Asquith was attacked by the Conservatives for 
surrendering to those people who were attacking the community, 
and the concept of the sympathetic, strike was denounced.
Even the Daily News and Leader was doubtful about the 
stoppage, and wondered if compulsory trade unionism might not 
prevent such unrest. It noted that opinion had turned, against 
the men: 'No one conversant with the temper of the middle 
classes can doubt the effect which-these'-continuous threats 
of instant and widespread calamity unless some particular 
wrong is remedied are producing on their minds. It is not 
true to suggest that the mass of the middle classes have any 
animus against labour; there is plenty of sympathy with 
the real grievances of the worker among shopkeepers and the 
less wealthy professional classes. But repeated threats of 
ruin unless this or*the other alleged wrong is instantly 
redressed can have only one effect in the long run, human 
nature being what it is. The result will be such a set back 
to progressive aims as has not been seen in our time and 
from which it may well take a generation to recover. The 
strike, properly used, is a valuable and legitimate weapon 
for the assertion in the last resort of Labour's rights: 
employed merely vexatiously it will recoil to the ruin of
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(o/)
those who have misused it*. dearly, the degree of
working class unrest had caused this paper, usually a 
supporter of the workers, to modify its stance. Even the 
Daily Citizen was not delighted at the militancy of the 
trade unionists, but the Daily Herald, as ever, pledged its 
full support to the strikers. It was the only paper which 
was unreservedly behind the men.
The stoppage at the Woolwich Arsenal produced the usual 
opposition from the Tory press, and a note of warning from 
the Liberal Party in general, and one of its leading and 
most radical organs in particular. Even the official paper 
of the Labour Party was not enthusiastic. The numerous 
disputes, and the increasing evidence of sympathetic strikes, 
or those over the issue of non-union labour appeared to be 
swaying opinion against the men, who were certainly becoming 
more militant.
The Triple Alliance
After several months of speculation, the various unions 
involving miners, transport workers and railwaynen come 
together in a federation known as the Triple Alliance, in 
June 19U. The participating unions agreed to take common 
action on wage claims, and in resisting their employers.
This would greatly strengthen the hand of the men, and it 
would also prevent one group of workers putting another out 
of work during a dispute - all would be involved together.
Opinions on the establishment of this organisation were 
varied. Some of the traditional Conservative papers
(3AV Dally News and Leader, 8 July 1914, p. A
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disapproved, feeling that i t  was part o f the Syndicalist 
campaign, and that the association would operate against the 
interests o f the community at large. Arguments in such a 
vein came from the Spectator, the Standard, end the Daily
Graphic. On the other hand, equally traditional papers lik e  
the Times and the Doily Mail fe l t  that the formation o f th is 
organisation would ensure that both employers and employees 
would think more carefully before seeking m ilitant solutions 
to their disputes, because o f the sheer numbers involved, and 
any stoppage would be shorter than before fo r the same reason. 
Radical journals such as the New Statesman and Reynolds's 
Newspaper concurred, and the Daily Herald took a similar lin e . 
The Syndicalists were bound to support such a move, as their 
policy was to unite the unions. The degree o f support fo r 
the Syndicalists within the trade unions cannot be accurately 
assessed, but there can be no doubt that the movement did have 
a following. For example, the Tickmansworth branch o f the 
newly formed National Union o f Railwayman produced a banner 
ca lling fo r 'p o lit ic a l action' and 'industrial action' to 
arrive at a ‘ co-operative commonwealth’ . The banner main­
tained that 'The liberation o f the working class is  the act
(o f the workers themselves’ . ' This would indicate a degree 
o f  rank and f i l e  support fo r the Syndicalist aims o f the 
Trip le Alliance.
Thus, the views on the Triple Alliance were extremely 
varied: the extreme Tories saw i t  as a Syndicalist organisa­
tion which would aim to take over the country, while the
(35) Banner in the John Goiman Collection
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extreme left wing hoped for just that, and ■ those in between 
tended to feel that its very strength might prevent industrial 
unrest, though they were not altogether sure.
General range of attitudes by 1914-
The Economist made a point which few of the Conservative
papers had considered. It argued that ’though agitators nay
exploit and ferment, they cannot create a thing so deep and
wide as labour's dissatisfaction with its own position'. ' -
II.A. Coulson, writing in the Sunday Chronicle, went even
further. He felt that the country was on 'the brink of
revolution', because 'society has failed, with a failure
growing steadily more conspicuous, to incorporate the working
(37}man as a stable and-contented element in her-organisation'. 1 
The Drily Mail, although critical of the 'internal anarchs’-' 
of the unions, when the members ignored their leaders, was 
nevertheless disturbed that some employers 'are still too 
mechanical and aloof in their treatment of labour and too 
heedless of the innumerable aspects of the industrial relation­
ship that lie outside the weekly payment of wages
Thus, a section of the Tory press had moved into the 
twentieth century, and was able to realise that the faults 
were not always on the side of the men: the working class did 
have grievances, and the employers were not always dealing 
with these complaints in the best way. Their opinions had 
changed as the unrest had intensified. Clearly, something
(36) Economist. L, October 1913» P* ¿37
(37) Sunday Chronicle. A January 191A. P. 1 
(33) Daily Mail. 7 October 1913, p. 6
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had caused the massive upsurge in militancy. J.R. Clynes,
the former cotton worker, and Organising Secretary of the
Lancashire District of the Gas Workers' and General Labourers'
Union? who had been a Labour M.P. since 1906, later recalled
that the strikes of 1913-U 'terrified the country, and
(39)civil war seemed at times to be very near'. Such fear
was expressed, for example, by "Politicus" in the Fortnightly 
Review: 'Organised labour has of late fallen more and more 
under the influence of men who despise law and order, who 
openly preach violence, and who aim not at improving the lot 
of the workers by legitimate means, but at destroying capital, 
making war upon society, and bringing about a revolution.
More and more often, organised labour trios to impyovo its, 
conditions not by negotiations, not by abstaining"from work, 
but by attacking the community and by inflicting upon it the 
greatest possible injury. Attempts are made to deprive the 
public of coal in mid-winter, of ice in the height of summer, 
of the post at Christmas time, of electric light at night.
A general strike was declared in Great Dritain at the very 
moment when serious complications had arisen between Great 
Britain and Germany at the time of the Morocco crisis, with 
criminal selfishness and indifference, refused to adjourn the 
strike until the foreign situation had become clearer...Nowadays, 
every large strike in peaceful Great Britain is accompanied by 
riots, the deliberated destruction of property, arson, and 
violence..¿Great strikes no longer break out, but are "made" 
by a few leaders.,.The tyranny...of labour, by undermining the 
foundations of British industry and of British wealth is one
(39) J.R. Clynes, Memoirs 1869-1924 (1937) p. 153.
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of the greatest dangers which threatens Society and the State1.
This indicates a very real belief that a revolution was 
imminent. Perhaps the reader was almost hysterically opposed 
to working class militancy, hut nevertheless, his fear and panic 
were real enough. Even those who were not so pessimistic were 
able to observe the increasing unrest, which was at least a 
cause for concern. Consequently, a variety of different 
solutions were advanced to prevent the continuance of the 
labour troubles.
Solutions
At the Labour Party Conference, Tom Fox, the President, 
commented on the * seething mass of unrest and discontent 
amongst our people, an unrest amply justified by cruel social .. 
inequalities and intolerable industrial pressure. But, surely, 
the duty of the Labour Party is not to exploit what is termed 
unrest for party purposes. It is rather our duty to direct it 
helpfully and give it object and method’/ ^  Thus, the idea 
was to channel the discontent into politics, and try to elect 
a Labour Government. This was an unlikely event, as the 
Labour Party had not in the past been able to control or 
direct the industrial militancy.
A solution regularly advocated was the use of compulsory 
arbitration. Buxton examined this matter very carefully in a
(AO) »Politicus" ’The Tyranny of Labour Fortnightly Review.
2 March 191A> pp. A06-7, A17.
(A1) Report of the 1Ath Annual Conference of the Labour 
Party (l91A) 27 January 191A> p. 91
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paper prepared for the use of the Cabinet in January 1914.
He agreed that something had to be done, for ’if the 
Government make no legislative proposals next session to deal 
with industrial disputes, they would be subjected to consider­
able criticism, especially if there were widespread labour
unrest this year’. However, he could not accept that com- .
(42)pulsory arbitration was the answer',
The Conservatives were more likely to adopt that method. 
The Unionist Social Reform Committee arrived at.what it 
called 'a practical solution’. It believed that the strikes 
were 'not so much against particular employers- as against the 
prevailing conditions of life’, and had to be prevented.
Thus, it advocated the creation of a single Labour Department 
at the Board of Trade. The Chief Industrial Commissioner 
would appoint a Board of Conciliation and Investigation, 
composed of three men, to look at any important strike, and 
offer advice. Its decisions would not be legally binding, 
though they could be made so should the lack of compulsion 
prove a hinderance. Wage agreements vrere to be contracts, 
with notice of termination or change, and there could be no 
strike or lock-out before the issues had been examined by a 
joint tribunal. *
This resembled the moribund Industrial Council, except 
that there was to be a compulsory waiting period for the 
tribunal’s examination, and was a typical solution of the
(42) CAB/37/118/14
(43) Unionist Social Reform Committee, Industrial Unrest; A
Practical Solution (1914) pp. 1, 19-30
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more moderate Unionists, seeking a compromise. The more 
extreme members of the community went even further. Lord 
Norton, the devout Anglican, wrote to Bonar Law, wishing 
that his Party 'would try to capture the Labour Party 
permanently by offering what Mr. Chancellor is now doing - 
a Tribunal to settle labour disputes without waste of Strike 
Funds and why not Trial by Jury as is done in the case of 
every breach of the Eighth Commandment1. Such people
invariably saw the working class as the wrong doers in the , 
labour unrest, and sought to legislate against them.
Thus there was an extremely diverse range of opinions on 
the course and the direction of the labour unrest, and an 
equally varied range of solutions, all of which, significantly 
were based on the expectation of further, end perhaps even 
better organised, militancy. The stage was set for a labour 
war, with the working class ready, and militant. That this 
never materialised was due to the outbreak of war.
(44) Bonar Law Papers 32/3/43 Letter from Norton to Law,
22 May 1914.
Chapter X
The Outbreak of War
Foreign affairs had been neglected by the majority of 
the press until the outbreak of war become imminent, but the 
labour movement had been prepared for years to prevent on 
outbreak of war which could lead to the working classes of 
different countries killing each other. The Second Inter­
national, a federation of the Socialist parties of the world, 
discussed this question at its Stuttgart Conference in 1907, 
and after many alterations agreed unanimously that 'If a war 
threatens to break out, it is a duty for their parliamentary 
representatives, with the aid of the International Bureau as 
an active and co-ordinating power, to make every effort to 
prevent the war by all means which seem to them the most 
appropriate means, which naturally vary according to the 
intensity of the class struggle and to the political situation 
in general. Should war none the less break out, it is their 
duty to intervene in order to bring it promptly to on end, 
and with all their strength to make use of the economic and • 
political crisis created by the war to stir up the deepest 
strata of the people and precipitate the fall of capitalist 
domination'. This was reaffirmed at Copenhagen in 1910 and 
Basle in 1912. On 15 and 16 July 19U, a special conference 
of the French Socialist Party, attended by Plekhanov and 
Rubanovich of Russia, Anseele and Wauters of Belgium, Vliegen 
of Holland, and Liebknecht of Germany decided by a small 
majority that there would be a general strike should war be 
declared. After Austrial had declared war on Serbia, the
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International Socialist Bureau met at Brussels on 29 July 
. 19U. Haase, of Germany, gave the impression that the German 
Socialists would oppose their country should it intervene,, and 
they would refuse to vote war credits. A resolution was 
passed calling on the workers’ movements to intensify anti­
war demonstrations.
In Britain, the Daily Citizen urged the workers of Europe
to stand firm, 'for if they do so they can prove themselves
more powerful than the rulers who, for their own ends, would
(1)
stifle working class liberty in blood’. On 1 August, the
British Section.of the International Socialist Bureau issued
a Manifesto to the British People which told them to act fo r
peace, reminded them that they had ’never been consulted about
the war’, ond^enoowraged demonstrations. It included the
slogan 'Down with class rule...Down with war...Up with the
peaceful rule of the people'. The same day, the Daily Herald
made a similar plea: 'Stop the war. Let this be the united
(2)command cf the British working class’, and the Dally 
Citizen was convinced that this was the case, as the ’Socialists 
and Labour workers of Great Britain stand solid and four-square 
against war'.^ It seemed as though this was going to prove 
to be the case. A mass meeting at Trafalgar Sqttarc the 
following day, organised under the auspices of the British 
Section of the International Socialist Bureau, passed a resolu­
tion tMt ’the Government of - Britain should rigidly decline •
(1) Daily Citizen, 27 July 191/,., r* L
(2) Daily Herald. 1 August 19U, p. 5
(3) Daily Citizen. 1 August 191-4» p. A
-  316 -
to engage in war, but • should confine itself to efforts to 
bring about peace as speedily as possible*. John McNair has
described this as *the greatest open air demonstration for 
(¿\ /
years'. ' It was presided over by Hyndman, who, although a 
fervent militarist *had so far scrupulously observed the 
peace resolutions of the International*, but, despite these 
efforts, war was declared, and from that juncture, Hyndman 
‘launched a campaign to support the cause of the allies'.
War was declared on 5 August; the Executive Committee of the 
Labour Party issued a statement which condemned ’the policy 
which has produced the war', but wanted to ensure that the 
working class did not suffer any hardships while hostilities 
lasted. That evening, a majority of the Parliamentary Labour 
Party rejected MacDonald's proposal to speak against war 
credits in the House of Commons, so he resigned as Chairman.
The Independent Labour Party, on the other hand, did not lend 
its support to the war, and on 13 August issued a manifesto:
'Out of the darkness and the depth we hail our working class 
comrades of every land...Long live International Socialism'»
It was signed by Hardie, MacDonald, Maxton and Snowden.
However, the main section of the working class movement rapidly 
became involved in the war effort. On 24 August, the Industrial 
Truce was announced, by which the unions pledged themselves to 
refrain from striking for the duration. On 28 August, Asquith *5
(4.) N. McNair, .Tames Maxton. The Beloved Rebel (1955) p. 43
(5) C..Tsugfiki, H.M. Hyndman and British Socialism (Oxford
D. Phil. 1959) pp. 293, 294
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wrote to Henderson, who had replaced MacDonald as the Leader 
of the Labour Party, inviting that organisation to co-operate 
in a recruitment campaign. The Parliamentary Labour Party 
agreed, and the National Executive of the Labour Party resolved, 
by the narrow margin of seven to four, that, 'in view of the 
serious situation created by the European war the Executive 
Committee of the Labour Party agrees with the policy of the 
pnliry* ParUnmsntnry Party in joining in the campaign
to strengthen the British Army and agrees to place the central 
office organisation at the disposal of the campaign, and 
further recommends the local affiliated bodies to give all 
possible local support*.^  By the beginning of September,
the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. agreed to encourage 
enlistment, and *thereby demonstrate to the world that a free 
people can rise to the supreme height of a great sacrifice 
without the whip of conscription*, and on the result of this 
'rests the preservation and maintenance of free and unfettered 
democratic government*. J Within weeks, the labour movement 
was becoming increasingly absorbed in helping the Government.
On 15 October, the majority of the members of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party and the Parliamentary Committee of the T.U.C. 
published a Manifesto blaming Germany for the war, and claim­
ing that ‘the victory of Germany would mean the death of 
democracy in Europe*.
Thus, although it had seemed that the workers of Britain 
would be encouraged to resist the war, the labour movement
(6 ) L.P. N.E.C. 29/1/19U f.9 5  29 August 19U
(7) Statement issued by the Parliamentary Committee of the
T.U.C., 4 September 1914
rapidly supported it. G.D.H. Cole has claimed that the leaders
•had caught the war mood. They did not care to argue1, ^
and miners, especially, rushed to the recruiting stations.
Lord Halifax wrote to Kitchener, telling him that he »would
be pleased, I think, with the way the miners are enlisting
in these parts (South Yorkshire)...1 do not think it is
possible to see men animated by a better spirit. It makes
(9)one proud of one's country*. Redmayne, the Chief Inspector 
of Mines, later made a similar comment: »From no class in the 
community did this call on their patriotism meet with a more 
spontaneous and conspicuous answer than from the coal miners. 
4.0$ of the miners of military age were absorbed into military 
service, and by far the greatest numbers left in the mines in 
the early weeks of the war, that is, in the autumn of 1914-’.
Ironically, the most famous opponent of the war was a 
former collier, Keir Hardie, who was M.P. for Merthyr Tydfil.
He had a solid record of anti-militarism, and his attitude 
was unchanged by the outbreak of hostilities. His popularity 
in his constituency had been enormous. Jack Jones has recelled 
his father's comments about someone who had stood against Hardie 
about ten years previously; the opponent "'Might as well have 
stayed home, for they may as well try to shift a mountain as 8910
(8) G.L.H. Coin. A History of the Labour Party from 1914
(1969 ed.) p. 21
(9) Kitchener Papers P.R.0./30/57/73 WS/& Letter from Halifax
to Kitchener, 5 October 1914
(10) R.A.S. Redmayne, The Britsh Coal Mining Industry during 
the War (1923) pp. 12-13
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shift Keir Hardie. He’s here for life"'.^^ Yet the var
changed that. Hardie returned to the area to speak at
Aberdare on 6 August 1914» and began to express his opinions
on events, but he vas unable to complete his speech because
of interruptions. Such treatment upset Hardie deeply. A.J.P.
Taylor has studied his reaction and discovered that ’the
outbreak of war broke his heart. What shattered him was not
so much the war in itself as that the working class went along
with it. He said after a rowdy meeting at Merthyr, his
constituency, ’"I understand what Christ suffered in
(12)Gethsemane as well as any man living"’,' His stance was
criticised in the national press, which accused him of trying
to draw attention to himself by his statements.
The flood of recruits to the Army was surprising, if only
because of the low status of the soldier. When Jack Jones had
enlisted during the Boer War, his father told him that ’"only
them that runs from the p ’lice, an’ them that are too lazy to
( 1 3 )work, goes to the army"', but now everything was different, 
and.there was a rush to the recruiting stations. This was not 
confined to the young. Sir Ellis Hume-Williams, the barrister 
and M.P., recalled that, with the declaration of war came for 
him ’the problem with which every other middle aged man was at 
once faced, namely "How to get a job of some sort at the 
Front Margaret Cole has observed that after the 1
(11) J. Jones, Unfinished Journey (Oxford 193?) p. 118
(12) A.J.P. Taylor ’The Man in the Cloth Cap in Politics
end Wartime and Other Essays (1964) p. 4.8
(13) J. Jones op.cit. p. 95
(14) E. Hume-Willicms, The World, the House, and the Bar
(1930) p. 73... .. ....'..;................ ........
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Germans had invaded Belgium, the 'great majority of those who
at the beginning of August were pacifist or "non-interventionist”
(15)now eagerly wished to go to war'. An anonymous writer has
claimed that the literary editor of the Evening Standard told
him at the beginning of August: 'What's rattling me is that I
don't believe in it - I hate it and wish I'd got the pluck to
stand up at street corners and say so - I'm going to join in
as soon as we're landed in the ness, tind I'm a pacifist'.
It was the sane with Sir Arthur Markham. His sister wrote
later that the war 'swept away every other thought and con-
(17)sideration, his near pacifism vanishing in a night'.' 1 The
Nation, q paper that had previously expressed anti-war
sentiments, discussed the concept of on international working
class strike against the war, and declared that it was
theoretically sound, but the workers of Belgium were unable
( 1 8 )to strike, and the British had to help them. As Beatrice
Webb put it, 'with one tiny exception, the whole nation is
( 19)unanimous for the war». ' The press tried to encourage 
more vigorous recruiting. The popular papers carried patriotic 
stories which demonstrated that the nation was united at this 
time, and the music hall developed a new repertroire of 
patriotic songs such as Pether and Trevor's 'lour King and 
Country Needs You'. -
(15) M. Cole op.cit. p. 50
(16) Almost Anybody, About Nothing Whatever (1936) p. 117
(17) V. Markham, Friendship's Harvest (1956) p. 23
(18) Nation. 15 August 19U, pp. 728-730
(19) M.I. Cole (ed.) Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1912-192A (1952)
p. 29
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H.A. Gwynne, the editor of the Morning Post showed how 
oblivious to death he had become when he wrote to Lord 
Kitchener, the Secretary of State for War. Gwynne advocated 
that Britain «should fix on a number, say 620,000 men, as the 
number of troops that are always going to represent Great 
Britain in the firing line throughout this war, and that all 
other forces being raised will be used only as feeders to 
this force so that whatever happens there will be an army 
of 620,000 men, composed of the most efficient soldiers in the 
world, always in front of the German*. This sort of on 
attitude was well depicted by H.G. Wells in his novel 
Mr. Britling Sees It Through (1916), in which an intellectual 
middle aged man, who had not believed that war was possible, 
became a super patriot at the outbreak of hostilities, though 
subsequently, with the death of his son, and their former 
German tutor, he began to think of the futility of war.
However, in 1914, virtually everyone supported the war. 
The Times was »convinced that the young nation will respond 
with eagerness to...take up arms in this righteous struggle 
with a stem determination to fight for their hones and to 
crush for ever the menace which has threatened all Europe*.
It was in no way surprised that the threat of an international 
strike against war had not materialised: »The class war of 
Socialism and the international peace movement associated with
(20) Kitchener Papers P.R.0./30/57/73 SW/6 Letter from 
Gwynne to Kitchener, 24 September 1914
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it have evaporated into words and are in process of collapsing
altogether...Now the occasion has arisen and the doctrine has
been put to the test what do we find? France has gone to war
with a Socialist at the head of her Government, supported by
the greatest anti-militarist trade union organisation, which
has issued a proclamation calling on all Frenchmen to serve
their country; and one of the most famous prophets of anti-
militarism in Europe, M. Gustave Herve, who was the other
day preaching desertion to soldiers, led the way in asking
permission to join the colours...M. V-nderville...the leader
of the Belgian Socialists...has joined the Ministry. The
Socialist Party has officially declared for the military
campaign. Socialists have always allowed the armed defence
of one's own country...(except) the largest Socialist body
in this country. Its horror of militarism is so uncompromising
that it even objects to the Boy Scouts...Defensive war
involves the admission that Germany, against whom they are
fighting, is engaged in on aggressive one. It is significant
that the German Social Democrats have always declined assent
to the anti-war Labour proposals...The spectacle we are
witnessing furnishes convincing proof that the tie of
nationality is still incomparably stronger than that of class...
The evidence at hone is not less emphatic. With one accord
employers and employed have called a truce to the stubborn
and widespread conflicts which were being waged in continuance
of the industrial warfare that has signalized the last four
years...Mr, Ramsay MacDonald ’ s resignation of the Leadership
(2 1)of the Labour Party indicates their failure'. 7 Fabian Ware
(21) Times. 7, 10 August 19K, p. 7
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was equally able to accept the situation, for several* years
previously, he had observed that ‘so long as...patriotism is
the controlling force, dominating all classes, the supreme
instinct in the hour of crisis, no renunciation and no
sacrifice vill be thought too great in the cause of unity’.
The Spectator adopted a similar argument, pointing out that war
’has proved what any man with any real knowledge of his country
should have known beforehand, that class differences are only
skin deep. The unity that arises from common nationality
supercedes the relatively trivial differences that arise from
(23)economic and social causes’. Most papers made some
comment along the same lines, and journals such as the Daily 
Mail, the Daily Graphic, the Manchester Guardian and the 
Quarterly Review noted how the working class had rallied to 
the support of the nation in her hour of peril, proving that 
the differences within the community were less important than 
the continuance of the nation itself. The Daily Express 
believed that ’the enthusiastic loyalty of the leaders and of 
the rank and file of the British trade unions is one of the 
happiest, characteristics of the situation, and it prophesies 
more clearly than anything the birth of a newer and a better 
Britain when the storm has passed. We are glad to admit that 
men whom we have been forced to attack in these columns are 
co-operating with the Government in many important particulars^ 
The Daily Telegraph, which had been one of the most bitter
(22) F. Ware. The Worker and his Country (1912) p, 276
(23) Spectator. 29 August 1914» p. 289
(24) Drily Express. 17 August 1914> p. 2
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opponents of organised labour, discovered ’the national
leadership of labour, as was to be expected, staunch for the
country and the cause of hunanity’. The National Anther,1 had
been sung in the House of Commons by William Crooks, the
Labour M.P. This pleased the Daily Telegraph: 'Who was it
who gave the signal for the thrilling confession of the
partiot’s faith that lives in every heart today?. It was one
of the leading spirits of that powerful Labour group upon
which, again, the unteachable ignorance of Berlin built such
high hopes; the party that was to raise the British working
class against the war, against the Monarchy, against the
foundations of the State for the benefit of the bloated
(25)ambitions of Prussian aristocracy’.
Reynolds's Newspaper had opposed the war, but, at the
onset, supported Britain, and agreed that the worker 'has been
as patriotic and as ready - more ready in most cases - to
sacrifice himself in the interests of the nation as has the
members of other c l a s s e s ' . T h i s  was a common attitude
emongst Liberals and supporters of the Labour Party. C.P.
Scott, the editor of the Manchester Guardian, wrote to W. Mellor
of the Manchester and Salford trade and Labour Council: 'I
am strongly of the opinion that the war ought not to have
taken place...but once in it the whole future of our nation
is at stake and we have no choice but do the utmost we can
(0 7)to secure success'.v The President of the Labour Party in
(25) Daily Telegraph. 5, 6 September 1914, p. 6
(26) Reynolds's Newspaper. 16 August 1914, p. 1
(27) T. Wilson (ed.) The Political Diaries of C.P. Scott
1911-1928 (1970) pp. 99-100
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1916, George Wardle, told the Annuel conference that he was
•as convinced today as I was at the onset that there could only
have been one greater tragedy than the war, and that would have
been for Britain to have kept out of it. I an proud of the
fact that the majority of the Labour Party threw itself into
the struggle with all the ardour at its command, and ny only
regret has been that the decision was not unanimous1.
G.R. Tweedie, a Liberal agent, noticed the sane unity:
•The finest thing nationally about the War was the grim
determination of almost every class of the community, without
distinction of class or creed, to face any sacrifice that night
(29)be necessary to secure victory'. The Duke of Lincolnshire
wrote to Lord Curzon, just after the former's son-in-law had 
been killed in battle. His daughter was heartbroken, and the 
Duke of Lincolnshire clearly felt deeply for her loss, but 
dismissed his personal grief, and urged Curzon to »think of 
the glorious way in which all our countrymen are behaving'. 
Thus, a common sacrifice was tending to unite the nation at 
that time.
One consequence of the outbreak of war was the end of 
industrial disputes. The long and bitter strike of London 
building workers had terminated at the declaration of 
hostilities, as had the Liverpool dock strike, which had
(28) Report of the 15th Annual Conference of the Labour
Party (1916) p. 83, 2A January 1916
(29) G.R. Tweedie, Yesterday (1932) p. 209
(30) Curzon Papers Eur.Mss.122/96. Letter from Lincolnshire
to Curzon, 22 September 1914-
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begun on 13 July 191-4« The Gelli Pit, belonging to the Cory 
brothers had been closed since October 1910 over a dispute 
about price lists, and the South Wales Miners' Federation 
had declared that none of its nenbers could work there. This 
ban was lifted with the outbreak of war. Thus, the unions 
were naking concessions in the war effort. This was illus­
trated further after the Government had taken over control on 
the railways. On 1 October 1914, a committee of eleven 
managers met the union leaders and agreed on a truce for the 
duration - no strikes, and the men renounced their claims for 
an eight hour day.
- The labour leaders had been caught in a web of patriotism, 
which was well reflected by Crooks singing the National Anthem 
in the House of Commons in September.1914. It was, perhaps, 
not very surprising that the more orthodox labour men should 
become involved in this way. Thus, it was no shock to see a 
chapter of B. Fuller's The Life Story of the Rt. Hon. J.H.
Thomas (1933) entitled 'The Recruiting Sergeant', or even to 
hear the miners' leader Herbert Smith described as 'patriotic 
to the core', because of his undeviating support for the war 
effort. However, even some of the men who had been regarded
as militant activists, such as Captain Tupper of the Seamen's 
Union gained a reputation for their vigorous encouragement of 
recruitment.
The anti-war group, centred around the Independent Labour 
Party, retained its fervour, despite a great deal of hostility.
(31) J. Lawson, The Man in the Cap. The Life of Herbert 
Smith (1941) P. 128
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Margaret Cole has recalled that there was opposition to the
_ war from all groups of society, including the Cabinet, the.
middle class, such as her father, on.the Clyde, and in the
South Wales coalfields, amongst the most class conscious.
Certainly, ordinary working folk were sometimes prepared to
take a stand. For example, R.M. Fox, in his autobiography,
remembers the war years well. He had just won a Co-operative
Scholarship to Ruskin College, but the outbreak of hostilities
prevented the reopening of the College. On Sundays, he used
to go to Finsbury Park, where he asked 1"Have you got a
sweating employer or a rack-renting landlord you can spare?
Let him join up to fight for humanity, for civilisation, for
democracy, for the women and children, for all those causes
(33)in which he has always been so enthusiastic"». The
Home Office kept files on those who were known to oppose the
war, and they were kept up to date by reports from the police
and from local citizens who objected to unpatriotic speeches*
at such a time. The Home Office would issue instructions to 
prosecute if it was considered absolutely necessary, but the 
real enemies of the anti-war group came from the local popula­
tion, who could threaten and even attack speakers whenever 
they wished.
Thus, the outbreak of war had changed the outlook of the 
majority of the British people. A fortnight before that date, 
industrial unrest was rife, and many expected even more 
serious internal disorder. The working class was distrusted
(32) M. Cole op.cit. p. 53
(33) R.M. Fox, Smoky Crusade (1938) p. 192
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because of its militancy, while large sections of the workers 
were prepared, even anxious, to overthrow the authority of 
their employers at any time. The country was seething with 
unrest and agitation, yet within a few days, as far as the 
majority of the population was concerned, this attitude had 
disappeared, and had been replaced by a new dominant force, 
that of patriotism. Moreover, the middle and upper classes 
did not seem particularly surprised that the working man had 
not rejected his country, and participated in the international 
strike against war, to which the International Socialist move­
ment had pledged itself. On the contrary, it seeps to have, 
been expected that the working man would behave as he did, 
and respond to the call made to him by his country. Some 
• comment was made on this topic, but it was simply to point 
out that the working classes had acted in the way.that the rest 
of the society considered proper, rather than relief that the 
militancy had not continued, with the needs of the nation 
ignored. Initially, it is surprising that the reaction to 
this burst of patriotism should have been one of nonchalence, 
as though no-one could have thought that any other behaviour 
was possible, but a more careful consideration reveals that 
the middle and upper class- were responding quite normally, 
given the social structure of Edwardian England. The outbreak 
of strikes had been opposed, because the lower classes were 
not supposed to act in a manner contrary to the interests and 
wishes of their employers and the welfare of the community. 
Consequently, such manifestations of discontent were blamed 
on demagogues, rather than on the mass of the men themselves. 
When a crisis arose - be it a pit accident or a war - they
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would then net in the decent British way. Patriotism had 
transcended class, but the Edwardian could not have anticipated 
anything else.
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Chapter XI **
Conclusions
The tern "public opinion" is regularly used as on 
argument for pursuing a particular policy, yet there is no 
such thing as a single "public opinion", which can be 
invoked to describe the attitude of the nation to a partic­
ular event. Over any issue, there is likely to be a collec­
tion of essentially similar views, which vary in intensity. 
It is extremely likely that there will also be a variety of 
opposing beliefs, which, again, will vary in strength. 
Opinion will shift over time, and the people who agree on 
one point might well be opposed to each other on another 
topic. Hence, public opinion is difficult to measure, and 
can only be related at best to one event, or series of 
similar events.
When attempting to gauge public .opinion, it is neces­
sary to study all those factors which help to create it - 
the mass media, speeches, articles and books, as well as 
important individuals within a group. In addition, there is 
the instinctive reaction of a person - perhaps irrational 
and ill-informed, but nevertheless an opinion based on an 
inner feeling. Any analysis of public opinion in years gone 
by is likely to be even more difficult than a contemporary 
study because of the scarcity of some material, and this has 
proved the case in investigating the reaction to labour 
unrest in Britain before the First World War. Particular 
emphasis has been given to newspapers, because they were the 
most prolific source. The public and private views of
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politicians, industrialists, trade unionists and individuals 
have been included whenever they have been ■uncovered, but, 
despite efforts to expand this side of the study, newspapers 
have tended to dominate the work. This is unfortunate, but 
unavoidable. It does mean that there may appear to be a 
series of more forceful opinions than was the case, and the 
Conservative bias of the press could present a somewhat 
distorted impression of events. However, it has raised 
several questions. The press is often accused of producing 
propaganda, so as to sway public opinion. This study 
attempts to look at the role of newspapers in the formulation 
of opinion, in the light of several current theories on this 
question.
The years 1911-U saw the worst outbreak of industrial 
unrest since the Board of Trade began to keep records. There 
were more strikes, more people involved, and more working days 
lost than ever before. Moreover, these were often not simple 
stoppages in a single workplace, but regional or national 
strikes. The first-ever national rail strike took place in 
1911; the first national coal strike in 1912. The walk out 
by sailors in 1911 was also national, while the disputes in 
the docks in the same year spread around the country from one 
port to another. In the Midlands, groups of unskilled men 
left work one after another in 1913. There was a new element 
in this because while there had been periods of high'strike 
activity before, the strikes had not been so widespread. Of 
the serious disputes, perhaps only the Great Dock Strike of 
1889, the coal lock-out of 1893» and the engineers* dispute 
of 1897 can be compared with those of 1911-14, as they,
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alone, involved a large number of workers. However, tKey were 
by no means national stoppages. The 1889 Dock Strike involved 
only the Port of London; the coal lock-out was confined to 
the English Federated Area; the dispute of the engineers, 
at its peak, affected only 702 firms end 4-7,500 workers.
These were the only major cessations of work prior to 1911-14, 
that can be compared to that period. It is instructive to look, 
briefly, at these disputes before venturing some conclusions 
on the main theme, for the similarities and contrasts between 
the reaction to these two sets of disputes may perhaps allow 
us to judge what was general and what was unique in 1911-144
The main contrasts, apart from the passage of time 
between them, was that the earlier disputes to be examined were 
seen as single events, whereas the public attitude in 1911-14 
was coloured by the fact that these disputes followed each 
other rapidly, end could possibly be seen as part of the 
same movement. A movement of a new order and magnitude 
with a powerful cumulative impact, as compared with strikes 
and lock-outs in earlier times^any. hostility or fear roused 
would by then w »  likely ie-be correspondingly intensive.
The story of the Dock Strike is well known. The 
permanent dockers received a regular weekly wage, but the 
casuals had to wait at the gates for jobs, and were paid 5d 
an hour - 4d at Tilbury - whin they were employed by a 
company. There were also contractors, who were paid r, sum 
of money by a company to do a piece of work. They would 
bargain with the men over wage rates. If the supply of 
labour was much higher than the demand, the wages received 
by the men could be as low as 3d an hour. Led by such men
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as Ben Tillett, Tom Mann and John Burns, the dockers' went 
on strike, demanding a minimum employment of four hours, the* 
abolition of contract and piecework payments, and a minimum 
wage of 6d an hour, with 8d for overtime. The publicity 
given to the dockers helped their cause; subscriptions come 
from as far afield as Australia to keep the strike going, 
and the Roman Catholic Cardinal Manning intervened to help 
end the dispute, because ’I found things going from bad to 
worse, and how much misery was the result. At last, from 
positive information, I became certain that fresh efforts 
which were about to be made to bring labourers from a 
distance...would lead to violent resistance, probably to 
bloodshed. Finding that no other medium aceep-aflato the 
combatants appeared to be available, I resolved to offer my 
humble services with the endeavour to bring them to meet 
together1.
On 6 September 1889, the Committee of Conciliation met 
at Mansion House. Present were Cardinal Manning, the Bishop 
of London, the Lord Mayor of London, Sydney Buxton, Lord 
Brassey, Sir John Lubbock, Ben Tillett, and John Burns. The 
latter two agreed that the 6d an hour should be paid from 
1 January 1890, and the Company agreed, but declined to moke 
any extra overtime payment. The men»s rejection of this 
caused the Bishop of London to withdraw, but Manning 
persuaded the Lord Mayor to remain, and then talked both 
sides into accepting the rise from 1 November 1889. Refer­
ring to the directors, he observed that *1 never in ny life
(1 \
preached to so impenitent a congregation».''
(1) E.S. Purcell, Life of Cardinal Manning (1896) pp. 665, 662
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This strike was the first major stoppage that affected
the public. The food supply of London was necessarily
interrupted, as were those industries which relied upon
imported materials. Nevertheless, popular opinion sided with
the dockers, possibly because of the good publicity they
received in the newspapers. The Manchester Guardian noted
that ’a remarkable feature of this struggle is the very
large amount of sympathy which has been shown among all
classes with the claims of the men. Unquestionably there
has been a widely prevailing desire for their success,
founded not so much upon a deliberate consideration of the
matters in dispute as questions of business, as on a
commiseration for the hard lot of a multitude of people
whose occupation is intermittent and precarious, and whose
rate of payment, even with continuous employment,'could not
(o)be considered liberal1.' That was one side of the 
reaction. The other was well illustrated by the Times, which 
had begun by supporting the dockers, but, by 28 August, was 
not so convinced: ‘While we continue to sympathise with the 
desire of the dock labourers to ameliorate their conditions, 
it is impossible not to feel some apprehension concerning 
the developments which the movement may take. The tendency 
of excited men in such circumstances is to get out of hand... 
Evidence is accumulating that intimidation is playing an 
appreciable, if not an important, part in this strike1.
Three days later, the stoppage had become 'nothing less than 
a deliberate attack upon the social organisation of the 
metropolis1, and by 2 September, it was insisting that if the
(2) Manchester Guardian. 2 September 1889, p. 5
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inactivity continued, ’it must be conducted with a.proper
regard for personal freedom’, by which the writer meant that
strike breakers should not be interfered with. Indeed, ’the
police have too often remained passive spectators of the
rowdy violence offered to men who wished to be allowed to
exercise their rights of working for whomever they pleased’.
By Christmas, the Times was arguing that employers ’ought
to take the lead in organising, disciplining, and
encouraging men who wish to work. If picketing is legal, as
seems to be the theory of the police, then it must also be
legal to picket the pickets. If a union con lawfully beset
all the roads to a manufactory with paid bullies, why can-
(3)
not employers take a leaf out of their books’. '
Thus, two quite distinct views had emerged? what appears 
to have been a large section of the community, including 
such notables as Cardinal Manning, who were appalled at the 
low wages of the dockers, and hoped that they would be 
successful. It is significant, as Llewellyn Smith and 
Vaughan Hash point out, that ‘the press was on the side of 
the menj the tide of public opinion was fast rising in their 
favour* subscriptions were beginning to pour in from all 
quarters’^  - and it was those subscriptions which main­
tained the strike. The authors imply that it was the line 
taken by the press that moulded public opinion, a debatable
(3) Tines. 28 August 1889, p. 9} 31 August 1889, p. 9}
2 September 1889, p. 7* 2A December 1889, p. 9 
(A) H.L. Smith and V. Nash, The Story of the Dockers’ Strike 
(1889) p. 68
-  336  -
contention, but they do indicate a large measure of support 
for the men. The opposite attitude was expressed by the . 
Times, whose dislike of industrial militancy increased as the 
dispute continued, so that by the resumption of work, it was 
a bitter enemy of strikes. Many employers felt the same way, 
and began to organise their defences, in case of further 
attacks by the working classes.
As has already been noted, the owners joined together 
in the Shipping Federation in September 1890, and established 
registry offices in every port, which, in 1891, enforced the 
Federation Ticket, the possession of which gave preference in 
employment in return for cxi agreement to sail with non- 
unionists. Strikes against this were defeated by the 
Shipping Federation, which then intensified its efforts by 
encouraging free labour associations to break strikes. The 
most famous of these was 'William Collison's National Free 
Labour Association, which was founded in 1893. It had 
regional offices, and could provide strike breakers to any 
part of the country, though it lacked skilled members, and so 
was useful only in disputes of manual workers.
Another group of employers to become involved in a 
debate with their men, leading to a stoppage, were the coal 
owners. Prices were falling in 1893, and in consequence the 
owners announced a reduction in wages. By 1893, the men of 
South Wales, Northumberland, and Durham had submitted to 
this, and on 30 June, a reduction was demanded for the 
English colliers, and the employers gave notice to terminate 
contracts by the end of July. The miners refused to accept, 
so that 300,000 were locked out, but eventually the union
-  337 -
decided to permit all the men who did not face a reduction 
to return to work, on the payment on a levy of 1s a day to 
the union. This levy went to a fund to alleviate distress. 
The coffers were swollen by the actions of A.E. Fletcher, 
the editor of the Daily Chronicle, who published articles 
about the hardships suffered by the men and their families, 
and who opened a subscription list for contributions to help 
ease this misery.
This, unlike the other, was not a dispute without 
violence. The most serious example of this centred around 
the Ackton Hall Colliery in Yorkshire. There had been a ' 
disturbance, some wagons were overturned and the troops were 
called in. When the crowd had failed to disperse, the 
soldiers opened fire, killing two, and injuring sixteen more. 
This caused a considerable amount of bitterness, and made a 
settlement even more difficult than before. At the end of 
October, the President of the Board of Trade, A.J, Mundella, 
suggested a joint meeting, which took place on 3 and A 
November, The owners asked for a reduction, though less 
than previously, but the men insisted on a return at the old 
wages. Thus, there was deadlock, until, in the words of 
Page Arnot, 'a step was taken till then unprecedented in the 
history of the coal trade1 - the Prime Minister, Gladstone, 
intervened, and in a letter dated 13 November 1893, asked the 
men to a meeting with Lord Rosebery, the Foreign Secretary, 
as Chairman. They met on 17 November, and agreed on an 
even smaller reduction than the revised demands of the owners, 
to begin on 1 February 189A, with the men resuming work at 
once on the old rates until then. A Conciliation Board
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composed of an equal number of employers’ and miners’
"representatives and an outside•Chairman was to be established
to determine the wages from 1 February 1894»
Page Arnot has pointed out that 'if it was not the
first time that a trade dispute had become the concern of
the whole country - the London Dock Strike of 1889 nay hold
this priority - it was certainty the first occasion on which
it was realised that a lock-out of cool miners could have a
slow, paralysing effect upon other industries and upon British
trade. Hence the Government, however reluctantly, was in
the end bound to intervene. It was also the first time for
over a century that sympathy towards the pitmen was widely
( 5 )manifested beyond the ranks of trade unionism'.
Certainly, there was some support for the action of the 
colliers. The Manchester Guardian, for example, felt that 
they were 'fully justified in resisting terras which would 
permanently depress mining labour below a reasonable standard 
of life’.^  On the other hand, opposition to the men was 
led, once again, by the.Tines, which condemned ’the obstinate- 
vanity of disappointed leaders’ who refused to accept the 
reductions, which were the 'inevitable-consequences of the 
prevailing economic depression’• The efforts of Gladstone 
and Rosebery were not.praised, but described as ’a doubtful 
step’. ^  That is hardly surprising. The attitude of the Times
(5) R.P, Arnot, The Miners 1889-1910 (19A9) pp. 2A9, 355
(6) Munchester Guardian, 10 October 1893, p. 7
(7) Times. 23 August 1893, p. 7j 8 August 1893, p. 9j
18 November 1893» p. 9
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was in principle conservative, in that it did net want to see 
change unless it was absolutely necessary,' and it did not 
believe that the role of a Government was to intervene in 
the free workings of the economy. Consequently, it was duty 
bound to be sceptical about the role of the Printf Minister 
and his colleagues during the dispute even when they had been 
successful in settling it.
Just as the Dock Strike had produced ono group which 
sided with the men, and another which felt that the employers 
were in the right, so the coal lock-out of 1893 led to the­
ory stalli sat ion of two opposing points of view. The two 
distinct opinions that emerged were held by the seme people 
on both occasions.
The next major industrial dispute produced a similar split 
in the community. After a dispute of engineering workers on - 
the Clyde and in Belfast, the Federation of Employers’ 
Associations was founded in 1396, thus uniting the various 
unions of owners in the engineering industry. By 26 May 1397, 
over a hundred London firms had conceded the forty-eight hour 
week, but ten days later, the Employers’ Federation formed a 
London Branch, which the Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
refused to recognise. The union continued to press for the 
forty-eight hour week, and served notice on those firms that 
had not granted it to yield, or face a strike on 3 July 1897. 
The Employers’ Federation decided that this was a national 
problem, and was not confined to London, and declared that if 
there was a strike, a national leck-out of 25% of all 
engineers would begin on 13 July. 17,000 union n tubers 
walked out on hearing this threat, and by the beginning of
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October, the lock-out had spread to 579 firms and affected 
- £5,000 sen, about half of whom belonged to the Amalgamated * 
Society of Engineers. Voluntary subscriptions showed that a 
section of the public sympathised with the men: George 
Cadbury gave £800, and by Nov amber, about £116,000 had been 
received. Nevertheless, as that month drew to on end, with 
702 firms, and £7,500 men involved, the costs were becoming 
prohibitive: the union was spending over £25,000 a week on 
benefits. It could not afford to maintain these payments, 
and by January 1893, the men were forced back to work.
This dispate did not arouse a great deal of comment,' 
even though it had encompassed a large number of people, for 
they were away from the public eye. When the docks closed 
down, shortages occurred, and the consumers would observe 
that the strike was having an effect upon their lives, but a 
lock-out of engineering workers would take a long time before 
its effects were felt on the daily lives of ordinary citizens. 
Consequently, it attracted correspondingly less interest. The 
Times, it may be worth noting, continued its staunch support 
for the employers, an attitude from which it had not deviated 
since 1889.
A great victory for the anti-lubour section of the 
community came in 19Q0. After a strike of the employees of 
the Toff Vale Railvay Company, the owners sued the Amalgamated 
Society of Railway Servants for damages alleged to have been 
caused by the loss of profits during the period of the strike. 
The case went as far as the House of Lords, which declared 
that the Union was liable for damages of £23,000. This 
decision virtually rendered the strike impossible,
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as the unions would henceforth have to recompense the 
companies concerned for any losses caused by the strike, 
whereas the vrhole purpose of such a stoppage is normally to 
inflict such a loss on the company that it becomes obliged 
to surrender to the wishes of the employees. The Times was 
delighted that the 'onions would suffer in this way, and 
rejoiced that the decision deprives them of an immunity 
which has been often and grossly abused...Vie believe it 
will commend itself to the natural sense of justice of the 
British people'.
The Liberal Government decided to pass a Trades Disputes 
Act in 1906 to change the law so that the unions were not 
, liable for damages caused in the course of a strike. The 
more conservative section of the community was outraged.:
The Times condemned the Bill's 'radically unjust provisions', 
while letters published in that newspaper reflected the 
ficaae attitude. A.V. Dicey, the authority on the British 
Constitution, pointed out that it 'confers a privilege on 
trade unions,,and this privilege is in reality the power to 
commit wrongs without incurring the risk of having to pay 
compensation to the victim of wrong doing. Is it, I ask, the
deliberate will of the nation that a privilege, so opposed to
">
every principle of justice should be conferred upon every 
trade union thoughout the land?'. A month later, Dicey, 
insisted that the effect of the Act 'menaces and authority 
of the State'. Godfrey Lushington argued that 'to grant 
immunity beforehand to a class to do what ex confesso is a 
both -unlawful and mischievous is a degrading proposal'.^ 8
(8) Times, 23 July.1901, p. 9j 2 November 1906, p. 7j 29
October 1906, p.-8; 29 November 1906, 'p.' 115 7+
December 1906, p. ..
V, '>
—  i
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Thus, the Times and others who shared similar views had 
made their opinions on the labour movement quite clear: they 
objected to strikes, to picketing, and to the power of 
trade unions. Every major incident had provoked the same 
type of comment, from them. The unrest of the years 1911-14 
was more likely to confirm such attitudes, rather than 
break them down, for the nation was faced with strikes on a 
magnitude never previously experienced, and the general 
public was becoming increasingly involved, precisely because 
the disputes affected the immediate well-being of the nation. 
This is an extremely important point. For the first tine, 
the strikes were hurting the public at largo, and were not 
merely contests between employer and employed. This altered 
the situation, in that the whole of the society was aware 
that the strikes were talcing place, and were liable to
suffer as a result. Consequently, most people were likely
\_ •to have opinions about the unrest, apportioning blcne on the 
men or the owners, according to their own feelings, status,. 
and political persuasion. Thus opinion tends to be public, 
rather than being confined to the press.
The views of the newspapers, however, were extremely 
varied, just as were those in the country at large, and it is 
not surprising that the opinions expressed by individuals should 
be repeated in one part or another of the press. The public 
utterances of politicians wore often repeated in the editorials 
of those journals with a similar outlook, while the private 
writings of individuals both prominent in public affairs and 
ordinary private citizens, often reappeared in a similar 
fashion. It would be difficult to maintain that public
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opinion was shaping that of the press, but it would not be 
unreasonable to suggest that the newspapers were apt to 
"repeat attitudes that had already been adopted, at least by 
one or another section of the community. Their reiteration 
in the columns of a newspaper could well have impressed them­
selves on the thoughts of the rest of the society in the 
troubled years of 1911-14, when everyone suffered to some 
extent from the working class militancy.
The Dean of St. Paul's, Dr. Inge argued that strikes 
had ceased to be contests between masters and men, end had 
ins4-o'-‘ become conspiracies against the whole community. As 
such, Dr. Inge considered that they should be regarded as acts 
of civil war, and repressed relentlessly by the Government.(9) 
He was by no neons isolated in his opinions. As strikes 
followed each other in the period 1911-14, similar sentiments 
became remarkably widespread. Be it a stoppage of. seamen, 
dockers, or miners, the men were decried for causing great 
suffering upon a large part of the notion, of trying to starve 
the community, and of conspiracy to attack the country. 
Anarchywas taking over,-or civil war was just around the 
corner. Of course, in such cases,' it was the employers who 
represented order, and the .strikers who were trying to disrupt 
this. The owners were never accused 9^  causing stoppages by 
their intransigent attitude. The enemies of the nation were 
the working men who organised such widespread disorder.
Indeed, they were often compared with external enemies, whose 
attacks had to be repulsed with all the means available to the 9
(9) Manche st er Guardi an, 9 February 1914, p.
State, or, alternatively, they had to be dealt with as 
^traitors who had organised a rebellion. Always, it was the 
workers who were the wrongdoers. This was not an uncomon 
view, and it is instructive. Those who maintained such a 
position did not hold its corollary, that to prevent people 
performing vital jobs from striking implies an obligation 
on the part of the community to ensure that such jobs were 
adequately paid. No such sentiments were expressed from 
these quarters, and those who wanted all strikes to be 
declared illegal, or at least all those strikes which would 
affect the community at large, did not feel that wages were - 
too low. They did not want to investigate the causes of the 
unrest, and do something to prevent it, but merely to stamp it 
out, and maintain the existing structure of the society.
When- such sentiments were uttered by a clergyman, one is' 
forced to conclude that blind prejudice was masquerading 
as Christian judiciousness.
Thus, the reaction of the traditionally conservative 
groups in the country towards industrial unrest had not 
changed for decades. They continued to condemn militancy 
and the effective cause of the breakdown, especially when 
the general public suffered, or when the nation was felt to bo 
at risk.
It may be worth noting that such people did not. wont to 
abolish trade unions as such, but having accepted their 
existence, wanted their role to be closely circumscribed.
The Conservative Party, in a series of pamphlets, outlined 
the position that it believed the trade unions should have- 
in the industrial process. One assured its readers that »the
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Conservative Party., has, whether in or our of power, the 
interests of the workers always at heart1, and in another 
article, pointed out that 'Unionists (i.e. Conservatives) 
wish to strengthen Trade Unions for their primary object, 
which ic collective bargaining and obtaining better wages
and conditions of labour - 
'AND
'TO FREE TRADE UNIONISTS, whether Liberals or Unionists, 
from the Tyranny of Socialist caucuses, who are trying to 
grasp their wages in order to glorify themselves and promote
their mad schemes of Socialism’.^
The official Conservative policy on trades unions was 
confirmed at the 1912 Conference, which attacked the agitators 
who had fermented the strikes, and who had no following among 
»the respectable working class of the country'. Thus, the 
Tories ere clear in their attitude. The unions should be 
divorced from politics, which is what they believed most of 
the members wanted anyway, and should concentrate on 
legitimate efforts to improve the lot of the worker. That 
section of the press which lent its support to traditional 
Conservatisi, such as the Standard and the .Spect ator, argued 
this point on several occasions. This was totally illogical 
end self-contradictory. The Conservatives were claiming that 
they wanted the trade unions to improve the lot of the 
workers, yet they attacked the same unions whenever they 10
(10) Conservative Party, Social Reform: the„,U^oni st^ rrty 
rnd the Miner (1911) P* 16? The Truth about jtho 
U n io n is t s  and the Trades Union Bill (1912), p. 1*
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employed the sanction of a strike of course, wages were often 
raised by peaceful negotiation, "but such discussions were far 
more likely to be productive for the men !when they could 
present the ultimate threat of a strike backed by a trade 
union. Yet it was the very use of this threat which was 
opposed. It would therefore, not be unreasonable to para­
phrase this attitude by saying that the traditional Tories 
did not want trade unions at all, but as it was politically 
inexpedient to say so, it was necessary to limit the powers 
of the trade unions, so as to render them effectively 
impotent, while appearing reasonable and open-minded.
Certainly, trade unions were not expected to advocate 
any type of militancy. Lord Devonport, in his resolute 
refusal to even discuss the issues with the leaders of the 
trade unions during the 1912 Dock Strike found many 
supporters with a similar outlook, who believed that the 
role of the workers in industry was to do as they were told, 
and work for the benefit of the national economy - and the 
profit of the employer. Indeed, the unrest of the period 
1911-14 revealed that when the employers went to the extreme 
of even refusing to meet the strikers, a group of the 
traditionalists - usually Conservative in political affilia­
tion - would applaud the stand that the owners were taking.
For such people, the working class were precisely that-- 
the men end women who performed the menial tasks for the 
ruling,and employing classes. Just as the workers should 
work, the employers should employ, and the rulers should 
rule. Of course, it was expected that the employers would 
be fair to their workers, and the rulers would rule in the
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best interests of the whole nation. Lord Lansdowne was 
indignant at the suggestion that the House of Lords operated 
in its own class interest, against the working class: ’It 
is intolerable that this kind of fiction should be allowed to
( i -i \
prevail and to get hold of the mind of the country1. '
This was a perfectly reasonable reaction, for the 
traditional aristocratic families were convinced that they 
were acting in the best interests of the whole community.
Their right to rule had not gone unchallenged in the past.
It had been the main point of contention from the English to 
the French Revolutions, and during the Reform movement of 
1830-32, but the workers did not begin to question this 
situation until the Chartists, and then the matter went 
■dormant, especially after the skilled workers were ■ 
enfranchised. Its re-emergence in a period of working class 
militancy indicates that attitudes were changing, and the 
unskilled worker, who, fifty years before had been unorganised 
and ignored, was now anxious to demand that for which he had 
previously not even asked. It must be remembered that 
previously, there had been no organised labour movement.
Trade Unions were almost entirely confined to skilled workers, 
who were relatively better paid then than in 1911» and the 
associations aimed to create an image of decency and respecta­
bility, so as to gain favour with the middle and upper classes. 
Thus, trade unionism tended to be divorced from politics,, and 
there were no political parties aimed to represent the workers, 
who did not even have the vote until 1867 - and many were not 1
(11) House of Lords Debates. Vol. 7, Col. 23, 6 February 1911
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enfranchised until even la ter. The unskilled men were 
i l l i te r a te ,  poor, and fa ir ly  passive. However, from the' mid 
1880's, this began to change. Education was becoming more 
widespread, and the theory o f Socialism was being expounded 
on street corners. Unions for unskilled workers began to be 
formed, and they were quickly associated with the newly 
formed p o lit ica l parties aimed to gain p o lit ica l representa­
tion for the workers.
In addition, the workers had enjoyed a rising standard 
o f liv in g  from 1850 onwards, but from around 1900, th is, 
growth in prosperity ended. Prices rose, and wages did not 
keep pace, so that for many o f the poorer paid, real incomes 
had fa llen . This added to the discontent, and may have 
contributed to the growth o f trade unions.
Certainly, mass unionism .*nd Socialist parties had 
arrived in Britain, and the relationship o f employers and 
employed, rulers and ruled, was to undergo a transformation. 
There was a very large section o f the community which did not 
want to accept this change, and who wanted to retain the old, 
established relationships between the classes. Until such . 
people could accept the changes in 'society brought about by 
these new forces, there would be unrest throughout the country 
A fter a l l ,  the strikes were the result o f the employers and 
the workmen fa ilin g  to agree on terms, and they were not 
lik e ly  to see eye to eye i f  the employers wanted to retain 
the autocratic attitudes to labour which had prevailed half 
a century before, while the workers insisted on being accepted 
as people with rights, rather than just a subservient work 
force. Any disturbance- o f the existing relationship would
arouse the anger o f the trad itionalists, and they were not 
confined to the Tories. I t  must be remembered that the - 
aristocratic Liberal and the aristocratic Conservative 
shared a similar upbringing and education, and held 
essentially similar assumptions. They were separated only 
by outward p o lit ica l differences, and were lik e ly  to think 
the same way when confronted with such basic issues as the 
class structure o f the country, and the relationship o f the 
classes. That assumes that such people would even fe e l i t  
necessary to think about such things, which is  unlikely, as 
crucial matters lik e  those would not require thought: the 
correct, the only, attitudes had been inbred and firm ly fixed 
in position by se lf«in terest. Thus, in industrial matters, 
the traditionalists in both parties adhered to similar 
concepts. This was well illustrated by an a rtic le  in the 
most in fluential Liberal paper, the Westminster Gazette. . 
which warned against the destruction o f trade unions, a 
notion that had been advocated. Such a proposal had to be 
resisted, because the defeat o f organised labour would open 
the door fo r extremist agitators, who had to be opposed at 
a l l  costs, because they wanted to a lter the structure o f the 
society. The Tories also insisted that all'hard core 
m ilitants should be excluded from the trade union movement, 
because i t  was they who encouraged unrest. I t  was thus the 
means used to achieve the same end which distinguished the 
d ifferent p o lit ica l parties. -
The case o f Driver Knox indicated that the two parties, < 
and the various groups within the parties, could be unanimous 
on some issues. His convictions fo r drunkenness in a court
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p o lit ica l parties were attempting to hide their reel"*interests 
behind a propaganda attack on the dangers o f working class 
militancy. I t  was merely the approach o f the two groups 
which differed. The Conservatives tended to oppose trade 
unionism, or at least that type o f trade unionism which could 
present a threat to the established order, while the Liberals 
were more inclined to give way on certain issues. A good 
example in the case o f the recognition of trade unions by 
the employers. Membership was growing rapidly -A^V^OOO^ln 
1900, compared with A, 135,000 in 1914- - and consequently, i t  
was hardly surprising that the unions wanted to be able tó 
negotiate d irectly  with the employers. Moreover, as the 
strength of the men's associations grew, so they were able 
to achieve more for their members. I f  the advantages were 
concerned with working arrangements, everyone would benefit, 
whether they belonged to the organisation or not. The 
unions fe l t  that this was -unfair, and often urged the 
employers to grant a closed shop, where a condition o f 
employment was to join  an appropriate trade union. This was 
lik e ly  to be contested far more than the recognition o f the 
union, but both demands were generally opposed, especially 
by the TTnionists. This was well illustrated in the reaction 
to the T illin gs dispute o f September 1913, which began over 
the right o f the men to wear trade union'.badges, and developed 
into a battle over trade union recognition, which some papers 
feared would spread into a demand for a closed shop.
Many Liberal journals had frequently advocated recogni­
tion, on the grounds that times had changed, and i t  was 
necessary»’ fo r the employers to adapt to the new conditions,
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and accept that the growth o f trade unionism necessitated 
a d ifferent approach from earlier generations. Again, 
Liberals were more lik e ly  to accept the arguments o f the men 
in labour disputes, and lend their support to the strikers. 
They were far more prepared to c r it ic is e  poor working condi­
tions, low pay, long hours, inadequate housing - indeed, the 
whole l i f e  o f the poorly paid - and to use these factors to 
explain and perhaps even ju s tify  the unrest.
Thus, many of the events o f the period 1911-14 appear 
to be related in two quite distinct ways, according to the 
p o lit ic a l persuasion o f the speaker or the writer. However, 
the matter was not so simple, nor would i t  be correct to 
assert that a l l  these people wished to preserve the basic, 
economic and social system, but the Liberals were more, 
prepared to accept minor readjustments in the position o f the 
working class to ensure this end than the Tories.' There was 
in fact no such thing as a single Conservative or a single 
Liberal stance on any o f these issues. While many newspapers 
remained loyal to their p o lit ica l party on every event others 
did not. Moreover, the intensity o f feeling often varied from 
event to event. I t  is  possible to devise a table to indicate 
the consistency o f each paper in its  reaction to every strike. 
Such a table can be seen overleaf.
This can only be regarded as a crude visual measure o f 
the r e l ia b il ity  and pred ictab ility o f the papers’ attitudes. 
Nevertheless, i t  does indicate that within the Unionists, 
there was a group who were lik e ly  to support the employers ■ 
against their men in almost every possible event. Newspapers 
fa llin g  into this-category would include the Standard, which
Dispute
Seamen Docks Liverpool Railways 1911 in general Cotton Coal
1912
Docks Knox
i
Richardson 1913-1Ain general
Liberal Papers -
Daily News A B B ' B E t.U. A D A 3
Morning Leader B . B C C B
Daily Chronicle C D C c B D C B c
Westminster Gazette C B D D D c
Manchester Guardian B D C C D c B C D A c
Nation A B B D A B
Reynold $ 's ' Newspaper B , B D • A B A A B
Conservative Papers
»
Standard D E E E E E E E ‘ E E E
Morning Post . D E E . : E E E E E E E E
Daily Telegraph E E E E E E E E E B E
Times D E E E E E E E E C E
Daily Graphic D .. E E E E E E E E . E E
Daily Express E E E E E E • E E A D
Daily Mail E , ■ E ' E E E E E E ra* C
Financial Times D E E E E E E E D D
Economist D E . E E E E E D E E E
Observer E E E E
Spectator E E E E E E E E
Sunday Times ' E E E E E E E E
Referee E E E • E D
Weekly Dispatch E E E E E E E A D
News of the World B C C B B |C
People ■ . c D D D c
KEY: A: extreme support fo r  men; B: moderate support fo r men; C: comments both,supporting and opposing the men ( .
D: moderate^aupport'-for employer.s;-Ei^extrerae support for-'Cnployers-.^  ^ -Blanks have been ,left where the statements 
were insufficient to provide any clear ed itoria l view.
believed that an employer had on absolute right o f action 
over his workers; the Times, whose studied moderation almost 
inevitably decided against the employees; the Daily Telegraph, 
which gave its  support to the autocratic methods o f the past 
with regularity; and the Morning Post, which, even in a ffa irs  
lik e  those o f Driver Knox, Guard Richardson, and the T illin g  
Company, could not believe that the trade unions had a case. 
There was another section o f the Tory press, including the 
Daily Graphic. Daily Mail, and Daily Express, which were Just 
as afraid o f the introduction o f Socialism into the country, 
and were lik e ly  to side with the employers, especially in - 
major disputes, but which cotild lend their support to the 
men on occasions. A centre group, which were usually 
described in the press directories o f the time as Conservative 
in policy, such as the People and the News o f the World, 
could not be predicted with accuracy. They would arrive at 
an opinion based on the evidence available, and i t  could 
support cither men- or management.
. In the same way, the Tory politicians were extremely 
varied in their reaction to the labour unrest. Within the 
group o f Members' o f Parliament who belonged to the 
Conservative Party there was no cohesive policy. There were 
those with traditional outlooks, and thosewho stated publicly 
that some people were paid too l i t t l e .  The Unionist 
Unofficial- Reform Committee was particularly active in 
attempting to modify the party's policy on social matters. 
Members o f this group had a far more libera l approach than, 
fo r example, the former Liberal Member o f Parliament, Lord 
Devonport, whose actions during the 1912 Dock Strike quito
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clearly established his position as a hard-line trad itionalist. 
Thus, the Conservative Party had a whole host o f d iffering 
attitudes to any situation, though i t  would he reasonable to 
assert that its  members were quite l ik e ly  to be traditiona­
l is t s  -  certainly more lik e ly  thatk Liberals.
That should not, however, bo taken to mean that the 
Liberal Party was homogeneous in it s  outlook. Just as the 
Tory press contained a variety o f papers, which would take 
rather d ifferent lines when confronted with similar acts, so 
would parts of. the Liberal fress. Thus, the Daily Hews.- end 
the Morning Leader - and after they had amalgamated, th e . 
resultant Daily Dews and Leader -  the Nation and Reynolds1s 
Newspaper were the most sympathetic to labour, but they 
could not be relied  on to support the labour cause in every 
situation. The Knox case, the Leeds Corporation Strike, the 
London builders1 lock out, and the stoppage at the Woolwich 
Arsenal a l l  provided instances o f these papers denouncing the 
a c tiv it ie s  o f the unions. The Westminster Gazette, the only 
quality national paper o f Liberal persuation, tended towards 
moderation. I t  was. unwilling to attack,either side with a 
great deal o f venom, perhaps because i t  did not want to 
jeopardise its  position. The Manchester Guardian also did 
not lik e  strikes, though,: equally, i t  had l i t t l e  time for 
unreasonable employers, so that it s  views tended towards 
the s te r ile . The Daily Chronicle was sim ilarly opposed to 
stoppages o f work, and tried to encourage mediation. The 
opinions within the Liberal Party were even more varied 
than those exhibited by the Liberal press, and even within 
the Cabinet there was no unanimity. Lloyd George was
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generally in harmony with the aspirations o f the working
classes, and he almost invariably advocated helping them,
as long as this did not threaten his p o lit ic a l position. He
liked to be regarded as a radical and wished to preserve this
image. Indeed, on these issues, he undoubtedly sympathised
with the men, but at the same time he was su ffic ien tly
opportunistic to use his prestige with the vorkers to advance
his standing within tho Liberal Forty. The le tters  o f
Herbert Samuel indicate that he, too, gave what assistance he
could to the men, while Viscount Haldane held that the
Government ought to intervene to end strikes, as a matter o f
p o lit ic a l expediency. Others were not so favourably inclined
towards this section o f the community. Winston Churchill had
achieved a reputation as a po litic ian  with views similar to
those o f Lloyd George, but his radicalism was waning within
this period, and when he was Home Secretary, he frequently
argued that firm measures ought to be taken against strikers.
Asquith himself was known to have been very harsh-in his
\
criticism  o f the railwaymen in 1911. The leader o f tho 
South Wales Coalowners in 1912 -and this was the group 
which opposed the miners hardest o f a l l -  had been a Liberal 
M.P. fo r twenty-two years, before relinquishing his seat in 
1910, while Lord Devenport, another vigorous opponent o f 
strikes, had also been a Liberal Member o f Parliament. On 
the other hand, there were Liberal politicians such ns- 
Chiozza Money, who were famous for their radical stances 
on social matters, and others, lik e  Sir Arthur Markham, 
whose knowledge o f coal mining and the c o llie r  meant that 
he would support the Miners1 Federation in i t s  demands for a
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minimum wage although he was a coal owner himself
The Liberal Party was in no way a single, coherent bodty. 
I t  was divided on its  attitude to social reform in general, 
and this very issue was to sp lit the Party but a: row years 
la ter. The reaction to labour unrest was a manifestation o f 
these divergent views, for i t  was clear that the Liberal 
Party embraced m enormously diverse range o f attitudes to 
working class organisations and to industrial unrest. Some 
were just as trad itionalist as the most orthodox Tory,'while 
others were almost as sympathetic to the couse o f labour «ns 
the Labour Party. Consequently, i t  would bo wrong to try  to 
consider a single Liberal attitude, but i t  would be fa ir  to 
say that most Liberals came somewhere between the traditional 
Tory and the Socialist on these issues.
Outside o f the formal structure o f p o lit ica l parties were 
writers such us Rowntree, Booth, and Cadbury, who investigated 
the conditions o f the poor. Booth, fo r example, began his 
work to disprove allegations o f poverty among the London poor, 
and became increasingly shocked with the conditions that he 
uncovered. On the basis o f their studies, these men wrote 
with great sympathy o f the plight o f such people, and urged 
that something be done to improve their lo t . These writers 
might not actually support the unrest, but they would 
increasingly understand its  causes, and frequently did so 
very fu lly . Another group who could examine the motivation 
behind the disputes were the Fabians, Authors such as 
Mrs. Fember Reeves denounced the liv in g  conditions o f the 
lowly paid at least as loudly as the socia lly  concerned 
industrialists. Both o f these groups were essentially middle
class, but their attitudes provided a stark contrast with 
the typical middle-class reader o f the Standard, and re­
inforced the picture o f society with a whole host o f 
d iffering  views on the structure o f the society.
There were also some middle-class Socialists, but since 
the social composition of the Labour and Independent Labour 
Parties has not been investigated, so i t  is  not possible to 
say how many. However, these groups, and their supporters 
who were not actually members, could be relied  upon to give 
whatever encouragement they could to those who opposed 
capitalism by direct action. At the samo time there was' a 
wide variety o f opinions, even within these parties.
Thus, to sum up, i t  would have been impossible to 
predict with absolute confidence the reaction o f anyone 
merely by looking at his a ffi l ia t io n  with one o f the two 
main p o lit ica l groupings, end the emerging force o f the
«
Labour Party. Among than the most united group was the 
Conservatives. Basically, they concurred that the workers’ 
actions in generating unrest were wrong, and should be 
prevented. Even the moderate Unionist U nofficial Reform 
Committee was working for that end, and was advocating - 
compulsory arbitration in trade disputes. The Liberals were 
sp lit, ranging from traditional Tory to neo-Socialist in 
their opinions on the militancy o f the period. Possibly, 
the difference was in part based on the fact that the 
Liberals were in o ffic e , so i t  is  possible to see the 
cohesiveness o f the Unionists as a neons o f attacking the 
existing Government. A fter a ll ,  i t  had intervened in a 
large number o f disputes and it s  actions were therefore a
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legitimate party p o lit ica l natter. —
Of course, i t  had not boon unknown oven before 1906 for 
a Government to attempt to mediate during strikes -  the 
Liberals had, for instance, done so during the coal lock-out 
o f 1893 - though this was not something that had occurred 
very often. But in the period 1911-14» the Government 
regularly involved i t s e l f  in such matters. George Askwith 
was appointed Chief Industrial Commissioner, and was expected 
to try  to mediate in disputes. .Lloyd George brought both 
sides together to end the ra il strike o f 1911} frequent 
negotiations involving the union, employers, and the 
Government fa iled  to solve the threatened coal strike in 1912, 
so a B ill  was passed by Parliament, giving the men at least 
part o f what they wonted -  the f i r s t  time in over a century 
that the Government had done anything towards the fix in g  o f 
men's wages. There was no direct intervention in the 
London Dock Strike o f 1912, but there was a c tiv ity  behind 
the scenes, trying to apply pressure to persuade Lord 
Devonport to adopt a less stern attitude. In the case o f 
Driver Knox, the Home Secretary actually sent a Commissioner 
to investigate a case that had already been tried in the 
courts. The Prime Minister intervened personally to end the 
strike at the Woolwich Arsenal, and ordered o. Court o f 
Inquiry. The Government even established the Industrial 
Tribunal, which could arbitrate between the/employers and 
the employed, and render stoppages unnecessary. That i t  was 
ignored was in part' a fault o f the Government, but neverthe­
less, i t  is  indicative o f the direct approach which was being 
adopted. The Liberals were taking a close interest in
- 360 -
industrial natters, and Askwith was involved throughout the 
period in trying to settle  disputes, whereas, in the past, 
there had been only a very occasional venture into the world 
o f labour disorder.
Clearly, this degree o f involvement was not always
popular, and any help that was given to the strikers brought
about severe attacks by its  p o lit ic a l opponents on the
Government for fa ilin g  in it s  duty. For example, Sir John
Fees, a former Indian C iv il Servant, and an M.P. from 1906
to 1910, in his election address for the Parliamentary by-
election at Kilmarnock, written on 14 September 1911,
insisted that the Government’ s 'one consistent principle is
( 11)surrender to agita tion '. H. Gvynne, the editor o f the
Morning Post, made a similar attack in a le tte r  to Lord
Robert Cecil. The Liberals ‘ have called themselves the
people's party, end have climbed into power rea lly  as a
result o f a class war, preached f ir s t  by the Labour
Socialists before 1906 and secondly by Lloyd George in 1909.
But I  claim that no p o lit ic a l party in England has ever,
within such a short period as they have been in o ffic e ,
deceived the people so thoroughly and persistently as has
(12)
the present Liberal pa rty '. Other politicians, such as
Austen Chamberlain, joined with newspapers such as the 
Standard, in commenting on the a c tiv it ie s  o f the Liberals.
I t  was generally agreed that libera ls had done very l i t t l e  1
(11) Sir J.D. Rees, Election Address (Kilmarnock 1911) p. 3
(12) Cecil Papers B.M. Add. Ms. 51161, f f .  22. Letter froa ‘
Gwynne to Cecil, 8 September 1913.
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to discourage the unrest, and some individuals, such as 
Lloyd George had actually encouraged i t .  Moreover, to 
grant a minimum wage to miners succeeded only in showing the 
working class that i f  they reso-rted to m ilitant action, then 
they would achieve their ains. The Conservatives wc-re 
especially severe on Lloyd George, and attacked him whenever 
possible, both in limited circulation journals, end in the 
mass media. Holcombe Ingleby, a Tory Member o f Parliament, 
writing in the Conservative Clubs Gazette, expressed his 
condemnation by saying that ’ there is  nothing quite so base 
in the higher circ les o f p o lit ica l l i f e  as to appeal to the 
masses against the classes, the letting-loose o f a l l  the 
worst instincts o f a man's nature, the open and callous 
preaching o f the doctrine o f plunder, and the flagrant 
disregard o f the Eighth Cormandment'Lloyd George was 
guily o f a l l  o f these. 1 The Conservative Party 
Conference o f 1911 blamed him for his contribution to the 
unrest o f that year, and in particular, his speeches comparing 
the incomes o f the rich and the poor.
Thus, the Government in general, and Lloyd George in 
particular, was blamed for fa ilin g  to  act in the best way to 
secure an end to the strikes, fo r doing the wrong things 
when they did secure, settlements, and for acting in such a 
way as to encourage men to leave work: and demand higher 
wages. I t  is  possible to interpret these comments in several 
ways. They could genuinely re flec t the- attitude o f the Tories 
towards the ruling party's e fforts  to socu.ro industrial peace,'
(13) Conservative CPubs Gagotto, August 1911, p. 158
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or they could be a part o f the Opposition's normal“criticisms 
o f the Government. After a ll,  i t  is  the role o f the Opposi­
tion to oppose. Certainly, some o f the attacks were violent - 
Lloyd George cane in fo r  a great deal o f adverse comment, and, 
o f course, he had been unpopular with the Conservatives, at 
least since he had expressed his disapproval o f the Boer 
War, so i t  could well be that he was receiving no more than 
his customary dose o f condemnation.from his p o lit ica l r iva ls , 
who did rea lly  regard him as a dangerous radical. Some o f the 
other ranarks seen to be rather exaggerated* The Liberals 
were more moderate than the Conservatives, end were more' 
sympathetic towards the underdog, and their a c tiv itie s  when 
they were in power would re flec t th is. To suggest that they 
did not represent the whole country would be unfair -  unless, 
perhaps, the accusation came from a member o f the working 
class. The Liberals were essentially a party o f the middle 
and upper classes, and their Cabinet reflected this. They 
were acting as they thought best fo r the country, not 
exactly as the Unionists would, o f course, but they were 
responding as their social, economic, and p o lit ic a l back­
grounds demanded. The Tories would-not approve o f this, 
because they would have dealt with the problems in d ifferen t 
ways. Consequently, they would denouce the e ffo rts  o f any 
Government which behaved in any way contrary to their wishes. 
That is  p o litics . I t  would be unreasonable'to expect that 
the Opposition should not object when the Government acted in 
a way which they thought was wrong, especially when i t  did not 
achieve the desired-result. This would be seen as proof that 
the po lic ies o f the ruling party were incorrect. Thus, some
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o f the criticism  o f the Government must be seen as the 
usual p o lit ica l gome played by a ll  parties vh ile out o f 
power, but underneath the exaggeration was a very hard core 
o f doubt about the wisdom o f the Government. The 
Conservatives had genuine alternative po lic ies , and were not 
merely making a noise for the s;ke o f i t .  Perhaps these 
solutions would have been equally unsuccessful, but at least 
they did exist. There was no single, o f f ic ia l  Tory lin e  to 
be taken -  many people had answers to the industrial unrest, 
but they a l l  d iffered. Thus, each newspaper, and a whole 
host o f individuals in public positions, were advocating 
their own ideas, and had developed theories about the best 
way to solve the problems presented by a m ilitant working 
class. "
Many o f the answers, and certainly the least hostile, 
centred around leg is la tion  to enforce compulsory arbitration. 
The practicab ility  o f such a scheme was doubted, because 
there was no way o f ensuring that the men adhered to the 
decisions. I t  was never even considered that the employers 
might refuse to obey a ruling, because the middle and upper 
classes often found i t  d if ficu lt  to accept that.their own 
classes could do wrong,. A more commonly advocated scheme was 
to prevent strikes by making them d if f ic u lt , or even im­
possible. One o f the easiest ways o f doing this was to change 
the law concerning picketing, fo r i t  was often argued that a 
large number o f strikers could -  and often did - intimidate 
those who wished to continue working. Thus, a restriction  
on picketing, or even its  abolition, would ensure that a far 
larger number o f men reported for duty, and the strike would
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be in effective . The culler at the way in.which the' 1906 Act 
was interpreted was well illustrated by Punch. There had 
been a general strike o f peers against the Parliament B ill: 
iLord Willoughby de Broke broke his windows, and shouted 
"K il l  the blackleg". On appeal to the police inspector in 
charge, Lord Heneage was informed that i t  was impossible to 
in terfere with peaceful picketing'. Clearly, there was a
very genuine feeling that the law should be changed to 
prevent picketing in. i t s  existing forra, and th is would be 
su fficient to end the serious wave o f indusftrial disturbances.
Others did not regard this as adequate, and maintained 
that strikes which disrupted industry -and o f necessity, 
th is would happen with v irtu a lly  every stoppage - should be 
treated as a criminal conspiracy against the State, and, the 
organisers dealt with as criminals. V irtually every 
Conservative paper made this sort o f a suggestion at some- 
point during the four years o f unrest, though some did want 
to lim it the groups o f workers who had to be dealt with in 
that way. A common warning was that i f  the men were not 
shown that their tactics could not succeed, then the country 
would be permanently threatened by stoppages.
Legislative methods were not the only answers to the 
disturbances. The more trad itionalist press, such as the 
Standard and the Sunday Times wanted to restrain the agitators 
or even to arm and train an army drawn from the respectable 
classes, which would be ready for any eventuality.
(14.) Punch, 30 August 1911, p. 152
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Thus, the solutions advocated by the Conservatives were 
varied, but they a ll  carried the same message - something had 
„to be done to end the unrest, which was serious in it s  
proportions, and i f  this meant that the law had to be changed 
then so be i t :  the labour disputes represented a threat to 
the very existence o f the State. The Tories were prepared to 
figh t in order to maintain the society which they knew, and 
the social order which they fe l t  ought to be preserved. Of 
course, the Liberals did attempt to tackle the problems, 
but without success, so that the unrest o f 1911-U  continued 
without any real abatement.
The reaction to the strikes, and the measures advocated 
by the Tories, re flects  the axiety fe l t  by at least a part o f 
the community. Most trade unionists, and a large section o f 
the working class that had not joined unions, but was 
involved in the stoppages, were anything but afraid: they 
were a part o f the country, yet i t  was they who imposed their 
w ill  upon the rest o f the society. Many o f their opponents 
did not regard than as fellow  countrymen, and when estimating 
the attitude to an event, argued that the whole country 
believed that the men were in the wrong. This could hardly 
be correct. Certainly, many Tories were afraid that a 
revolution was imminent, and around the time o f the general 
strike in Liverpool, th is b e lie f was repeated in various 
newspapers. The story o f Sir Ernest Jardine discovering 
that a gunsmith had sold out during the coal dispute may 
in d ic a t e  nothing more than a small group o f stupid but 
powerful men preparing fo r every eventuality, but even 
then, men such as Jardine held important positions in the
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society, end their fear could have roused concern in 
others. At least they thought that the unions were acting 
wrongly, and they feared the Socialist influence that was 
fanning the unrest. The determination and the militancy o f 
the men convinced many that the economic end social structure 
o f the country was in danger. Consequently, those who were 
dismayed at the prospects for the future and wanted to 
preserve everything in it s  existing form were lik e ly  to demand 
extreme measures. I t  was quite log ica l fo r  them to do so.
The Liberals were less lik e ly  to oppose every change, but 
only because they believed that the growth o f a labour move­
ment meant that there had to be some minor adjustments to the 
organisation o f society.
The war removed a l l  dangers o f internal conflict, fo r  the 
time being, as the working class proved to be intensely loyal 
and patrio tic , at least in the f ir s t  phase, and those who had 
been locked in con flict with their-cap ita list amployers in 
the years 1911-1A rushed to en list, or surrendered hard von 
trade union rights in order to increase production, and so 
help the war e ffo rt. The press applauded these actions, and 
insisted that they had known a l l  along that the workers were 
British and patriotic at heart. The labour movement in 
general participated in the war at a l l  levels , from the 
Cabinet a fter 1916, to the common soldier, and received the 
praise o f the nation for so doing, but this did l i t t l e  to 
a lter the traditional Conservative views on working class 
militancy. The seizure o f power by Lenin's Bolsheviks in 
Russia had demonstrated to the British ruling class that a 
well organised and militant body could gain control o f a
country. Thus, in 1919, when, the shipbuilding and engineering
workers went on strike, the Tines pointed out that 'itjnust be
fought out without flinching. There w ill  be some violence -
"that is  port o f the programme.' I t  is  intended to terrorise *
the public, the local authorities, and the Government; and
perhaps to develop into serious conflicts lik e  those which
have been distracting Germany. I t  w ill not do so i f  i t  is
handled firm ly at the onset, for our conspirators have no
stomach for a c iv i l  war. But, i f  treated weakly and allowed
to go on, the class war w ill become a c iv i l  vex. The example
o f Russia is  before us*. When the ruilwaymen went on strike
against a proposed wage reduction, in the autumn of 1919, the
Times described i t  as ban attack on the community, an attempt
to starve them into surrender. People perceive at once that
such on attack must be resisted to the utmost, for obviously
i f  i t  succeeded there is  no burden whatever that might not be
(15)put on the community by the use o f the same means'.
Thus, the fear o f revolution was just as real,as i t  had
been before the war. The expectation o f violence emerged
ones more into the open during the General Strike of 1926.
William Jcynson-Hicks was the Home Secretary at the time. He
moved the troops whenever disturbances seemed possible,
because he 'knew that the moment the situation got out o f
hand, the country would be subjected to mob rule, and tho
forces o f the Crown would have to figh t the mobs fo r the
f 16V
restoration o f law and order'. Attitudes had not changed
(15) Times. 1 February 1919, p. 9; 29 September 1919, p. 9
(16) H. A. T a v l o r  J i x .  V i s c o u n t  B r e n t f o r d  (1933) p.196
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greatly during the coal dispute of 1973-74, or at least,
the sane range of attitudes could be found, as sixty jrears
-earlier. Sir Willion McEwan lounger noted that some numbers
of the corn-unity had suggested that it would be cheaper to
pay the miners than to fight then, but *a similar argument
would have shown conclusively that the cost of paying
Danegeld was substantially less than the cost of resisting
a Danish invasion’. The Conservative Member of Parliament,
William Shelton, argued that ’the present challenge is not
only to the Conservative Government, but also to our .
institutions and even to our democratic system. That is why
(17)the Government must stand firm’.
These, as we have seen, were the attitudes which had 
existed before the First World War. The traditional Tory 
views had remained unaltered by the co-operation of the 
labour movement during two sets of hostilities. This group 
had reacted in the same way since 1889. Nevertheless, the 
period 1911-14 is particularly useful in estimating the 
varying opinions to labour unrest, because in those four 
years, there occurred the first national strikes, and the 
. greatest wave of unrest that the country had experience to 
date. The general public were regularly inconvenienced, 
whereas previously, disputes had almost invariably been a 
battle between employers and employed, and only very seldom 
included the rest of the community. The response was in no 
way uniform. Everyone, except Socialists, wanted to retain 
the capitalist system. Most, except for radicals, wanted to
(17) Times, 7 January 1974, p. 5.
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maintain the economic and social system that existed at the 
time. Thus, for the majority of the upper and middle classes, 
the best policy was either to make concessions, so a s to 
appease the militants, or to take a firm stand, resist all 
pressures, and crush the growing power of the unions. There 
were those who came in between, but the solution was 
effectively one of political adherence: Conservatives wanted 
a far harder line than Liberals, and were less likely to have 
noticed changes in the conditions of life of the working class 
which had fanned the unrest.
Having used all the available material to arrive at the 
varying reactions to labour unrest does not mean that all the 
differing shades of public opinion have necessarily been 
uncovered in the end, because the public in general were not 
questioned, there can be no real definition of public opinion 
on this topic. Letters to the editors of the newspapers, . 
when published, generally agreed with editorial policy, but 
that does not add greatly to the picture, for they could 
have been selected simply because they supported the tone of 
the paper. Anyway, they were written by a small number of 
people, who felt deeply on a particular matter. Nevertheless, 
the press was the main disseminator of information, so many 
people learnt of events from the papers. It could be that 
their reaction to this caused papers and politicians to 
adopt certain viewpoints, or it could be that the latter 
expressed their opinions, and these were adopted by the 
public. J.L. Woodward has suggested that this couild be 
decided by careful analysis. It would be nc-cessary to create 
two time series: one for newspaper opinion, the other for
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readers' attitudesj one an index of press opinion, the other 
an index of public opinion, and correlate the two. Any lead 
or lag would show a causal relation between the two.^^ 
Unfortunately, it is not possible to nake such calculations 
on the problem of the reaction to labour unrest before World 
War X, but it is possible to examine press opinion and the 
private views of those who kept diaries or wrote letters. 
There are insufficient data to do this in an acceptable 
statistical way, but the evidence that exists indicates that 
the time lag was very short, if it existed at all. For 
example, before the 1912 coal strike had begun, the Tory ' 
press was prophesying doom and despair, while at the same 
time, Conservative politicians were saying the same sort of 
thing in private, and the Home Office was receiving requests 
from Chief Constables in mining areas for troops should the ■ 
violence they anticipated occur. Of course, editors and 
politicians might be friends who exchanged opinions and 
ideas, and this could influence their views. However, they 
were making statements which could influence the general 
public. Some speeches and writings were intended to do just 
that, and could be described as propaganda, in that they 
contained an appeal to the emotions, exaggeration, selection, 
repetition, and avoidance of argument. This could apply to 
the most orthodox Tories as well as the rigid Socialists.
(18) J.L. Woodward, 'Quantitative Newspaper Analysis as a 
Technique of Opinion Research, Social Forces 
(1934) PP- 526-537.
Jarvis and Feshbach have worked on the effect of 
propaganda on public opinion. Their experiments concerned 
three different lectures given to three groups of students . 
on dental hygiene, all given by the same speaker. The first 
one contained a strong fear appeal, pointing out the dangers 
of dental decay. The second lecture involved a more 
noderate appeal, with the problems put in a milder form, and 
in the final form most of the fear-arousing material was 
replaced by relatively neutral information 'dealing with the 
growth and functions of the teeth. The fear appeals were ' 
designed to represent typical characteristics of mass 
communications which attempt to stimulate motional 
reactions in order to motivate the audience to conform to 
a set of recommendations. The immediate result was that 
those who had heard the first lecture were more concerned 
about their teeth than the second group, who, in turn, wore 
nore worried than the third group, but tests revealed that 
all three had assimilated the same information. A week later, 
further tests showed that the group which had received the 
strongest warnings had done the least to counteract the 
dangers of tooth decay. The middle group had done more, 
while those who had heard the most moderate lecture had 
talien more precautions than the others! "^his does not imply 
that under certain conditions, fear appeals would not be the 
most successful, but it is instructive to compare this 
experiment with the press reaction to labour unrest in the 
years 1911 -14-, There can be little doubt that many editors
(19) I.L. Jarvis and S. Feshbach 'Effects of Fear-arousing
communications' in D. Katz, S. Eldersveld and A.M.
Lee (eds.) Public Opinion and Propaganda (New York
. 196/+) pp. 320-336
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wore wholly sincere. For example, the most strongly 
Conservative did not believe that the working class had the 
right to complain about their conditions let along strike 
about them and genuinely held that the social order and 
public welfare were threatened by such behaviour. Xet, more 
than sixty years later, their views appear sufficiently 
biassed to be described as propaganda, and this, in turn, 
did not have any lasting impact on the community. It was 
often suggested that revolution was just around the comer, 
but as soon as a major strike had ended, virtually everyone 
forgot about the dangers until another dispute erupted, just 
as those who had received the sternest lecture on dental 
hygiene had done the least to remedy the situation.
This would imply that the strongest propaganda is often 
the least effective, yet in Edwardian England, the newspapers 
tried to persuade their readers to interpret the news by 
just such methods. Of course, it could bo that the papers 
merely reflected the views of their readers, and so did not 
have to attempt any persuasion. Whether this was so or not, 
this cannot be resolved by the work done here. It seems 
unlikely that a Socialist would read, for example, the 
Standard, except, perhaps, for ammunition to use against the 
orthodox views. Xe-t, despite the logical argument that people 
pick papers to suit their outlook, the labour press did not 
boom in the period of increased militancy. Certainly, the 
Daily Herald and the Daily Citizen survived even the outbreak 
of war, and the consequent upsurge of patriotism, but neither 
really prospered. Some workers must have continued to read 
journals in which as trade unionists they were occasionally -
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or even regularly - abused. On the other hand, many of the 
upper and middle classes must have taken papers in which 
their elitist attitudes were given strength at regular 
intervals. It is not possible to estimate accurately the 
political affiliation of the readers of the various 
newspapers, which complicates even further an analysis of 
public opinion.
Thus, no precise measurement o f the public reaction to 
working class unrest in the years 1911-14 is  possible, simply 
because the whole o f the public did not record it s  varying 
opinions. The private papers o f many o f the period's leading 
figures, sim ilarly, contain l i t t l e  o f relevance, so that i t  
has been necessary to re ly  on the press, • with a ll  the 
d ifficu lt ie s  and potential unreliab ility  that tins creates. 
Nevertheless, i t  is  clear that there did exist a variety o f 
opinions ranging from complete support fo r the working class 
a c tiv ity  to to ta l opposition. Newspapers provided informa­
tion and comment, and some o f the views must have been
(20) I tried to do-this by unearthing local newspaper
wholesalers who were in business in the period 
1911-14, so as to discover which papers predominated 
in certain areas. Sheffield is a city in which the 
classes-lived in distinct districts in those days, 
so that a crude correlation of class, political 
persuasion and newspaper readership might have been 
" possible. This attempt was frustrated by sheer lack 
of information. Wholesalers either no longer 
existed, or had failed to retain the records.
adopted by the public, vhich was often unable to.accept the 
changes in the country's social structure which had been' 
brought about by increased education, expanding trade 
unionism, and the growth of Socialism. It is evident that 
many of the opinions in the years 1911-1U had existed 
twenty years before: a few have survived to the present
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